

SCIPIO AFRICANUS
SOLDIER AND POLITICIAN

HOWARD H. SCULLARD

SCIPIO AFRICANUS:
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ASPECTS OF GREEK AND
ROMAN LIFE

General Editor: Professor H. H. Scullard

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AND
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PREFACE

'A GREATER than Napoleon.' Thus one of our great military experts, Captain (now Sir Basil) Liddell Hart, acclaimed Scipio in 1926. Whether or not all would agree that Hannibal's conqueror should be placed so high in the military pantheon, such a judgment at least underlines Scipio's historical importance as a soldier. Nearly forty years ago I tried to examine his military achievements, and some twenty years later I wrote a book on Roman politics, in which his political career was incapsulated and set in a wider context. Since both these books are out of print, it seemed to me perhaps worthwhile to attempt a general account of his whole career. While drawing very heavily upon my earlier work (and for permission to do so I am deeply grateful to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press and to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press), I have not thought it necessary here to rehearse a large number of detailed problems (e.g. of chronology or numbers of troops) or to give so full a documentation, but merely refer back. If I appear to mention *Scip.* and *Rom. Pol.* an immodest number of times, it is simply to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the matter in question is one of debate and that a fuller discussion of the relevant sources will be found there and, I hope, help to justify statements which might otherwise appear unduly dogmatic.

I have naturally tried to take account of what has been written about Scipio in recent years and of course have modified or amplified my own views on some points. I have also been able to add a much larger number of illustrations.

I am greatly indebted to Professor C. Claveria of the Spanish Institute for the very considerable personal trouble that he took on my behalf to secure from the Spanish Air Force air-photographs of the sites of the battles of Baecula and Ilipa. These are

excellent photographs but unfortunately since they were not taken for this purpose (e.g. height, angle and season of the year are not what is needed) no archaeological features are visible, not even to the expert eye of Dr J. K. St Joseph, for whose critical scrutiny I am most grateful. I am also greatly indebted to my friend Mr Ivor Davies for making a scale model of the site of Baecula: his skill in this field is shown by his models of Snowdonia now in the Cardiff Museum. One other debt I gratefully acknowledge, namely the kindness of another friend, Professor F. W. Walbank, in letting me see advance proofs of his *Polybius* II, thus enabling me to use this indispensable tool earlier than would otherwise have been possible; I should also mention the lecture he gave in 1967 on the Scipionic Legend which helped to revive my interest in Scipio. Finally, I wish to thank the staff of Thames & Hudson, especially Mr Stanley Baron, and Mr Peter Clayton for his understanding help with the illustrations.

I should have preferred to have called this book simply 'Scipio Africanus' but have added the other words in order to differentiate it more clearly from my earlier book. Also I have not hesitated on occasion to refer anachronistically to Scipio as Africanus when this seemed the least confusing name.

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CHAPTER I

SOURCES, YOUNG SCIPIO AND SPAIN¹

POLYBIUS

ROMAN GENERALS, like their modern counterparts, sometimes wrote their memoirs. Unfortunately the fashion did not start until half a century or more after Scipio's death, and in any case his literary output seems to have been small: at least Cicero says that in his day no literary work by Scipio survived (*De Off.* III, 4). Scipio did however write a letter to Philip V, king of Macedon, in which he explained the calculations on which he based all his military operations in Spain and in particular at the siege of New Carthage. This letter was presumably written in Greek and sent after Scipio had made personal contact with the king in 190 BC. Philip may well have been dissatisfied with some of the popular accounts of Scipio's exploits which were current at the time, and therefore asked him for a true record. Though Scipio's reply probably remained a private document and unpublished, a copy survived in the Scipionic household where it was seen by the historian Polybius.

Our knowledge of Scipio in fact derives very largely, in the final analysis, from the personal link between his family and the Greek historian. Scipio had a very famous daughter, Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, and a less famous son, Publius, whose ill-health prevented him following a public career. Being childless the latter adopted one of the sons of Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus, king of Macedon. The boy, known as Scipio Aemilianus, soon gained the friendship of Polybius, who was thus brought into close contact with the family of the Scipios and with Roman governing circles in general.

The contact between the two men had come about thus. Born about 200 BC at Megalopolis, Polybius spent the earliest years of his active life in close association with his father Lycortas, who was the leading statesman of the Achaean League. He thus obtained an early training in political, diplomatic and military affairs. After the battle of Pydna in 168 he was taken with other eminent Achaean hostages to Rome, where his previous contacts with Aemilius Paullus in the campaign against Perseus now won for him the position of tutor to the general's sons, the younger of whom became Scipio Aemilianus by adoption. Further, he gained the personal friendship and high regard of Aemilianus, and so during his long residence in Rome and Italy he was drawn into the so-called 'Scipionic Circle' and enjoyed exceptional opportunities of meeting famous Romans and of studying at first hand the history and constitution of Rome. During his sixteen years there, he realized that his own country was destined to submit to Rome, and he determined to write the history of Rome's conquest of the civilized world from 220 to 168 BC, believing that Fortune was moving to one goal and that Rome's conquests stamped history with a unity which hitherto it had not possessed (cf. I, 4, 1). During his nominal internment in Italy he wrote at least fifteen books (and it is with these that we are primarily concerned, or more precisely with the slightly incomplete books, X, XI, XIV, and XV). His abilities gained such recognition at Rome that, after the internees had been released, he was even allowed to play some part in her affairs. He participated in the diplomatic discussions preceding the Third Punic War, he was with Aemilianus at the fall of Carthage, and after the destruction of Corinth he was left by the Roman commission to settle administrative details in Greece. He also travelled widely, in Spain, Egypt, Asia and Africa. Further, as his life advanced, important events took place which he felt must be recorded; so he extended the original plan of his History to the year 146 and made some (probably very minor) revisions in the earlier part.

His view of history contrasts with that of many Greek historiographers, whose chief fault was rhetoric and who subordinated truth to sensationalism and dramatic effect, placing the emotions

before the intellect. Their imaginations had been given more scope after the conquest of the East by Alexander the Great, which opened up a new world of romance where fact and fiction could merge. From such an attitude Polybius reacted violently in his attempt to write a universal history which should be pragmatic. His primary aim was not to please but to instruct, to provide a practical guide for politicians and to give men examples of how to endure the changing fortunes of life. Further it was not enough merely to narrate events, but their causes must be shown. His views on the role that Fortune (Tyche) played in human affairs have been debated at great length without any very clear picture emerging, probably because he himself had no precisely defined and consistently held belief. In general his attitude was rationalistic, though he did not deny the existence of Tyche and its effects on events within certain areas.²

His historical standards are the highest. He believed in careful study and criticism of his sources; in personal knowledge of geography, topography and local conditions; and finally that the historian should be well versed in politics and war through personal experience. To fulfil this last requirement he brought high credentials from both an active life and observation, and he would have appreciated the remark that Gibbon applied to himself, that 'the captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers was not useless to the historian of the Roman Empire'. The extensive travels, which took him to Spain and Africa, guaranteed his autopsy of many important sites. He sifted his sources carefully and refused to admit the authority of any man merely because of his near relation to the events described or because of his position (cf. III, 9). He aimed at the strictest impartiality and realized the difficulty of achieving it (cf. I, 14, 4; XVI, 14). No marked bias can be discerned in his attitude to Rome, to whose world-mission he bowed, though slight partiality may be found when he deals with the Achaean League. For Scipio Africanus he had an intense admiration, which, as will be seen, led him to misrepresent in a curious way the hero whom he sought to honour. In short, if he did not quite achieve the objective impartiality of Thucydides, his aim was truth and he normally attained it.

POLYBIUS' SOURCES

When Polybius undertook his great task, a considerable body of written historical material was available to him, but here only that relevant to Scipio's life and background need be mentioned. Many Greek authors had narrated the history of Hannibal; five at least are known to us by name. One of them, Chaereas, who appears to have been a contemporary of Hannibal, is mentioned by Polybius with disdain. Two others, Sosylus and Silenus, were in camp with Hannibal and lived with him 'as long as fate allowed' (Nepos, *Han.* 13). Whether this meant until their deaths or till Hannibal's death or until Hannibal left Italy or fled from Carthage, remains unknown, but clearly they must have been in a unique position to record the Carthaginian side of the Hannibalic war. Sosylus was a Lacedaemonian who, besides living with Hannibal, taught him Greek. Neither the precise scope nor method of his book is known, nor indeed the use made of it by Polybius: the only surviving fragment of the work describes a sea-battle which Polybius also recounts but in terms which do not suggest a use of Sosylus. Silenus was a Sicilian Greek from Caleacte. The extent of his work also cannot be determined, but it was more than a mere history of Hannibal because it included Scipio's siege of New Carthage (cf. L. XXVI, 49, 3) in which Hannibal was not involved. Polybius probably used or at least had read Silenus because he alludes (III, 47, 8) to an anecdote about a dream of Hannibal which Cicero relates (*De Div.* I, 49) and had received from Silenus. This in turn suggests that Silenus may have been among the more sensational Greek writers. As will be seen shortly, there grew up around Scipio a mass of romantic legend and fiction which was quite probably reflected in a moderate form in Silenus' work. Against this popular legend of Scipio as divinely inspired, Polybius sternly set his face: hence perhaps his contemptuous criticism of Chaereas and Sosylus. But even if these Greek historians were too dramatic in style for Polybius, they were probably serious writers from whom he may well have drawn material and facts described from the enemy's point of view, while at the same time he dealt critically with their attitude to history.

Polybius also used Roman writers. Of these the earliest and most important was Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator and contemporary with the Hannibalic War; he visited Delphi as a senatorial envoy in 216.³ He wrote a history of Rome down to his own day, writing in Greek not Latin, chiefly perhaps to explain to the Greek world Roman achievements, institutions and policies, and partly perhaps because the Latin language had not yet been used for historical prose writing. His account of the First Punic War was used extensively by Polybius, but unfortunately we do not know how far Fabius carried his story of the Second Punic War or when he wrote it. Even if he did not write until after 202, there is no certainty that his narrative reached that date. He was a relative of Q. Fabius Maximus, whose exploits he will have extolled and he may possibly have ended his history at a point when the Cunctator was still a dominant figure, for instance in 209 or even 206, and thus he may not have related the campaigns of Scipio or not all of them. But if he did leave any account of Scipio's activities, which Polybius will have read, we may be sure that Pictor will have sided with his kinsman Maximus and not have given a favourable picture of Scipio, at least in such matters as his desire to carry the war into Africa.

The fashion set by Fabius Pictor of writing Roman history in Greek was followed by other members of his class, namely by L. Cincius Alimentus (praetor in 210 and taken prisoner by Hannibal), by A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 151), and C. Acilius (who flourished in the 150s). These are likely to have been read by Polybius (Postumius' work certainly was), though whether he made much use of them remains uncertain, as does their attitude to Scipio, except perhaps in the case of Acilius, who if he was related to Acilius Glabrio, a protégé of Scipio, will have given a favourable account of Scipio.

The father of Roman history written in Latin was Cato. Book V of his *Origines* covered the main part of the Hannibalic War, but it was probably not published until soon after his death in 149, while Polybius' account (down to Book XV) was probably written before 146. Thus it is uncertain whether Polybius can have made any use of this work; however, it will have had a

powerful influence on later writers, while no one could expect an appreciative estimate of Scipio in the pages of Cato.

Polybius must also have read, besides the Roman historians, the poetry of Ennius, who in addition to his *Annales* wrote a panegyric on Scipio. But while Ennius may have influenced the growth of the Scipionic Legend, there is little evidence to show that Polybius made any use of him. We know too that Scipio's own son Publius wrote a history in Greek, but again its content and possible use by Polybius remain obscure, while Scipio's letter to Philip has already been mentioned. In general, however, there clearly was a considerable body of historical work, written both from the Carthaginian and Roman points of view, to which Polybius had access.

Polybius, however, believed strongly in direct enquiry, in questioning as many people as possible who had taken part in the events: in fact he did not start the main part of his History earlier than the events of 220 BC largely because for any previous period he would have had to rely on indirect reports rather than the evidence of eye-witnesses (cf. IV, 2, 2-3; XII, 4c, 2-5). Thus he made great use of oral sources and these must have been numerous. Living in Rome from 167 to 150 BC, he could have met many men who had played an active part in the Hannibalic War, while his connection with the Scipionic House would give him access to the traditions of the family. Further, since he was a keen man of affairs, he would have sought to assess the credibility of his witnesses and to disentangle the truth from the mass of panegyric which clustered around the family archives.

One of his chief informants was Gaius Laelius, who had been the intimate friend of Scipio, his close companion and trusted aide-de-camp throughout his career, and is the only officer whose life Polybius traces in any detail. At the siege of New Carthage, Laelius commanded the fleet, and alone shared early knowledge of Scipio's plan of campaign; he commanded one of the wings at the battle of Baecula; he was sent to capture Gades and on diplomatic missions to Rome and Africa; he defeated Syphax and played a decisive role in the battle of Zama. Thus he was in a unique position to give Polybius information, and Polybius tells

us that, in criticizing certain popular views of Scipio's character, he followed the impression produced on him by Laelius 'who from Scipio's youth to death shared his every word and deed', because Laelius' account is 'probable in itself and accords with the actual doings of Scipio' (X, 3, 2). In detail we know of only one or two anecdotes which Polybius heard from him, and these raise difficulties because they may not be accurate. One tells how young Scipio saved his father's life at the battle of the Ticinus, and the other concerns his election to the aedileship in which he was helped by a prophetic dream. They are discussed later, and here we need only note that although a rival version of the first story circulated later, we cannot be sure that it is more accurate. Further, although there are definite inaccuracies in the aedileship story, it may not in fact derive from Laelius since Polybius only implies but does not state that it does (see pp. 30 f.). But even if both anecdotes about Scipio's youth are held to derive from Laelius and to contain inaccuracies, that would not necessarily invalidate Laelius' authority in general since they probably derive from a time before he knew Scipio and rest on hearsay. It is hardly necessary to try to excuse Laelius on the grounds that he was old when Polybius met him: 'the suggestion that when he gave information to Polybius at the age of seventy his memory was so impaired as to be unable to distinguish personal recollections from legends, or that he deliberately distorted the truth, does not merit serious consideration'; so wrote F. W. Walbank (*Pol.* II, 199). Further, Polybius was in close touch with Scipio's living relatives as well as with the family archives, while some of Scipio's bitterest enemies, such as Cato, were still alive, so that falsification would have been a dangerous line. In any case clearly Laelius' account of events which he shared with Scipio rests on a different basis from the anecdotes and there is no reason to think that any information which he supplied to Polybius about the conduct of the war is anything but valid. Polybius had many years of political and military experience behind him, since he was about forty when he met Laelius, and he is not likely to have been deceived by any supposed falsehood.

Nor has another attempt to undermine Laelius' authority

proved more successful: it rests on the assumption that he altered and rationalized the popular tradition about Scipio because he was a Stoic and a rationalist. However, it now seems clear that there is no evidence to support the view that he was either and that even if he had been a Stoic that fact would not, before the time of Panaetius, necessarily conflict with a belief in prophetic dreams. The rationalism which we find in Polybius is much more likely to arise from his own interpretation of events than from Laelius.

Polybius also doubtless got other points of view, including that of the enemy, from Carthaginian ambassadors, hostages or prisoners of war at Rome or when he visited Africa. For instance he met the Numidian king Masinissa, perhaps in 150 BC shortly before the old man's death; the king must have proved a valued source of information for Scipio's African campaigns, since he had fought in all the important engagements, at the battle of the Tower of Agathocles, at the burning of the camps, at the Great Plains, at the defeat of Syphax and at Zama. Although we can name only a few of the men whom Polybius could have questioned in Italy, Spain or Africa, we can be sure that he made the fullest use of all oral sources, including Laelius.

THE LEGEND⁴

By Polybius' day there had already grown around the figure of Scipio a mass of popular tradition and legend, partly in literary form and partly oral. Polybius believed that this popular view of Scipio's character was very wide of the truth and gave rise to a mistaken impression of him. This he attempted to correct, and it should be noted that he is primarily concerned with the interpretation of Scipio's motives rather than challenging the accuracy of accounts of any specific historical events. Through his criticism Polybius naturally gives a glimpse into the content of the tradition which he is rejecting. All other writers, he says, represented Scipio as favoured by Fortune and owing his success largely to chance and the unexpected, such men being considered more divine than those who act by calculation; his conquests were obtained by following the promptings of dreams and omens; and in general his genius was believed to be due to special in-

spiration and the guidance of heaven. Polybius completely rejects this view and emphasizes calculation and foresight as the cause of Scipio's success. But before the twist that Polybius gave to his interpretation is discussed, the further growth and content of the legend must be considered. It is in fact very difficult to date the genesis of some of the stories, but clearly many were early since this general belief was so widespread by Polybius' time.

In the popular mind Scipio was linked with three gods: most intimately with Jupiter, Rome's greatest and best god, but also more episodically with Neptune and Hercules. It may well be that the link with Neptune was largely responsible for the birth of the whole legend. Polybius himself tells us that when Scipio in 209 was attacking New Carthage, on the night before the assault he explained to his men the feasibility of the attempt and added that Poseidon (Neptune) had appeared to him in a dream, suggested the plan to him and promised his help at the right moment; this help was manifested the next day when the waters in the lagoon on the north side of the city miraculously sank and enabled Scipio to send a wading party through the sinking waters and storm the city walls.⁵ This episode which is of crucial importance for our understanding of both Polybius and Scipio is discussed more fully in its historical context later on (see pp. 52 ff.), but here two points may be added. First, it is curious to note that our surviving references to the Scipionic legend contain no further mention of Neptune. Secondly, Polybius may have read the story in Silenus. This source seems probable, since we know that Silenus told of a dream which Hannibal had before setting out against Italy and also probably another dream which he had later in the temple of Juno Lacinia before he left Italy. Here too Polybius criticizes those who suggested that Hannibal depended on divine help on his perilous journey, which in fact he had planned by careful enquiries and calculation.

The god who is alleged, by the writers denounced by Polybius, to have helped Hannibal through the Alps may well be Hercules.⁶ Scipio too is linked in the legend with Hercules, possibly as a counter to the Carthaginian claim that the god favoured their

hero. Thus we find Scipio compared to Hercules by Cicero, Horace and Lactantius.⁷ In the story of his divine birth (to be mentioned shortly) a snake crawled over him as an infant and left him unharmed, while the infant Hercules' struggle with snakes was famous. Like Hercules too, Scipio was, in the epic of Silius Italicus, visited by Virtue and Pleasure who contended for his allegiance.

Much more important, however, is Scipio's connection with Jupiter. This is summed up in the *De Viris Illustribus* (49): 'Scipio was believed to be the son of Jupiter; for, before he was conceived, a serpent appeared in his mother's bed, and a snake crawled over him when an infant without doing him harm. When he went late at night to the Capitol, the [temple] dogs never barked at him. He never commenced an action without having sat for long in in the shrine of Jupiter as if to receive the god's purpose.' Similar stories are found in the works of two men who wrote lives of Scipio, namely C. Oppius, a contemporary of Julius Caesar, and Julius Hyginus who lived in the Augustan age. They told how a snake appeared in the bed of Scipio's mother, who till then was barren, and after its mysterious disappearance the soothsayers (*haruspices*) foretold the birth of a child. Livy (XXVI, 19) gives a similar account: Scipio acted and spoke in public as if he were guided by dreams or divine inspiration; he sought to maintain this impression, since he never undertook any important business without sitting alone for a long time in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This custom revived the story previously told of Alexander the Great, that Scipio's conception was due to an immense serpent.

Not all the elements in these stories are of equal value. The snake story, which was also told of other men, such as Aristomenes, Aratus and Augustus, no doubt arose when Alexander was recognized as the prototype of Scipio who by his conquests established the power of Rome throughout the Mediterranean world, as Alexander had conquered the East; a transference of legend from one to the other was natural enough. But what of Scipio meditating in the temple? First, although not recorded by Polybius, it is certainly not excluded but may even be implied by

him when he says, in the context of Scipio's election to the aedileship, that 'people now believed that he communed with the gods not only in his sleep but still more in reality and by day' (X, 5, 5). Objections to the temple-visits include the fact that Scipio was not long in Rome during the early part of his public career and the supposition that the quietness of the dogs was miraculous. But there is really no cogent reason to deny the visits for the periods when he was in Rome, while the fact that the dogs did not bark at him may be because he did visit the temple often and they knew him. A further objection was raised by R. M. Haywood who thought this was a later (Augustan) tradition because Scipio's alleged conduct was not in line with 'the old Roman concept of what one did in a temple' but, as F. W. Walbank points out, the idea does not seem to have caused any difficulty to Livy.⁸ To reject the visits out of hand therefore seems too arbitrary, the more so since there can be no doubt that Scipio enjoyed a special connection with Jupiter: this is shown by other evidence.

At some time Scipio's *imago* was placed in the Capitoline temple instead of in the *atrium* of his house; it was brought out from here for the funeral processions of eminent members of the Cornelian *gens*. Unfortunately we do not know when this honour was granted. Since Scipio was not popular in governing circles in his later years and died in virtual exile, it is unlikely to have been granted very soon after his death. A good opportunity would have been in the time of his adopted grandson, Scipio Aemilianus, when at the end of the Third Punic War the roof of the temple was gilded and a mosaic floor was laid. If it was there before 83 BC, the mask would probably have been destroyed in the fire that burnt down the temple in that year; some suggest that this may have been the occasion of the honour since in reconstructing the temple the dictator Sulla, himself a member of the Cornelian *gens*, might wish to glorify an earlier illustrious fellow-clansman. There is one much earlier reference which, if genuine, would date the honour very early indeed: in a speech which Livy puts into the mouth of Ti. Gracchus in 187 it is said that Scipio prevented a decree being passed authorizing his *imago* to be carried in triumphal garb in procession from the temple of

Jupiter. But although some scholars accept the speech as embodying genuine early material, it more probably belongs to a later age, whether that of Sulla, Caesar, or Augustus. However, at some point during the Republic, whether early or late, the *imago* was given this extraordinary honour, which becomes more understandable if it is true that Scipio himself was known to have frequented the temple.⁹

Another item of evidence is unfortunately not unambiguous, a *denarius* of c. 105 BC, with the Capitoline triad on the reverse and a helmeted head on the obverse, issued by Cn. Cornelius Blasio (*Pls.* 2, 13). The portrait is often regarded as that of Scipio, but we must beware of a circular argument, since one reason for this identification is the alleged link between Scipio and the temple of Jupiter, Juno and Minerva. However, while this risk is recognized, it is not easy to see why Blasio should have used the Capitoline temple as a type if the head is that of one of his much earlier ancestors (see pp. 249 f.), so that the possibility still remains that the head is that of Scipio and the temple is used because of his known connection with it. Another early reflection of Scipio's link with Jupiter may perhaps be found in Plautus' *Amphitruo*, although the interpretation of possible allusions in drama must remain somewhat problematical.¹⁰

Finally, it has been held that the poet Ennius contributed at an early stage to the Scipionic legend by attempting to heroize him. This may be implied by the lines which he puts in Scipio's mouth:

Si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est
mi soli caeli maxima porta patet

'if it is right for any man to ascend the heavenly heights, to me alone the great gate stands open'. In quoting this, Cicero added, 'quite true, Africanus, for the same gate stood open to Hercules.' How much influence this approach had on Roman tradition, it is difficult to guess, since heroization is a Greek not a Roman concept. However, it clearly accords with all the ideas which tended to elevate Scipio slightly above his fellow-men.¹¹

In sum, amid considerable uncertainty, it seems clear that before the middle of the second century there was a widespread

belief that Scipio claimed some measure of divine inspiration (as in the Neptune story, for which Polybius vouches); he may well have enjoyed a particular connection with the temple of Jupiter; and a number of wilder stories were circulating, which doubtless increased in sensationalism as time went on and culminated in the idea of his divine birth.

POLYBIUS AND SCIPIO

Polybius had an intense admiration for Scipio, calling him 'almost the most famous man of all time' (X, 2, 2), yet he gives a portrait of him which to some has seemed little better than a caricature. Scipio is shown deliberately spreading a belief that he was divinely inspired, while disbelieving in it himself; coldly rational and calculating, he cunningly worked on men's superstitions, as Lycurgus is alleged to have done in early Sparta through his use of oracles. If accepted, such a cynical interpretation of Scipio's actions would turn him into something very like a charlatan, and this view has misled some later historians into an unjust depreciation of his character. Thus Mommsen wrote of him: 'a strange mixture of genuine gold and glittering tinsel . . . not naïve enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly persuaded that he was a man specially favoured of the gods.' Hence Mommsen depreciated all Scipio's exploits and assumed their motive to be self-seeking and their cause pure chance. But in fact Polybius, rationalist by nature, may have reacted too sharply against the popular view. On Polybius' own method it might be unfair to try to reach a conclusion on this matter here, since he condemns on principle any attempt to give a complete portrait of any leading person of his history, because men are inconsistent. It is misleading to characterize a man when he first appears on the stage, or to infer his whole character from particular acts; the right method is to criticize his actions as they occur. But a glance at Scipio's actions here might suggest that he had qualities other than mere cleverness. The man who captivated so many of his contemporaries by the brilliance of his personality and character, by his charm and manner, who revolutionized

Roman military tactics, who beat Hannibal and won the Second Punic War, saving his country despite bitterness and antagonism at home, who set Rome on her imperial course and founded her power in Spain, Africa and Asia, who championed a wider view of Rome's mission than did many of the Roman nobles, who headed that line of men who through their greatness as individuals potentially threatened the supremacy of the senatorial nobility, foreshadowing the Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar, and who still could resist the last infirmity of noble minds, the supreme temptations of personal ambition and power when they might seem to lie within his grasp, who could retire from his country when it no longer had a place for him—is it likely that such a man was no more than a mere charlatan?

If Polybius' interpretation of Scipio's character, when set in the scales against the man's life work, does seem somewhat too shallow, should it be modified as representing only one side of the picture? In other words is the legend to be thrown completely overboard or not? Now the legend in itself is a historical fact of great importance. It represents the impression which Scipio made on his contemporaries, and as such cannot be lightly dismissed. With whatever extravagances and fictions the Greek historiographers embellished it, some truth may lie at its root. Polybius only records one occasion on which Scipio said he had received promise of divine aid, but it is significant that it is quoted by Polybius who does not in fact at this point say that it was a lie invented by Scipio to encourage his troops, though elsewhere of course he does attribute such policy to Scipio (X, 2, 12). The crux of the problem is that while we have to accept Scipio's claim to divine help, do we also have to accept Polybius' explanation of it? May not Scipio, even if he was not a deeply religious man or a mystic, in fact have felt some sense of mission and some confidence in divine support? After all it would scarcely reflect an uncommon belief in human history, and even the atheist knows that innumerable men believe that they receive divine guidance. If at New Carthage Scipio genuinely felt that he would receive some special help and at the same time he knew that his naval operations might make the difference between success and failure (we shall

see later in more detail the role of sea and lagoon in his plans), might not this feeling come to him under the symbol of the lord of the sea and would he not then be eager to use such confidence to encourage his men? Clearly we cannot be certain, and I may well have exaggerated in earlier years in seeing in Scipio 'a rationalistic mystic', but I see no reason to deny him all genuine religious confidence. Belief in God and keeping one's powder dry are not necessarily mutually exclusive activities. Those who looked to one side of Scipio's nature, through superstition or deliberate invention, wove around him fantastic tales of his divine origin and his continuous close relation with heaven. On the other hand Polybius, the rationalist, saw only the rational in Scipio, and deliberately tried to show the falsity of the other view by constructing a portrait of the Stoic rationalist's ideal of the great man. Unfortunately, in attempting to glorify his hero, Polybius' reaction has been too strong, and Scipio emerges as a trickster, who, knowing the widespread belief in his supernatural powers, in which he himself disbelieved, used it to trade on the superstitions of the credulous. Polybius could not doubt that men believed in Scipio's inspiration, but as a rationalist he could not accept that his enlightened hero could have shared the belief. But the existence of the legend—and it is a unique phenomenon in Rome's history—is in itself the strongest testimony: a pure rationalist or a smaller man would scarcely have gained such a romantic halo.

LIVY AND OTHER SOURCES

Our other chief source is Livy, who made great use of Polybius: indeed the bulk of his account of Scipio's campaigns derives from Polybius' history.¹² At first he appears to have derived Polybian material from an intermediate source, or perhaps consulted him on a specific point, but later he began to use his text direct: the precise place where this commenced is uncertain, some placing it at least as early as Book XXIV, others in XXVII and others again in XXIX. For events after the Hannibalic War, which Livy recorded in the books of his fourth and fifth decades, he again made great use of Polybius, particularly for Greek and Asiatic

affairs which take up some two-thirds of Books XXXI–XLV. But for other matters Livy turned both here and in his third decade to other writers; the most important of these for the period with which we are concerned were L. Coelius Antipater, Q. Claudius Quadrigarius and Valerius Antias.¹³

Coelius was a serious historian who introduced into Roman historiography the historical monograph. He wrote, after 121 BC, seven books on the Second Punic War, using Roman family archives as well as the works of Silenus, Fabius, and Cato: his relation to Polybius remains uncertain. He seems to have taken pains to be accurate, although at times aiming at rhetorical and dramatic effect; his work was praised by Cicero, perhaps primarily on literary grounds, and is specifically referred to by Livy no less than eleven times in his third decade.

Very different were Claudius and Valerius, who lived in the Sullan period: they did not by enquiry seek the truth, but rather sought to please the reader by painting dramatic and pathetic scenes, straining after effect and often piling up enemy battle casualties to fantastic heights. However, they provided a chronological framework, based on reliable material (election lists, provincial commands, etc.) which derived from the *Annales Maximi*, and thus they saved Livy the trouble of consulting the original sources for these records; unfortunately they did not always stop at this point but went on to invent other 'documents'. Yet Livy was not entirely uncritical and indeed called Valerius credulous and impudent in his lies. These two annalists were, however, his main sources in his fourth and fifth decades for Roman and western affairs, Polybius being wisely followed for Greek matters. His precise use of one or other can scarcely be determined. One view is that Valerius was the main source for XXXI–XXXVIII with Claudius used as a check, and that thereafter Claudius was given first place, Livy perhaps changing over because of the muddle into which Valerius led him in his account of the trials of the Scipios; this theory is perhaps over-rigid, but Valerius does seem to have been used more in XXXI–XXXVIII. Of these two annalists' attitude to Scipio not much can be said: Claudius may have been favourable (at least he followed Acilius

in telling the anecdote of the meeting of Scipio and Hannibal at Ephesus; cf. p. 198), while Valerius Antias' account of the trial of the Scipios, besides being hopelessly distorted, does not suggest much partiality for them.

Thus a wide and rich tradition of varying historical accuracy filtered through to Livy, who used his material in a very different way from Polybius, and his treatment of Scipio is a good example of this divergence. While Polybius' method was subjective, like that of the poet in the didactic epics, Livy's is objective, as in the heroic epics. Livy in epic form works his judgment into his historical narrative so that it partly becomes the narrative, while Polybius appears in his own person as critic and shows us how he forms his judgments. Livy constructs artistically, whereas Polybius analyses scientifically. Livy must have known Polybius' attitude to Scipio, but his own is different. Although he admits a certain skill (*ars*) in Scipio's use of his inspiration to impress others, he also leaves open the possibility that his motive was genuine belief (*sive et ipse capti quadam superstitione animi*: XXVI, 19, 4); although he uses the word *superstitio*, the important point is that he does not necessarily exclude honest belief or accept Polybius' view that Scipio was play-acting.¹⁴ He quotes much of the legend, though with misgivings. Further, he stresses Scipio's personal and moral qualities, his extraordinary self-confidence, his un-Roman enthusiasm, his sympathetic understanding of men, his moderation and clemency. True, Scipio is the great man, and as P. G. Walsh has said, 'Livy's Stoic outlook sees Scipio in the same way as Virgil depicts Aeneas—as a man of fate destined to lead Rome to enhanced greatness', while 'Africanus undoubtedly approaches nearest to Livy's ideal Roman.' But what R. S. Conway called 'Scipio's rich humanity' is also part of Livy's conception of him, and it helps to balance the detached superhuman figure drawn by Polybius.¹⁵

SCIPIO'S YOUTH

Publius Cornelius Scipio was born in 236/5 BC into one of the great patrician families of Rome.¹⁶ His father, also named Publius, was consul in 218, one of the most critical years of Rome's

history when her life was threatened by Hannibal's invasion of Italy. Of his mother Pomponia little is known beyond an anecdote, recorded by Polybius, that when her sons Publius and Lucius were standing for the aedileship she visited the temples and sacrificed to the gods for their success; this may reflect only normal Roman custom, both religious and electoral, but it might indicate a pious woman from whom her son Publius could have inherited a religious outlook such as some of the authorities attribute to him. Around his birth, as we have seen, there later clustered a mass of legend, formed largely on the analogy of legends of Alexander's birth. He was almost certainly the eldest son,¹⁷ but nothing is known about either his boyhood or the date of his marriage to Aemilia, the daughter of Aemilius Paullus, the consul of 216 who fell at the battle of Cannae; the link with the Aemilii, another of Rome's old patrician families, will have had political as well as social significance. His physical appearance is shown on some coins and, probably, on a signet-ring¹⁸ (*Pls.* 1-4).

Scipio's public life had two main phases, military and political. The first part was largely devoted to fighting the enemy in Spain and Africa, with brief intervals of political activity as when he held the consulship; during the latter part his fighting was mainly confined to the political arena. Thus it will be more convenient to postpone a general consideration of the nature of political life in Rome and Scipio's fortunes in the struggle for office until the second part of this book, and to concentrate on the soldier in the first part.

Before he was out of his 'teens Rome and Carthage were at war. Whatever the deep-seated causes, the proximate cause was Hannibal's siege and capture of Saguntum in Spain, after which Rome declared war in the spring of 218. Although the Romans knew that Hannibal had a large army in Spain, they supposed that their naval superiority would allow them to dictate the theatres of war. They therefore decided that one consul, Scipio's father Publius, should conduct a campaign against Hannibal in Spain, while his colleague raised a force in Sicily with the object of invading Africa and attacking Carthage itself. These plans, however, were frustrated by Hannibal's speed of movement.

P. Scipio had only reached southern Gaul when he found that Hannibal had slipped past him and was heading for the Alps and Italy. He then took a momentous decision: instead of trying to chase after Hannibal he sent his army under the command of his brother Gnaeus to Spain to try to contain the rest of the Carthaginian forces there, while he himself returned to north Italy to await Hannibal's arrival with other quickly raised troops. Though he can hardly have realized it, he had laid the strategic foundations for Rome's ultimate victory.

His immediate plan to deal with Hannibal when he arrived over the Alps and debouched into the northern plain of Italy, was to use the tributaries of the Po to fight delaying actions until his colleague could hurry up from the south and join him. The first engagement was a cavalry action on the Ticinus, and here we have the first anecdote about his son. The father had placed the boy in command of a picked body of cavalry in order to secure his safety, but when young Scipio saw his father wounded and cut off by the enemy, failing to get those with him to go to the rescue, he charged forward alone; the others followed and the elder Scipio was saved. Polybius, who tells the story on the authority of Laelius, pragmatically adds that as Scipio had thus gained a reputation for bravery, he did not expose himself unnecessarily in the future (a compliment to the sagacious commander rather than any reflection on Scipio's courage). We know from Livy that Coelius Antipater gave a slightly different version of the episode, in which the father was rescued by a slave. Since Polybius does not vouch for the accuracy of his version, but only says that Scipio 'seems to have charged', it is impossible to be sure of the truth. In view, however, of the enmity which Scipio suffered in his last years, it is as likely that the slave version was invented to his detriment as that Polybius' version was composed to his glory: Coelius is not usually preferred to Polybius.¹⁹

Scipio next appears on the scene in the dark days after Cannae, the third and greatest defeat that Rome had suffered from Hannibal in less than two years. He was one of the four military tribunes who, with some four thousand survivors, had reached Canusium where the supreme command was assigned to him and

his colleague Appius Claudius Pulcher. When he learned that many of the young nobles were saying that Rome was doomed and some were planning to escape overseas, he went with a few followers to a meeting of the faint-hearts where, flourishing a naked sword, he swore never to desert Rome and forced the others to take this oath. With discipline restored and hope kindled, Scipio and Claudius reported to the consul Varro who, they learned, had survived the battle and reached Venusia. Since Polybius does not honour his hero by recording this story, the episode is sometimes rejected, but perhaps without good reason, since Polybius' account of this period is not completely preserved, while the story finds support in the evidence of a coin of Canusium which almost certainly depicts Scipio²⁰ (*Pls.* 4, 16). Thus Scipio's military career started in ambiguous circumstances: his own personal courage shone forth brightly, but he had seen Hannibal twice victorious, in a minor engagement at the Ticinus and in an overwhelming success at Cannae. Great indeed must have been the young man's self-confidence if at this moment he could believe that in the future he would, like Marlborough, never command in a battle which he did not win.

The other Polybian anecdote records that after the elder Scipio had left for Spain (217) his son Lucius Scipio was standing for the curule aedileship with little chance of success, and so Lucius' younger brother Publius decided to help him. By telling their mother that he had twice dreamt that he and his brother would be elected, he obtained from her in jest the whitened toga worn by candidates. On the election day Publius himself appeared as a candidate with his brother, and both were elected through Publius' popularity. Hence he won not only the aedileship but also a reputation for communing with heaven in his sleep and also by day; Polybius hastens to add that the dreams were irrelevant and that Scipio's popularity and skill were the real cause of his success. This account is surprisingly unsatisfactory, and it is difficult to believe that Polybius heard it from Laelius (as he implies, but does not state categorically). It contains three errors of fact: Scipio was aedile in 213 (not 217, as implied); his colleague was M. Cornelius Cethegus, not his brother; and Publius was

almost certainly older than Lucius. Further, it is most unlikely that the supposedly younger brother would have enough political weight to help the other. However, Publius was elected, and that not without considerable political opposition (see further p. 164).²¹

Scipio's feet were now set on a normal political career and he might next hope to reach the praetorship, but a more glittering prize was unexpectedly offered him. The pattern of the Hannibalic War was changing. In Italy the impetus of Hannibal's attack had begun to weaken, and Capua and Syracuse, the two great cities which had gone over to him, now fell to Roman sieges. But the western horizon was darker: in Spain, Gnaeus Scipio and his brother Publius, who had joined him in 217, were defeated and killed in 211, and the Romans only with difficulty rallied sufficiently to hold the line of the Ebro. Immediately the Romans sent out a senior man, Gaius Claudius Nero, praetor of 212 who had taken part in the successful siege of Capua, and he might well have anticipated that his command in Spain would be prolonged for a few years. However, when the commands for 210 were considered, a surprising result followed: the People decided to invest young Scipio, although he had been only aedile, with a proconsular command to supersede Nero in Spain.²² Livy's naïve account (Polybius' does not survive) that no one else dared to seek this responsible post may be doubted and it is conceivable that the Senate arranged that Scipio should be the only candidate. But why was Scipio chosen? There probably was a shortage of first-class men and perhaps none of the younger men seemed so promising as Scipio; this might help to explain the choice of Scipio, but does not adequately account for the prior decision to supersede Nero. This is best explained by the desire for renewed offensive action in Spain for which Scipio, with the tradition of his father and uncle, might seem better suited than Nero whose military experience at Capua had been more static. Nor was the People's choice wild: though young, Scipio had gained military experience during the past eight years (we do not know where he served after Cannae), while his extraordinary self-confidence marked him out as a potential leader. True, M. Iunius Silanus was sent out with him, but despite the fact that

Polybius refers to him as Scipio's 'fellow-commander' Silanus almost certainly had less authority (*imperium minus*).²³ Further, the appointment marks an important stage in Rome's constitutional development. Scipio, who had not been praetor or consul, was thus the first *privatus* to be invested with proconsular *imperium*, on which later rested the military authority of the emperors of Rome. Thus he suddenly sprang into the limelight and his feet were set on the ladder of fame. Whether he would climb or fall, depended on his attainments in Spain.

SPAIN

The campaigns of the two elder Scipios may be considered briefly because of the light they throw on the methods and aims of the younger man.²⁴ This is inevitable since the country itself, no less than the character of its inhabitants, forces an invading army to adopt certain methods and routes. The interior of Spain is mountainous and contained few large towns, so that many years of guerilla warfare were needed before the Romans mastered the highlands of Celtiberia and Lusitania. In the campaigns under review, the interior was for the most part left severely alone. The districts involved are the rich fertile valley of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) in the south, where lay the seat of Carthaginian power, and the valley of the Ebro in the north. These two districts were linked by a coast road which in turn embraced two regions, namely the fertile neighbourhood around Saguntum, Valencia and the mouth of the Sucro, and that near New Carthage, the Carthaginian base in Spain. Although the Romans cannot have had very exact information about the lie of the land, the two Scipios evolved a successful strategic plan, which was then followed by the younger Scipio and still later by Pompey. To an army invading Spain from the north-east it was necessary to secure the coast road and to win an adequate base; command of the sea would be an invaluable further asset, since without it the communication lines of an invading army might be threatened. Thus in 76 BC Pompey tried to force the line of the Ebro and to conquer the coast road by pushing Sertorius' lieutenants out of

his way. He was thwarted by Sertorius himself who had taken up a position on the upper Ebro, and his plan ultimately failed because he lacked an adequate base, his convoys were harrassed by Sertorius' guerilla bands, and his supplies by sea were liable to attack. He succeeded only when he gave up the coast road and took to the highlands, but had he had a base and command of the sea, his first method, that of the Scipios, might have proved successful. The Peninsular War taught a similar lesson, though the British were attacking from Portugal, not from the north-east. When Sir John Moore advanced dangerously far into Spain, relying on the Spaniards and with his forces unconcentrated, his army found itself isolated; only the skill of its commander saved it from disaster in retreat and covered its embarkation at Corunna. On the other hand, Wellington had a strong base at Lisbon behind the lines of Torres Vedras. Outside these lines the French could not maintain themselves indefinitely, for they lived largely off the country: they must move or starve since the British held the seas. From Torres Vedras, Wellington could advance as the French retired and harass their retreat. If he did not succeed in manœuvring them into a favourable position for battle, he could himself again retire behind his lines. A base was essential.

The primary purpose of the elder Scipios in Spain was to prevent reinforcements and supplies reaching Hannibal, by holding the Pyrenees or Ebro at all costs. They also doubtless realized that Rome's future security required the breaking of Carthaginian power in Spain. When their strength was adequate, they would take the offensive and though they worked to make Spain not so much Roman as non-Carthaginian, they must have realized what this would involve; after all, they knew that the First Punic War had left Sicily in Rome's hands. This was the legacy they bequeathed to Publius' son who, by his victories in the Peninsula, vindicated the judgment of his father and uncle.

In the late summer of 218 Gnaeus Scipio landed with two legions at Emporiae (Ampurias), which he made his first base from which to march south. He tried to secure the coast down to the Ebro by land and sea, and won over some towns and tribes. Hanno, the Carthaginian general in command of the district

north of the Ebro, was busy in the interior settling territory which Hannibal had recently conquered. Scipio wisely persevered down the coast, securing his line of retreat before turning to the interior. When he reached Cissa, near Tarraco, Hanno came down but was defeated, and the town, which was the Carthaginian base in northern Spain, fell into the hands of the Romans.²⁵ Scipio then moved his fleet to Tarraco. Here Hasdrubal arrived from the south and, being too late to help Hanno, attacked the Roman naval camp, and then retreated back over the Ebro to his base at New Carthage. Thus Scipio, who established his winter quarters at Tarraco, in less than two months had won a base and started to conquer the land north of the Ebro, effectively preventing any reinforcements getting through to Hannibal.²⁶

The year 217 was critical for Spain. Hasdrubal approached the mouth of the Ebro with his land forces and fleet. Despite naval help from Massilia, Scipio was outnumbered but nevertheless decided to fight by sea rather than by land. Engaging the enemy fleet off the mouth of the Ebro, he won a great victory in which Carthagian sea-power on the Spanish coast was broken. Thus the way was now open for Scipio to cross the Ebro and to advance further southwards, as he could protect his communication lines by sea, while penetrating down the coast. He was also strengthened by the arrival of his brother Publius with reinforcements. The two brothers advanced to Saguntum and encamped near the temple of Aphrodite about five miles from the city; impressive remains of their camp survive²⁷ (*Pls.* 24, 25). Through the treachery of a Spanish chief they got possession of some Spanish hostages whom the Carthaginians were holding in the town and returned them to their homes: an act which foreshadows Africanus' similar clemency towards the natives.²⁸ They also apparently won and garrisoned Intibili (near Benicarlo in Catalonia) and Ilturgi (near Cabanes) and then withdrew to winter quarters north of the Ebro.²⁹

The next year was something of a stalemate. Hasdrubal, faced with a serious rising of the Turdetani in southern Spain, wisely acted on the defensive until the enemy scattered to plunder: Spanish armies seldom remained long in the field without ex-

ternal pressure—when their own masters, they soon broke up to follow their own devices. Carefully biding his time, Hasdrubal attacked and won a complete victory. The Carthaginians in their desire not to let Spain slip from their grasp sent reinforcements to Hasdrubal who, probably in the next year, marched to the Ebro and met the Roman army near Ibera, which lay opposite Dertosa (Tortosa) on the south bank of the river and was an important strategic point, controlling the coast road and the passage of the river as well as the valley up into the interior. It was a critical moment, and Rome's fate hung in the balance. If Hasdrubal broke through and joined Hannibal in Italy, Rome might succumb to the double force, while Spain would surely be lost, since a Carthaginian victory would involve a change of feeling among most of the wavering and even pro-Roman tribes. Hasdrubal used the same tactics as his brother did at Cannae, but his centre of Spanish troops crumpled before his wings could outflank and surround the enemy: his army was routed. Five years later his opponents learnt how much faith to put in the native troops. But, for the time, the situation was saved and Rome was freed from a grave danger. The Scipios had accomplished something which might brighten the heart of the home government even in the gloom caused by Cannae; all was not lost. As a natural result of the Roman victory, more Spanish tribes revolted from the Carthaginians.

The Scipios, who had reached and decisively held the line of the Ebro, could think next of offensive measures. But there were difficulties in the way. Their strength was exhausted no less than Hasdrubal's and they could not make fresh demands on the home government at so critical a time. Further advance meant, as before, securing a new base and the coast road. This would involve longer communication lines which in turn needed more men to guard them. The further they penetrated to the south, where the Carthaginian power was more deeply rooted, the less hope was there of winning the support of the natives. If they won this support by force, they would become the aggressors and so alienate the sympathy of the Spaniards, while if they neglected it their communications would be endangered. They hesitated to take the offensive until they had sufficient strength, and so the

next years, 215–213, were comparatively uneventful. The Romans gradually occupied more territory south of the Ebro, holding smaller towns (such as Ilturgi and Intibili) till they could win a real base in Saguntum, and recruited their strength for the coming offensive.³⁰

By 212 the gradual advance of the Scipios was crowned by success; they had won over many tribes south of the Ebro, and also obtained the base which they so urgently needed, by gaining possession of Saguntum (probably in 212). This town had an important strategic position: it commanded both the coast road at the head of the main fertile plain of the east coast and also the passes to the south. The Scipios could now plan a more extensive advance for the next year, venturing perhaps to pass the winter further south. Unfortunately for Rome, Carthage was able to give more attention to Spain, as she had just quelled a Libyan rebellion and now maintained three armies in Spain under Hasdrubal Barca, his brother Mago, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo.^{30a} The superior numbers of the enemy meant that a Roman offensive would be risky; further penetration involved increasing the distance from the centre of supplies, even though Saguntum was now held. Yet to revert to a defensive policy would mean sacrificing the Scipios' previous conquests and their new Spanish allies. These they trusted and, confident in that trust, advanced in two divisions against the enemy, Publius with two-thirds against Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, probably to the upper courses of the Baetis, Gnaeus with the other one-third against Hasdrubal Barca probably in the hinterland of New Carthage. This division may have been a mistake, as the united force might have crushed Hasdrubal Barca. They divided perhaps to put less strain on the natives from whose territory they must in part derive supplies, and to facilitate the obtaining of these by widening their area. But they were to learn the truth of the dictum of Henry IV of France that Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get beaten. In avoiding the former danger the Scipios divided their forces and ran the latter risk. The commissariat difficulties of the French in 1807 and the following years illustrate the danger of starvation in Spain.

Publius soon got into difficulties and was prevented from leaving his camp freely by the enemy's cavalry; then learning that the Spanish chief Indibilis was bringing 7500 reinforcements to help the Carthaginians, he made a dash to try to defeat him before he could reach the Carthaginians. However, he was caught on all sides by the enemy, his army was cut to pieces, and he himself killed in the fighting. Meantime his brother Gnaeus discovered the fickleness of his Spanish allies, who deserted to the enemy. Thus weakened and threatened by the united forces of the enemy, he was forced to retire, but his retreat was retarded by the Carthaginian cavalry, and he made a last stand on a hill so hard and bare that the men had to use their pack-saddles to form a rampart in place of earth, stone or wood. Here at Ilorci (almost certainly modern Lorquí, not Lorca: see note 70) he and his force were destroyed. Only remnants of the two armies, led by Fonteius, a legate of P. Scipio, and by L. Marcius Septimus, a Roman knight, managed to reach the Ebro where Marcius was chosen by the troops as their commander. Thus the offensive, which the two Scipios had undertaken so hopefully, met with complete disaster, and they met their deaths, while the whole Roman cause in Spain seemed for the moment lost.

The cause of the disaster was evidently the treachery of the Celtiberians and the separation of the Roman armies (P. X, 7, 10). Wellington's bitter experience with his Spanish allies at Talavera was anticipated by 2000 years. Further, the Scipios, possibly relying too much on rumours of dissension among the Carthaginian generals, had abandoned the gradual advance of the last few years for an offensive which overtaxed their strength, especially when they acted independently and could not trust their Spanish allies. They had obtained a good base and the control of the coast road, but not far enough south. To advance inland, unless they held the coast and consolidated their advances as they went, was dangerous and in the circumstances proved fatal. This lesson, which the death of his father and uncle emphasized, was taken to heart by the young Scipio. It was only after winning New Carthage as a base that he could feel safe in penetrating to the Baetis and the south.

The Carthaginians could now extend their influence northwards again, yet they signally failed to make full use of their victory. The reason was that each of the three generals wished to exploit the success for his own advantage and would not co-operate with his colleagues. The way was open to aim a mortal blow at the enemy's heart by trying to send help to Hannibal in Italy, but their selfishness and quarrels prevented them from taking the road to the north which was soon to be barred by the arrival of Nero, and then barred more effectively by young Scipio, who would not be content merely to stand on the line of the Ebro but would strike out boldly against the enemy, true to the policy of his house. The folly of the Carthaginians, which saved Rome at a critical moment, is thrown into even greater relief when set against the gallant attempt of the Scipios with their lack of any adequate base, supplies or money, and with their small armies.

All south of the Ebro was lost to Rome, with the possible exception of Saguntum. The Carthaginians even made some headway north of the river, but in the main the remnant of the Roman armies, some 9000 men, managed to hold the line of the Ebro. Then, late in 211, C. Claudius Nero arrived with some reinforcements. His appointment may suggest that the Roman Senate envisaged a purely defensive strategy in Spain, since Nero had long served Italy under the cautious strategy of Fabius. But since his whole force was only one-third as large as the Carthaginian, which had increased to some 45,000 men, he could hardly plan any offensive south of the river. Instead he tried to secure the land to the north, possibly throwing Hasdrubal Barca into difficulties, and to hold the river itself. Even in this he was not completely successful since some of the tribes north of the Ebro revolted, as can be seen from the fact that among the hostages held by the Carthaginians in New Carthage in 209 are found representatives of the good faith of the Ilergetes, the most powerful tribe between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. Thus Nero held on grimly, possibly somewhat precariously as far as the Ebro, but certainly no farther south.

Such was the position when young Publius Scipio arrived.

CHAPTER II


NEW CARTHAGE

SCIPIO SET SAIL for Spain with reinforcements amounting to 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, with M. Iunius Silanus as his aide-de-camp, and with a fleet of thirty ships, to take over the command from Claudius Nero. He disembarked at Emporiae and marched by land to Tarraco, which he made his headquarters. He was met by deputations from friendly tribes and during the winter he visited some of these tribes themselves, doubtless winning their support as much by his ready sympathy as by his confidence, for he had come to Spain to conquer the Carthaginian, not the Spaniard. He inspected the winter quarters of the army, whom he commended for holding on after two such terrible blows, and for keeping the enemy south of the Ebro, which robbed them of the fruit of their victories and also protected the allies of Rome. Marcius he treated with great honour. This was the more remarkable in view of Marcius' recent conduct. While Fonteius had rallied the survivors of P. Scipio's army, Marcius, who had served under Cn. Scipio, rallied his defeated troops, and had then joined Fonteius. But the army thereafter elected him as their commander, although Fonteius, as Publius' legate, had official status. He then offended the Senate by signing his despatch to it as 'propraetor', although his command derived neither from the Senate nor the Roman People. When Claudius Nero arrived as commander-in-chief he took over the army from both men, who presumably had co-operated in face of their common danger. The young Scipio on his arrival wanted to give honour where honour was due, and at the same time he needed a loyal and united command and army: generous treatment of Marcius would be popular with the troops who had previously elevated

him. 'Scipio's appreciation,' comments Capt. Liddell Hart, 'of the moral factor and of the value of personal observation, two vital elements in generalship, was shown in his earliest steps . . . Napoleon's jealousy of Moreau, his deliberate overshadowing of his own marshals, is in marked contrast with Scipio's attitude.'³¹

Thus Scipio spent the winter encouraging and reorganizing his troops, trying to blend the varied elements into a homogeneous whole, strengthening his hold on the land north of the Ebro, and preparing for the offensive which he was planning for the next year. This was one of the most daring exploits accomplished in the whole Hannibalic War, a dash and surprise attack on the Carthaginian base in Spain, New Carthage (Cartagena). Its capture would naturally be of extreme value: it had an excellent harbour, while the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and war material in the city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain (P. X, 8).

How did Scipio come to form such a hazardous plan? The key to the situation was that none of the three Carthaginian armies was within ten days' march of New Carthage. They were acting on the defensive and had to spread rather than to concentrate their forces for many reasons. The general dissatisfaction and restlessness of the Spaniards forced the Carthaginians, who were victorious invaders in a foreign country, to display their strength widely, hold what they had, and subdue any sedition. Their grip on the natives was not yet strong enough to allow an assumption of loyalty; indeed it was chiefly maintained by the holding of hostages. And because Spain is a country in which large armies starve, difficulties of commissariat and supplies would suggest spreading their forces as widely as possible, while they would not want to throw the burden of supporting the three armies on any one district which was still loyal. In case of attack, though perhaps they scarcely anticipated a Roman offensive, their separation would protect more of the country from surprise. And, as each of the generals was at loggerheads with his colleagues, each would be glad to keep the other at arm's length. So Hasdrubal Barca was in the centre of Spain in the territory of the Carpetani, the other Hasdrubal probably on the Atlantic



1-4 Probable portraits of Scipio Africanus (*see pp. 249f.*). *Above*, portrait on a gold signet-ring from Capua, signed by Herakleidas, of the late third or early second century BC. *Below, left*, portrait on the obverse of a Roman *denarius*, issued by Cn. Cornelius Blasio *c.* 105 BC. For the reverse *see* Plate 15. *Below, centre*, portrait of a Roman on the obverse of a silver shekel minted at New Carthage. The reverse type (Plate 16) continues the Carthaginian type of the mint there. *Below, right*, portrait on a bronze coin of Canusium






5-10 Coins from the mint of New Carthage (*see* p. 249). *Above. Obv.* Bust of Melkart-Herakles, bearded, with features of pronounced African type. Probable portrait of Hamilcar Barca. *Rev.* African elephant, with cloaked rider holding goad. *Centre. Obv.* Similar, but beardless, with different features: Hannibal. *Rev.* Elephant. *Below. Obv.* Beardless head, similar to 7: also Hannibal. *Rev.* Horse and palm-tree, a common Carthaginian reverse type





11-17 *Above. Obv.* Head, with African features. Probably Hasdrubal Barca (see pp. 252f.). *Rev.* Elephant. *Centre. Obv.* Beardless bust, diademed, with prominent frontal bone. Probably Mago, brother of Hannibal and Hasdrubal. *Rev.* Prow of war-galley. Mint of Gades (less probably, New Carthage). (See pp. 252f.) *Below, left, rev.* of Plate 2, with the Capitoline triad, Jupiter, Juno and Minerva; *centre, rev.* of Plate 3, horse and palm-tree; *right, rev.* of Plate 4, galloping horseman





18–23 North African rulers on coins. *Above. Obv.* Diademed head of Masinissa. *Rev.* Horse galloping. *Centre. Obv.* Head of Syphax. *Rev.* Numidian horseman and Syphax' name in Punic, *Spq hammamleket* ('the king'). *Below. Obv.* Head of Vermina, diademed, son of Syphax. *Rev.* Horse and Vermina's name, *Urmnd hammamleket*. Silver coin, one of two known specimens



coast by the mouth of the Tagus, while Mago was not far from Gibraltar³² (*Pls.* 11, 13). Each was ten days' march from the base at New Carthage and badly out of position strategically.

The situation was in some respects similar to that of 1812, one of the most critical years of Napoleon's career. He was tired of guerilla warfare, which cut his long lines of communication, involved numerous troops and endangered any serious operations against the British. He decided to subjugate east Spain and Andalusia, but he failed because 'he did not make sufficient provision for unity of command nor for ensuring concerted action among his jealous and subordinate generals, and he overlooked the possibility of an English offensive'.³³ The result was that Wellington struck suddenly, captured Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and followed up his success by defeating Marmont at Salamanca. In the same manner the dissension of the Carthaginian generals opened the way for a Roman offensive.

According to Polybius, Scipio told his men that the reasons which led him to decide to attack New Carthage were that 'the enemy are encamped far apart and have estranged all their allies by their tyrannical treatment . . . But the chief point is that the enemy's commanders are quarrelling and are unwilling to engage us with their united forces, while if they attack us separately it will be easy to handle them.' Already in Rome he had thought much about the situation and, on arriving in Spain, he made enquiries about the position of the enemy and learnt that none was within ten days of New Carthage. He thought then that if he decided to engage the enemy, it would be very dangerous to risk a battle with all three at once, both because his predecessors had been defeated and because the enemy were greatly superior in numbers; while if he made a dash at one of the three and upon being refused battle found himself shut in somewhere by the other hostile forces coming up to help, he feared he might meet the same fate as his uncle and father. He therefore rejected any such course, and planned his attack on New Carthage. In so far as this plan was formulated during the winter it must clearly have been tentative and dependent upon the three enemy armies remaining where they were. It is idle to speculate as to what he would have

done (for he must have faced the situation) if one of them moved, or if they patched up their quarrels before Scipio himself left his winter quarters or while he was actually moving. The fact remains that, when he did cross the Ebro, they were in the same places which they had occupied during the winter, and all were out of position.

Not only, however, were all the Carthaginian armies ten days' march from New Carthage, but the trained soldiers who garrisoned the city were only about 1000 strong, while the remaining population, though large, consisted mainly of artisans, tradesmen, and seafaring men, all with little military experience. Scipio knew also the position and plan of the town and its lagoon. In the event of failure he could, since he was master of the sea, withdraw his troops safely. Such were, according to Polybius (X, 8, 4-9), Scipio's reasonable chances. Further, one may add, the command of the sea gave him the means of securing communications with his base near the Ebro, of obtaining adequate commissariat and reinforcements if necessary, and of ensuring the arrival of his fleet at New Carthage at the same time as the army—a vital part of his plan. Negatively, it would prevent Carthage putting supplies into New Carthage by sea, if by any chance the siege should be prolonged. Since the attack must be sudden and unexpected, if it was to succeed, Scipio shared his plan with no one except his friend Laelius. Thus all was in his favour, while New Carthage would be a rich prize.

We do not know precisely what first turned Scipio's thoughts towards this city. He surely acted from the cool determination which Polybius praises rather than as the result of any sudden idea, as the annalistic tradition implies. The chief factor in his decision must have been the realization that he could never master Spain without a base well towards the south. Some means was necessary to make any advance permanent. During the last few years of his father's and uncle's command, the situation had altered but little; a kind of ding-dong warfare was waged till they determined on an active offensive, which had failed partly because Saguntum was not far enough south to form an adequate base. Unless he was to work down the coast and secure a base,

Scipio could never hope to subdue the interior. Besides, he could never really secure a firm hold on south Spain while the Carthaginians controlled the actions of the natives through their hostages. So realizing the need and the possibility, what better base could Scipio look for than the enemy's?

It was a deliberate, if daring and brilliant plan. Scipio had every hope of success if he had the courage to make the attempt. Courage was undoubtedly needed to revert to his father's policy and carry it out with even greater vigour and audacity. The plan required a similar determination of the part of his men, whom he so remarkably inspired. He hoped to be able to storm the town with his 27,500 men by a sudden blow. The only danger was the arrival of a Carthaginian army before he could do so, which was, of course, impossible within ten days. Even if one did arrive before he succeeded, all was not lost, as none of the three Carthaginian armies can have numbered more than 20,000 men, and he might be able to hold off or defeat the one, and still take the town now weakened by ten days' siege. The greatest danger was that the Carthaginians might co-operate once more and two of their armies arrive; then his chances would have been small, none in fact, unless he could cover his men while they embarked. That was a risk and a great one, but it was unlikely to occur. Finally, let us hear Capt. Liddell Hart's comment (p. 42) on Scipio's strategy. 'Those who exalt the main armed forces of the enemy as the primary objective are apt to lose sight of the fact that the destruction of these is only a means to an end, which is the subjugation of the hostile will. In many cases this means is essential—the only safe one, in fact; but in other cases the opportunity for a direct and secure blow at the enemy's base may offer itself, and of its possibility and value this master-stroke of Scipio's is an example which deserves the reflection of modern students of war.'


Early in the spring of 209 Scipio ordered the allied contingents to muster at Tarraco. With 5000 of these he marched to the mouth of the Ebro, where he had ordered the legions to concentrate from their winter quarters and where he also brought his fleet and transports. Then with 25,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry he crossed the Ebro, leaving M. Silanus with 3000 infantry and 500

cavalry to guard the line of the river and protect his rear and communications. Livy (XXVI, 42) describes a council of war after the crossing of the Ebro, in which some of his staff urged Scipio to attack the nearest of the Carthaginian armies, but he himself decided to march on New Carthage. This view, by which Scipio led out his army without being clear against whom he was leading it, contradicts the Polybian account by which Scipio formed his plan of campaign during the winter. Yet as that plan could only operate if the same conditions held during the spring as in the winter, he may well have taken the final decision at this point. At the same time he gave secret orders to Laelius, his only confidant, to sail with the fleet along the coast to New Carthage and synchronize his arrival there with that of the land army. The co-operation of the navy with the army proved excellent, and stands in strong relief against the lack of it and the ill-feeling shown between the two services in, for instance, the ill-fated expedition of 1741 against Cartagena's namesake on the Spanish Main. The land army also, after a rapid march, reached New Carthage before the enemy could move.³⁴


More is involved in the episode of the capture of the town than a magnificent feat of arms. Because of the difficulties inherent in Polybius' account of it, it is a testing ground of his reliability and in particular of his assessment of Scipio's character. Hence it must be examined in some detail, including the topography, since this is bound up with the supposedly miraculous elements in the story.

First a brief description of New Carthage which Polybius himself visited, probably in 151, and described, although his description may rest on literary sources as well as autopsy and, incidentally, is wrongly orientated. The town lay on a peninsula, which ran from east to west, within a deep bay which faced south. On the west it was separated from the mainland by a narrow channel running north into a large lagoon which spread over the land immediately north of the town. The town was thus surrounded by water on three sides: by the lagoon in the north, by the canal in the west, and by the bay leading to the open sea in the south. The configuration of modern Cartagena has changed somewhat:


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
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Figs. 2-5 Development of Cartagena. These plans, based on the work of M. Fernandes Villamarzo Canovas, show the growth of the site and the drying up of the lagoon from



4



5

ancient to modern times. 2 In Roman times. 3 In the sixteenth century. 4 In the seventeenth century. 5 In the eighteenth century.

which are named and can be identified. Just outside the eastern gate lay another hill (Hill of Mercury = Castillo de los Moros), spanning the isthmus between lagoon and the north-east corner of the bay³⁵ (*Pls.* 26, 27; *Figs.* 1-5).

Polybius' account of the assault is briefly as follows. While he was still in winter quarters in Tarraco, Scipio had learnt the plan of New Carthage and the lagoon, and some fishermen there told him that the lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable and that usually the level of the water fell each evening. When he arrived at the town Scipio encamped on the isthmus to the east, throwing up earthworks on the outside of his camp but none on the town side, where the nature of the ground protected it or because he wished to intimidate the enemy and to leave freedom of movement for his own troops (Polybius' two alternative reasons).³⁶ When the fleet arrived, Scipio addressed his troops, promising crowns to those who first scaled the walls, and saying Poseidon had promised his divine help in a dream. Next day, he encircled the city from the sea with his fleet and, drawing up his troops in battle array, attacked at the third hour of the morning. Ladder-bearers were included, therefore clearly an assault was intended. As soon as Mago, the Carthaginian commander of the town, heard the Roman call to attack, he sent out a sortie. A sharp engagement ensued, but at last the Romans prevailed; the Carthaginians fled into the town and the Romans almost got through the gate with them. Failing this, however, they set up their ladders and delivered a vigorous assault—'nothing could restrain their dash and fury'—but without success. When his men were at last worn out, Scipio recalled them, for the day was already advanced. The town seemed saved. But Scipio, who was waiting for the fall of the tide, sent five hundred men with ladders to the lagoon at the north of the town, and then began a new frontal attack on the walls. When the assault was at its height, the tide began to ebb, and all to whom it was unexpected thought it the work of a god. The frontal attack on the gate was continued with fresh courage, while the five hundred men waded through the lagoon, reached and scaled the deserted walls, where the enemy was not expecting an attack. Sweeping along them till

they reached the gate, they caught the Carthaginians in the rear and so the town fell.

This account presents serious difficulties. If Scipio had learnt the nature of the ebb while he was in winter quarters, as Polybius says, why did he not wait till it started before he commenced to attack? If he knew, that is, that the ebb did not take place till evening why did he attack in the early morning? Granting that one of the main objects of the frontal attack was to distract the enemy's attention, why did Scipio deliver such a strong attack, which apparently caused him considerable loss, when he knew that if he waited the ebb would take place and he could effect the plan which he had formed? In other words, on the assumption that he knew that the ebb took place in the evening, the strength of the morning attack is out of all proportion to the need. Another difficulty is presented by the attitude of Mago and the Carthaginians: would they have neglected the possibility of Scipio utilizing the ebb? If fishermen at Tarraco could tell Scipio all about it, surely the Carthaginian commander would be only too conscious of its existence and of the consequent exposure of the walls to the north of the town when it took place. Further, before the assault Scipio announced Poseidon's help—yet if the morning attack had succeeded (as it nearly did) the god's help would have been unnecessary and Scipio's prophecy unfulfilled.

Doubts such as these have led some scholars to question whether the ebb played quite the part which Polybius assigns to it in the capture of New Carthage, and whether Scipio counted on it as a critical part of his strategic plan. Ed. Meyer even considered that the ebb in Polybius' narrative is the rationalistic interpretation of a miraculous account. The 'legend' would stress Scipio's inspiration and favour from heaven. After describing how he reached the town and announced Poseidon's help, it would show his early fruitless attacks. When he is in an awkward position, the god intervenes as promised, and causes the water in the lagoon to ebb so that a rear attack on the town is possible. Thus Scipio's success is ascribed to luck and the intervention of heaven. How then would a rationalist treat this miraculous account? There must, he might think, be some basis for the story of the sinking of the

waters, which, as the divine is rejected, must be some natural phenomenon, an ebb of the tide. Hence the glory of the exploit falls not to the gods and chance, but to Scipio and his careful plans. For obviously if there was an ebb, Scipio would get to know of it, and work it into his strategic plan; and so we find the story of his early enquiries while still in winter quarters. The rationalist takes the popular miraculous account, assumes there must be a basis of fact behind it, and finds it in an ebb which is in fact as untrue as the divine element, but which is more acceptable to man's reason.

Now can something of this sort have happened in Polybius' account? If so, it is obviously due to himself or his chief source, Laelius. Ed. Meyer made Laelius responsible, but as we have seen he was probably not a rationalist. Should then Polybius, who was, be held accountable? This is unthinkable in view of the nature of his sources. Whatever Silenus' account may have contained, Polybius would surely not have completely twisted a plain story told him by Laelius. But apart from any consideration of Laelius' authority, the idea must be rejected on the strength of Scipio's letter to Philip. The authority of this must be final, and if Polybius says that in it Scipio 'explained clearly that it was after making the calculations, which I have just recounted, that he undertook all his operations in Spain and especially the siege of New Carthage', and we remember that these calculations included his learning of the ebb while he was still in winter quarters, then we must accept the ebb as historic fact and seek to explain the difficulties by other means.

If, however, we examine the nature of the ebb tide more closely, perhaps some explanation will be found. According to Polybius, Scipio learnt that 'the whole lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable, and that usually the water in it receded every day towards evening'. We also hear that 'when the tide began to ebb, and the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current set in through the channel to the neighbouring sea'. This is generally assumed to be a regular daily tidal ebb. Polybius says it occurred every evening, but this is, according to Meyer, because he has falsely generalized the time

which was correct for the decisive day, but which must alter on other days. This is, of course, possible, since, although the Mediterranean is often said to be tideless, like most generalizations this is only partly true, as the cases of Venice and Tarentum show. But according to *The Mediterranean Pilot* (I⁶, 68) 'there are no tides in Cartagena harbour' and there is no evidence for them in antiquity unless we accept Polybius at his face value with this slight correction. Yet even if there was a tidal ebb, this does not help to solve our difficulties, because if it was regular, why could not Scipio count on it, and why did not the inhabitants fear attack from that quarter? The other alternative is that it was not a regular tidal action but an irregular one, something extraordinary. If so, what was its nature? Was it due to some exceptional wind, which may have blown at certain times of the year and of which Scipio may have learnt?

Here Livy supplies a vital clue. He says (XXVI, 45, 8) that about midday, in addition to the draining of the water as the tide ebbed seaward, 'a fierce north wind also had sprung up and was carrying the receding lagoon water in the same direction as the tide'. There are no natural difficulties in accepting the wind: conditions in fact favour it. According to *The Mediterranean Pilot* (I⁶, 68 f.), at Cartagena 'with westerly and south-westerly winds, heavy squalls rush down from the hills which border the western and southern sides of the basin' of the harbour. Further, 'there are no tides in Cartagena harbour but with winds from south to south-west the level rises from one to one and a half feet and north to north-east winds have a contrary effect'.³⁷ Again, such winds would not only tend to lower the water in the lagoon, but by forcing the waters of the bay seawards would empty the lagoon still more. Livy, it is true, gives both tide and wind, and Livy is not usually to be preferred to Polybius, but in this case when one account accords with, and the other contradicts, natural physical conditions, one should pause. Livy drew his material from Coelius, who here was probably using Polybius and Silenus (possibly also Fabius Pictor: via Polybius?).³⁸ It is possible therefore that we have here a sound item of information: what would impress onlookers would be the falling of the waters,

the ebb, and there would be less speculation as to its physical cause (tidal action or wind), especially among those who were prepared to see in it the divine help which Scipio had promised.

Such a phenomenon would be perfectly natural; the only 'miraculous' element would be the timing, the fact that it occurred at the right moment for the Romans. Nor would it be unique: other examples may be quoted. We have the well-known Old Testament parallel in the story of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea.³⁹ 'And the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided' (Exodus xiv, 21). 'The fact of the passage of the Red Sea,' says Dr Driver, 'can be questioned only by an extreme and baseless scepticism.' Other parallels are given by J. Rendel Harris (*Dict. of Bible* I, 802): 'The action of wind upon shallow waters has been constantly the cause of phenomenal effects which are not far removed from the miraculous statements in Exodus. E.g. the Russians in 1738 entered the Crimea, which was strongly fortified against them by the Turks, at the Isthmus of Perekop, by a passage made for them by the wind through the shallow waters of the Putrid Sea at the north-west corner of the Sea of Azov. And Major-General Tulloch has recorded an instance even more to the point when, as he himself observed, under a strong east wind the waters of Lake Menzaleh at the entrance of the Suez Canal receded for a distance of seven miles (*Journal of Victoria Institute*, XXVIII, p. 267). Other instances of the same effect which would have been counted miraculous if they had been Biblical may be found in a paper by Naville (*Journal of Victoria Institute*, XXVI, p. 12).' For instance, we are told that a book, *Le Fardelet hystorial*, was 'printed in Geneva in 1495, in which year there was such a very strong wind on the ninth day of January that it drove back the Rhône into the lake as much as one fourth of a league above Geneva, and it looked like a wall of water, and it lasted nearly an hour before the water could flow'. And again 'on the Nineteenth of January 1645, owing to a very strong wind, between seven and ten in the morning, the inhabitants could go down on dry ground between the bridges and pass from one bank to the other'.⁴⁰ Or to take an example from

ancient history, one which Josephus (II, 16, 5) compared to the Red Sea episode: when Alexander was in Pamphylia and wished to get past the cliffs of Mount Climax which came down to the sea, he learnt that it was only possible to go by the beach when a north wind was blowing. The wind, which had been blowing south, changed at the critical moment and he got through quickly, although his men had to wade. This change of wind was naturally regarded as a sign of divine favour. So too, the exceptional lowness of the water, when Cyrus wanted to cross the Euphrates, was taken as a similar sign.⁴¹

Thus the ebb at New Carthage may have been a phenomenon, a happy coincidence, an example of *Tύχη* or Divine Providence, according to the individual interpreter's view of the meaning of history. Scipio may have learnt that some disturbance occurred occasionally, due to squalls; he could not, of course, count on it, but when by a coincidence it took place, he used it to the full. Polybius, the rationalist, would tend to under-emphasize the *Tύχη* element of the incident, and has perhaps made a false generalization not of the time of day of the phenomenon, as Meyer suggested, but of its regularity. Further, the wind would not have to be of much strength, as Scipio already knew, according to Polybius, that 'the lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable'—a sentence which has been too often overlooked in modern considerations of the problem; if it had been accorded its proper value, much discussion might have been saved. If the tide was regular, the difficulties of the whole account remain, unless we can suppose that Scipio did not have precise information as to what time of the day it would take place, and so could not count on it. But this is unlikely, because he had arrived there the previous day and could have observed it; or, even if he had not, one would have expected him to send on scouts to get the information, if it was to be a vital part of his strategic plan. Thus we must suppose the sinking of the waters to have been due to some exceptional cause; in which circumstance, of course, the story of divine intervention would receive far greater support.

But even so, the statement that Scipio hoped to send a detachment through the lagoon need not be rejected. Not necessarily

because he was hoping a wind might arise to make this possible—that is merely subsidiary—but because of the plain statement of Polybius (X, 8, 7): ‘the lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable’ (βατὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον). Scipio learnt this when he was in winter quarters, and formed the idea of sending a detachment through the shallow lagoon. He also knew, if the above hypothesis is correct, that a wind did blow occasionally, which made the level of the lake sink even lower. Thus an attack from the lagoon side of the town was probably included in his plans, though it could not be reckoned on as critical. When he reached the town and commenced the siege, he detached 500 men, with ladders, in the hope that they might be able to wade through, when the attack was at its height. This was helped by the occurrence of what he had hardly dared to expect. Such a coincidence as this would easily lead to the growth of the idea of a divine intervention. At a moment when all seemed doubtful, something happened which most of the troops would not understand clearly. They would only know that a wading detachment had received some obscure help, which led to the fall of the town. In the camp talk, in an atmosphere of mystery, the event began to be distorted, and the belief that Scipio was a favourite of the gods was born.

If then the ebb was an extra bit of luck, what are we to make of Scipio’s earlier references to Neptune’s promised help? Here is a further complication: whereas Polybius says that Scipio had told his troops of this hope on the previous evening, Livy puts it in a short speech which Scipio delivered when his troops were about to enter the lagoon. One solution would be to eliminate the contradiction by supposing that Livy referred to the promise, like Polybius, on the previous evening and then repeated it on the next day; this is conceivable because there is a lacuna in Livy’s text at the end of the evening speech (end of XXVI, 43), but this supposition does not harmonize very well with 45, 9 which perhaps implies that Scipio is mentioning Neptune for the first time at the moment of attack. If then there is a contradiction, which version should be accepted? It would make better sense to follow Livy, since then Scipio would only be making the reference to Neptune when he knew that the fording of the lake was possible.

But, if so, Polybius' reputation as a historian would be involved, since, as Walbank emphasizes, 'he repeatedly insists that the speeches recorded by a historian should correspond with what was actually said'. There need be no real difficulty in accepting Polybius' order and supposing that Livy has transferred the speech to a later point for rhetorical and dramatic reasons, because it seems that Scipio counted on a lagoon attack in any case, so the promise would encourage the men, whether or not the ebb came (if it did not, the matter might well be forgotten in the general joy of victory). But an additional reason may be suggested. As will be seen, Scipio intended that the fleet should play an important role in the operation, so this general reference to Neptune's help would encourage the navy also. If, with Polybius, Scipio's action was a calculated fraud designed to encourage his men, the risk he took of it not coming off was small (the naval attack was in fact most successful), but others may prefer to believe that Scipio really had some feeling that the lagoon and sea might play a decisive role and that he would enjoy the help of Neptune.

Livy also supplies more information about the action of the fleet. Polybius (X, 12, 1) merely says that Scipio 'encircling the city from the sea by ships equipped with all kinds of missiles under the command of Laelius . . . began the assault about the third hour'. Livy however tells (XXVI, 43, 44) how, after encamping, Scipio drew up the ships in the harbour as though he were going to blockade the place by sea. He was then rowed round the fleet, and advised the captains to be on the alert during the night. Next day, while the walls were being stormed, 'the ships began an attack on that part of the city which is washed by the sea. Here, however, there was too much noise and confusion to admit of a regular assault'. This additional material probably comes from Polybius' source, since it is more likely that Polybius would omit an aspect in which Scipio did not play a leading part than that the original source would let the fleet start and then do nothing.⁴² Its general reliability is confirmed by the story of the subsequent rivalry for the *corona muralis*, awarded to the first man over the wall (L. XXVI, 48). Two claimants came forward, a centurion Q. Tiberilius, and a *socius navalis*, Sextus Digitius, each

man representing the claims of his branch of the service as well as his personal achievement. When disputes and disorder continued even after an attempt at arbitration, Scipio judiciously awarded a crown to each man, and also singled out Laelius, the commander of the fleet, for special distinction. Both these facts underline the important part played by the fleet in the capture of the town in the view of Livy's source. It is curious that it is Livy rather than Polybius who stressed the importance of the fleet, considering that Laelius himself was one of Polybius' sources. Anyway, Polybius, notwithstanding the personal influence of Laelius, has determined to keep his hero in the centre of the canvas, and so has not given the fleet its due significance.

We must now revert to the storming of the town. On arriving at New Carthage, Scipio encamped on the isthmus in the east, his lines stretching from the sea on the south, over the Castillo de los Moros to the lagoon in the north, thus effectively blocking the connection of New Carthage with the mainland. He protected the outer side, i.e. the east, with a trench and a double palisade, reaching right across the neck of land, in view of the possibility of the arrival of one of the three Carthaginian armies. The side facing the town was left unprotected, because the position of the hill was quite strong enough in itself, and it would leave greater tactical freedom. The fleet under Laelius arrived at the right time, and after drawing it up as if to blockade the town by sea, and reviewing it, Scipio addressed his troops, inspiring his men with the self-confidence and courage which he so obviously felt. He also promised golden crowns to those who should be the first to mount the walls, and the usual rewards for conspicuous courage.

The next day, encircling the city from the sea with ships furnished with all kinds of missiles, round from the south of his camp to the bridge over the canal in the west (now the Puerta de Murcia), Scipio drew up his men outside the camp at the third hour of the morning. It is clear that he did not launch a strong attack at first, because if he had wished to storm the town he would have tried a surprise attack earlier. Actually he tried to provoke the Carthaginians to a sortie, which if successful would

mean a fight on ground favourable to himself and considerable loss to the already numerically small garrison, while he might even force his way into the town with the fugitives. He may also have hoped to draw the best Carthaginian troops from their position on the hills in the town, which would then be exposed to attack by his fleet. It is clear that he did not wish to take the offensive, but that this move was a preliminary to the second part of his plan, namely a regular assault with all his strength. The preliminary move cannot have been a vital part of his plan, as it was very doubtful whether Mago would attack, and whether Scipio could force his way in, if he succeeded in beating the Carthaginians back. However, Mago fell into the trap; as soon as Scipio's troops were drawn up and seemed about to attack, Mago sent out his 2000 armed citizens from the gate by the isthmus, 'feeling sure', according to Polybius, 'of striking terror into the enemy and entirely defeating their design'. Surely a forlorn hope against Scipio's 27,000 men! Mago then sent out as reinforcements his 1000 regular troops, who had been posted on the hills Molinete and Concepcion (which respectively protected the lagoon and overlooked the sea): he now thought they were more necessary for the land battle.⁴³ So Scipio's object of drawing off these troops from that side of the town was accomplished. But the engagement was unequal. For Carthaginian support had to come through a single gate a quarter of a mile away and then attack on unfavourable ground and uphill,⁴⁴ while the Roman supplies were immense and at hand. 'Yet the battle was hotly contested as both sides had picked their best men'—so we must assume Mago's regular troops were engaged. At last, the Carthaginians were forced back by sheer weight, receiving many casualties in the actual fight and retreat, while many more of them were trodden down in the rush through the gate. The Romans very nearly forced their way in with the fugitives, but not quite. Thus Scipio's hopes had been more than justified, though not of course completely successful. He had seriously weakened the enemy's strength and morale. Scipio now tried to convert his partial success into victory, and turned to the second, more serious part of his plan, namely an assault on the walls from as many sides as

possible. He wisely consulted his own safety by having three men with him carrying large shields to protect him, knowing well the value of his leadership. He kept on the higher ground where he could see to direct operations, and where he could pass along his lines to inspire his men, rather than risk all by dashing into the thick of the battle.

Then the real storming started. The fleet beleaguered the town from the south, while Polybius (X, 13) gives a vivid picture of how detachment after detachment was hurled against the walls facing the isthmus, until, as the hour was advanced, Scipio recalled his wearied troops. Since Scipio could not count on the ebb, the assault had probably been made with all his strength and had failed. He had spent the greater part of a day now, without success. After allowing his men to rest awhile, he distributed still more ladders, and recommenced the assault with such energy that 'the whole extent of the wall was covered with escaladers'. The defenders, who had hoped the danger was averted for the moment and were short of ammunition, were thrown into confusion. At the same time the wading detachment prepared to start through the shallow lagoon on a desperate adventure, to try to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Suddenly, as the sun began to decline, a squall from the north sprang up which forced the water from the lagoon to the sea. Scipio, who had learnt in Tarraco of such a possibility, was less surprised than the men who were about to start through the lagoon; in his extraordinary confidence and exultation of spirit, he may even have anticipated some such external help. 'And the Lord said unto Moses, Lift thou up thy rod, and stretch out thine hand over the sea, and divide it: and the children of Israel shall go into the midst of the sea on dry ground. And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided' (Exodus xiv, 15, 16, 21). To the fearful, Scipio now, if not earlier, proclaimed it as the work of Neptune. Astonished and inspired, the five hundred men raced with their ladders through the sinking waters of the lagoon. At the same time Scipio urged the frontal attack still more strongly, to divert the enemy's attention away from the lagoon to

the gate, where the Romans redoubled their efforts. The wading party soon reached the wall through the now shallow water, and ascended the deserted battlements, probably between Monte Molinete and Monte Sacro. Mago was in a desperate situation; his front was now widened still further. He was attacked on all sides, on the south by the Roman fleet, on the east by the even more vigorous assaults of the enemy's main force, and lastly by this new danger from the north. With few troops originally, and these now weakened by casualties, he could do little. The Roman escalading party swept along the north wall, and, reaching the gate, attacked the enemy in the rear, and thus were able to cut through the bolts, so that those outside could force their way in.

At this moment the whole defence was crumbling up. The escaladers at the isthmus were establishing themselves on the battlements, and men from the fleet were scaling the walls on the south. So the city fell. Those who defended the southern hill, Concepcion, were dislodged, and a massacre began. Scipio went with 1000 men to the citadel (Monte Molinete) against Mago, who surrendered after an attempted resistance. Then the massacre stopped and pillaging began. At nightfall some slept in the camp, Scipio bivouacked on the citadel, doubtless in Hasdrubal's palace, with his 1000 men, while the pillagers were ordered to collect the booty in the marketplace and sleep there; the light-armed troops were withdrawn from the camp, and stationed on Monte Concepcion.

On the next day, the booty was divided among the troops in the regular Roman fashion. Of the 10,000 prisoners, the citizens with their wives and children were sent home, and received complete freedom; these would be, in the main, Carthaginian colonists with a mixture of native Spaniards.⁴⁵ The 2000 workmen, mostly Spaniards, were made public slaves of Rome, but were promised their freedom, if they were diligent in their work, when Rome won the war. Scipio incorporated in his fleet the strongest of the rest (Carthaginians, Libyans and Spaniards) and thus manned eighteen captured vessels, almost doubling the crew of each ship; he now had a fleet of fifty-three ships. He promised these men also their freedom on the final defeat of

Carthage if they did their duty. He committed Mago and the leading Carthaginians to the care of Laelius, and treated the 300 Spanish hostages with the greatest courtesy, assuring them of their safety and their restoration, if their tribes would become allies of Rome. He gave presents to the children, we are told, and Polybius further repeats two anecdotes to illustrate his humane-ness. At the request of the wife of Mandonius, brother of Indibilis, ruler of the Ilergetes, Scipio was made to realize the dangers with which the beautiful young hostages were threatened in the captured city. So 'grasping her by the right hand he bade her and the rest be of good cheer, for he would look after them as if they were his own sisters and children'. Again, when some young Romans brought a very beautiful girl to Scipio, knowing he was fond of women (*φιλογύνης*), he showed himself a pattern of moderation by giving her back to her father. Livy tells the story at far greater length, and weaves into it the love of the young girl and a young Spanish prince, Aluccius by name. These stories, invented to illustrate Scipio's character, possibly by Ennius, probably give a true picture of Scipio's policy and treatment of his prisoners.

Besides this great accession to his strength, there fell into Scipio's hands a vast quantity of material booty, including the public funds of the Carthaginians, more than 600 talents; these, with the 400 he had brought from Rome, gave him a reserve of about 1000. He secured an immense quantity of war munitions, whether or not Livy's actual list (XXVI, 47) can be accepted; the Carthaginians must have accumulated a very great store of supplies in their Spanish headquarters. Further, the Carthaginian mint apparently fell into Scipio's hands and it even produced a series of coins which retained the Punic reverse type of horse and palm-tree, but replaced the portrait of Hannibal on the obverse with that of the new master, Scipio (cf. note 18 and *Pls.* 4, 17).

Laelius was sent by sea to take home the chief prisoners with news of the victory, which would encourage the home government and win even greater support for Scipio, who now spent some time in New Carthage reorganizing. He kept his troops up to their standard by a series of regular exercises: though he had captured the enemy's base, there were still three Carthaginian

armies in the field. On the first day he made them double thirty stades in full armour; on the second day they saw to their equipment and were reviewed; the next day was a rest day; then arms drill, and so on. Scipio, however, was probably engaged not merely in keeping his men keyed to concert pitch, but in training them in new methods. He had realized the essential weak points of the Roman army of his day, and had planned how best they might be remedied; what these were, and what brilliant developments Scipio introduced, will be considered later when they have been seen actually put into practice on the field of Baecula. But it was doubtless now and throughout the coming winter that Scipio found time to train and discipline his army in that revolution in tactical method which was to win the war and place him among the world's greatest generals.

Apart from the drill necessary to carry out his tactical reforms, it is significant that Scipio spent part of his time in training his men in arms drill. Also in order that there might be no shortage of weapons for practice and for real fighting, he gave special attention to the artificers. He had appointed skilled supervisors in the different branches, and saw personally to the manufacture and distribution of weapons, visiting the workshops. The town became a 'workshop of war'. One of the chief weapons was the sword, the type of which the Romans changed about this time. The *Suda*, following a lost passage of Polybius, records that at the time of the Hannibalic War the Romans adopted the excellent Celtiberian sword, which was well pointed and suitable for cutting with either edge. Though objections have been raised, the Romans probably did change over about this time from a short Graeco-Italian sword of the Hallstatt type, which was better for thrusting than cutting, to a stabbing-cutting weapon of La Tène I type which was used by the Iberians, and this new sword became known as the *gladius Hispaniensis*.⁴⁶ It is tempting to suppose that the change was made by Scipio in Spain, although there is some evidence in Polybius himself (II, 30, 8; 33, 5) to suggest that the Romans were using this type as early as the Gallic War of 225-223; if this is so, they may have adopted it from Spanish mercenaries in the service of Carthage in the First Punic War.⁴⁷

Thus perhaps the chronological statement in the *Suda* should not be pressed, but in any case Scipio will have trained his troops to use this relatively new weapon with great efficiency.

Then the fleet had to be reorganized and kept in fighting trim. The town itself was strengthened, the walls repaired, and Scipio did not neglect the silver mines, which formed so important an item in New Carthage's value. Thus his personal supervision was needed and given in every branch, apart from the general keeping of discipline—a necessity, as is shown by the high feeling engendered by the dispute for the *corona muralis*. Now that the strain was temporarily over, he had to prevent his troops becoming slack. He may also have tried to open up and secure the way to Baetica for the next year's campaign. Livy (XXVI, 51) refers to his reception of numerous embassies from native tribes while on his way to Tarraco, and to his council with all his allies, old and new, when he got there. Scipio may even have sent out some small military expeditions, for instance, against the town of Baria, some 70 miles south of New Carthage—incidents not important enough to be mentioned by Polybius, but which have left a faint impress in the inferior tradition.⁴⁸ Thus, besides consolidating his base, Scipio paved the way for future advance by force and alliance. Finally, he garrisoned the now strengthened town, and left with his army, navy, and hostages for Tarraco where he intended to spend the winter.

Nothing positive is known about the three Carthaginian armies during this period. They did not and could not act. Despite propaganda attempts to minimize their loss, they realized its seriousness, but made no attempt to recover their base. Perhaps they thought that Scipio's position was now too strong, protected as he was by the fortifications of the town and by the fleet. Perhaps they were kept busy and feared to leave their present positions, as the Spanish tribes may well have shown signs of disaffection when the news spread abroad. The only counter-blow they could have attempted was an attack on the Ebro, which they feared to venture, and so they remained inactive from the Roman point of view, leaving Scipio time to form his new plans and spread revolt among the northern tribes of Spain.

Thus Scipio's daring was more than justified by its results. The Carthaginian power in Spain received the first great blow, which struck at its very roots. The Carthaginians had lost their main base, the key to their control of Spain; and the loss of Spain would have severe repercussions in Italy. By gaining the hostages of the Spanish tribes and his wise use of them, Scipio obtained a hold on the country which was even more significant than mere territorial advance. He had strengthened his fleet at the expense of the enemy, and so now more than ever were the Romans masters of the sea. Apart from all the actual property, munitions, and money which he captured, he had won control of the silver mines of New Carthage, and from this point perhaps began the financial difficulties of the Carthaginians, who depended so largely on mercenaries.⁴⁹ The loss of this source of revenue reacted widely on the whole war. Finally, Scipio had gained that which the Romans had always needed in Spain, the control of the coast road and an effective base.

Brewitz suggests that the capture of New Carthage was not such an heroic deed, though it proved *ex ungue leonem*: the position of his camp, the learning of the ebb, the feint on the gate, the march through the lagoon, all show that Scipio was no average conventional general. Also we may add his use of the victory. But surely he did more than this. The mere formation of the plan, which involved a return to the disastrous offensive policy of his house, his disregard of the main armed forces of the enemy and his attack on their base, his hold upon his men, the courage and determination with which he carried it through, all show the greatest spirit and ability. If the ebb in the lagoon was a stroke of luck on which Scipio was not seriously counting, his use of it showed that he was ready for it. Fortune may favour the brave, but it was a question of trusting in God *and* keeping his powder dry. The only objection that can be raised against Scipio's performance was its risk, which was reduced to a minimum. The result far outweighed this, for with the fall of New Carthage a blow was struck at the Carthaginians' power in Spain (and indeed at their hopes in the whole war) from which they never recovered.

CHAPTER III

BAECULA

SCIPIO SPENT THE WINTER of 209–208 at Tarraco.⁵⁰ It was not necessary immediately to follow up his first blow: a short delay would allow time for the victory to work its effect on the minds and sympathies of the Spaniards. The confidence and friendship of many had been won, as we saw, by restoring their hostages. The change of feeling which spread over the Peninsula is seen by the action of Edeco, the chieftain of the Edetani, a powerful tribe between the Ebro and Sucro. On hearing that after the capture of New Carthage his wife and sons had fallen into Scipio's hands, he immediately headed the pro-Roman movement and went to Tarraco, begging for friendship and the restoration of his family; he pointed out how much depended on Scipio's treatment of him, as the other tribes would no doubt take his case as an example. As it suited Scipio's hopes and policy, he granted the chief's requests, handing over the hostages, and giving perhaps not the formal friendship which Edeco was seeking, but establishing a more personal relationship. Scipio came as conciliator as well as conqueror, and behind his many acts of courtesy lay not only scheming calculation, but a genuine desire to win affection and not the mere submission which Edeco showed when he made obeisance and called Scipio king. Scipio's romantic personality, like that of Sertorius later, fired the imagination of the natives, so that his action, as Edeco had predicted, now led many Spaniards, hitherto unfriendly, to embrace his cause.

When Edeco and his family had been sent back home, Scipio prepared for the next year's campaign. Since he now held the coast and sea, his fleet was only necessary to maintain his naval supremacy. This was important enough, but it did not need so

large a fleet as he now had, while a navy would not help him to overcome the three Carthaginian armies in Spain. So, beaching the ships at Tarraco, he broke up his navy and distributed the pick of the crews among his land forces, which were thus increased possibly by some 3000 to 4000 men. He had sufficient arms for the new forces, as he had captured a great amount in New Carthage, and also had wisely manufactured many since. With this increased force and with New Carthage as a base, he could think of a more serious offensive than that of his predecessors, and he planned to strike farther south at one of the Carthaginian armies. So in the spring of 208, after Laelius had returned from Rome, he left winter quarters and advanced south.

During the winter, the Carthaginians were still misusing their earlier victories and oppressing the natives even after the loss of New Carthage. So unreasonable were Hasdrubal's demands for money and hostages that the two greatest chiefs in Spain, Indibilis and Mandonius, hitherto regarded as the most faithful supporters of Carthage, one night withdrew from the Carthaginian camp with all their forces to a strong position; their example was followed by most of Hasdrubal's other Spanish allies. Thus, as soon as Scipio started on his march, he was joined by Indibilis, who had been in communication with him for some time and now came out openly on the Roman side and, in submitting, hailed Scipio as king, as Edeco had done earlier. Scipio returned to him his daughters, whom he appears not to have returned previously with the other hostages; Indibilis agreed to follow the Roman commanders and obey their orders and no doubt help with supplies. This agreement was embodied in a treaty, but there is no evidence that it or similar treaties made by Scipio with other Spanish chieftains were ever formally referred to Rome.⁵¹ Scipio needed unity of command and, further, he got it. He suffered from disobedience among his officers or allies less than did many other generals in Spain. For instance, Sertorius had much difficulty with Perperna and Hirtuleius; while Wellington's trouble with the Spaniards at Talavera taught him never to trust them. Scipio granted Indibilis and Mandonius the special honour of sharing the Roman camp, and then, reinforced and guided by

these new allies, he continued his march southwards, everywhere welcomed by the natives.

Hasdrubal faced a very difficult position. His grip on the natives had weakened, and Indibilis had openly revolted. He was still troubled by the estrangement of the other generals, while Scipio might arrive with a numerically superior army. After the loss of New Carthage he was cut off from his base and home country, and communication was difficult. Delay would mean a gradual decline of his strength through the desertion of the Spaniards, and a consequent increase of his enemies. He must act soon, stop the wastage of strength, and put everything to the test before it was too late. So he determined to fight. If he won, he could then deliberate at leisure on his next move. Victory would mean a reversal of feeling among the Spaniards; he would regain his strength by reclaiming his former allies or by forced levies if necessary, and then with renewed forces win his way through to Italy. But he was by no means assured of success, as the Romans were considerably stronger. He determined, if he failed, to retreat with as many survivors as possible, after collecting all the money he could, and make his way to Italy to join his brother Hannibal, recruiting natives on his route. He would strike the Romans as severe a blow as possible, and then leave Scipio to the care of Mago and the other Hasdrubal. Thus he would only be obeying the command of the Carthaginian State, which he had received seven or eight years previously.

Hasdrubal's next thought was to find suitable ground for his duel. He spent the winter in central Spain among the Carpetani—should he turn north or south? He could not hope to reach or find a suitable site in the Ebro district, since the Romans were now supreme there; even the territory south of the river was pro-Roman, the Edetani having thrown in their lot with the Romans. If he turned to the north, there was now New Carthage on his flank or rear, so he must turn south where the Carthaginian power was still unshaken. The winter was passed in preparing for this plan, especially in raising money—a lengthy business in the exhausted land, as the mines of New Carthage were now lost and only those of Baetica remained. Thither Hasdrubal moved

from central Spain, thus leaving the way open for Scipio to march south unmolested. Hasdrubal's headquarters were in the neighbourhood of Castulo, near the town of Baecula (Bailen) and the silver mines—the latter perhaps in the hilly country north of Bailen, near La Carolina, the mining area of today.⁵² But on learning that Scipio was approaching Castulo, he prepared for battle. He had to choose his ground carefully and find a strong position by which he could counteract the numerical superiority of the Romans, who had perhaps 35–45,000 men compared with his 25,000.⁵³ He advanced to the south-east of Bailen and camped probably on a height near Ahorcado, where he had in his rear the effective protection of a river (Rio del Rumber), and in his front a stretch of ground, defended by a ridge, of sufficient depth for safety and of sufficient width for deploying his troops⁵⁴ (Fig. 6; *Pls.* 28, 29). Strategically also he was in a strong position. The valley of the Guadalquivir (Baetis) is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena, on the south by the Sierra Nevada, while the east end is blocked by the Sierra Sagra. The only entrance from the east through these mountains into the fertile valley of Andalusia is through the valley of the Guadalquivir and its tributary the Guadalimar, and these are commanded by the district around Bailen, especially by the heights of Jabalquinto. These heights, however, were occupied by Scipio on his arrival. This hardly implies, as it might seem to do, a serious tactical mistake by Hasdrubal, because the only position which Scipio could occupy opposite him, though strong, suffered from inadequate water supply. Scipio was thus forced to fight on Hasdrubal's ground.

In this position both armies waited for two days. Scipio was eager for battle, but hesitated in face of the strength of the enemy's position. On the third day, not knowing whether the other two Carthaginian armies might not come up, in which case his situation would be desperate, he determined to put all to the hazard. On the morning of the battle, he sent out two detachments, one to hold the entrance of the valley through which the river ran (probably where the Bailen–Malaga road crosses the Guadiel, just by Bailen station; for here the river valley begins to widen out), and the other to block the road which led from the city




Fig. 6 Battle of Baecula. Contour lines, at 20 metres, are marked only on the probable sites of the battle. The two left-hand (i.e. westerly) camps are those suggested by Veith; the ground between would then be the site of the battle. The more northerly site is that suggested by the author.

along the slope of the hill into the country (L. XXVII, 18, 10). This is more difficult to identify, as it is not known where the ancient road ran; possibly the detachment went up the Guaditel a little beyond where the Bailen-Linares road crosses it, or somewhere along the modern road running out of Bailen to the north-east. After getting his forces ready for battle in the camp, Scipio

launched an attack of his *velites* and of a picked force of infantry against Hasdrubal's covering force of Numidian cavalry and Balearic and African light-armed infantry, which was stationed on the terrace. Scipio's men carried out the order with great gallantry, crossed the river which is not more than waist-deep, and, pressing up the slope on the other side under a hail of weapons and stones from the enemy, struggled to the more level ground where their superior efficiency told. Hasdrubal, who had at first kept his main troops in the camp, relying on the strength of his position and not expecting a serious attack, was forced to the conclusion that he must now try to hold the terrace with all his forces; for in itself it was a strong position, if adequately guarded. So he began to lead his men out of the camp down towards the ridge. Scipio, who doubtless had in the meantime been leading out his troops, sent the whole of his light-armed troops to support the first attack and to keep the enemy's attention directed to the front where the battle was now raging. Then he divided the main part of his army, and led one half himself up the Arroyo de la Muela on the enemy's left, while Laelius was sent, with the other half, up the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza on his right. Hasdrubal was still busy deploying his troops and had not yet occupied the ground on his wings, when the two Roman divisions swept up on to the terrace on both wings, and fell on the flank of the Carthaginians, while they were still trying to form up. Broken on the wings and fearing to be surrounded, the Carthaginians fell back, and the Roman centre gained the plateau on the top. Hasdrubal, seeing that the day was lost, decided not to fight to the death, but in accordance with his original plan hastily collected as many troops and elephants, and as much of his money as he could, and fled to the north. Scipio captured and plundered the enemy's camp, taking prisoner in all some 12,000 men, according to Polybius (X, 40, 1), a possible figure if it includes the population of Baecula. Hasdrubal must have retired with half or two-thirds of his army.

The tactics employed by Scipio at Baecula were a complete break with the traditional movements of a Roman army, and mark a real turning-point in military development. The Roman army, which was traditionally drawn up in three lines, suffered

from two chief weaknesses. It relied mainly on its weight, and while able to advance with devastating force, or to retire, it could not wheel easily and so could be outflanked and surrounded by a more mobile enemy, as had happened at Cannae. Secondly, inadequate training of the individual precluded separate action by the army's component parts; it must act as a whole. These weaknesses Scipio tried to remedy by training his troops to new methods. At Baecula he abandoned the traditional tactics of the three lines—namely, that each line should reinforce the one in front of it by filling up gaps caused by casualties. Instead, he placed his light troops with some infantry in the centre, while the really effective legionaries were posted on the wings to act as independent bodies. With his centre of light troops he held the enemy's light-armed and directed all attention to the front. His chief attack was launched by his best troops against the flanks of Hasdrubal's best troops, who were rushing forward to join what they thought would be the main battle. The weak point of Scipio's move was that his light troops were not holding the enemy's main body. He had not yet learnt completely the lesson of Cannae, where the Romans were so held on their whole line that they could not face or withdraw from the Carthaginian flank attack. At Baecula, Hasdrubal met Scipio's flank attack by sacrificing his light-armed troops, and at the same time withdrawing his main troops, who still had freedom of movement and were not held by the Romans. Thus the battle, which was a tactical victory for Scipio, was a strategic defeat. He could not hold the whole body of the enemy till it was surrounded, and so Hasdrubal was able to withdraw to Italy with the loss of only a part of his troops. It could be argued that the Romans might have rolled up more effectively from one flank only, with double the force, as was done for instance in the battles of Magnesia and Tigranocerta. If this had been carried out on Scipio's right wing, Hasdrubal might not have been able to withdraw easily, and so have been forced back to the river in the rear. However, if Hasdrubal intended to retreat if the day went against him, he would probably have got away; Scipio's attempt to surround him was probably the better manoeuvre. But though it was not a complete victory for Rome, Scipio had set in motion

the rock which was to crush Hannibal. The new training and tactics had won the day. Ilipa, the Great Plains, and Zama were only further developments of the same tactical principles, and merely confirmed the verdict of Baecula.

Though Scipio won the battle by such brilliant tactics, nevertheless Hasdrubal withdrew northwards towards the Tagus and marched on towards the Pyrenees. Scipio sent a detachment to watch his movements, or as Livy puts it, 'to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees'. This force probably prevented Hasdrubal from taking the easier road to the east and forced him northwards; but it did not prove a serious obstacle. Livy says that on his way Hasdrubal was joined by his namesake, the son of Gisgo, and by his own brother Mago, and that at a council of war it was decided that Hasdrubal should proceed to Italy, and that Mago after handing over his army to the other Hasdrubal should go to the Balearic Isles to hire mercenaries, while the son of Gisgo was to retire far into Lusitania and avoid any collision with the Romans; a force of 3000 horse was given to Masinissa the Numidian prince with which to scour western Spain. This disposition of the Carthaginian forces probably represents what took place, but it is unlikely that Hasdrubal Barca joined the conference. He had already determined to go to Italy in case of defeat, and it is not clear that he was on friendly enough terms with the other generals to confer even if he had the opportunity. If they had intended at last to act with him, as Livy implies, why did they not arrive a few days earlier, to help him crush Scipio once and for all? Hasdrubal carried out his original purpose, while the other two Carthaginian generals made their own arrangements.

Scipio did not follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked in the rear by the other generals; although he knew of their dissensions, he could not tell how long they would remain on bad terms. He clearly did fear their movements, because he transferred his army to the Carthaginian camp, which was a stronger position than his own.⁵⁵ Many of the Spanish tribes went over to the Roman side. Towards his prisoners Scipio adopted his usual conciliatory policy: he dismissed all the native Spaniards without ransom, and left them free to return home; however, he sold the

Africans. He treated his allies generously, giving Indibilis 300 of the horses, while he distributed the rest among those who had none. Livy adds to Polybius' account another anecdote. Among the prisoners was Masinissa's nephew, who had been forbidden by his uncle to join in the fighting but had done so and been captured. Scipio showed the boy the greatest kindness, giving him many presents, and then returned him to his uncle in safety. Whether this generosity was calculated or spontaneous, it certainly paid good dividends later: Masinissa's help was to prove invaluable in the future. Then after sending the force to watch Hasdrubal's movements, Scipio retired to winter quarters at Tarraco.


This settlement with the Spanish tribes, whose action in surrendering did not at this period involve any suggestion of dishonour,⁵⁶ was the scene of an important episode. When the Spaniards came in to submit, they saluted Scipio as king. Previously, after New Carthage, Edeco had so called him and had even made obeisance, and his example had been followed by Indibilis and his men, but then, as Polybius records, Scipio, though moved, had not paid much attention to the greeting. But now this later incident caused him to give thought to the implications. He therefore assembled the Spaniards and told them that he wished to be called kingly by them and to be so in the truest sense, but he did not wish to be a king or to be called so by anyone; he ordered them to call him *imperator*. This is almost certainly the meaning of the title given by Polybius: he uses the word *strategos*, 'general', but, as he nowhere employs the more technical later Greek equivalent of *imperator*, namely *autokrator*, he is probably recording the use of *imperator* here, which is the word that Livy uses in his version of the episode.


There is no good reason to doubt the truth of the episode or of Scipio's recorded reaction to it. The story probably rests on the authority of Laelius, and a people may well be carried away in the joy and enthusiasm of a great victory, for such Baecula must have seemed at the time, whatever the later verdict of history. Further, although Scipio was far too shrewd to accept a title which would afford his political opponents in Rome a splendid handle against



24 Walls of the Roman camp at Almenara on a hill facing southwards to Saguntum; its position near a temple of Venus is given precisely by Polybius. Built by the elder Scipios, it was presumably used also by Scipio Africanus (*see* p. 257)


25 General view of Saguntum, looking westwards, with the Roman theatre in the foreground. The medieval walls and castle no doubt roughly correspond with the ancient pattern





26–27 Cartagena, from Mt. Concepcion, looking (Plate 26) north-east and (Plate 27) east (*see* pp. 254f.). *Above* 26. In middle distance: extreme left Mt. Sacro, centre (behind long building) San José, right Cast. de Despeña Perros. Beyond is the eastern part of the plain of Almajar. *Right* 27. The long building on the left centre marks the approximate line of the eastern city-wall and the long, whitish, building in the centre is in the valley outside; beyond, across the centre of the picture is the






Cast. de los Moros, the site of Scipio's camp. In the foreground, the Bull-ring and the site of a Roman amphitheatre

28 Probable site of the battle of Baecula. View taken from near Jarosa, looking to the north-east (*below*). See pp. 257ff.





29 Contour model of the site of the battle of Baecula, with super-imposed battle-plan. *See Fig. 6.* Hasdrubal's camp lies at the top, near Ahorcado. The site suggested by Veith lies on the left side of the picture

him, this may not have been his only motive: the admiration of Polybius and Livy for his restraint may not be unfounded. Although the salutation may not have meant very much to the tribal Spanish chiefs—probably only that they recognized another leader more powerful than themselves or their previous Punic overlords—there was another aspect: Scipio's relations with his own troops. Livy, writing after the dictatorship of Julius Caesar, not unnaturally attributes to Scipio the explanation that the title of a king, though elsewhere a high honour, was intolerable at Rome; but, more important, Livy adds that Scipio told the Spaniards that 'his highest title was that of *imperator* and his soldiers had addressed him with it'.

Was Scipio therefore the first of the Roman *imperatores*? In the later Republic it became customary for a general after a victory to be saluted as *imperator* by his troops, and to assume this as an honorary title until after the end of his magistracy or triumph, while the title might sometimes be confirmed by the Senate. From the time of Sulla in particular, when the army played a more important role in Roman politics, the title increasingly signified military supremacy, and under the Empire it denoted the supreme power of the emperor, who used it as a *praenomen*, though at the same time it was still used in the old sense after an emperor's name to mark a military victory. If therefore Scipio was the first Roman to be so saluted by his troops, the act was of considerable importance, but this must not be exaggerated; it must be remembered that neither he nor any of his contemporaries could have any conception of how the use of the word would develop in the future, although it would clearly mark a very close personal link between commander and men.

If the acclamation is a fact, it is the first occurrence, since possible earlier examples are not historical; if it is rejected, the first securely attested case will be that of L. Aemilius Paullus in 189 BC. But in view of Polybius' terminology and Livy's explicit statement, not to mention the possible relevance of a Saguntine inscription, it would not be rash to regard Scipio as the first *imperator*: it is certainly symbolically true, since he was the first general to enjoy so long and close a relationship with his army,

which he led from victory to victory through nearly a decade.⁵⁷

But was the battle of Baecula an outstanding victory or has its historical importance and Scipio's generalship been overrated? Was it a severe blow at the Carthaginian power in Spain, after which the latter rapidly failed, or a mere rearguard action of Hasdrubal on his way to Italy? Scipio let Hasdrubal pass through and ultimately reach Italy. On this charge Scipio is arraigned and often condemned. Led on by the idea of Scipio's inefficiency and failure, some modern critics have come to regard the battle itself as of little importance.

Indeed attacks were levelled at Scipio by ancient as well as by modern critics. Livy (XXVIII, 40-2) puts in the mouth of Q. Fabius Maximus a long attack on Scipio's policy of carrying the war into Africa a few years later. The old general glances at Scipio's Spanish campaigns; after mentioning that the attack on New Carthage was carried out without the slightest interruption, and damning with faint praise the rest of Scipio's operations in Spain, he goes on to describe the alarm of Rome at the appearance in Italy of Hasdrubal, 'after you had allowed him to slip through your hands . . . You will say that you defeated him. Then I regret all the more, both on your account and on behalf of the Republic, that you allowed him after his defeat to invade Italy.' To this attack on his Spanish campaigns Scipio does not deign to reply. Some modern commentators might with advantage have avoided following Fabius' example. Scipio's tactics at Baecula may be open to criticism, but a condemnation of his conduct after the battle rests on false assumptions, and it is easier to condemn than to suggest an alternative policy which he ought to have followed. Strong criticism underestimates the dangerous situation in which Scipio was, even after his victory, and tends to overestimate the danger to Rome of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy.

It is quite clear that, when Hasdrubal had slipped through his grasp at Baecula, Scipio made no serious attempt to stop him reaching Italy. The object of the detachment which he sent to the Pyrenees was probably to observe Hasdrubal's movements (P. X, 40, 11), not to block the passes of the Pyrenees, as Livy states, since so small a force could obviously not do this effectively.

Its purpose was to reconnoitre and to keep in touch with the retreating enemy; otherwise Scipio would not know where Hasdrubal was, and might, if Hasdrubal should change his plan, have to face an attack from an unexpected quarter. Since he did not know in detail Hasdrubal's intended route, Scipio probably merely ordered his force in general terms to watch Hasdrubal, which, as a matter of fact, did lead it to the Pyrenees; Polybius, knowing the result, has formulated the order as it was actually carried out. Scipio did not try or intend to hold Hasdrubal in Spain but only to know where he was. This, however, does not exculpate him in the eyes of the unfriendly critic, but merely condemns him the more.

Ought Scipio in the circumstances to have tried to stop Hasdrubal? There are three main reasons why he ought not—it was far too dangerous and difficult, his object was to hold Spain at all costs, and Hasdrubal's arrival in north Italy was not an overwhelming disaster. Could he risk following Hasdrubal when in his rear were two Carthaginian armies who would exploit his absence, if they did not actually attack him from behind? Still less could he risk a division of his army. Even if he did venture to keep on Hasdrubal's track, would he be able to stop him from reaching Italy? On the assumption that he could have overtaken him, he could not have blocked the Pyrenees effectively. Hasdrubal could have slipped across somewhere, since there are more than the two passes at the east and west. Even if all except these two were too difficult and so could be neglected, Scipio would be in an awkward position: if he stopped in the east, Hasdrubal would go to the west, while, if Scipio went to the west, he would be cut off from his base and the coast. When Wellington held the three main valleys of the western Pyrenees, he had to trust them to divisional commanders who nearly lost their heads. How then could Scipio guard east and west? Such a move was too dangerous to risk.⁵⁸

Secondly, what was Scipio's object in Spain? Surely to subdue and to hold the country, to break the power of the Carthaginian forces there, and win over their resources. Would he have achieved his object by a wild-goose chase after a fleeing enemy? True, his object was also to stop reinforcements reaching Hannibal in Italy.

But was it better to let pass 10,000 men whom, even if he exerted his whole strength, he probably could not have stopped, or to hold on to Spain and try to defeat the two remaining armies? To follow Hasdrubal would be to expose the whole of the country to Carthaginian influence, and to lose what advantages he had already gained. When Hannibal had slipped past the elder Scipio at the Rhône, the latter saw the value of sending on his army to Spain and realized that the war must be won there. His son now entrusted the defence of Italy to others and, true to his father's policy, determined to maintain his hold on Spain at all costs, whether Hasdrubal slipped through or not. Further, there is the legal and constitutional aspect. Scipio had been sent as a *privatus cum imperio* to Spain to fight the Carthaginians there: thus, unless he was recalled, it was his duty to stay in his province—a point often overlooked by his critics. He was a servant of the State, and though we may wonder what he would have done, had he thought that military necessity clashed with Republican form, his action was here demanded by the legal as well as justified from the military point of view.

Finally, the dangerous consequences of his action can be over-emphasized. Scipio did not let Hasdrubal pass with his full force, but inflicted a serious defeat on him, which deprived him of perhaps half his army, even though the larger part of these may have been his Spanish allies rather than his best African troops. The danger of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was far less now than it would have been a few years earlier. Fighting in Sicily was over, and Rome was operating in fewer theatres of war; she could concentrate more strength at home, especially as Scipio was making the Spanish war self-supporting, and did not need to drain her strength by demanding fresh reinforcements and supplies. The situation in Italy was not so desperate as it had been. Further, Hasdrubal would arrive in north Italy, and it would be no easy task to join Hannibal in the south: central Italy and the Metaurus intervened. Rome in fact did cope with the situation, which doubtless appeared to her more dangerous at the moment than it actually was. The patriotic Roman, who extolled the dramatic and crowning mercy of Metaurus, unwittingly depreciated Scipio's

work in Spain, and opened a channel for criticism which in the main is misguided.

After Baecula, Scipio found himself in a very difficult situation, and it is idle to blame his conduct, unless any alternative constructive plan is advanced. What would his critics have him do? He solved the difficulty with marked success: Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was the lesser of two evils, both of which Scipio could hardly avert. His action was justified by subsequent events, for he would have ill served Rome if he had lost his hold on Spain. There were still two unconquered Carthaginian armies there—a fact which cannot be overlooked, and is indeed given by Polybius as the reason for Scipio's conduct. He had to take a risk and the result justified his choice. To carp at his policy is as short-sighted as to follow Q. Fabius Maximus in criticizing Scipio's policy of carrying the war into the enemy's territory a few years later.

CHAPTER IV

ILIPA AND THE LAST STEPS IN SPAIN

AFTER HASDRUBAL BARCA'S DEPARTURE for Italy, Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, had retired to the coast near Gades, leaving the Mediterranean seaboard and nearly all eastern Spain in Roman hands. However, the Carthaginian government made a fresh effort and sent out reinforcements under Hanno, to compensate for the loss of Hasdrubal Barca. But the Carthaginian leaders, who then had not more than 40,000 men, felt the need of even greater strength, and so Hanno was sent with part of the army to recruit among the Celtiberians. After the fall of New Carthage they could not count on their subjects, and had to seek help from the wilder and neutral tribes of the interior, where Hanno succeeded in raising some 9000 men.⁵⁹

The Romans were not in quite so strong a position as they could wish: notwithstanding their command of the coast road, the sea, and New Carthage, they could not prevent reinforcements reaching the enemy in Celtiberia. Action must be taken there at once to stop the recruiting, because it would not be safe to operate in the south with the enemy in their present position, from which they could execute a flank attack on the Romans, or even let them pass and then cut their communications. Scipio therefore sent M. Silanus with a force of some 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry against Hanno. Silanus by a forced march, despite bad roads and narrow mountain passes, reached the enemy before news of his expedition had time to filter through. He learnt that they were lying across his route some ten miles distant, divided into two camps, one occupied by the new Celtiberian recruits, the other by the Carthaginians. He decided to attack the former first: it was not guarded so carefully, and the new recruits were less discip-

plined. When within three miles of the camp, he fed his men and then advanced in battle order. When he was within a mile, the enemy saw him. Mago rode across from his camp to take command, stationing his main strength of 4000 men and 200 cavalry in front, with the light-armed troops in the rear. Livy's description of the battle well illustrates Roman methods. The Romans advanced in close ranks, hurled their *pila* and received the answering fire on their shields. Then, drawing their swords, they fought hand to hand; only occasionally the roughness of the ground forced them to break their ranks and fight singly as in duels. The men trained by Scipio were beginning to realize that the strength of the battle-line, without any individual initiative, was not adequate in a rough country like Spain, and so we find some individual action; yet it is true that the day was won by the solid ranks of the Romans, while the enemy found their agility useless on the broken ground. Nearly all the Celtiberian heavy infantry and the Carthaginian light troops were destroyed; not more than 2000 of the infantry got away. The cavalry escaped with Mago, who joined Hasdrubal at Gades some ten days later. Hanno was among the prisoners, and the Celtiberian levies scattered to their homes. Thus the Carthaginian attempt to raise more troops in the interior failed, and the way was now cleared for the Romans to advance in safety to the south.

Meanwhile Hasdrubal had been forced to move into Baetica to secure his hold on his allies, who would be very restless after the battle of Baecula. The last thing he wanted was a pitched battle; he was now on the defensive and had been driven back nearly to the coast itself. His only hope was delay, and so he turned to a strategy of exhaustion. He retreated to Gades, and distributed his army in the various towns near by, knowing well that Scipio desired a battle but would hesitate to spend time storming one town after another. Also, by placing detachments of his army in the various towns, he could be sure of the fidelity of those towns at least. His plan succeeded, for Scipio saw that the loss of time involved in a number of sieges would not be compensated for by the results, and so retired; the organization involved in keeping a large army in Spain claimed his time and attention.

But he could not retire without making some demonstration. He therefore sent his brother Lucius with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to attack Orongis in the country of the Maessesses, whose soil was fertile and rich in silver mines; it had been used by Hasdrubal as a base for making incursions against tribes in the interior.⁶⁰ Lucius soon carried it by assault, but stopped any plunder or massacre, in accordance with his brother's usual policy. Then, since winter was coming on, Publius Scipio, after sending the troops to their winter quarters, and his brother with Hanno and other prisoners to Rome, retired to Tarraco. There is little reason to suppose that this exploit has been unduly exaggerated. A strong determined attack upon an important position was needed to establish Roman superiority.

By the beginning of the year 206⁶¹ Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, had probably learnt of the fate of the other Hasdrubal. No longer must he try to protract matters until the war was won in Italy, since a mortal wound had been inflicted on Carthaginian hopes there, and Hannibal, though still formidable, was isolated in the south. For Hasdrubal to act on the defensive any longer meant helping Hannibal only in the negative way of holding Scipio in Spain, and Hannibal needed help urgently. Hasdrubal must try to force the issue and stake all on a last throw; if he won, the long-looked-for help could be sent to Italy, while, if he failed, the Carthaginian hold on Spain was for ever lost. He could assume that if he did not take the field, his opponent would storm one town after another and gradually win over the whole district still held by the Carthaginians, either by force or by his wise treatment of those who submitted. Indeed Scipio might even entrust the command to Silanus or his brother Lucius, since even now he was looking across the sea to Africa for the ground of the final duel, and was impatient to force Hannibal's hand. Hasdrubal therefore was ready to put all to the test, and in this he was supported by Mago. Early in the year he advanced from Gades with all his forces, recruiting as he went, till he reached Ilipa, where he encamped with a total force of some 50,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry and 32 elephants⁶² (*Pl.* 31).

Scipio also began to concentrate his forces, despatching Silanus

to collect the 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry which the native chieftain Culchas had gathered for the Romans during the winter. He then advanced south with the rest of his allies and was joined by Silanus and Culchas near Castulo and Baecula. His whole force then amounted to 45,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, some 10,000 men less than the enemy's total. He next moved down the Baetis valley, keeping perhaps to the north of the river. Meantime Hasdrubal had concentrated his forces at Carmona and then crossed to the north of the Baetis to Ilipa (modern Alcala del Rio, a few miles north of Seville), 'camping not far from Ilipa and entrenching himself just under the hills with a plain in front' (P. XI, 20, 1). 'When Scipio was in full sight of the Carthaginians he encamped on some low hills opposite the enemy'; his camp will probably have been on a hill 79 metres high, named Pelagatos⁶³ (Pls. 30, 32).

The situation which faced Scipio was difficult, because, discounting his allies, he had not enough troops to risk a battle, while the fate of his father had taught him how dangerous it could be to rely wholeheartedly on Spanish allies. So he devised a plan to use his allies to impress the enemy and to leave the real fighting to his own legions: how well this worked out the coming engagement proved. While he was pitching his camp, Mago and Masinissa launched a cavalry attack in an attempt to surprise him. But they fell into a trap, for Scipio had foreseen such a possibility and had placed his own cavalry behind a hill. These charged out so unexpectedly that they disconcerted some of the enemy's horsemen, but the rest rallied for a time till they were finally forced to retire. The engagement had its natural reaction on the spirits of both sides. For the next few days they drew up their forces on the level ground between the two camps, but only cavalry and light infantry skirmishes took place.

After several days, during which Scipio intended that Hasdrubal should become quite familiar with the order of the Roman formation, he determined on action. He had seen that Hasdrubal always placed his African troops in the centre, and his allies on the wings, with the elephants in front of them. He himself had been in the habit of placing his Roman troops in the centre and his Spanish allies on the wings, that is, in a formation which matched

that of his opponents. On the critical day, however, he reversed his usual procedure.

As soon as it began to be light he ordered⁶⁴ his men to eat, arm themselves and march out of camp. This they did, and Scipio then launched his cavalry and light-armed troops against the enemy's camp. As the sun was rising, he advanced his main troops to the middle of the plain, and drew them up in the new order he had planned, placing the Spaniards in the centre and the Romans on the wings. By this clever alteration, Scipio tied the enemy's hands: not only did it secure the fidelity of his own Spanish allies (since they would not now take any real part in the battle, and would not be tempted to desert to their fellow countrymen who were no longer opposite them), but it stopped the enemy making full use of his best troops, the Africans of the centre. The attack on the Carthaginian camp also accomplished its aim, since the Carthaginians hardly had time to arm themselves, and Hasdrubal was forced to lead out his men before they could take their morning meal. He at once despatched his cavalry and light infantry against those of the enemy, and hastily drew up his heavy infantry on the plain near the foot of the hill. In the face of the sudden Roman cavalry attack, he had to act too quickly to be able to alter his usual formation, even if he thought of doing this, and so he led out his men in their accustomed order. Probably it was some little time before he realized the changed Roman formation, and, when he did, it was too late for him to rearrange his own troops. The Romans remained inactive for a time, waiting until the Carthaginians began to feel their lack of nourishment and were further fatigued by standing in the heat of the day. The sun rose higher and higher while the cavalry engagement and skirmishers surged to and fro. At last, about noon, Scipio felt the time for action had come. He received back his skirmishers through the intervals between the maniples of his line, and placed them on the wings behind his infantry and in front of his cavalry. He then prepared to deliver the final blow at the Carthaginian power in Spain.

The Polybian account of the battle which follows is somewhat complicated; but if followed step by step it is in the main perfectly




Fig. 7 Battle of Ilipa.

clear and scarcely warrants some of the strictures that it has incurred nor justifies some of the interpretations placed upon it (e.g. that Scipio's advance was in the form of either a curve or a right and left incline).

Scipio next advanced to within half a mile of the enemy. He then ordered his centre of Spanish allies to continue their advance slowly, while he himself commanded the right wing, and L. Marcius and Silanus the left. These wings carried out an identical

movement, and it will be enough to follow the right wing, if it is realized that the left wing did exactly the same; though naturally the movements to either side were in exactly opposite directions for each wing, e.g. when the right wing wheeled to the left, the left wing wheeled to the right.

After a short advance forward in line, the right wing turned to the right (second movement; P. XI, 23, 1-2).⁶⁵ The rear ranks (i.e. light-armed and cavalry) did the same, but when they started to march, the head of their columns would be slightly in advance of that of the front rank (i.e. in this case further to the right) in order to prevent confusion in wheeling. The wing then marched out to the right in column, parallel to the Carthaginian line till its head was level with or stretched beyond the end of the Carthaginian left wing. This move was necessary because the enemy's front originally was longer than that of the Romans. Then the wing wheeled sharply to the left and marched toward the enemy in column (third movement; P. 23, 3). When it was near the enemy and its head about to engage, it once more formed a line, the infantry carrying out a left form, the cavalry a right form (fourth movement; P. 23, 5-6). It is inconceivable that a column of such length could merely have wheeled into line, the one rank swinging out to the left, the other to the right; such a movement would have invited a flank attack. They must surely have formed sections first, and then carried out the left and right form by sections. By this move, as Polybius says and as can be seen from the diagram, the relative positions of the parts of the infantry line remained unchanged (i.e. its left was still on the left), while the cavalry and light-armed line was now reversed, its original left being on its right and *vice versa*. (Note on the plan that the infantry line *ab* remains the same, but that the cavalry *aβ* is reversed to *βα*.) Meanwhile the Roman left wing had carried out a similar move, so that Scipio had brought his line up to the enemy's, which was at the same time outflanked. The final movement (the fifth) was the actual outflanking of the enemy's line by the Roman cavalry and light-armed on both wings.

The Carthaginian elephants, which were placed in front of the two wings, became frightened and stampeded, harming their

own side as much as the Romans. The superior training and ability of the Roman troops on the wings soon told against the Spaniards opposed to them. The latter put up a gallant fight, but were worn out by the heat of the day and lack of food. About 140 years later, Hirtuleius was to realize the effect of the sun on his army in south Spain, only a few miles from this spot, at Italica; while the heat of the sun at Bailen, the scene of Scipio's earlier victory, was one of the causes of the capitulation of the Napoleonic army in 1808, after it had stood exposed all day.⁶⁶ So the Carthaginian wings gradually retreated, till they reached the foot of the hill, where they evidently hoped to make a stand, but when the Romans pushed their attack home they fled in disorder to the camp. Meanwhile the Carthaginian best troops in the centre had been helpless and inactive, for they feared to send help to the wings in face of the enemy's centre, which would not give battle. At last the struggle was terminated by a cloud-burst which forced the Romans to return to their camp. There is perhaps no good reason to question the historicity of this 'act of God'; our sources emphasize the heat of the day which may well have broken in a storm later. Thus Scipio had managed to 'fix' the enemy's best troops, while he used his own against the weaker part of the enemy and by a clever manœuvre succeeded in outflanking them.

It is, however, easier to explain the stages of Scipio's manœuvre than some other difficulties which arise from Polybius' account. Nothing is said of the Carthaginian cavalry. Could they not have taken the Roman wings in the flank or at least have made an effort to prevent the Roman outflanking movement? Obviously they must have received some check, though this is not mentioned in any of our authorities. The solution probably lies in the behaviour of the elephants which were drawn up before the Carthaginian wings; when assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and *velites*, they did as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. The Carthaginian cavalry, when withdrawn from the skirmish, would be posted on the wings or behind them. When the Roman cavalry attacked, the elephants stampeded back and damaged their own troops: these must have been not only the Spanish infantry, but also the cavalry. Thus the Carthaginian cavalry was

thrown into confusion at the first shock, and the Roman cavalry in its outflanking movement had no difficulty in beating them off the field. Another difficulty is to explain the inactivity of the Carthaginian centre. If they had charged home, the result might have been like that of Austerlitz. Thus there were two weak points in Scipio's manoeuvre—the risk that when his main forces marched out they might be outflanked, and, secondly, the isolation of his centre and its having to refuse battle. The first was avoided through the fate of the Carthaginian horse; the second was a grave risk. The only defence is that Scipio managed to carry it off. Hasdrubal did not dare attack the Roman centre, since if his own centre advanced, his wings would be still more exposed. Scipio ran the risk, hoping that Hasdrubal would hesitate, which, in fact, he did.

The tactics were only a further development of those employed at Baecula. The army once again operated in three separate divisions—the centre and the two wings—while Scipio temporarily abandoned the control of the whole and led in person one of the wings. It was on the wings that the battle was won, and by the self-reliance and unity of smaller bodies of men. The manoeuvre needed training and discipline, especially the fourth move, the forming line from column, which probably was carried out by sections. By this time Scipio had got an army not only devoted to their general but one which had imbibed and practised his new methods, and had outgrown the old deficiency in mobility and in individual action. He had taken to heart the lesson of Cannae, which he now applied with great brilliance against the enemy. Not only had he remedied the defects of his own army, but by a stroke of genius had been able to compensate for his inferior numbers by a measure which also prevented any disorder among the less trustworthy of his troops. Liddell Hart (p. 62) comments: 'Military history contains no more classic example of generalship than this battle of Ilipa. Rarely has so complete a victory been gained by a weaker over a stronger force, and this result was due to a perfect application of the principles of surprise and concentration, that is in essence an example for all time. How crude does Frederick's famed oblique order appear beside Scipio's double oblique manoeuvre and envelopment, which effected a crushing

concentration *du fort au faible* while the enemy's centre was surely fixed. Scipio left the enemy no chance for the change of front which cost Frederick so dear at Kolin.' This eulogy may overlook the two weak moments stressed above, but nevertheless Ilipa was a great advance on Baecula. For here Scipio held with his inferior troops the enemy's main troops of the centre, not merely the light-armed men; at the same time, he flung his own main strength against the enemy's wings—a move brought about during the battle itself. He had overcome the weakness of Baecula and, like Hannibal at Cannae, held the enemy's chief force while he encircled the wings. One defect still remained, that the Carthaginian centre was not actually engaged and so not held securely; Hasdrubal could have withdrawn his chief strength. That defect was remedied in Africa. Yet Ilipa was the justification of Scipio's military reforms and methods, and of his whole policy: by it the fate of Spain was sealed and the Carthaginian cause there for ever lost. The whole war took on a different aspect.

The moral effect of the battle soon began to tell, and the Spaniards, led by Attenes, chief of the Turdetani, commenced to desert the Carthaginian cause. Not knowing how far this movement would spread, Hasdrubal determined not to make a stand at his camp and see his forces slip away. So he retreated, but found the passage of the Baetis blocked by Scipio's forces. He then headed for the sea but was soon overtaken by the main Roman army. After great losses he escaped with some 6000 men. On an impregnable height, but without adequate food or water, he saw more of his troops desert, and so at length he fled to Gades, leaving the army to its fate, which was only a question of time. Scipio left Silanus with 11,000 men to complete the victory, and returned to New Carthage.⁶⁷ When Mago managed to join Hasdrubal in Gades, the rest of the Carthaginian army broke up, part deserting to the Romans, part dispersing, and Silanus was soon able to join Scipio and report that the war was over. Liddell Hart comments on Scipio's pursuit: 'Masterly as were his battle tactics, still more remarkable perhaps were the decisiveness and rapidity of their exploitation.'

'Such was the way in which, under the conduct and auspices of

Publius Scipio, the Carthaginians were expelled from Spain,' says Livy (XXVIII, 16). True, at Ilipa the Carthaginian cause in Spain was finally shattered, but Scipio had now to turn to diplomatic arrangements and punitive expeditions. In fact he spent one of the busiest years of his life—so busy, that some scholars question whether he could have accomplished so much in the same year as Ilipa, and, deciding that he could not, have transferred Ilipa to the previous year. It is, however, possible to draw up a time-table which just allows all to be crowded into the year 206.⁶⁸

Scipio could now think seriously of the ideal towards which he had long been struggling. He had seen that the solution to the first part of the war lay in Spain, but he had also seen beyond—that the only way to force Hannibal from Italy was to strike at the enemy's heart, Africa. Hoping that he would be able to convince the government at home of this truth, he began to lay the foundations for an African campaign by trying to win over two African princes, Syphax and Masinissa (*Pls.* 18, 20). Masinissa, who had aided the Carthaginians in Spain, now came to a secret agreement with Silanus, and crossed over to Africa to try to win over his people to the Roman cause. Further, Laelius was sent to Africa to approach Syphax who was nominally in alliance with Carthage. But Scipio knew that a treaty would not stand in the way of Syphax' interest, if the prince considered that to lie with the new conquerors of Spain. Syphax received Laelius in a friendly manner, but insisted that Scipio should come to discuss the matter in person. Meanwhile Scipio, from New Carthage, had despatched his brother Lucius to Rome in charge of many prisoners of rank to announce the subjugation of Spain. On Laelius' return he committed the charge of Spain to Marcius at New Carthage and M. Silanus at Tarraco,⁶⁹ and determined to sail to Africa.

Scipio was not the man to undertake a venture unless he thought it worthwhile, and Mommsen's judgment is surely unjust—'a foolhardy venture, which was not warranted by any corresponding advantage, however much the report of it might please the curiosity of the citizens of the capital at home'. Scipio knew how risky it was to expose his person to a country in the enemy's sphere of influence, and to trust the promises of safe-conduct

from Syphax, who might well play him false. But he saw clearly that some attempt must be made to build up a strong pro-Roman party in north-west Africa, preparatory to carrying the war over there. So weighing the risks, he set sail for Africa, taking only two quinqueremes. The danger proved even greater than he had anticipated, for he was just off the harbour when he sighted Hasdrubal with seven triremes. The Carthaginian had also come to seek the support of Syphax, and now saw the victor of Ilipa in his grasp. He made a desperate effort to get his ships under way, but the wind suddenly freshened and Scipio sailed into the harbour before Hasdrubal could intercept him. Once within the port Scipio was safe, for Hasdrubal was afraid to interfere lest he might alienate Syphax. Soon afterwards the men who had faced each other at Ilipa met under Syphax' roof. Scipio's personal charm and tact seem to have won the day. Not only was Syphax won over, but even Hasdrubal, it is said, was amazed at Scipio's personality.

No definite results were reached at the meeting—indeed none could have been, since Scipio did not come as an ambassador of Rome, but in a private capacity. Even if a treaty had been ratified, which Livy says was done, no one would know better than Scipio how formal it would be. What Scipio gained was a great moral advantage. He impressed Syphax with the might of Rome, and struck a severe blow at Carthage, who feared nothing more than the consolidation of the tribes in the west, with Syphax at their head and a pro-Roman policy. After a stormy voyage of four days, Scipio reached New Carthage, confident that he had done all that was possible to win a foothold in Africa. He could not foresee that the charms of Hasdrubal's daughter would counteract the impression he had made, and that Syphax would be won to Carthage by more subtle means. In the same way, some hundred years later another Roman, Sulla, was to risk his personal safety by interviewing a Numidian sheikh, and so bring the Jugurthine War to a successful conclusion.

With the way paved for future advance in Africa, Scipio could turn to those Spanish towns which must be punished for their past conduct.⁷⁰ He marched first to Ilurgia (Ilorci), which he found

prepared for a siege. He delivered a double assault, Laelius being in command of one division. The town resisted desperately, and at one moment Scipio had to attempt to scale the walls himself, to re-inspire his men, but at length the walls were taken. Scipio's treatment of the town was brutal in the extreme: the whole population was massacred, and the town itself utterly destroyed. He knew that an example was necessary, and did not flinch from giving it in all its horror, and from departing for once from his usual policy of clemency. The incident recalls the great blot on Caesar's military career, when in 55 BC he massacred the Tencteri and Usipetes. No wonder that Livy knew but little of the town and muddled it with Iliturgi, when it was thus razed to the ground. Liddell Hart here comments on how 'consistently Scipio executes a convergent assault—his force divided into independently manœuvring parts to effect surprise, and strain the enemy's defence, yet combining on a common objective. How strongly does his appreciation of this, the essential formula of tactics, contrast with its rarity in ancient warfare, in modern also, for how often do commanders wreck their plan either on the Scylla of a divided objective or on the Charybdis of a feint or "holding" attack to divert the enemy's attention and reserves from their main blow.'⁷¹ Yet such a method involves risk. In his attack on Drogheda, Cromwell apologized for investing only the south of the town, because a division of his army would have shown such a want of 'correspondency' as to afford the enemy a chance of defeating them in detail. Scipio however succeeded. Again Moltke at Sadowa showed the value of converging attacks; Sedan also bears witness ('getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen'). Moltke had good chiefs of staff for his separate armies, and Scipio may have owed much to the efficiency of Laelius.

Marcus, who had been sent against Castax (site unknown), had apparently made but little progress. When Scipio marched there, news of his approach, and still more the news of the fate of Ilurgia, caused the Spanish element in the town to surrender, though some Carthaginians in the town counselled resistance. The necessary example had been given, and so Scipio could treat Castax with clemency: he bound the city by personal links to himself and Rome

by installing a native of the city as local ruler, a policy which he may have followed in other cases where he showed leniency to a city.⁷² He then returned to New Carthage, while Marcius was sent to reduce any tribes which were still resisting. This was soon done apart from Astapa (Estepa, near Osuna, ancient Urso) which resisted desperately, but fell after an unsuccessful sally. All the women, children and property in the town were immolated by a guard told off for this purpose: they preferred death to surrender. After this Marcius rejoined Scipio at New Carthage.

Meanwhile Scipio had been holding gladiatorial shows at New Carthage, perhaps on the site of the ancient amphitheatre and modern bull-ring (*Pl.* 27), to honour the memory of his father and uncle. The participators were not slaves but volunteers who wished to display the prowess of their race or settle private disputes; native chiefs were among the combatants. These contests were followed by lavish funeral games. During this time Mago had been defending Gades (Cadiz), the one town which still held out against the Romans. When deserters reached Scipio from Gades, promising to betray the city, Marcius was sent off with some light-armed troops by land, while Laelius went by sea to conduct joint operations, as Laelius and Scipio himself had done against New Carthage. Possibly Scipio himself intended to follow with more troops if they were necessary, as in fact they proved to be; but he was prevented by illness. But the Romans' hopes proved vain: the plot miscarried and the conspirators were arrested by the Carthaginians. Laelius and Marcius then decided not to attempt to besiege Gades, which was situated on an island and difficult of approach, and at once returned to Scipio. They had perhaps been ordered to return if they did not meet with instant success: the north was more dangerous at the moment and Gades could wait. Apart from preventing the enemy recruiting further by land, the expedition had miscarried. The town has always been difficult to attack, as witness the abortive attempt on it by Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lord Keith in 1800.

The illness, which laid Scipio low in New Carthage for a short time, was serious. Rumours spread that it was likely to prove, or indeed had proved, fatal. This was the opportunity for which all

the discontented elements in the country had been waiting. Mandonius and Indibilis began to ravage the territory of tribes allied to Rome, while a mutiny broke out among the Roman troops on the Sucro, which prevented immediate action from being taken against the rebellious Spanish tribes.

The 8000 men stationed on Scipio's lines of communication at Sucro⁷³ on the river of that name, south of Saguntum and Valentia, had been demoralized through long inactivity. They were deprived of the plunder which active service involved, and were even suffering from arrears of pay (despite the fact that the mines of New Carthage were in Roman hands). When the news of Scipio's illness reached them, they broke into open mutiny, driving out the military tribunes and placing the supreme command in the hands of two common soldiers. Soon, however, seven military tribunes arrived in the camp, sent by Scipio to announce his recovery. These officers wisely avoided all criticism, and went about the camp trying to find out in a sympathetic manner the causes of the discontent. Scipio then ordered the mutineers to come to New Carthage to receive their arrears of pay. This they were ready to do, as their courage was turning to fear, especially as Mandonius and Indibilis had retired to their own territory on the news of Scipio's recovery. At New Carthage they found the army under the command of Silanus about to start on a punitive expedition against the rebel Spanish tribes, and so they hoped to be able to dictate terms, when once the general was separated from his army. The ringleaders however, were decoyed into accepting the hospitality of certain military tribunes, while the rest of Scipio's army guarded the gates instead of proceeding against Mandonius. The next morning Scipio summoned an assembly in the Forum, but as soon as they were gathered together, unarmed, they realized that there was a ring of loyal troops around them. Their spirits were still further cowed by Scipio's healthy appearance and foreboding expression. After sitting on the tribunal in silence for some time, he came forward and addressed the frightened men in a threatening speech.⁷⁴

The hush which followed was broken by the surrounding troops clashing their swords on their shields, while the voice of the clerk

was heard reciting the names of the doomed. The thirty-eight ringleaders were brought in bound and naked, and then scourged and executed before the frightened gaze of their late followers. Scipio had followed up his words with a terrifying appeal to the emotions and senses. The mutineers, assured of forgiveness, came forward singly to take the oath of obedience, and receive the pay due to them. By his adroit handling, Scipio had averted a great danger and now had an even more devoted army.

Scipio could now turn to the less serious danger of the incursions of Mandonius and Indibilis. These chieftains felt that no mercy would be meted out to them, and so decided to make one last bid against the new conqueror of Spain. Collecting a force of 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, they marched into the territory of the Edetani. From Scipio's point of view this was not without its bright side, as he now had an objective and a unifying purpose to set before his men. He pointed out to them that there were no Spanish allies in the Roman army, since he wished the rebellious tribes to be crushed by Romans alone. The army, eager to blot out its past disgrace, crossed the Ebro allegedly on the tenth day after leaving New Carthage, and four days later came up with the enemy. We have no evidence to fix the site of the battle which followed, beyond that it was four days' march up-country from the mouth of the Ebro. It is not even clear on which side of the river it was fought,⁷⁵ but the general position is significant. It is possible to minimize the importance of this last victory of Scipio in Spain, but geographical considerations should make one careful. A strong force of rebel tribesmen some way up the Ebro in the highlands, possibly in Celtiberia, presented a serious threat to the Roman cause. In 76 BC Sertorius occupied a similar position, and caused Pompey and Metellus the greatest embarrassment; true, Sertorius had some control of the sea, but even without that, a strong force on the upper Ebro could endanger the Roman lines of communication and threaten the coast road. It was imperative that Scipio should punish his former allies: his safety as well as his prestige was at stake. Although he never really mastered the interior of Spain, which required years of guerilla warfare, he did win nominal allegiance from the tribes of the interior in the

north, which it was essential to hold. The generalship of Alexander is sometimes depreciated by regarding his foes as Asiatic hordes; it is also possible to underrate Scipio's opponents. The native tribes, skilled in guerilla tactics, might have given the Roman army much trouble. But Scipio was able to force on them a pitched battle on level ground. He might belittle the foe to his men—according to Livy (XXVIII, 32) he did: they were mere brigands who could ravage their neighbours' lands but had no courage in a pitched battle, when they would trust to flight rather than to their arms. But these were just the dangers Scipio himself must have feared. Did the Romans of the next century really subdue the interior? Viriathus and Sertorius show the difficulty of successfully combatting guerilla warfare.

Scipio found the enemy encamped on a hill, and took up his own position on another hill opposite, with a level stretch of ground in front of his camp. The ends of this valley were shut in by mountains. The next day he drove some cattle into the valley, as a bait. The Spaniards descended into the plain and were attacked by the Roman light troops. As each side sent up reinforcements, a sharp infantry skirmish ensued. Laelius had meanwhile been posted ready with the cavalry, according to Livy, behind a projecting mountain spur. He now led a charge which cut off the Spaniards from their hillside and camp, and at the same time he launched a frontal attack. The preliminary skirmish merely infuriated the Spaniards, who determined to fight a pitched battle. Thus Scipio had cleverly drawn his opponents to a decision, in which the superiority of Roman training and equipment would count.

Next day they drew up in battle array on the plain; but this was too narrow for their whole force. The cavalry and infantry were drawn up in line, although some of the cavalry was probably behind the infantry line; the light-armed troops, consisting of a third of the whole force, were posted on the hillside. This was what Scipio needed; for the enemy could not employ his full strength, and the cavalry massed with the infantry would be useless. Scipio's usual outflanking tactics were precluded by the confined space, but he hit on a brilliant extension of this plan. Laelius was detached with the cavalry. As soon as the battle commenced and




Fig. 8 Battle of the Ebro. This plan is purely schematic: the actual site has not been identified.

the enemy's attention was engaged, he was to attempt a wide sweeping outflanking move, as far as possible under the cover of the hills. The Roman light troops were sent against those of the enemy on the hillside, while the infantry line of four cohorts (there was room for no more) fell on the enemy in the valley.⁷⁶ Laelius executed his turning movement and caught the enemy's cavalry in the rear, which, not having enough space to operate in, was faced by the infantry in front, and was pressed on by its own infantry in the flank. The greater part of the Spanish infantry, which had relied on the help of the cavalry, was cut to pieces. The light troops posted on the hills succeeded in escaping to a

strong position; among these were Indibilis and Mandonius. The Spanish camp and 3000 prisoners were secured.

Indibilis now threw himself on Scipio's mercy and sent Mandonius to plead his case. Scipio showed him how completely he was in his power, and then granted the Spaniards security, demanding no hostages, but exacting indemnities sufficient to supply the arrears of pay for his troops. Those who minimize the importance of this revolt find support in Scipio's not having exacted any hostages. This, however, was probably due to policy, not to its unimportance. He had taken hostages from Indibilis before, but this had not stopped the revolt of the Spaniard, and there was no guarantee that more hostages would restrain him in the future. Scipio made a virtue of necessity, and tried to appeal to the loyalty of his former allies by granting them easy terms. He knew that the worst move he could make was to leave an embittered enemy behind him in Spain, especially one that commanded such an important strategic position. Short of a real reduction of the highlands, for which he had not time, as the needs of Italy were calling, he did all that was possible. By brilliant tactics he administered a severe defeat on his opponents, and then tried to win their friendship. Harshness would merely have alienated them, and have left behind a festering sore.

Scipio then made a hurried journey to southern Spain in order to meet Masinissa, who was at Gades but wanted to go over to Scipio. The African prince persuaded Mago that his horses needed exercise on the mainland, and so managed to meet Scipio at a secret conference. He seems to have been astounded, like Syphax, at Scipio's personality, and promised Scipio all the help he could give, especially in Africa. He then returned to Gades while Scipio went back to Tarraco.⁷⁷ On this journey Scipio may have busied himself with founding Italica, near Seville and Ilipa, where he settled some of his Roman and Italian veterans, including the sick and wounded. The scheme may have been inaugurated when he was at New Carthage earlier in the year, but now he had his army with him and could leave more men as settlers while he himself returned to Italy. Having conquered Spain, he knew it must remain Rome's, and so he tried to give it a small Italian community

which might act as leaven in the Baetis valley. This plan shows not only his care for his troops, but also his boldness in experiment: it marked a new departure in Roman colonial history, and its success is seen in the fact that Italica provided Rome with many good citizens, including two emperors, Trajan and Hadrian. His work now done, Scipio returned to Tarraco and sailed to Rome in time for the consular elections for 205, leaving the Spanish command to Marcus and Silanus.⁷⁸

Spain was conquered, although Mago still held Gades, which he was preparing to evacuate when he received orders from Carthage to join Hannibal in Italy, recruiting Gauls and Ligurians on his way. He was sent some money and raised more by plundering Gades, thus alienating the last shreds of the inhabitants' sympathy for the Carthaginian cause. Next he planned a surprise attack on New Carthage, hoping that there might be a pro-Carthaginian party in the city, and that it was held by a weak garrison. He landed by the canal, but was surprised by a sally and escaped with difficulty by sea, after losing 800 men. His intention had been admirable, but he acted too late. While Scipio was engaged with the mutiny and rebel Spanish tribes, Mago should have tried to win a base on the east coast or in one of the islands off it, from which he could help the discontented Spaniards. Gades was useless to him and he should have applied all his force where it had some chance of being useful. It was too late in the day to try to rebuild the Carthaginian cause in the south. If he was to maintain Carthaginian influence in Spain, he should have staked all on a last desperate throw. Livy could of course have confused the order of events and Mago's attempt on New Carthage might have taken place during, not after, the revolt; in that case it was a brilliant counter-attack which failed. As it stands, it is merely a forlorn venture to get a base in eastern Spain, which was launched too late.

Mago returned to Gades, only to find that it had at last deserted the Carthaginian cause and had closed its gates to him, so he sailed off to the island of Pityusa, where he got supplies to make an attempt on the Balearic Isles. Though repulsed by Majorca through the sturdy efforts of the native slingers, he won over




Fig. 9 Map of Spain.

Minorca and wintered there, leaving his name permanently enshrined in its capital, Mahon. The position was good, but his strength inadequate. When based on Minorca in 1797, Sir Charles Stuart was urged by Dundas and Lord St Vincent to make an attempt on Cartagena, but he refused because of its difficulty.



Mago's forces now were far too weak to attempt any such action again. Meanwhile Gades, relieved of its Carthaginian garrison, turned to the Romans, by whom it was well treated, as its continued prosperity shows.⁷⁹ The last Carthaginian stronghold in Spain had fallen, and Scipio was returning to Rome in triumph.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERLUDE

IN THE CAMPUS MARTIUS in the temple of the war-goddess Bellona, before the assembled Senate, Scipio gave a report of his conquest of Spain and his defeat of four Carthaginian generals, the two Hasdrubals, Hanno and Mago. He hoped to be granted a formal triumph, which as a *privatus cum imperio* without a magistracy he could not claim. But as the Senate showed no sign of setting aside its traditional policy, he wisely did not press for the outward show and entered the city where he deposited in the Treasury 14,324 lbs of silver (over a million *denarii*) in addition to coined silver. He was, however, allowed to draw on some of this in order to celebrate the Games which he had vowed during the mutiny in Spain. He was just in time for the consular elections. Crowds flocked, we are told by Livy, to see the hero, both to his house (which was behind the Tabernae Veteres in the Forum, on the site of the future Basilica Sempronia and Julia) and with him to the Capitol where he sacrificed to Jupiter a hecatomb of oxen which he had vowed in Spain. Amid these enthusiastic scenes rumours were rife that, if elected, he ought to have Africa for his province—as if the war in Italy was ended. He was easily elected, with P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, as his colleague, and entered office in 205.

Concerning the allocation of provinces a fierce debate ensued which turned on Scipio's desire to carry the war on to African soil. Some of the wider issues involved in this deep clash of opinion, together with the political tensions in Rome, are discussed later (pp. 168 ff.). Scipio had to fight a tough political battle on the home front, but here we need consider primarily the military aspects. The Senate finally decided that one consul should take Sicily as his province with the right to sail to Africa if he thought

that the interest of the State demanded it; the other consul was to operate against Hannibal in Bruttium. Since the other consul was Pontifex Maximus, who was not allowed to leave Italy, it was obvious to whom Sicily must fall. Scipio with his African project had won and Fabius' policy was discredited.

The two conflicting strategic policies stand in deep relief. Fabius' object was strictly limited; to get rid of Hannibal with all speed so that he could turn to Italy and heal the wounds of her countryside. Scipio's object was more absolute. He aimed at crushing both Hannibal and Carthage. To get rid of Hannibal by defeating him in Italy would only alleviate a symptom. Until Carthage was humbled, Rome would never be safe. It was not necessarily desire for personal glory, and certainly not desire for territorial expansion or for trade, that led Scipio to his determination to carry the war to Africa, but it was his penetrating vision, which soared above the narrow patriotic view of Fabius and convinced him that Rome's safety did not lie merely in Hannibal's defeat. Carthage itself must be humiliated and fettered—though not destroyed: the cry of 'Delenda est Carthago' had not yet arisen.

Corresponding to these two aims of defeating Hannibal in Italy or forcing him to withdraw to Africa, was the strategy employed by each party. Tactical inferiority forced on Fabius a defensive strategy which had won for him his title of Cunctator. He had learnt the lesson of Cannae—that the Romans could expect only defeat in a pitched battle—and so he set himself to avoid one. A 'strategy of exhaustion', an 'Ermattungs-Strategie', followed, which led to little else than a war of sieges. The object of such purely defensive strategy is to wear out the opponent and to gain the opportunity of recovering one's own strength; it may be valuable as a temporary expedient, but is not likely to win a war. Two modern examples may be cited: 'At the outbreak of the Seven Years War, the King of Prussia found himself threatened by Austrians and Russians in a great superiority of numbers. For two years he fought battle after battle. He could no longer afford to lose the numbers which his victories cost him. He fell back on the rival strategy. The military folly of the Austrian generals and the lukewarmness of their Russian allies (due to political reasons)

allowed him the chance of its use. The Austrians played about, ravaging the country and looking at its fortresses. Frederick skillfully avoided battle. The war "fizzled out" and the Prussian triumphantly escaped from the terrible dangers which had seemed to threaten the weaker side.' Again, 'the trench warfare of the Great War was stalemate for both sides. The final victory was won when the war of movement became possible again and was directed by Marshal Foch.'⁸⁰ The utmost Fabius could expect was that the war might 'fizzle out' and Hannibal retire. He had succeeded hitherto and might hope to continue successfully on the same lines, especially as Spain had now been won. Carthage he could never conquer.

Scipio's strategy was entirely different. In the first place, he did not fear to meet Hannibal in the field. He had trained up an army in Spain in tactical methods which he hoped would succeed against Hannibal himself. The only question was where to face him. He could employ a strategy of 'annihilation', the 'Niederwerfungs-Strategie' of the Prussian Clausewitz. This means setting first and foremost the attempt to discover and destroy in a pitched battle the main armed forces of the enemy, and allowing no side-issues to interfere. It has been said of Cromwell that he never besieged a fortress whilst there was an unbeaten army in the field. But Scipio applied this doctrine of Clausewitz only in a limited way. He saw that he must adopt the principle, as opposed to the Fabian strategy of exhaustion; but he knew that if he beat Hannibal in Italy the war would be regarded as finished, and so he would not be able to stir up the people to carry it against Carthage itself. A reaction to a more narrow Italian policy would follow immediately, and the danger of Carthage would remain. He saw that the best way to thwart Hannibal was a counter-offensive at the enemy's heart. For the moment he would disregard the main armed forces of the enemy, leaving these to the Fabian strategy, and strike at Africa whither he knew Hannibal would follow. There he could apply to the full his new strategy of 'annihilation'. Africa offered a better battlefield for him than Bruttium, and in addition he could give the enemy a taste of what Italy had been suffering. No doubt like any Roman noble Scipio desired personal glory, but he must also

have been convinced of the superiority of his strategy. The view that Pericles started the Peloponnesian War for personal reasons refutes itself, because he intended to carry on that war in an unpopular way. Similarly, unless Scipio was fully convinced he could win, he would hardly have ventured on a course which was unpopular with a large section of the State, and in which failure would mean the end of his career.

After obtaining the command of Sicily, Scipio had to make extensive preparations for his expedition to Africa. Unfortunately these are shrouded in doubt. According to Livy the government, unable to thwart Scipio entirely, tried to hamper him by not granting permission to levy troops, though it allowed him to enlist volunteers, of whom he raised 7000. The Italian allies, especially many Etruscan cities, provided corn, timber for ships, and munitions of war. Scipio was thus enabled speedily to build a fleet of twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes, which he sailed to Sicily. There he began to organize and train his new army. His great weakness was one from which Roman armies had always suffered, lack of cavalry. We are told that he began to overcome this by conscripting 300 Sicilian nobles to form into a cavalry corps. He then excused them, provided that they relinquished their horses and equipment, for which he had 300 of his best men waiting. Thus, according to the story, Scipio won the nucleus of his cavalry. He then had to face the task of unifying his army—the volunteers he had brought, and all the troops which he found in Sicily, including the two legions who survived Cannae and had been sent there in disgrace.⁸¹ These men, who had tasted Hannibal's tactics, would readily assimilate Scipio's new methods, and be eager for revenge. Scipio wisely fed his troops on corn raised from the Sicilians, and conserved the supplies he had brought from Rome. He refitted the old ships, and sent them under Laelius to plunder and reconnoitre the African coast; the new ones he beached for the winter as they had been hastily built of unseasoned timber. He also spent some time at Syracuse, where he redressed some local grievances: as Sicily was to be his base in the war against Africa, he must win the support of the inhabitants. Further, his magnetic personality must have won over all he met

here, as elsewhere; Spanish chieftains, his troops, African princes, Hasdrubal and Philip, all felt his charm. In the congenial atmosphere of Grecian Sicily, it would not be difficult for him to win friendship. In fact, he adapted himself too easily for those who, like Fabius, looked with abhorrence on the gradual adoption of Greek ideas and habits by some of their contemporaries. The Roman general who walked about the gymnasium in a Greek cloak and Greek slippers, who spent his time among rhetoricians and athletes, and whose whole staff was enjoying the attractions of Syracuse, was likely to win local sympathy as easily as he alienated that of his sterner contemporaries.

Laelius' expedition plundered the neighbourhood of Hippo Regius (Bone), while a report that Scipio himself had landed caused some alarm in Carthage. Laelius was also probably met by Masinissa, who complained of Scipio's delay and urged that Syphax' continued friendship was doubtful. Indeed the main object of the expedition may have been to reconnoitre and try to learn the state of feeling in Africa.

During his preparations in Sicily Scipio saw an opportunity, hitherto overlooked, of recapturing Locri which had been in Carthaginian hands since 215. Some Locrians had been captured by a Roman raiding party and carried off to Rhegium. There certain Locrian nobles, who had taken refuge in the city when driven out of their own in 215, recognized some of the prisoners who promised to betray Locri. The exiled Locrian nobles ransomed and sent back the prisoners to Locri, and then communicated with Scipio. He quickly sent two military tribunes to take 3000 troops from Rhegium and advance against Locri, while Q. Pleminius was ordered to act as his legate. These troops, equipped with specially long ladders, stormed one of the citadels by night, but the town itself, which lay below two hills crowned by citadels, still resisted until news came of the approach of Hannibal himself. Thereupon on the next day Scipio, by a sudden sortie, forced the enemy to withdraw. That night Hannibal, 'when he realized that the consul was there', retired, since he was not prepared for a long siege; the Carthaginian garrison soon escaped and joined him. Thus Locri again fell into the hands of the Romans, and Scipio, besides

robbing the enemy of another foothold in southern Italy, had shown that Hannibal was not unconquerable.

The sequel was less successful. Scipio treated the town severely, by executing the pro-Carthaginian leaders, but left its political status for the Senate to decide. Then, leaving Pleminius in command of a garrison, he returned to Sicily. This man proved quite unworthy of his trust, and the unhappy Locrians, who had looked for better times under Roman control, found that their change of masters was for the worse. For Pleminius, that '*pestis ac bellua immanis*', proved a forerunner of Verres, and far surpassed Hamilcar in crime and vice. He held absolute power in the town, which meant absolute licence. The crime which impressed the Romans most was his sacrilege in plundering the treasury of Prosperine, which had previously suffered only at the hands of Pyrrhus, whose impiety had led him to such misfortune that he had hastily returned the treasure. Pleminius' example soon infected the troops, and the situation was further complicated by rivalry between two groups: those originally commanded by the two military tribunes and his own men. One of his men, who was stealing a silver cup, was stopped by the tribunes, who were either trying to keep a semblance of law and order in the town, or were merely quarrelling over the booty; the sequel possibly suggests the latter. In any case, Pleminius was furious and had them scourged. Their men retorted by seizing Pleminius and mutilating him. On learning this, Scipio returned to Italy and held an enquiry. Pleminius was acquitted and retained his command, while the tribunes were imprisoned. This judgment is unexpected, whether it was based on pity for the mutilated Pleminius, anger at the insubordination of his own men or a desire to give Pleminius a second chance. If the last, Scipio badly misjudged the man; for no sooner was his back turned than Pleminius broke out into even greater excesses. He tortured the hapless tribunes to death and then turned on the chief citizens of Locri, continuing his course of lust, avarice and cruelty.

At length the Locrians sent an embassy to the Senate. Q. Fabius and his supporters were glad of the chance to criticize the absent Scipio, whose part in the affair was severely handled in the House.

The resentment against Scipio was further kindled by religious scruples at Pleminius' sacrilege, and by moral scruples at Scipio's Greek mode of life in Sicily, as well as by pity for the Locrians. All the opposition to Scipio and his policy broke out. Fabius had found an excuse and even proposed to recall him. At length the Senate, on the motion of Q. Caecilius Metellus, consul of 206 and Scipio's supporter, decided that Pomponius, the praetor-elect of Sicily and Scipio's cousin, should proceed thither with a board of enquiry consisting of ten senators (chosen by the consuls), two tribunes of the plebs and an aedile. If this commission found that Scipio was not privy to the outrages of which the Locrians complained, he was to retain his command, but otherwise he was to be ordered from his province, or, if he had already crossed to Africa, the tribunes should bring him back, while two senators took temporary command. The Senate was also anxious to expiate with due rites the desecration of Proserpine's temple. The commission proceeded to southern Italy and arrested Pleminius (or, according to another account, of which Livy speaks, Pleminius was arrested by Scipio himself). The outraged Proserpine was requited, the disputes of the individual Locrians settled, and justice re-established. The Locrians wisely declined the opportunity of charging Scipio himself, on the ground of his personal integrity and misjudgment of Pleminius; they preferred Scipio's friendship to his enmity. The commission was doubtless relieved, as it would have been no easy task to depose Scipio when he was surrounded by his new army. Pleminius and thirty-two others were sent in chains to Rome. Then the board turned to investigate Scipio's doubtful Greek morals. Scipio skilfully turned the tables by impressing it with his own military preparations. Its members were conducted round the arsenals and magazines, and witnessed manoeuvres of the army and fleet, which were so impressive that they returned to Rome in a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, bidding Scipio sail to Africa with the blessing of heaven.⁸²

The full truth behind the Pleminius incident can scarcely be recovered. Scipio had at very least been guilty of extreme negligence, but it is perhaps not necessary to presuppose a perfidious plot. The suggestion has been made that Scipio, who was short of

supplies thanks to senatorial opposition, used Pleminius to seize the treasures of Locrian Proserpine to supply the sinews of war, and then eventually disowned his agent. This hypothesis might help to explain several obscurities (e.g. the clash between Pleminius and the two tribunes, or why the commission found so little of the treasure still in Pleminius' hands), but it raises further difficulties. As A. J. Toynbee says, 'If Pleminius was, in truth, first Scipio's tool and afterwards Scipio's victim, why, after his arrest, did he not then turn king's evidence? Fabius Verrucosus would surely have been delighted to give Pleminius a hearing in the Senate.'⁸³ Further, if so deep a plot had been planned it is curious that it has left no trace in the tradition; during many periods of his life, not least near the end, Scipio certainly had no lack of political foes who would have welcomed any hint of such a past scandal with which to help undermine his *auctoritas*.

After Scipio had averted this danger from home, he was faced by a further difficulty. Syphax, who had nominally been won to the Roman side, married Hasdrubal's daughter Sophonisba and turned once more to Carthage, with whom he now drew up a treaty. Further, he reported this to Scipio, repudiating any earlier agreement and saying that if Scipio invaded Africa, he would feel bound to fight for his country and his wife's native city. The arrival of this embassy was a blow to Scipio; it might have far-reaching effects if his new army got wind of it. Scipio could not prevent the Numidians from walking about the city and being seen at his headquarters, so, before the truth leaked out, he announced that Syphax had sent to urge him to attack at once. He therefore mustered his whole force, perhaps some 35,000 men,⁸⁴ at Lilybaeum. Supplies of food and water for forty-five days were put on board, and when all was made ready and Scipio had offered prayer for success, amid a great crowd of spectators the expeditionary force set sail for Africa in the spring of 204, 'conquering and to conquer'.

CHAPTER VI

FIRST YEARS IN AFRICA

THE THEATRE OF WAR to which Scipio was going was a comparatively small part of North Africa. It consisted of the northern half of modern Tunisia, bounded on the north and east by the Mediterranean, on the west by Algeria, and on the south by a line from El Djem to Thala. The district is divided by the great chain of mountains, which runs from the interior north-east to Cape Bon. The part south of this chain hardly comes into the question, except as forming a base for Hannibal when he landed. The northern part is again divided into two distinct halves by the River Bagradas. North-west of the river is mountainous highland, very difficult to operate in; the south-east is more varied, consisting of small mountain chains and isolated peaks between which lie plains. It is this district, stretching from far inland to the bay of Carthage, that is the chief area involved. Into this territory there are many ways of penetrating; up the valley of the Bagradas and the Muthul; from Hadrumetum by the Ou. Nebaana to the valley of the Siliana; or via Kairouan and the valley of the Marguellil into the plain of Zouarines. The important valleys running south are those of the Ou. Miliana and El Kebir, the Siliana, and the Ou. Tessa. The climate was not excessively hot and did not cause operations to be broken off for a period in the summer; but in the winter there was a regular cessation of campaigning, at least before Caesar's day, partly owing to the difficulty of getting fresh supplies by sea in the stormy weather. The chief obstacle to be surmounted was lack of water, as in the summer many of the Oueds dried up; yet compensation was not entirely lacking, because, when dry, they would hinder the movements of troops less. Such natural features and climatic conditions made the move-

ment of armies in North Africa possible only in certain well-defined directions (Fig. 13).

Consideration of the methods adopted by other ancient generals, who wished to attack Carthage, throws light on Scipio's campaign. In 310 BC Agathocles of Syracuse, whom Scipio is said to have admired greatly (P. XV, 36, 6), landed on the west side of Cape Bon, advanced westwards through the unexpectedly fertile plain, and, after winning a pitched battle, captured Tunis. This city formed the natural base from which to attack Carthage, and also offered a good harbour. For Carthage stood at the end of a peninsula, and the isthmus behind was both blocked by a range of hills and also commanded by Tunis. So, by occupying Tunis, Agathocles had cut Carthage off from her rich hinterland. The first counter-stroke of Carthage was an attempt to relieve Tunis, while Agathocles was busy storming towns on the east coast, but it was thwarted. After winning some towns in the fertile lowland along the east coast, and then another pitched battle, Agathocles turned to the west of Carthage. He intercepted supplies coming to Carthage from Sardinia and Sicily by capturing Utica and Hippo (Bizerta), which formed a good naval base, but he lacked an adequate fleet. The native Libyans welcomed him as a deliverer from their Punic masters. When soon after he left Africa, his army was cut off at Tunis; and on his return he was beaten in battle and had to fight against fire, the element which Scipio used so successfully later. Agathocles' failure was chiefly due to the lack of a strong fleet. Carthage had wisely adopted a Fabian strategy; after unsuccessful pitched battles, she settled down to a policy of inaction. The war had proved that a campaign in Africa could seriously embarrass Carthage, but need not threaten her very existence, unless the invading army commanded the sea.

In the First Punic War the Romans had their first experience of Africa as a theatre of war. Regulus was sent to invade it in 256 BC. He landed, as Agathocles had done, at Cape Bon, but on the eastern side at Clupea. After ravaging the open country, he won a battle and then took Tunis; officialdom recalled his colleague to Rome with half the army and nearly the whole fleet. Carthage sued for peace, but Regulus offered too severe terms. Then the

Carthaginians were led by Xanthippus to victory, on ground which suited their elephants and cavalry. This expedition again emphasizes the value of Tunis and the need for a fleet. It failed because Regulus lost part of his fleet, had insufficient forces, especially cavalry, would not strengthen this arm by alliances with native princes, offered too severe terms and fought on unfavourable ground.

Then came the revolt of the Carthaginian mercenaries, which once more showed the important strategic points. They occupied Tunis, strong points on the hills behind Carthage, and the mouth of the Bagradas at the north end of the hills, thus completely cutting off Carthage from the mainland. At the same time they besieged Bizerta and Utica. By a brilliant move, Hamilcar forced the abandonment of the siege of Utica, and turned their flank by winning a battle at the mouth of the Bagradas. Then followed marches and counter-marches and the sudden revolt of Utica and Bizerta, which had remained faithful when Agathocles and Regulus landed. Hamilcar's victory at Prion won for him the command of the open country, and he could besiege Matho at Tunis from the south, while Hannibal closed in from the north. At length the mercenaries lost the decisive battle. Carthage had undergone a grave danger, and lost control of the open country through the capture of Tunis, but she maintained the control of the sea, and so pulled through, notwithstanding the disloyalty of Utica. Two hundred years later, Curio followed in Agathocles' footsteps and his campaign showed the difficulty of storming Utica, even when in command of the strong site known as the *Castra Cornelia*.

In North Africa, at the time of Scipio's invasion, there were, besides the empire of Carthage, certain native kingdoms. East of Morocco were the Masaesytes. Under their king Syphax, who resided at Siga, they controlled the coast as far as Cape Treton (Bougaroun), while in the interior Syphax ruled at Cirta. Between them and the borders of the Carthaginian possessions, which included Sicca (El Kef) and the Great Plains, lived the Massydes. These native kingdoms flourished by the side of Carthage, sometimes in alliance with her, sometimes at war. In the main, Carthage did not interfere with them; it was better for her

commerce and easier to draw mercenaries from them, if each was united under one prince than if they remained separate tribes under petty chiefs.

Gaia, king of the Massyles and father of Masinissa, was allied to Carthage from 213 to 208, but Syphax was hostile in 213, and perhaps even negotiated with the two Scipios in Spain. In 212, however, peace was again established (App., *Ib.* 16). The Massyles remained faithful to Carthage, and Masinissa served her well in Spain from 211 to 206. But soon both Syphax and Masinissa began to doubt whether friendship for Carthage was wise in face of Rome's successes, and so they turned to Scipio, who was looking beyond Spain to a war in Africa and recognized their value. To win them both over would be to gain a valuable base against Carthage, as well as to deprive her of their material help. Besides, he would have the use of their cavalry, an arm which needed strengthening. After Ilipa, as has been told, he even visited Syphax in Siga, and seemed to have won his support, but later, thanks to Syphax' marriage to Sophonisba, on the eve of his departure for Africa Scipio learnt that the ally on whom he had been counting had gone over to Carthage.

Scipio was more successful with Masinissa, who had in Spain taken the measure of Scipio and his army. His nephew had been well treated by Scipio after Baecula, and he himself had been worsted in the prelude to Ilipa. He realized that Scipio might carry the war to Africa, and, being discontented with the Carthaginians, negotiated with Scipio who had visited him, as already seen, near Gades. He promised that if Scipio did cross to Africa he would support him to the full, and Scipio, conscious of the value of Masinissa's cavalry, saw that his journey had not been in vain.

While Masinissa was still in Spain, his father Gaia died, and the throne passed according to Numidian custom to the late king's brother. But he too died soon afterwards and Masinissa in seeking the throne had to face a long series of dynastic intrigues, complicated by the hostility of Syphax and the Carthaginians. After many adventures he was forced to flee to the Syrtis Minor but later perhaps went to a point (in north-east Algeria?) where he

could communicate more easily with Laelius when the latter arrived.

Such was the condition in Africa when the Roman expeditionary force set sail against Carthage, which lies deep in the Gulf of Tunis between Cape Bon in the east and Cape Farina in the west. After a foggy night, land was sighted which the pilot said was the headland of Mercury (Cape Bon). As the fleet moved on fog came down again and in the light of the next day the nearest headland was seen to be Pulchrum (Cape Farina, near Utica). On learning its name Scipio is said to have hailed it as his Cape of Good Hope and landed there, forming a camp on some hills nearby, about sixteen miles from Utica. This was probably his original objective; it is unlikely that he had intended to land on Cape Bon for an advance on Tunis and was diverted from doing so by the fog.⁸⁵ Rather, he probably deliberately disembarked near Utica, and hoped to secure a base there. From here he plundered the countryside and defeated a cavalry squadron, 1000 strong, sent against him under Hanno, who was killed. He captured a fairly rich city, and shipped his plunder and prisoners to Sicily.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, Carthage was in a state of alarm, and the country-people, flocking for protection to the towns, caused great confusion, especially in Carthage itself. The Carthaginians had no reliable general and no effective army at hand. Hasdrubal may have raised some 13,000 men, but was away somewhere in the interior. At the moment, the Carthaginians had to rely on hastily-raised cavalry squadrons. Appeals for help were sent to Hasdrubal and Syphax, the city was made ready for a siege, there was a general call to arms, and a fresh force was collected by another Hanno, Hamilcar's son. Scipio had sent his fleet on to Utica, and after his initial success moved his whole force against the town, encamping near the fleet about a mile from the city walls. Utica stood at the end of a line of hills, Djebel Menzel Roul, on which Scipio pitched his camp, to the south-west of the town, just north-east of the modern road over the hills. Meanwhile he had been joined by Masinissa, who, true to his promise, arrived with 200 horsemen. Scipio then prepared to check Hanno, whose recruiting efforts had secured some 4000 men. He planned that Masinissa

is found exactly the type of hills which would cover such a manoeuvre as Scipio performed. The Djebel Menzel Roul, at the north-eastern end of which stands Utica, gradually broadens out as it runs to the south-west and west, and then narrows to a neck where it joins on to the Djebel Douimis, which in turn also broadens to the west. It is on this neck or saddle of the hills that the probable site of Agathocles' Tower is fixed. Salaeca lay to the west, and Masinissa could decoy Hanno thence past this saddle behind which (i.e. to the north) Scipio lay concealed. The saddle is broad, flat, sloping gently on both sides, of hard but not very rocky soil; it could be quickly crossed by a cavalry squadron on a broad front. The level ground in front is, at any rate today, marshy in parts; if this was the case then, the spot was still more suited for the ambush, for it would make it more difficult for the enemy to withdraw to the south (Fig. 10).

Masinissa, according to his instructions, rode up to Salaeca where Hanno was—a position which drew, we are told, from Scipio the remark: 'Cavalry in houses in the summer! Let there be more of them, so long as they have such a leader!' Here Masinissa drew out the enemy's forces, and when no longer able to endure their attack he retired slowly along the south of the hills, past the saddle which Scipio had reached from the north under cover of Djebel Menzel Roul. Masinissa continued his retreat to Utica round the south of the hills, the easiest way. When Hanno was passing the ambush, Scipio broke forth and fell on his flank, while Masinissa wheeled round and attacked his front. Hanno's front ranks, 1000 strong, were surrounded and killed. The rest of the force fled, but lost another 1000 men, including Hanno, in its retreat. Possibly, since many escaped, Scipio's attack was delivered a moment too soon and fell slightly too near the head of Hanno's column, failing to surround the rear and block the retreat. This might easily occur through Hanno pulling up his force sharply when he saw the attack coming, more sharply in fact than Scipio had allowed for. After rewarding all who had distinguished themselves in the engagement, in particular Masinissa, Scipio garrisoned Salaeca, plundered the neighbourhood, and returned to his camp in a week's time laden with booty.⁸⁸

Scipio could now turn all his attention to winning Utica as a base hoping, perhaps, to storm it before winter set in. The fleet operated north of the town which faced the sea, while the army moved up to part of the hill which commanded the walls themselves, possibly that part which was later crowned by the amphitheatre.⁸⁹ But Hasdrubal soon collected a large army, and was joined by another one under Syphax; together they advanced threateningly from Carthage to near Utica. Since winter was approaching and, after forty days' siege, Utica had not fallen, Scipio could not risk prosecuting the siege any longer, but had to look elsewhere for his winter quarters. If he stopped where he was, he would be separated from the fleet. He found an admirable spot about two miles to the east of Utica, where he could concentrate his whole force. Near Utica there is a long narrow line of raised ground, stretching some nine miles in a south-south-westerly direction. At the northern end now stands the village of Galaat el Andelass. The first mile or so from here, in Scipio's time, projected into the sea, which came considerably further south than it does today. Utica was on the coast, but it is not known exactly how far the sea reached to the east of the town; probably the coast ran almost due east and west here, and terminated in the sharp headland where Scipio encamped, later known as the *Castra Cornelia*. The ground between the camp and the town was marshy; today, it is crossed by the *Ou. Medjerda*, which has changed its course since Roman times, and by its deposits has caused the coastline to recede. In the middle of this ridge opposite Utica, at the base of the part which projected into the sea, Scipio placed his legionary camp. The ships were beached to the north, enclosed by the same lines as the military camp. The cavalry lay on the south slope towards the other side. Here, after abandoning the siege of Utica, Scipio passed the winter.⁹⁰

The first season's campaign led to small, or at any rate unspectacular, results, and Scipio was driven to an awkward position. Positively, he had effected a safe landing, gained the support of Masinissa and his invaluable cavalry, beaten all the forces sent against him, and won certain towns. But he had failed to win a base in Utica, and was now driven to winter on a barren rocky

peninsula, where he was carefully watched by two hostile armies, together stronger than his own force. He had accumulated much corn from plundering the neighbouring country, and drew fresh supplies of food and clothing from Sicily, Italy and Sardinia. But his communications were somewhat precarious; winter had set in, and he had to fear loss from storms and wrecks, even apart from the threat of the Carthaginian fleet. He was even temporarily cut off from those towns which he had won. But doubtless he had the confidence of his troops and of the Roman People, for his command was prolonged; above all, he trusted in his own ability. He had acted cautiously, and was feeling his way, seeking a secure base and adequate strength and supplies. His caution has been compared with that of Gustavus when he landed in Germany. 'Both were justified not only by the result, but by the science of war . . . alike unable for reasons outside their control to adjust the means to the end, they displayed that rare strategic quality of adjusting the end to the means. Their strategy foreshadowed Napoleon's maxim that "the whole art of war consists in a well-ordered and prudent defensive followed by a bold and rapid offensive".'⁹¹

The Carthaginian allied forces, which had caused Scipio to withdraw from Utica and effectively protected the interior from a sudden attack on his part, passed the winter not far off. Their numbers are uncertain, perhaps in all some 30,000 infantry and 3000-5000 cavalry.⁹² They encamped on high ground, 60 stades ($10\frac{1}{2}$ km.) from Scipio's camp, and 10 stades ($1\frac{3}{4}$ km.) from each other; Hasdrubal to the east, Syphax to the west. Here they would be able to cover and communicate with Carthage itself, while Syphax also could keep in touch with his kingdom in the west. Hasdrubal's camp probably lay at the extreme southern end of the range of hills, at the north end of which Scipio himself was encamped. The range terminates in a peak called the Koudiat Touba (59 m.), which is connected by a narrow neck with another hill to the west, on which stands the village Douar Touba. This almost isolated hill is some $2\frac{1}{2}$ km. in circumference, and is exactly $10\frac{1}{2}$ km. (the Polybian figure) from the site of Scipio's camp, if measured along the way to the east of the hill, the route

which Scipio was to follow. Three km. further west lies an isolated broad flat hill, some 5 km. in circumference, the Koudiat el Mabtouha; this is the probable site of Syphax' camp.⁹³ Although the Ou. Medjerda runs between these two hills, in antiquity it flowed to the east of them (Fig. 10).

During the winter Scipio began to negotiate with Syphax, hoping that he might have tired of his new friends and possibly also of Sophonisba, his main link with the Carthaginian cause. But Syphax remained loyal to his allies, would not treat with Scipio personally and even tried to negotiate as an intermediary for peace between Carthage and Rome on the basis that the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy, and the Romans Africa, each side keeping the places they held between these two countries. Carthage was clearly tired of the war. She had lost her empire in Spain, Sicily and Sardinia, and wanted peace to revive and extend her commerce; Africa itself offered sufficient scope for the moment. In Rome, too, many, like Fabius, were doubtless ready for terms which would remove Hannibal and Mago from Italy, involve no loss of territory and open the way to economic revival in Italy. But Scipio thought otherwise: Rome had won Sicily and Spain and the command of the sea, she, a nation of farmers! She had resisted the genius of Hannibal with dogged perseverance, and saw the end at hand. Was she now to return to a *status quo* after all her sufferings? It was only Hannibal's inborn hate for Rome that had sustained him all these years, and the enmity of his House that had so largely brought on the war. What guarantee did Rome have that, if he evacuated Italy, she would be secure in the future? Real peace necessitated the defeat of Hannibal himself. Scipio therefore rejected the proposals of the enemy, and trusted that his genius would find some way out of his present difficulties.

He soon conceived a plan, as daring and unexpected as the one after his first winter in Spain when he struck at Cartagena. Learning that the Carthaginian camps were made of branches and reeds without any earth, he planned to set them on fire. Meanwhile he deliberately held out hopes of reaching an agreement with Syphax, to enable frequent embassies to be sent, with officers and spies disguised as slaves, to explore the approaches, entrances and

position of the two hostile camps. By the spring of 203 he prepared to break off negotiations. He launched the fleet against Utica, and sent 2000 men to occupy the hill overlooking the town, which he had held during the previous autumn. This move was not a serious attempt to blockade Utica again, but merely to give that impression: it would lull any suspicions Hasdrubal might have, and also protect Scipio's rear against sorties from Utica when he suddenly struck south. He sent more envoys to Syphax, this time with orders not to return without a definite answer. Syphax, believing Scipio was ready to make peace on his terms, referred them to Hasdrubal. The Carthaginians ratified the terms, and Syphax sent the embassy back to Scipio, who was now ready to strike. Scipio replied that he was ready for the peace, but that some of his staff were dissatisfied. He did this, according to Polybius (XIV, 2, 13), in order not to appear to have broken the truce if, while formal negotiations for peace were in progress, he committed any hostile act. It is difficult to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate diplomatic tricks, but Scipio evidently felt that he had gone as near the borderline as possible, and that some explanation was necessary. Livy (XXX, 4, 8) patriotically goes further, and invents an excuse: Syphax at the last moment added some unacceptable conditions to the treaty. Both Syphax and Hasdrubal, disappointed at their failure and with no suspicion of the shadow which hung over them, concluded that they should try to bring on a pitched battle. But before they had time to act, Scipio launched his attack; his speed again calls to mind his similar surprise dash on Cartagena.

Scipio's preparations and orders led his troops to believe they were going to renew the siege of Utica, but at midday he disclosed his real plan to the most efficient tribunes, and ordered them to draw up the troops after supper, when the buglers had sounded the retreat as usual. He then took counsel with the spies who had been to the enemy's camps, but left the decisions largely to Masinissa owing to his personal knowledge of the ground. The army started from the *Castra Cornelia* at the first watch of the night, and marched along the east side of the hills, where it would be protected from the enemy. North of the Koudiat Touba, where

the modern road crosses the range in a narrow cutting, Scipio called a halt. Laelius and Masinissa were detached, with half the legionaries and all the Numidians, to attack Syphax' camp. When they approached this, they divided. Laelius at once sent forward men to fire the camp, while he himself held back to cover the operation. Masinissa, who knew the exits of the camp, surrounded and guarded them, to cut off the fugitives. As soon as the fire had spread, Laelius attacked. Syphax and his troops, supposing the fire to be accidental, rushed out from their huts unprepared. Many were trampled to death in the passages, others were burnt, while some fled in panic into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians in the other camp also thought that the Numidian camp had caught fire by accident, and so rushed unarmed from their own, to help. Scipio, who had been waiting till their attention should be directed towards the blazing camp, now came up over the Koudiat Touba, and, falling on their camp, set fire to it also. The whole camp was soon aflame and the Carthaginian troops suffered no less terribly than the Numidians. Hasdrubal soon realized the meaning of the disaster and, making no attempt to save the doomed camps, fled with a small body of horse, and was joined by Syphax, who had also escaped. A large part of their armies was destroyed. The horror of the night, Polybius believed, could not be exaggerated. For the Romans, the success was complete. By a daring stroke with practically no loss, Scipio had delivered a vital blow at the superior forces of the enemy. Instead of being confined to the narrow peninsula of the *Castra Cornelia*, he had boldly taken the offensive, and dispelled the gloom which may have oppressed some of his followers during the winter (Fig. 10).

Hasdrubal tried to rally the survivors at the nearest fortified town,⁹⁴ but at daybreak Scipio left the camps in pursuit. Seeing that the citizens of the town would not remain loyal in face of Scipio's attack, Hasdrubal fled with all his forces, 2000 infantry and 500 cavalry, to Carthage. The town surrendered to Scipio and was spared, but two neighbouring towns were pillaged. Scipio then returned to the *Castra Cornelia*, and, after distributing the booty among his men, recommenced the siege of Utica.

At Carthage alarm prevailed. The tables had been turned with

dramatic suddenness. Instead of being cooped up in his camp almost besieged, Scipio now had command of the open country. This was a serious blow to the Carthaginian communications, since the Romans, virtually in command of the seas, could now impair their land supplies also. Worse still, their only army in Africa was lost, and the city itself endangered. Some were for recalling Hannibal, others for approaching Scipio. But the bolder opinion of the war party of the Barcids prevailed. All hope was not extinguished. For the disaster had not shown the superiority of the Romans in the field, but had resulted from a ruse. If they could collect the fugitives and raise new troops beyond the reach of Scipio's grasp, they might hope soon to lead a fresh army to relieve Utica or to face the foe in battle. So Hasdrubal was allotted the task of recruiting both in town and country. It was also feared that Syphax, who was nearby at Abba, might desert them if unsupported, so an embassy was sent to urge his continued loyalty. He had, in fact, started to return home, but near Abba he met 4000 Celtiberian mercenaries on their way to join the Carthaginians. This altered his purpose, which was finally changed by the continued entreaties of his Carthaginian wife, Sophonisba. The news of the arrival of the Spanish mercenaries, whose courage was known and whose numbers were doubled by rumour, together with the knowledge of the loyalty of Syphax, encouraged the Carthaginians to renew the war. Within a month of the disaster, Syphax and the Celtiberians had joined together and concentrated, with the force raised by Carthage itself, at the Great Plains, with a total strength of perhaps some 20,000.⁹⁵ This plain, five days' march from Utica, lies around Souk el Kremis, on the upper reaches of the Bagradas. It is about 15 miles long, 12 miles broad, and 75 miles distant from Utica. The place was well chosen, for it was some distance from Scipio, and from it Hasdrubal could keep in touch with Carthage, while Syphax would be nearer his own kingdom and could more easily draw reinforcements thence. Both leaders imagined that Scipio was busy with the siege of Utica, and that if they chose a spot far inland they might be left undisturbed for the moment.

The Carthaginians were gathering strength in the quiet of the

desert, when suddenly Scipio struck, determined to anticipate the enemy's offensive. Leaving part of his force to continue the siege of Utica, he set out with the rest (perhaps 12,000–15,000 men in all) in light marching order, and arrived on the fifth day at the Great Plains, where he found some 20,000 of the enemy opposed to him. Encamping on a hill nearly four miles from the enemy, he came down to the plain on the next day, and drew up his forces within a mile of the Carthaginians.⁹⁶ For two days the armies faced each other, and only skirmishes took place. Next day they advanced to battle (Fig. 11).

The Carthaginians at first were no doubt surprised that Scipio should dare to divide his force to stop their recruiting, and that he had so quickly anticipated their offensive. But they determined to fight, probably with good hopes of the issue. For they were numerically superior, and had a very effective weapon in the Celtiberian mercenaries. They had better knowledge of the ground and the surrounding country, while Scipio was far from his camp, from which they might hope to cut him off. But they ought to have made better use of these advantages. True, if they won an open battle, they could make it awkward for the survivors to escape. But the issue must be uncertain, in face of Scipio's tactical brilliance. If on the other hand they avoided battle for a time, they knew that Scipio could not hold on indefinitely if his supplies were threatened, or risk leaving his army at Utica weakened, and so he would be forced to retire. On his retreat they could have harassed him severely, with little loss to themselves. The Romans were generally nonplussed when faced by guerilla tactics. However, Hasdrubal apparently hoped his numerical superiority would outbalance Scipio's tactics, and so determined to fight.

Scipio advanced to battle with his infantry in the centre, drawn up in the usual three lines, *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*; the Italian cavalry was placed on the right wing, Masinissa's horse on the left. The enemy's centre was held by the Celtiberians, the right wing by the Carthaginians, and the left by the Numidians. At the first encounter, the cavalry squadrons on both Carthaginian wings were routed by the Roman wings. The Celtiberians stood firm, and put up a good fight; their ignorance of the country reduced the

safety of flight, while they feared Scipio's attitude if they were captured. But their flanks were exposed, and Scipio took advantage of this. The *hastati* engaged them in front, while the *principes* and *triarii*, under cover of their first line, turned into column, half to the right, half to the left, and then marched out to encircle the Celtiberians. These were soon surrounded and cut to pieces, but their heroic resistance allowed Hasdrubal and Syphax to escape, the former back to Carthage, the latter to his own kingdom.




Fig. 11 Battle of the Great Plains.

Scipio's tactics were a still further development of those used at Ilipa. Previously the *principes* had stood behind the *hastati*, ready either to come up into the first line to strengthen it in the actual attack, or to fill any gaps in it. In the same way, the *triarii* were the reserve to the second line. Now the *principes* and *triarii* no longer directly supported the first line. The old triple line was still preserved, but each line formed a self-dependent unit, ready to come up and prolong the line at each end. Thus the outflanking of the enemy could be carried out to a still greater degree than before. For it was not to the cavalry and the light-armed troops that this was assigned, but to the legions themselves; Scipio was able to use his best troops to carry out his manœuvre. This reform by Scipio marks a signal development in Roman military history, and prepares the way for the use of the reserve, as it is now under-

stood. Scipio did not form a detached reserve which could be hurried to any necessary point, but an offensive reserve to prolong his lines, when necessary, and to outflank the enemy. Also the enemy's centre was now not merely held at bay, as at Ilipa, but was actually engaged, and that on its whole front, which meant that the possibility of a sudden retreat was minimized. At Ilipa there had been no attempt at enclosing the enemy, but merely at outflanking him. Now Scipio could encircle the foe, as Hannibal himself had done at Cannae with his more risky crescent formation.

After a staff meeting Scipio decided to divide his forces. This could be done in safety, since Syphax had fled, the Carthaginian force was checked, and the Romans were masters of the interior. Laelius and Masinissa, with the Numidians and part of the Roman legions, were sent against Syphax to strike a decisive blow before he had time to recover, and also to regain Masinissa's own kingdom. Scipio himself went round to several towns or villages, storming those which did not surrender; but many did, as they were tired of the hardships which they had endured at the hands of Carthage. Scipio, who sent much of the booty to the *Castra Cornelia*, did not himself return to his camp, but determined to follow in the steps of Agathocles and Regulus, and seize Tunis. On his arrival the garrison fled, and the town fell into his hands. At Tunis he was, intimidatingly, in full view of Carthage itself; he could also command the enemy's land communications better than at Utica. This probably was the object of his move, rather than the desire for a base whence to start the actual siege of Carthage itself.

The battle of the Great Plains, following so quickly on the heels of the disaster of the burning of the camps, naturally produced the greatest despondency at Carthage. Some may have thought that the terms of a peace should be considered, but not many. Rather a counter-offensive was suggested: the Carthaginians would send the fleet against the Roman forces at Utica, engage the Roman fleet and try to raise the siege. They also realized that the time had at last come to recall Hannibal, and some senators were despatched to Italy. The city itself had to be strengthened against possible

attack, and the fleet equipped. But it took time to raise the crews and before the fleet was ready, Scipio had reached Tunis just in time to forestall the enemy's plan.

While the Romans were settling down in Tunis, they saw the Carthaginian fleet under way en route for Utica. Scipio, knowing that his own fleet was unprepared, at once marched at full speed towards the *Castra Cornelia*. His warships were quite unready for a naval action, as they had been loaded with artillery and siege weapons to invest Utica. Seeing the futility of attempting an open fight, he drew them in near the shore, and lashed the transports together four deep in front of them, leaving only small intervals between the transports for despatch boats to pass in and out. These lines of moored vessels formed a barrier through which it would be almost impossible to force a way. One thousand picked men were placed on board them, with an adequate supply of ammunition.

The Carthaginian fleet seems to have been guilty of culpable delay both earlier and at this point. The essence of their plan was a surprise attack, preferably while Scipio was in the interior, but they had failed to anticipate his arrival at Tunis, presumably because of delay in preparations or contrary winds. Again when they approached Utica and all depended on swift action, they did not attack at once, but anchored the first night off the harbour of Rusucmon, near *Porta Farina*. Next day they put to sea in battle array, and, as the Romans did not put out against them as they had expected, they attacked the transports, which towered above their ships like walls. At last the Carthaginians threw poles fitted with grappling irons on to the Roman ships, broke up the first line, and retired to Carthage with some six transports in tow. This partial success caused great joy in the city. Thus Scipio had arrived in time to prevent serious disaster to his fleet, but was perhaps guilty of some negligence, in not making sure of the movements of the Carthaginian fleet, before converting his own navy into a weapon of siege warfare only.

Scipio seems to have stopped some time at Utica, without being able to take it, since he had not returned to Tunis when Syphax was sent to him, and when Laelius and Masinissa came

back. It was only after these incidents that he returned to Tunis, possibly after an unsuccessful attempt to storm Hippo Diarrhytus.

Meantime, Laelius and Masinissa followed on the track of Syphax. When they reached Masinissa's old kingdom, the Massyles expelled many of Syphax' garrisons, and gladly welcomed back their prince. Urged on by his wife's entreaties, he raised a fresh force, and camped near the enemy, probably a little to the east of Cirta or near the Ampsaga. Cavalry skirmishes soon brought on a general engagement. The Roman cavalry was harassed by the enemy's numerically superior cavalry, but their line was reinforced by light-armed troops, who checked the enemy's wild rushes. By the time that the legions were coming up, the Masae-syles were routed and Syphax, whose horse was shot under him, was taken prisoner, but their losses were not very heavy.

With Laelius' permission, Masinissa hastened on to Cirta, Syphax' capital, which he hoped to surprise in the general confusion; Laelius followed more slowly with the infantry. Masinissa called the citizens of Cirta to a conference, but they were unmoved by threats or thoughts of their defeat, until Syphax himself was brought in bound; at this, the town surrendered. Masinissa hastened to the palace, where he was met by Sophonisba and was so struck by her charms and entreaties that he promised her safety. The only way he could secure this was to marry her at once. When Laelius arrived, he expressed strong disapproval but the matter was left over for Scipio to decide. Laelius and Masinissa then recovered some other cities, but do not seem to have advanced beyond Cirta. Thus Syphax' defeat did not involve the fall of all Numidia; his son, Vermina, tried to save what he could, and in the east were rivals of Masinissa like Mazaetullus. But Carthage could no longer expect any help from Numidia.

When Syphax arrived in the Roman camp, Scipio treated him courteously, and could not but remember how, only a few years before, he himself and Hasdrubal had been Syphax' guests. Syphax, a true son of Adam, excused his conduct by blaming his wife. When Masinissa arrived, Scipio blamed him privately for his lack of self-control, and for appropriating Sophonisba, who was now part of the booty of the Roman People. Masinissa, duly

abashed, concluded that the only way to prevent his wife from falling into the hands of Rome was to send her a cup of poison. This she accepted gladly and drank. Next day, to divert Masinissa's mind from this tragedy, Scipio assembled all his troops, and honoured Masinissa before them, calling him king: he also gave him an ivory staff (*scipio*), which was used as an emblem by the Scipios.⁹⁷ Syphax was sent with other prisoners under Laelius' escort to Italy, where he was imprisoned at Alba, then at Tibur where he died. An embassy from Masinissa also accompanied Laelius, to beg the Senate to ratify the title of king and the honours which Scipio had granted him; this the Senate did.

This story of Sophonisba, as told by Livy, is rejected by most critics, but though romantic, there is nothing very improbable in it, when allowance is made for his artistic handling. It is perhaps too drastic to reduce the underlying truth merely to Sophonisba's suicide to avoid capture.⁹⁸

The joy at Carthage caused by the naval success was short-lived. On news of the fall of Cirta and the capture of their ally Syphax, the Carthaginians turned their thoughts to peace. Although Scipio had failed to take Utica, he was now encamped in full view at Tunis; he was master of the open country, cutting off their supplies; and Syphax' defeat meant no further recruits from that quarter. Hannibal and Mago had been recalled from Italy, but were still far from home. The fleet and the garrison of the city alone were left. Naturally the peace party came to the front, headed by the aristocracy of rich landowners, who were tired of seeing their property ravaged, and who had been at enmity with the Barcids. Even the war party would welcome negotiations, if these could be prolonged till Hannibal returned, assuming he was not prevented by the Roman fleet; if that blow fell, few would hope for success in continuing the war. So, partly as a genuine peace move, partly to play for time, an embassy of thirty members of the Council went to Scipio, to sue for peace. At the Roman headquarters they prostrated themselves in oriental fashion, and, throwing all the responsibility of the war on Hannibal and his party, professed themselves ready to submit. Scipio, too, was ready for peace, since in any case there would be a lull in the

hostilities, as winter was at hand; the war was won in a manner sufficiently glorious for a large part of the home government; Italy was to be freed from Hannibal and Mago, and would be able to recover her agricultural prosperity. If Hannibal could be securely guarded, nothing remained to be done. Scipio did not aim at the destruction of Carthage itself, as the conditions he offered now and after Zama show.⁹⁹ Even if he had, its reduction by famine would take time, as long as the Carthaginians kept their fleet; and he could hardly expect to reduce it easily by storm, when he had failed at Utica. Besides, Hannibal's return must be considered before attempting a siege. He wanted, it is true, more than Fabius and his supporters, but only to deprive Carthage of her European empire, and to ensure future peace by crushing the war party. The terms of the peace which he proposed would accomplish his aim. He saw, too, that Hannibal would return, and, however confident in himself, he could not know how the issue would lie if they came into contact. He was ready to strike while the iron was hot. It is unnecessary to ascribe to him motives of undue personal ambition, in wanting to finish the war in his own period of office and not to let the glory fall to a successor after the spade-work had been his own. He treated for peace, because he saw that the season was ripe.

The terms he proposed were these: the surrender of all prisoners, deserters and refugees; the evacuation of Italy and Gaul and of all islands lying between Italy and Africa, and the abandonment of all action in Spain; the surrender of the whole navy, except twenty ships; an indemnity of 5000 talents. Two further clauses, doubtless of a temporary nature till the treaty was definitely made, enacted that double pay be furnished for his troops, and a large quantity of barley and wheat. Thus Scipio ensured supplies for his own men and also crippled the Carthaginians in a corresponding measure. Three days, in which to decide, were granted to the enemy, who then sent one embassy to conclude an armistice with Scipio, and another to Rome to sue for peace on these terms. The conditions would successfully reduce Carthage to a purely African power, limited by the territory of Rome's ally Masinissa, deprived of the great resources of Spain and of her carrying trade, crippled in her

recovery by a heavy indemnity, and above all robbed of her fleet, the means of regaining or holding any distant territory. Nominally she was to remain independent, but really her future lay in Roman hands, and she would be little else than a client state.¹⁰⁰

Scipio himself probably remained at Tunis while negotiations were proceeding, but later he returned to the *Castra Cornelia* (P. XV, 2, 5 sqq.). The winter (203/202) was probably passed at both these places; he would hardly relax his grip on Tunis, while on the promontory he could more easily maintain his communications. Masinissa left, with his own forces and ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, to complete the recovery of his own kingdom and to gain Syphax' territory. The Roman assistance made it clear to all that Masinissa was acting as an ally of Rome and that Roman power was supreme in Africa.

At Rome all rejoiced. The arrival of Laelius, with his prisoner Syphax, was a visible proof of Scipio's victory. Next came the Carthaginian envoys, under escort, to seek ratification of the terms agreed on by Scipio and their government. After some delay these were confirmed by the Senate and Roman People, perhaps at the beginning of the consular year 202. The embassy then returned with Laelius to Africa, which they reached just before Scipio was starting his campaign of 202.

The cause of this delay is obscure, but there is no doubt that the Senate did ultimately approve the peace.¹⁰¹ The Roman annalists, however, did not like the idea of the Senate thus calmly accepting the terms. Thus Livy (XXX, 21-3) patriotically tells how the Carthaginian embassy tried to negotiate better terms and were then dismissed. Dio (57, 74) gives a more reasonable account, but still one savouring of a too patriotic Roman source—the Senate refuses to treat while there is still an enemy on Roman territory; but, after the departure of Hannibal and Mago and after a long discussion, the Senate ratifies the terms. Yet this need not be too theatrical to be true: at the beginning of the 1914-18 War, the Tsar took a solemn oath never to make peace while an enemy remained on Russian soil. More probably the delay was due to differences of opinion among Roman senators. As will be seen in more detail later (pp. 169 ff.), the political opposition in Rome

was increasing and became so violent that efforts were made even to supersede Scipio in his command. These did not succeed, but his enemies may well have argued at length during the winter against accepting the terms which he had arranged with Carthage. However, whatever the cause, the terms of the treaty were ultimately accepted by the Senate.

While the peace negotiations of 203/202 were in progress, Hannibal left Italy. He had been recalled after the battle of the Great Plains, but clearly had not left at once, as one of the conditions proposed by Scipio was the evacuation of Italy by Hannibal. In fact, it is possible that his continued presence caused the delay in reaching a settlement, and that the Romans remained true to their tradition of not treating with an enemy while he was still on their soil. At last, when he had the necessary transports, he yielded to the call of his country, and reluctantly left the shores of Italy, where he had maintained himself for fifteen years unconquered. There may well be little rhetorical exaggeration in Livy's source when he says that Hannibal left the land of his enemies with more grief than most men feel in leaving their own country for exile. He had failed in an attempt to which he had devoted his whole life. Yet all was not lost, and he must have felt some eagerness in the thought that he was going to meet the most brilliant general Rome had produced, and that, when they parted, the fate of the civilized world would be decided. The Carthaginian troops, which had been operating under Mago in Liguria, were also withdrawn and sailed for Africa. On the voyage the general died as the result of a wound, but the army itself joined Hannibal who had landed at Leptis Minor near Hadrumetum.

While peace negotiations were being carried on at Rome, a violation of the truce had caused the war to flare up again in Africa. The Romans were expecting two large convoys of supplies. One, of a hundred transports with an escort of twenty warships coming from Sardinia under the praetor Lentulus, reached Africa in safety; but the second, of two hundred transports with thirty warships, coming from Sicily under Cn. Octavius, encountered a gale just off Africa. The convoy was scattered. By the exertions of the rowers the warships reached the Promontory of

Apollo. But most of the transports were driven on the island of Aegimurus (Zembra) at the entrance to the bay in which Carthage lies; others were carried nearly to the city itself, to the Aquae Calidae, on the west of the peninsula of Cape Bon.¹⁰²

All this could be seen from Carthage itself and caused the greatest excitement. For now Hannibal had returned, the city could turn its thoughts to war again. Besides, during the winter they had suffered great hardships and privations. Scipio was master of the open country, cutting off their supplies from the interior, and was also superior by sea. The populace of the overcrowded and ill-supplied city could not let the opportunity slip, when they saw such great supplies within their grasp. Yet not to return them, or not to allow the Romans to fetch them, would mean breaking the truce. The Carthaginian Senate met, but in vain was it objected that interference would infringe the truce and prejudice the peace. The people, crowding into the Senate House, forced the Senate's hand, and Hasdrubal was sent with fifty warships to collect the transports from Aegimurus and the coast.

Scipio was indignant at this violation of his truce, especially as news had just reached him from Rome that the peace was ratified. Further, he must have felt that Hannibal's return was ominous and would prejudice his peace moves; yet for the moment he still turned to peace. He sent three envoys to Carthage, to report about the ratification of the treaty at Rome, and at the same time to demand some reparation for the recent outrage.¹⁰³ They spoke with great frankness and pride before the Senate and people, taxing Carthage with breaking the treaty. If this had been done, they argued, through reliance on Hannibal, Carthage was trusting to a broken reed; besides, in defeat Carthage would now find no mercy or pity. The Carthaginians objected to the harsh conditions of the treaty and the bearing of the embassy, and could not endure to give up their freshly gained supplies; further, they still trusted in Hannibal, notwithstanding the Roman estimate of him. And so the people were for dismissing the ambassadors without a reply. But the government formed a treacherous plan to make the renewal of hostilities inevitable. Two triremes were sent to escort the ambassadors' ship back to their camp, while Hasdrubal, son

of Gisgo, who was with the Carthaginian fleet near Utica, probably at Rusucmon, was ordered to wait in ambush. When the Roman quinquereme had reached the mouth of the Bagradas the Carthaginian escort unexpectedly sailed back, and soon afterwards three Carthaginian triremes bore down on the Roman ship, which put up a gallant resistance and finally managed to run ashore, near some Romans out foraging. These saw the danger, and ran to the beach to assist the vessel. The ambassadors themselves escaped safely, but most of the Romans on board had been killed. This treacherous act meant the final termination of any thought of peace, and the war was renewed with greater bitterness on both sides.

CHAPTER VI

THE LAST CAMPAIGN

HOSTILITIES RECOMMENCED. Scipio took measures to ensure the safety of the fleet, entrusting the command to Baebius (perhaps as *pro praetore* rather than as a mere legate), and started on a punitive expedition into the interior. When the peace embassy, returning from Rome, reached the Roman naval camp, Baebius detained the Carthaginian members, but sent on to Scipio the Roman envoys (presumably the fetial priests who conducted the formal treaty-making). They informed him that the treaty had been accepted by the People and Senate, thus either formally confirming what he had earlier learnt from despatches or possibly bringing for the first time news that both the Senate and the People had now ratified the terms. Scipio wisely ordered Baebius to treat courteously and send home the Carthaginian ambassadors, who were fearful for their safety. But in the interior he stormed town after town, refusing submission, selling the inhabitants as slaves, in anger at the Carthaginian treachery. He sent repeated messages to Masinissa, who was engaged in winning back his father's kingdom and as much of Syphax' realm as he could, urging him to raise a strong force and join him with all haste. For he hesitated to take the offensive until he was strengthened by the Numidian cavalry, with whose help he hoped to win the field. Meanwhile he played for time, wishing to avoid an engagement, and, as Masinissa did not appear, he gradually advanced further inland and westwards to meet him. At the same time the Carthaginians, who saw their towns being sacked, urged Hannibal to bring the enemy to battle at once. He replied, naturally enough, that he himself would judge when the time for action was ripe; for he was still engaged in his preparations. He, too, felt his weakness, and sought help from a Numidian named Tychaeus, a connection of Syphax, who brought him 2000 cavalry and also from Vermina (*Pl.* 22), Syphax' son, who had not relinquished all hope for his father's

kingdom. But soon after receiving the plea from Carthage, Hannibal acted, perhaps with his preparations still uncompleted. He moved his camp from near Hadrumentum and, advancing quickly, encamped near Zama (probably Seba Biar).¹⁰⁴

Regarding the strategy underlying the movements of Hannibal and Scipio before they actually met on the field of battle, it is generally agreed that Scipio moved to the west and interior with the object of joining Masinissa. He dared not face Hannibal in the open field, until he had strengthened the arm in which he was weakest, by availing himself of Masinissa's Numidian cavalry. The object of Hannibal's move from Hadrumentum was to prevent Scipio joining Masinissa, and to force him to fight without the Numidian cavalry, by cutting his communications with his base at Utica; he may also have hoped to join Vermina, who was raising a squadron of horse for him. Since Polybius does not say where Scipio was when Hannibal left Hadrumentum, it has sometimes been supposed that he was storming the towns of the Bagradas valley, in good communication with his base; and that on learning that Hannibal had started, Scipio coolly decided to retreat to Numidia to meet Masinissa, thus sacrificing his communications. But since Scipio presumably still controlled the Bagradas valley, his advance will have been much further inland to the south-west, where he pressed on storming the towns as he went, as a hostile demonstration to intimidate the Carthaginians, to cut them off from the economic base and source of supplies, and at the same time to secure his own communications. This policy was the one usually adopted by all the enemies of Carthage (e.g. by Agathocles, and by the Mercenaries) who avoided a direct attack on the city itself. This campaign led Scipio far into the interior, to near Naraggara (Sidi Youssef). At the same time he determined to await Masinissa there, in a strong position. Only when the meeting was accomplished (probably at or near Naraggara) did he move on to the site of the battle, changing from a defensive to an offensive position.

By this strategy Scipio had perhaps endangered his communications with Utica, and ran the risk of a flank attack; possibly, too, he miscalculated the time necessary for Hannibal's preparations,

and hoped to be back at his base with Masinissa before Hannibal was ready. And perhaps Hannibal was forced to start before he was fully prepared. Each general took in turn a great risk, Scipio to avoid fighting while without his cavalry, Hannibal to bring on the engagement before his enemy's weakness was remedied. And here Fortune favoured Scipio, not his opponent.

When Hannibal was at Zama, he despatched three spies to gain information about the position and camp of the Romans. These spies were caught, according to Polybius' story, but instead of being punished were conducted round the Roman camp, shown its exact arrangement, and then escorted back to Hannibal. Since they will have seen only what the Romans intended them to see, this episode may be regarded as a deliberate blow at the enemy's morale rather than dismissed as historical fiction.¹⁰⁵ At this, Hannibal desired to meet Scipio in person; the latter accepted the suggestion, and said he would fix the time and place of the interview. Scipio was then joined by Masinissa, advanced to the site of the battle, which was perhaps near the *Ou. et Tine*, and announced he was ready for the meeting. Hannibal moved up, and encamped on the hill opposite; next day both generals met each other in the middle of the plain between the camps. After a fruitless discussion they retired and prepared for battle on the next day (*Pl.* 33).

Two questions arise: why did Hannibal advance from his base at Zama and can the personal meeting of the two men be accepted as a historical fact? Discussion of the former question has often been complicated by the assumption that Hannibal already knew that Masinissa had joined Scipio. But in fact Polybius' narrative nowhere suggests that he did know this, and thus Hannibal's advance from Zama will simply have been part of his general attempt to fight Scipio before Masinissa arrived.¹⁰⁶ When he had advanced, he learnt the truth, and fought because he could not act otherwise. That is, Hannibal's brilliant attempt at surprise failed, because Masinissa had arrived in the nick of time.

The interview of Scipio and Hannibal has often been rejected, sometimes on the assumption that it derives from the poetic imagination of Ennius. But it is unlikely that Polybius, with his intimate knowledge of the Scipionic House, would have repeated

the story if it lacked all foundation; he was more than a Greek historiographer aiming at the dramatic. Scipio would not refuse to listen to terms, especially as by doing so he forced Hannibal to fight on ground he himself had chosen. Hannibal was suddenly in an awkward situation, and might well seek to avoid a battle by one last attempt at peace. A victory might not mean the end of the war, while a defeat would be fatal. The terms which he offered showed that he still hoped that his dread name might cause the Romans to hesitate before coming to the death grapple.¹⁰⁷ He was ready to relinquish all the Carthaginian possessions outside Africa. Scipio naturally rejected terms which were worse than those offered before the Carthaginian violation of the truce, since they excluded the surrender of the Carthaginian fleet and prisoners, and the payment of an indemnity. There was no chance that the home government would accept such a peace, which would have ended Scipio's career. He trusted too much to his own genius to accept, and so it only remained to fight.

Both armies were drawn up for battle in three lines. Hannibal's first line consisted of some 12,000 mercenaries: Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders and Moors. These were probably heavy-armed troops, and had, in the main, been raised by his brother Mago.¹⁰⁸ In front of this line were the light-armed troops and some eighty elephants. At a certain distance, and distinct from the first line, was the second, consisting of the native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were separated, and were not to reinforce the mercenaries in the way that the Roman *principes* usually aided the *hastati*; but they advanced with them, though keeping their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than a furlong; it was the Old Guard, the veterans who had fought for so many years in Italy and had crossed over with Hannibal. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, thus increasing still more the distance between themselves and the second line. All three lines were of approximately the same strength. On the wings were posted the cavalry, Hannibal's weakest arm, the Numidians on the left, the Carthaginians on the right, perhaps 4000 in all.

The Romans were drawn up in their usual three lines. Between






Fig. 12 Battle of Zama. The site is that finally suggested by Veith and accepted by the author.


the maniples of the *hastati* were certain intervals. The second line, the *principes*, was not in the customary quincunx or chess-board formation, but its maniples were directly behind those of the *hastati*, not covering their intervals. The *triarii* formed the third line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with companies of *velites*. The cavalry was posted on the wings, on the left Laelius with the Italian horse, on the right Masinissa and all his Numidians.¹⁰⁹

After a preliminary skirmish of the Numidian horse on each side and presumably of the light-armed troops, Hannibal opened the battle by a charge of his elephants, but the noise of bugles frightened them. Some turned back on the Numidians, who were also attacked by Masinissa; thus the Carthaginian left wing was exposed. The rest fell on the Roman *velites* who will have advanced ahead of the infantry line, leaving the gaps between the maniples of the *hastati*; the elephants were driven through the gaps to the rear or fled to the right out of the action. Laelius used this disturbance to attack and drive the Carthaginian cavalry off the field. So the enemy's elephants and cavalry were accounted for, and the infantry could close. The Roman lines advanced, keeping their usual distance; the first two Carthaginian lines followed suit,




30-32 The battle of Ilipa. *See* pp. 261f. *Above.* Site of Scipio's camp on Pelagatos, from the north. The earthwork running round the crown of the hill *may* be the rampart of the camp or may be later. *Centre.* Eastern stretch of the Carthaginian camp. *Below.* View from the Carthaginian camp; looking across the plain of the battlefield towards the Roman camp on Pelagatos in the centre distance





33 Probable site of the battle of Zama in the plain of Draa el Metnan. The second small hill from the left is Kdt Bou Grine and the probable site of Hannibal's camp. The high hill on the horizon on the right is Dj. Garn Halfaya. Under the lower line of hills on the extreme right (Kdt Si Ounis?) is Kdt el Behaima, the site of Scipio's camp. (See p. 271)





34 View from the Byrsa hill at Carthage, looking over the ancient harbours and across the Gulf of Tunis (*below, left*)

35 The ancient harbour site at Carthage (*below*)





36 Obverse of a gold stater, with a portrait of Flamininus. The reverse shows Victory (Nike) crowning his name, T. Quincti. Since the inscription is in Latin, not Greek, the issue may have been authorized by Flamininus himself, rather than as a compliment by the Greeks. It was not an official issue of the Roman mint. (*See p. 195*)

37-40 Portraits of Hellenistic Kings.
Centre, left, Philip V of Macedon; *right*, Nabis of Sparta. *Below, left*, Antiochus III, the Great, of Syria; *right*, Prusias I of Bithynia



but their third line remained still. At first the Carthaginian mercenaries made good headway, but Roman discipline and equipment began to tell. Further, the Carthaginian second rank did not support their first, which thought itself betrayed, and so retreated, attacking all the Carthaginians it encountered. Thus the second line of Carthaginians had to fight against their own mercenaries, and then came into conflict with the Romans, managing to throw some of the maniples of the *hastati* into confusion. The latter, however, were not directly supported by the *principes* who were ordered to hold firm their ranks (i.e. not advance). The result was that the greater part of the mercenaries (and the Carthaginian second line?) were cut to pieces. Hannibal did not allow the survivors to mix with his own men, but forced them out on the wings. As the ground was now in a very bad condition, Scipio recalled the *hastati*, and a pause ensued, in which he closed their ranks and brought up the *principes* and *triarii* on their flanks. Hannibal also must have reorganized his troops. Then the second phase started. The lines closed again and fought bravely, till the Roman cavalry returned from pursuing the Carthaginian, and fell on the enemy in the rear. At this, the survivors fled, though few alone escaped.

Such is Polybius' description, but it contains difficulties, some of which may be glanced at here.¹¹⁰ Various theories of the tactical development of the battle have been advanced, but none can be accepted if it seriously reconstructs Polybius in matters of fact. It may be legitimate to try to assign motives to Hannibal and Scipio where Polybius does not: at most it is possible to suppose that where Polybius does assign motive he might sometimes be wrong. But his facts must be accepted, since there is no valid reason to reject them.

Since Polybius does not say what Hannibal's tactical aims were, the ground is open for modern speculation. The essential data are, according to Veith whose own reconstruction of the battle is one of the most influential, the relative strength of the two sides, what Hannibal could know about the enemy, and the actual arrangement of his troops. As he was weaker than the Romans in cavalry and stronger in infantry, he would obviously aim at a decision by

the latter. If his cavalry had little hope of success, he would wish to nullify the superior Roman cavalry, while his infantry won the day. Thus he quite possibly ordered his cavalry to give ground in order to draw their opponents off the field. However, whether their flight was deliberate or not, it involved their defeat. Scipio doubtless ordered his own cavalry to pursue the fleeing enemy and then to return as soon as possible, in order to take the enemy's infantry in the rear. Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberately drew them away.¹¹¹

After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse the foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always rather a doubtful quantity, and here fell foul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand.

Why did Hannibal place his veterans so far behind his first two lines? It is scarcely likely that he would use his best troops to protect his rear against the risk of encirclement and the eventual return of the Roman cavalry, important though this need was. Rather, they were held back until they could be used as fresh troops against the Romans when the latter were exhausted by their struggle against his first two lines. But there may have been even more than that in his mind. When a modern historian begins to put thoughts into the minds of men, a danger signal should flash. But since a good general must obviously have speculated about the intentions of his opponent, it is surely legitimate to consider what he may have thought those plans to have been and how he hoped to thwart them. Now Hannibal must have known how Scipio had learnt from him at Cannae and had applied that knowledge with increasing skill at Baecula, Ilipa and Campi Magni.

Weakness in cavalry might prevent Hannibal himself from using his favourite tactics, but he might think that Scipio could and would try to apply them. And Scipio's plan was doubtless as Hannibal may have conceived it (admittedly our ancient sources do not tell us this, but they do record the earlier growth of Scipio's tactical methods which it is reasonable to suppose he would try to apply if Hannibal gave him the chance). Scipio would hope to expose Hannibal's wings with his cavalry, hold the enemy with his first line and send out his two rear ranks on both sides to out-flank him. Hannibal would try to thwart this possibility by keeping his third rank as a reserve. If Scipio did not realize this in time and was too committed in the battle to make any change in his dispositions, then Scipio's attack would be against the first two lines alone, and when that was spent, Hannibal could attack with his reserve third line. Alternatively, if Scipio did realize the trap in time and was thus forced to abandon his outflanking intention, Hannibal would be in no worse position, since Scipio presumably would rely on traditional Roman methods of three supporting lines whose weight would fall on Hannibal's first two lines, after which the weary legionaries would have to advance against Hannibal's intact third line.

At first, with the exception of the elephants, all went according to plan, and the mercenaries fought bravely against the *hastati*. However, then, according to Polybius, they received no support from the second line of Carthaginians who acted like cowards. This may be the explanation of their conduct, but possibly, as Veith has suggested, a correction of motive should be introduced: the second line denied its support to the first not from cowardice but under orders. Hannibal may have intended to keep his lines distinct; after the elephant charge, each line was to be thrown against the enemy separately. By such means he might gain partial compensation for the lack of time in which to try to blend the varied elements of his hurriedly gathered army into one homogeneous whole. However that may be, the mercenaries turned against the second line of Carthaginians who appeared to be leaving them in the lurch, and a severe fight followed. Some think that Polybius may have inflated its severity somewhat: if the

Carthaginians merely refused to receive the fleeing mercenaries into their ranks and killed those who resisted, the scale of such a fracas might later have been exaggerated. If, however, Polybius' account of the struggle between them is taken at its face value, this incident may have been, as Veith believes, a stroke of luck which saved the Romans and wrecked Hannibal's plan. By this time, if not earlier, Scipio must have realized that an outflanking move was impossible in face of Hannibal's reserve and he must have been challenged by the prospect of launching a purely frontal attack where the enemy's chances were greater. But then suddenly the two first lines of the enemy who, united, could have forced Scipio to bring up his rear ranks, turned against each other. Scipio profited by the confusion to let the *hastati* carry on alone and then, as will be seen, broke off the battle in order to reorganize, while Hannibal accepted the pause because he too needed time to re-adjust his forces.

One or two further difficulties may be mentioned. What precisely happened after the clash between the mercenaries and Carthaginians? Polybius says, 'the greater part of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut down on the spot, either by themselves or by the *hastati*' (13, 8), i.e. only the veterans were left. But this is improbable because if the veterans stood alone and untouched, Hannibal would not have needed time to reorganize, as his permitting of the pause suggests he did. Also it is possible that Polybius' earlier statement is contradicted by his later observation (14, 6) that both sides were nearly equal, which would not have been so if virtually all the two first Punic lines had been scattered. One solution (e.g. that by Veith) is to omit the word 'and' and read 'the Carthaginian mercenaries', i.e. Polybius was referring to the mercenaries alone. But since this creates grammatical difficulties,¹¹² it is probably simpler to suppose that Polybius has exaggerated when he says 'the greater part' and that while both lines were engaged and suffered heavy losses, they were not totally destroyed.

The role played by the *principes*, the Roman second line, is not quite clear, but depends on the meaning of ἐπέστησαν in Polybius 13, 7. If it means 'brought up their ranks' to help the *hastati* in the

normal manner, this would imply that both ranks moved forward and would help to explain the recovery of the *hastati* and the subsequent defeat of the first two enemy lines. However, since Polybius later refers (14, 1) to a subsequent recall of the *hastati* only, and since no parallel usage for this meaning of the word can be found in Polybius, it is better to translate 'held firm their ranks', i.e. having kept close to the *hastati* during the initial advance, the *principes* then halted and the *hastati* went on alone.¹¹³

The *hastati*, however, had got into an awkward position in pursuing the broken first and second lines, which Hannibal was forcing out to the flanks of his third veteran line. They were face to face with the veterans and exposed (they can scarcely have followed the fleeing men to the flanks because we find them in the centre later on when Scipio brought up his other lines on their flanks); Scipio had to relieve them. This would involve sending the *principes* and *triarii* over the battlefield, which by this time was so encumbered with dead and slippery with blood that an advance might disorder the ranks of advancing troops. Scipio therefore decided to recall the *hastati* and reorganize his line. Hannibal too was ready to break off. It might be argued that he should have attacked the isolated *hastati*, but this would have involved committing his last troops to action while the Romans still had two lines intact which could outflank him. Thus he too was ready for a pause in which to reorganize.

The details of the Carthaginian reorganization are not recorded by Polybius. Presumably the mercenaries and Carthaginians who had fled to the wings were regrouped there, though it is just possible that they were so demoralized that they were 'written off' and consequently the Romans had to face only Hannibal's veterans¹¹⁴ (it is still less likely that the reorganization was more fundamental, with the veterans ultimately on the wings which would have put them opposite the fresh troops in Scipio's reorganized line). The Roman movement, however, is described by Polybius: Scipio lengthened his line by bringing up the *principes* and *triarii* on the flanks of the *hastati*, with the gaps between the maniples closed up; presumably the move was made by the two rear lines dividing in the centre and half marching to each flank, as at Campi Magni

(rather than all the *triarii* going to one flank and the *principes* to the other). Hannibal would need longer to prepare, since some of his troops had been defeated, so perhaps the implication in Polybius' account that Scipio took the initiative in renewing the battle should be accepted, although it might be thought that he would have been only too glad to delay in the hope that his cavalry would return. The battle, when joined, long remained in doubt, until the returning Roman cavalry under Laelius and Masinissa swept up in Hannibal's rear, and the day was won for Scipio. They had arrived in time to decide not only the course of the battle, but of the world's history.

The losses were severe. A great number of the Carthaginians were cut down in their ranks, while few of those who fled escaped, owing to the superior speed of the Roman cavalry. The casualties are numbered at 20,000, the prisoners the same, while the Romans lost only 1500.¹¹⁵ After pillaging the enemy's camp, Scipio returned to his own, while Hannibal fled without halt to Hadrumetum. Scipio then returned to the Castra Cornelia, whence he despatched Laelius with the news of his victory to Rome.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile P. Lentulus had arrived off Utica with a great convoy of supplies—twenty warships and one hundred transports—thus bringing Scipio's fleet up to perhaps ninety warships. With his combined forces Scipio decided to make a demonstration against Carthage: while the legions marched thither under Octavius, he himself sailed with the whole fleet in the same direction. On the way he was met by a Carthaginian vessel bearing envoys, who came to sue for peace; they were ordered to meet him at Tunis.

News reached the Romans on their march to Tunis that Syphax' son, Vermina, was coming up to the help of Carthage. Part of the Roman infantry and all the cavalry were sent against him, and completely routed his force on the first day of the Saturnalia (12 December), leaving heavy casualties on the field, though the prince himself escaped.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile Hannibal, who had returned to Carthage after an absence of thirty-six years to plead for peace, had prevailed. Thirty Carthaginian delegates presented themselves at Tunis to beg for peace. What else could be done? Hannibal, indomitable even in defeat, had, like a lion,

turned to the mountain fastnesses of southern Italy, and was only driven thence because a genius had arisen among the enemy. But then Scipio's counterstroke had forced on the final struggle and defeat in open battle. Carthage might still resist; she had still the strength of her walls and position. Fury, born of despair, might beget still further strength, as happened in the hour of her doom fifty years later. Hannibal's genius was unimpaired, and she might rally the native enemies of Masinissa. She might even try to urge Philip of Macedon to renew the struggle with Rome, but he would not be likely to respond. The risk of further resistance was, as Hannibal saw, too great. Carthage was exhausted in all her strength, in men, in food, in equipment and in her treasury. Spain was lost, and the hinterland of Africa cut off. Above all, she had lost control of the sea, and so all hope of help or supplies from abroad was gone. And the House of Barca, which had taken so large a share in causing and supporting the war, now counselled peace. Resistance might mean death, so peace was sought.

Scipio also was ready for peace. At first, his staff wished to avenge the broken treaty of 203, but the general's sane desire for peace prevailed. The main reason, on military grounds, was the strength and position of Carthage, and the extreme difficulty of besieging it. True, he had complete command of the sea, and could invest the city on all sides and prevent supplies from reaching it. Also the city's extreme exhaustion made it less impregnable than it proved to be in its final downfall in 146. But if Scipio destroyed it, he would alienate the other African powers; he had appeared as a saviour, but if he turned oppressor he would forfeit this advantage. To storm the city would take time, men and money, all of which would involve making fresh demands on the home government. These would doubtless be met in the enthusiasm caused by his victory, since Rome as a whole was friendly to him. This alone is enough to discredit the charge, which Livy brings against him, of wishing to finish the war quickly, for fear of being superseded in his command and losing the glory of terminating the war. Even Mommsen, not Scipio's most friendly critic, rebuts this charge.¹¹⁸ It can only have been the baseless rallying cry of his political opponents. Scipio could have stormed Carthage, but did not wish

this, if he could get his terms accepted without doing so. Italy desperately needed rest to heal the wounds of seventeen years of war. Her strength was drained, her countryside depopulated, her fields ravaged. A period of peace was essential for her recovery. Fresh efforts could have been made, but they were not necessary, and Scipio was patriotic enough to wish to spare her. If his terms were accepted, Carthage could be disarmed, and the time had not come when Rome's expansion could be characterized as '*solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*'. Scipio wished to disarm but not to destroy, and in this showed himself a champion of Rome's protectorate mission in the world.

The terms which Scipio propounded to the Carthaginian embassy are as follows, the first four clauses referring to the preliminary armistice:¹¹⁹ (a) A three months' armistice is granted, during which the Carthaginians are to send no embassy except to Rome, and receive none without Scipio's permission. (b) Reparation to be made for the injustices committed during the truce, by restoring the transports and their contents; this was fulfilled by the equivalent payment of 25,000 pounds of silver (= 312 talents). This sum seems excessive, as the support of all Scipio's troops for six months would cost only some hundred talents. (c) The Carthaginians to supply to the Romans both corn for three months, and pay, until Rome ratified the treaty. (d) One hundred hostages were to be chosen by Scipio from the Carthaginians between the ages of fourteen and thirty. Appian mentions 150 hostages, who were to be released when the treaty was ratified. Probably these statements are complementary, the former being a clause of the peace, the latter of the armistice. The hundred hostages (or their replacements) were apparently held in Italy until the tribute was finally paid off; they were still there in 168 BC.¹²⁰

The terms of the peace were as follows:

(e) The Carthaginians were not to be injured, but to be governed by their own laws and customs, and to receive no garrison; that is, their autonomy was granted.¹²¹

(f) Carthage to retain all the cities which she possessed formerly in Africa before entering on the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all her flocks, herds, slaves and other property. Appian

defines the period more precisely than Polybius as 'before Scipio crossed to Africa' and defines the territory as that held 'within the Phoenician trenches'.¹²² This geographical and temporal precision seems reliable.

(g) The Carthaginians to be friends and allies of Rome on land and sea. This important clause is given by Appian alone, but its validity is shown by the help given later by Carthage to Rome against Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus. Thus Carthage was reduced to the condition of a dependent ally, a client state, and although she did not have to recognize Rome's supremacy in the formula of a *foedus non aequum* she did so in effect, by not being allowed to make war or peace.

(h) The Carthaginians not to make offensive war on anyone outside Africa, and on no one in Africa without approval by the Roman People; so defensive wars in Africa were not forbidden in every conceivable circumstance.¹²³ Thus Polybius, but there are traces of another tradition. In another context Livy says (XLII, 23, 3) that all military action outside Carthaginian territory was forbidden, as also was war on allies of Rome. This latter point, which is given also by Appian who specifically mentions Masinissa, has sometimes been regarded as a deliberate attempt to give the Romans an opportunity for future intervention, if they so wished: since the Carthaginians must not make war on anyone outside their own territory, they could not make war on any of Rome's allies (and so the clause is redundant), unless those allies had invaded Carthaginian territory! Thus Carthage could not resist any aggression by, for instance, Masinissa. Appian does go on to suggest an escape clause: they must not fight 'as an act of official policy', which suggests they might have a loophole by disclaiming public action. However the clause, if accepted as genuine, may affect the legal position, in practice Rome would remain the arbiter between her client state of Carthage and her friend Masinissa, whom Scipio had addressed as 'king'. How she held the balance, time was to show.¹²⁴

(i) The Carthaginians were to restore to Masinissa, within the boundaries which would be assigned, all houses, land, and cities, and all else which had belonged to him or to his ancestors. This

clause, which includes 'to his ancestors' in Polybius' version only, might give grounds for future dispute. Livy falsely adds that the Carthaginians were to have a treaty with Masinissa, which would be contrary to Rome's procedure.

(j) Appian adds that the Carthaginians were to withdraw their garrisons from all cities beyond the Phoenician trenches, and that their hostages were to be surrendered. Is this clause valid? The limits of the Carthaginian territory were fixed, by clause (f), to the Phoenician trenches, but the Carthaginians apparently retained control of Emporia which lay beyond the trenches. When later Masinissa seized this region, they complained that it was contained within the limits assigned by Scipio to their territory (L. XXXIV, 62, 9-10). A possible solution is to emend Appian's text so as to read that Carthage had to abandon the African cities, but was allowed to keep the Libyan-Phoenician coastal cities. Or perhaps Appian's statement should be rejected.

(k) All prisoners of war, fugitive slaves and deserters to be surrendered. Appian adds that the restitution should be made within thirty days after peace was declared.

(l) The Carthaginians to surrender all ships of war, except ten triremes, and all their elephants. Livy and Dio add that they were not to tame any more elephants.

(m) Appian adds that within sixty days Mago should evacuate Italy. But he had already died. De Sanctis suggests there is only an error of name in Appian's source, and that there was a clause referring to Carthaginian garrisons in Italy; certainly Carthaginian officers remained in Italy to stir up the Gauls against Rome. There may also have been a clause forbidding the levying of mercenaries in Italy (App., *Lib.* 54).

(n) An indemnity of 10,000 talents to be paid in fifty years, 200 Euboic talents being paid each year. The annual payment was not only a concession to the weakness of Carthage, but kept her dependent on Rome for the fifty years (in 191 BC Carthage tried to pay a larger lump sum, and was refused).

(o) The Romans to evacuate Africa within 150 days—a reasonable clause, though given only by Appian.

The treaty was naturally more severe than that proposed before

the armistice was broken; the indemnity was doubled, the number of ships left to Carthage was halved. But more sinister was the limitation of her military rights. She was definitely humbled to the condition of a client state and a dependency of Rome, and no security was given for her future. If Rome wished to interfere, the pretext would not be lacking. Masinissa was left to watch and check her, which he would do out of self-interest; while, if necessary, Rome could use him as a means of aggression. Vermina, however, was left to check Masinissa in turn, lest he became too powerful. So a balance of client states was established. All might have been well if both sides had acted fairly, which Carthage did and Rome did not. Carthage accepted the situation, and through years of quietness recovered something of her old prosperity. But when Scipio's ideals were forgotten, Carthage was threatened and finally destroyed. Scipio's treaty contained the seeds of Rome's future aggression, but if she had retained something of Scipio's vision and something of the loyalty of Carthage, no suspicion need have attached to the clauses of a peace which humbled the capital of an old empire to a dependency, and which confined but did not crush.

The rest of the story is soon told.¹²⁵ When the Carthaginian embassy brought the terms before their assembly, Hannibal protested, even with personal violence, against those who still rejected them, so that the peace was accepted and Scipio notified. The terms of the truce were carried out, while important Carthaginian ambassadors were sent to Rome, accompanied by Scipio's brother. The victory was officially announced at Rome, the temples thrown open and public thankgivings ordered for three days. The embassy was granted an audience in the Senate by the new consuls, one of whom, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, tried to prevent the House from passing a resolution until he should be granted Africa as his province. In face of this consular veto and subsequent tribunician intercession, the Senate compromised to the extent that Lentulus was to have command at sea, while Scipio was to retain full command on land (see further p. 172). The speech of Hasdrubal Haedus, who had always opposed the Barcids and the war policy, made a good impression and a greater part of

the senators clearly favoured peace, especially in view of the trouble that was brewing in the East. It is, however, quite likely that in a debate some senators did argue against the terms proposed by Scipio and advocated harsher measures against Carthage (see pp. 170 and 173). Nevertheless the Senate finally decided that Scipio, accompanied by ten commissioners and the fetial priests, was to make peace with Carthage on such terms as he thought fit.

The Carthaginian ambassadors returned to Africa where the treaty was formally concluded. Its conditions were fulfilled. The ships were surrendered and were burnt at sea by Scipio. The elephants, deserters, refugees and prisoners were handed over. One of the prisoners, Q. Terentius Culleo, later showed his gratitude by following Scipio's chariot in his triumph. The deserters were punished with the greatest severity. Carthage prepared to pay the first instalment of her indemnity in the hour of her great exhaustion. Masinissa was rewarded with Cirta and other districts which had belonged to Syphax, and also with some of the surrendered elephants. The Carthaginian ambassadors once more were sent to Rome, where the Senate and People ratified the treaty and the arrangements which Scipio had made with the ten commissioners. The fleet was despatched under Cn. Octavius to Sicily, where the consul Cn. Cornelius took over command. Then, sailing from Africa with his victorious army, Scipio landed at Lilybaeum, and travelled to Rome by land amid the joyful acclamations of the whole countryside. After reaching Rome, he celebrated the most brilliant triumph which had yet been witnessed, and his greatness was acknowledged by the conferment on him by his troops, or by the people, of the title of the land he had conquered—Africanus. But the future was casting its shadows before it. Would Scipio be content to sink back to the private life of an ordinary citizen and sit under the consuls in the Senate, or would he seek to retain a position which war had given him, but for which there was no place in the life of Republican Rome? Would he oppose the will of the Senate? Even in the hour of his victory, the sounds of political opposition began to ring in his ears, and before his feet there stretched a path which led to defeat but not to dishonour.




Fig. 13 Map of North Africa.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICS AND PEACE

IN THE ROMAN STATE the People were theoretically sovereign, but the Populus had a subsection which was usually named before it: *Senatus Populusque Romanus*. Of the two groupings it was in practice the Senate which predominated in political life and formed the government. At the time when the Struggle of the Orders between patricians and plebeians ended (287 BC) and it seemed that a democracy might be emerging, power in fact remained in the hands of an oligarchy. The main advance was the theoretical assertion of the sovereignty of the People, while the oligarchy merely changed its composition: in place of an exclusively patrician body it consisted of a group of mixed patricio-plebeian nobles who exercised their power collectively through the Senate and individually through the higher magistracies. The Senate had gained this leading position not by constitutional enactment but simply through its own initiative: custom, not law, enabled it to govern. It comprised some three hundred men, drawn mainly from the landed aristocracy, who remained senators for life and held the chief magistracies. It thus came to contain the men who possessed the greatest administrative experience and political wisdom. Its unwritten authority was seldom challenged: when at the beginning of the Hannibalic War the People put forward some military leaders against the wishes of the Senate and these men met with ill-fortune in the field, the People once again in general acquiesced in senatorial leadership, though they might voice their enthusiasm for a Scipio more loudly than some senators may have wished.

Naturally not all senators had equal influence, and the business of the Senate was in fact very largely in the hands of the *nobiles*. These were an inner circle of senators, drawn from a very limited

number of families; only a man who could boast a consul among his ancestors could claim to be a noble, and the consulship was the closely guarded prerogative of comparatively few families. Thus between 223 and 195 BC members of only five new families won their way to the consulship, and it is not known that any of these families previously lacked praetors among their members. The praetorship was not quite so closely guarded against newcomers as was the consulship, but even so 151 of the 262 praetors known between 218 and 167 BC came from only twenty families. A slightly greater number of 'outsiders' might gain a lower magistracy and access to the Senate, but they would exercise comparatively little influence there, because the business of the House was arranged in such a way as to give greater control to the senior members who had held the higher or curule magistracies. Thus the effective management of the State rested in the hands of some twenty or fewer families who supplied the generals, administrators and provincial governors; by guiding senatorial policy these men shaped the destiny of Rome.

The Senate thus exercised its control through customary rather than official recognition, and the manner in which the nobles maintained their influence was even less 'constitutional'. One of the most vital, but less advertised, aspects of Roman life was patronage: most of the nobles had a considerable number of 'clients' whose interests, personal, economic, social, legal or political, they protected and advanced. Political relations were fundamentally of a personal character, and it was largely on this basis that the nobles built up their own political careers. Through patronage they swayed the elections; this in turn gave them control of the Senate, where the influence of the higher magistrates was out of all proportion to their numbers. They also gained much political influence through their membership of the priestly colleges of Augurs and Pontiffs, since most official acts had to be accompanied by some religious observances, such as the taking of auspices.

However united a front the Senate might present to other classes, naturally not all the nobles would think alike on every matter, while each family would wish to advance its own members: thus internal divisions would arise from conflicting views on

policy and from personal and family ambitions. In view of the strong Roman feeling for family ties and *patria potestas*, the rival groups which developed within the nobility would tend to rest upon the family or *gens* or groups of families allied by kinship, by marriage or by political convenience. Such groups did not develop into anything like modern political parties because their leaders did not normally proclaim political programmes when seeking election but rather appealed for personal backing and formed personal political alliances (*amicitiae*). Such groups, personal and unofficial and remote from the possibility of exact constitutional definition, are generally agreed to have existed, but historians reach different opinions when any attempt is made to assess in detail their composition, inter-relationships and permanence: were they continually forming and dissolving, were they merely supporters of an individual leader or might political and group loyalties survive the political eclipse or death of a leader?¹²⁶ Here we need not perhaps get involved in too much detail nor survey the whole political background of Scipio's day;¹²⁷ it will be enough to examine the nature of the support he enjoyed in the light of what is known about his friends and enemies, without at the same time looking at all other rival groups that may have been jockeying for office and political power.

His noble birth, the eminence of his father and uncle, and indeed his own early exploits at Ticinus and Canusium (see p. 29), all combined to advance Scipio's career and enabled him to reach the curule aedileship in 213 (cf. p. 30). The plebeian tribunes are said to have tried to block his candidature because he was below the legal age and he is said to have replied that, if his fellow-citizens wanted to make him aedile, he was old enough. It is not known whether the tribunes' ineffective move was motivated by constitutional scruple or the jealousy of political rivalry. It is also uncertain whether at this period there was a minimum legal age for holding the curule aedileship; later it appears to have been 36, so that young Scipio at 21 or 22 certainly seems to have leapt forward rapidly. Further, it was normal first to have held the quaestorship, for which later the minimum age, if any was fixed, was not more than 25; in Polybius' day ten years' military service

was a prerequisite for this office.¹²⁸ While it is not possible to establish the norm in the Hannibalic period, it is clear that constitutional propriety had often to be set aside, as with the frequent iteration of the consulship within the forbidden ten years period. 'Silent enim leges inter arma.' Then in 210, amid a sudden upsurge of popular support, all precedent was broken and Scipio as a *privatus* received the proconsular command in Spain (cf. p. 31).

During these years the political scene had been dominated by members of the Fabian, Claudian and Fulvian families and not least by the towering figure of Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator who, by a strict application of a 'Fabian' strategy, had enabled Rome to weather the stormy days after her momentous defeat at Cannae. Consul for a third and fourth time in 215 and 214, he had presided over the elections for 213 at which his son Quintus had been successful. If the father was in some respects somewhat old-fashioned and slow to move with the times, he was a skilled politician and alert enough to control the hidden machinery of patronage, *amicitia*, and religion (he was a member of the colleges of Augurs and Pontiffs and knew well how to exploit their political potentialities). In 209 he was consul for the fifth time and was chosen by the censors as *princeps senatus*, while he enhanced his military reputation by the recovery of Tarentum, although helped by internal treachery in the city.¹²⁹

Although Fabius remained very active, war casualties and old age were thinning the ranks of the senior men, the *consulares*, to an astonishing extent: not more than a dozen survived and some of these were probably incapacitated. Thus the way was open for those junior men whose military achievements and political skills might advance them to highest office. If his father and uncle had come back from Spain in victory, Scipio would clearly have enjoyed the prospect of powerful support in Rome, and even as it was, the tradition of his family, combined with confidence in his abilities, had advanced him to an unprecedented degree. But he needed political backing in Rome itself; his future would depend not only on waves of popular acclaim but also on friends to help him win a position against the claims of rival nobles.

One of his supporters was another remarkable young man,

P. Licinius Crassus. He was a close contemporary, since both were born about 235, held the consulship together in 205 and died in 183. Crassus flashed into prominence in 212 by defeating two much more experienced rivals for the post of Pontifex Maximus: the losers were T. Manlius Torquatus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been joint censors as far back as 231 and consuls in 224, while the latter was to be consul for a fourth time in 209 and lived on to oppose Scipio's African expedition. Crassus was, in Livy's view, one of the most cultured men of his day: exceptionally strong and handsome, a good soldier, a versatile orator, and deeply versed in pontifical lore. His next victory was to step straight into the censorship of 210 without having been consul, his colleague being the old L. Veturius Philo (*cos.* 220) whose family seems to have been friendly to the Scipios. Although Veturius died and Crassus had in consequence to resign, they had had time to reinstate in public life M. Livius Salinator who, after his campaign as consul in 219 against the Illyrians, had been accused of peculation and had withdrawn from Rome. Even so, Livius did not speak in the Senate until two years later when he probably crossed swords with Fabius in debate. When, reluctant and embittered, he stood for the consulship of 207, he probably enjoyed the backing of Scipio's supporters and considerable popular favour. His colleague was his old enemy C. Claudius Nero, but an official reconciliation allowed them to co-operate sufficiently to win the decisive battle of Metaurus. Livius was then appointed dictator to hold the elections for 206, at which his Master of Horse Q. Caecilius Metellus, Scipio's friend, and L. Veturius Philo were elected consuls.

Thus when Scipio returned in victory from Spain just in time to stand for election for 205 he had many friends to help his candidature, including the presiding magistrate Veturius. True, doubtless through Fabius' opposition, he failed to secure the grant of a triumph, although he was allowed to celebrate Games which he had vowed in Spain (see p. 108).¹³⁰ His plan to invade Africa was widely known and the enthusiasm and confidence of the voters was heightened when he sacrificed to Jupiter Capitolinus, in whose temple he had often communed. The god would doubt-

less reward their hero with further victories; meantime the People would prepare his way. Scipio was easily elected (by all the centuries, i.e. unanimously, according to Livy), with Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, as his colleague.

Scipio's extraordinary achievement was underlined when envoys from Saguntum asked permission to offer to Capitoline Jupiter a golden crown as a celebration of victory and a thank-offering for the preservation and restoration of their city both by the elder Scipios and then by Africanus. They told the Senate that whenever Africanus captured a city held by the Carthaginians in Spain, he always picked out the Saguntines from the mass of prisoners and sent them home.¹³¹ In Roman eyes the Saguntines would appear like clients approaching a patron, whether on a moral or legal basis: indeed there could have been a formal relationship, if they had made some official agreement or even a surrender (*deditio*) when Scipio had seized their city from Carthaginian control. This must have made many senators think hard. Marcellus, as conqueror of Syracuse, could regard the Syracusans as his *clientela*, but Scipio's position was very different and in fact unique. Lutatius Catulus had brought the First Punic War to an end by his naval victory, but the task of clearing the Carthaginians out of Sicily had been a prolonged combined effort: 'moribus antiquis res stat Romana *virisque*'. But Scipio himself had in four years overthrown the empire which had slowly been built in Spain by the Carthaginian viceroys, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal, and swept the enemy out of a vast country. Though he had been aided by loyal subordinates, whose help he was the first to acknowledge, the achievement was nevertheless due to the driving power and skill of one man, the commander-in-chief. And the result? Spanish chieftains had hailed him as a king, his army had acclaimed him *imperator*, the mint-officials at New Carthage had placed his portrait on the coinage in lieu of the dethroned Hannibal, great numbers of cities besides Saguntum will have entered into formal relations with him and regarded him as their patron, and he was the founder of the only Italian settlement in the Peninsula. It may well be that, as the Saguntine envoys were speaking and his fellow-senators looked at young

Scipio, there flashed through the minds of some not only words like *patronus* but even Euergetes and Soter, if not Basileus—after all, some of them had recently been serving in Greece against a Hellenistic monarch, Hannibal's ally Philip, and ideas alien to earlier Roman concepts of power were becoming more familiar. *Invidia*, if not suspicion, must have infused more bitterness into the attack that was launched upon his next project: if he were to defeat not only the Barcids but Carthage itself and add Africa to his *clientela*, what then?

When the allocation of provinces was discussed by the Senate and Scipio asked for Africa, Fabius attacked and fought Scipio's African project tooth and nail. Besides the military and strategic issues at stake (cf. pp. 109 ff.), the men were divided by an essentially different approach to Rome's future. Fabius represented a more old-fashioned agrarian outlook: he wished to finish the war with all speed, to heal the wounds which it had inflicted on the Italian countryside, and possibly to develop northern Italy; and there is perhaps sufficient evidence to rank him among those Romans who looked with apprehension at the tide of Hellenism which was flooding Rome. It has even been suggested that he might now have been willing to attempt a compromise peace with Carthage by which she would be allowed to retain her African possessions.¹³² The other view, represented by Scipio, whose horizon had been broadened by family tradition and personal experience in Spain, was that a purely Italian policy was outdated and that Rome must become a Mediterranean power.

The description which Livy (XXVIII, 45) gives of Scipio's political tactics does not inspire much confidence in its details. When challenged by Q. Fulvius whether he would abide by the Senate's decision on the allocation of provinces or would appeal to the People, Scipio is said to have replied that he would act as he thought best in the interests of the State. The tribunes then said that if he entrusted the decision to the Senate its decision should be final and there should be no appeal to the People, but, if he did not entrust it, the tribunes would support any senator who refused to vote on Scipio's motion. Scipio could thus drop his motion and appeal to the People, but after a day's delay he decided to leave the

question to the Senate. The one fact which emerges is that he was prepared to appeal to the People if he failed to gain his way in the Senate and that he could not be overawed by the prestige of senior senators. When he gave in, he presumably must have concluded or perhaps even have been privately assured that the Senate would prefer compromise to an appeal to the People. Finally, as we have seen (p. 108), a nominal compromise was reached by which one consul should command in Sicily with the right to sail to Africa if he thought fit; since Scipio's colleague Crassus, as Pontifex Maximus, was debarred from leaving Italy, Scipio had clearly won a resounding political victory over Fabius.

While Scipio was launching his African campaign, his supporters in Rome watched over his interests. His friend Q. Caecilius Metellus was appointed dictator to conduct the elections for 204: this was done on the proposal of the consul Crassus who was himself ill. When at the beginning of 204 Fabius seized a chance to attack the absent Scipio through the Pleminius affair (pp. 113 ff.), Metellus championed Scipio's cause in the Senate against Fabius' wild proposal to recall him and advocated a commission of enquiry which was led by Scipio's cousin M. Pomponius; consequently Scipio escaped unscathed.^{132a} Another cousin of his, Scipio Nasica, the son of Cn. Scipio who had been killed in Spain, helped to enhance the honour of the *gens*, since he was chosen, as the best and noblest man in the State, to receive the Magna Mater who was being brought from Asia Minor to Rome. Then in the elections for 203, conducted by Cornelius Cethegus, two members of the Servilian *gens* were chosen consuls: Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Servilius Geminus. The rise of the Servilii had been unspectacular but steady in recent years: not a year had passed since 213 but that one of these men or M. Servilius Geminus had gained some political or religious office. They had been friendly towards the Scipios, but having won power they deserted their former friends.

By the autumn of 203 Carthage sought an armistice and Hannibal was forced to leave Italy and return to his native land: thus Scipio's strategy was gloriously vindicated, and when Laelius arrived in Rome with the captured Syphax the Senate decreed

four days' thanksgiving amid scenes of great popular rejoicing. But when the Senate began to discuss the proposed peace terms, the debate showed that Scipio's victories were stirring up jealousy and hostility even among some of his former friends. M. Livius demonstrated his sympathy with the Servilii by proposing an adjournment until at least one of the consuls should return. When Metellus advocated the acceptance of Scipio's proposals on the ground that the man on the spot knew best, M. Valerius Laevinus (*cos.* 210) urged the rejection of the Carthaginian overtures and the continuance of the war.

The precise aims of Laevinus and his supporters, aside from the desire to discredit Scipio, must remain obscure. Some senators may well have wished for harsher terms and even have advocated fighting on until Carthage could be completely destroyed. Such views are recorded by some ancient authors as having been expressed in a senatorial debate after the total victory at Zama, when their application could be considered more seriously than in 203, and they should not be dismissed out of hand as false reflections of debates which preceded the Third Punic War (cf. p. 173). But it would be going too far to suppose that the main attacks on Scipio in 203 were motivated by such a desire rather than by the wish of individuals for a share in military glory. However, in the end after discussions (it is not known whether Fabius, who died some time during the year, lived long enough to take part), Scipio's terms were ratified;¹³³ the attack had miscarried, but it was ominous.

The events leading to the elections for 202 tell the same story, although Livy's account is confused because he found his authorities divided. One version tells that the consul Cn. Servilius Caepio had determined to make a direct assault on Scipio's position by crossing to Sicily with the intention of sailing to Africa. When he disregarded a praetor's order from the Senate to stop, a dictator, P. Sulpicius Galba, was appointed, probably by the People, to recall Caepio by virtue of his *imperium maius*. Later in the year the elections were held by the consul C. Servilius Geminus. According to the other version Galba was named dictator by C. Servilius in order to hold the elections. This second version might have

been invented by a pro-Servilian tradition to cover up Caepio's ambitious schemes or the first version have been designed by Caepio's political opponents. But since Galba is named as dictator in order to hold elections by the *Fasti Capitolini* and it is improbable that a dictator would have been appointed merely to recall a consul, the second version appears the more probable. At any rate the episode suggests the growing hostility of the *Servilii* towards Scipio.¹³⁴

The consuls elected for 202 were M. Servilius Geminus and Ti. Claudius Nero; the former was the brother of the consul of 203 and indeed had been made Master of the Horse by Galba who will clearly have supported his election. The new consuls both wanted Africa, but when they convened the Senate to allocate the provinces, they were instructed to act with the tribunes of the plebs who were to ask the People whom they wished to conduct the war in Africa: the unanimous vote was for Scipio. Nevertheless the consuls balloted for their provinces, and Africa fell to Ti. Claudius, who was granted *imperium* co-ordinate with Scipio's, and fifty ships; M. Servilius received Etruria. Later, when the Carthaginians had broken the truce, Claudius was ordered to take the fleet to Africa, but he delayed his preparations because the Senate had decided that Scipio rather than he should fix the terms of the peace; when ultimately the fleet was ready, it was wrecked by a storm.

Such briefly is Livy's account (XXX, 27), but it is very doubtful. The Senate had not the right to disregard the People's vote; the question of Scipio's command did not require discussion by the People if his *imperium* had been prolonged in 203 for the duration of the war (L. XXX, I, 10), although a colleague could be sent to him; also the discussion was futile if peace had just been concluded. The truth behind Livy's account is probably that, while the consuls wanted some share in the final victory, there was no serious question of recalling Scipio, but when news came that the armistice had been broken Claudius was ordered to prepare a fleet. When ready, this was wrecked, and before it could be repaired Claudius' year of office expired and his command was not prolonged.

While Scipio was fighting the Zama campaign, political intrigues continued in Rome, where either the consul M. Servilius or his brother Gaius remained all the year in an effort to control events. Finally Marcus named Gaius dictator to hold the elections, but although various dates were fixed for them the weather prevented their being held, so that after 14 March 201 the Republic was without curule magistrates. Clearly the religious machinery by which augurs could postpone elections had been set in motion.¹³⁵ In view of the composition of the augural college it appears slightly more probable that the augurs had co-operated with Servilius in order to allow him to exercise power longer, rather than that the pro-Scipionic opposition had tried to delay elections until the end of the consular year when the dictator's period of office perhaps should end. In fact Servilius remained in office until at least 19 April and thus the State was administered by a dictator without curule magistrates until at length elections were held and his Master of the Horse, P. Aelius Paetus, and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, doubtless both men of his choice, were elected consuls for 201. Livy's account (XXX, 39-40) of these disturbances is suspiciously reminiscent of the dislocation of magisterial elections at the time of Julius Caesar, but there may yet be a basic element of truth in his narrative. At any rate this misuse of the dictatorship contributed to its desuetude.

Lentulus, a Cornelius but no friend of Scipio, made one last unavailing attempt against him, if any trust can be placed in Livy's annalistic tradition, by trying to prevent the Senate from transacting any business until Africa had been assigned to himself. Two tribunes, Q. Minucius Thermus and M'. Acilius Glabrio, both Scipio's staunch supporters later, intervened by putting the matter before the People, who voted unanimously for Scipio. The Senate compromised to the extent that Lentulus was assigned a fleet and was to sail to Sicily; if peace negotiations failed, he was to sail to Africa, but only with power at sea, for Scipio was to retain full command by land. But negotiations did not fail. The Carthaginian envoys put their case to the Senate and all were inclining to peace when (according to Livy whose account may not inspire much confidence) once again Lentulus vetoed a

decree of the Senate and once again the same two tribunes appealed to the People, who supported the Senate. At any rate the Senate followed the People's wish and decreed that Scipio, together with ten commissioners, was to make peace with Carthage on such terms as he thought fit. This decision may have been preceded by senatorial debate on the fate of Carthage, such as is recorded by Appian and Diodorus although not by Livy. The case for vengeance is said to have been put by a relative of Lentulus, while a supporter of Scipio urged moderation and rejected alternative solutions such as destroying Carthage, handing it over to Masinissa, turning it into a Roman province, or colonizing it.¹³⁶ In any case Scipio's wish prevailed and the conqueror of Hannibal, having vindicated his military strategy, triumphed also in the political field. He arranged a wise peace (pp. 155 ff.) such as could never have been made if Hannibal had been defeated only in Italy, and he had withstood the attacks of his political opponents, now joined by his erstwhile allies. His success owed much to the enthusiastic and loyal support of the People of Rome, and his popularity reached its zenith when he celebrated his triumph in 201 amid scenes of enthusiasm and was honoured by the title of *Africanus*.

When Scipio returned from Africa he found Rome at the cross-roads; the formulation of her foreign policy was at a critical stage since she had to define her attitude not only to Spain and the more barbarian West but also to the civilized Hellenistic world in the East. Further, she was short of older men with wide experience. The Hannibalic War had taken heavy toll and a new generation was at the helm: no man who had held the consulship before 211, except Varro the scapegoat of Cannae, was still in harness. The new leaders, however, were faced not only by broader international problems but also by a domestic question: would the conqueror of Hannibal raise any constitutional issues and how would he meet the challenge of the hostile faction in the Senate which had been intriguing against him during his absence?

Although Scipio's authority was recognized as pre-eminent when in 199 he was elected censor and appointed *princeps senatus* (i.e. his name was placed first on the list of senators), his exact

influence is difficult to assess. It was certainly not so strong as suggested by the observation that 'the victory of Zama made Cornelius Scipio the most powerful man at Rome. It would seem that any member of his family could then have any office which he desired. Seven Corneli are recorded as consuls during the ten years after Zama.'¹³⁷ True, Livy has recorded that the People wished to make him a monarch, but his testimony is hardly credible.¹³⁸ He tells how Tiberius Gracchus charged Scipio towards the end of his life with disregarding the tribunate and contrasts this with Scipio's earlier magnanimity: 'Gracchus reminded his hearers how severely Scipio rebuked the People for wishing to make him perpetual consul and dictator; how he prevented them from raising statues to him in the Comitium, the Rostra, the Senate House, and in the shrine of Jupiter on the Capitol, and how he prevented a decree from being passed authorizing his image decked in triumphal garb to be borne in procession from the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.' Even Livy himself had some doubt about the authenticity of this speech, which probably derives from a political pamphlet masquerading as a speech of Gracchus and reflects the conduct of a later dictator, either Sulla or Julius Caesar. Any serious suggestion that the Republic should be converted into a monarchy would surely have left other traces in the extant tradition. Some have seen such a potential threat two generations later when Scipio's adopted grandson, Scipio Aemilianus, returned in military triumph from Spain, but even this is probably seriously to antedate the problem. Still less can the threat of monarchy have been an actual danger in 200 BC.

If any thought of attempting a *coup d'état* ever crossed Scipio's mind—and according to Polybius he often thought of monarchy, in some part of the world if not in Rome itself—it was only to be rejected. Though naturally regal and desirous of rule, Scipio was too clear-sighted and great-minded to play the demagogue. Nor perhaps did he deliberately court the People; his popularity rested partly on admiration for his dazzling personality, but not less on the prospects of booty which his overseas campaigns opened up, and perhaps still more on the psychological release from feelings of frustration which his aggressive policy must have occasioned

when the war was dragging on so slowly in Italy. He certainly would not and probably could not have broken the power of the Senate. A member of one of the oldest aristocratic Roman families, he was too class-conscious and loyal, as well as too wise, to pit his strength against the Senate which had won undying prestige by its conduct of the war. Instead, he sank back into the life of a private citizen, a noble among nobles, soon to be forced to enter the arena of politics in order to maintain the pre-eminence of his family and friends, and only accepting a further military command when his country had need of him.

But if there was little fear of dictatorship, the rapidity and irregularity of Scipio's extraordinary career at least gave good grounds for suspicion and envy. For ten years, from 210 to 201, he had held supreme command successively in Spain, Italy and Africa, the inspired hero of a devoted army and of a grateful people, respected alike by Spaniard, Greek and Carthaginian. True other men through the necessities of war had overstepped the boundaries normally laid down by the constitution, but there was a vital difference: Fabius (*cos.* 215, 214, 209), Marcellus (215, 214, 210, 208) and Fulvius Flaccus (212, 209) had not survived. And what was necessary in war became intolerable in peace.

Thus Scipio's position was unique and the nobility began to realize the meaning of the advice given to Periander of Corinth by Thrasybulus of Miletus who took Periander's messenger into a cornfield and struck the heads off all the taller stalks—a policy which Aristotle justified as 'not only expedient for tyrants, but equally necessary in oligarchies and democracies'. Athens had recourse to ostracism, Rome to factional politics within the Senate. If there is about Scipio something reminiscent of the captive lion who, his freedom lost, is forced through the tricks of the circus, it was because he preferred to play, none too successfully, the game of politics rather than to allow the Roman mob to acclaim him 'king' even in thought, a title which he had heard and refused from his devoted Spanish allies some years before (see pp. 76, 81).

This last episode probably had very different implications for the people concerned, as pointed out by A. Aymard.¹³⁹ The Spaniards

may have thought of Scipio as a Roman king or have used the word to indicate his paramount status in Spain, while to Scipio himself the use of the title, so hated by Romans, was embarrassing and potentially damaging for his political life. Polybius on the other hand interpreted the salutation not as 'king of Rome' or 'king of the Spaniards' but merely as king in the Hellenistic sense of a man whose military, moral and intellectual qualities endowed him with a kingly character. He takes the occasion in fact to remark upon Scipio's exceptional greatness of mind: for after his conquests of Africa and Asia 'he had made the greatest and richest part of the world subject to Rome and in doing so had numerous opportunities of acquiring regal sway (*δυναστείαν βασιλικήν*) in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose or wish. For such achievements were enough to kindle pride, not merely in any human breast but even, if I may say so without irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio's greatness of soul (*μεγαλοψυχία*) was so superior to the common standard of mankind that he again and again rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp, the prize beyond which men's boldest prayers do not go—the power of a king (*βασιλεία*); and he valued more highly his country and his loyalty to her than that royalty which men gaze at with such admiration and envy' (P. X, 40). True, Polybius was a Greek, to whom the supreme political temptation was tyranny, and matters may have appeared slightly different to Roman eyes. But Scipio was well acquainted with the history of Greek tyranny and monarchy: indeed, when asked whom he thought the greatest statesmen combining boldness and wisdom, he is alleged to have named Agathocles and Dionysius, a tribute probably to the efforts made by these two Syracusan tyrants against Carthage rather than an expression of approval of tyranny as such (P. XV, 35–6). But it must be emphasized—the point is striking—that Polybius' tribute to Scipio's restraint was made long before the military dictatorships of Marius, Sulla, or Caesar, of which Polybius and his contemporaries of course knew nothing, and it must be accorded full weight in any estimate of Scipio's influence, even though the precise offer of dictatorship, as recorded by Livy, must be regarded as unhistorical.

Scipio thus had to face his fellow-senators as an equal. He seems to have accepted quietly the powerful position of the Servilii and Claudii and not to have made any immediate effort to win important posts for his family or friends. The explanation may well lie partly in his desire for a period of rest. He had seen ten years' active service, training armies, organizing, campaigning, and fighting. During a winter in Syracuse he had snatched the opportunities of culture and relaxation which the Greek city offered to him, thereby incurring the hostile contempt of the more rigidly Roman Fabius. Men of the past are not lay figures, but flesh and blood. Scipio might well have been eager to devote some time to that Greek culture which he so much admired, to renew old friendships, and to seek society in Rome rather than to attempt to establish the power of his family in the Senate where his own personal position at least was supreme.

A further explanation of his apparent inactivity after his return may be found in his attitude to foreign affairs, where the most pressing problem for Rome was whether to answer the appeal of many Greek cities to help them check the aggressive conquests of Philip of Macedon (*Pl.* 37). Owing to the inadequacy of the sources the part which Scipio played in shaping foreign policy at this time cannot be clearly indicated, but in view of the liberality of his policy to the East in general it has been suggested that he did not support the Senate's decision to send a harsh ultimatum to the king and to precipitate immediate war in 200, when the way of diplomacy was still open.¹⁴⁰ True, the Senate as a whole clearly approved of immediate action and we do not hear of any division of opinion within its ranks; the opposition came rather from the People. But in so far as Scipio had popular support, he would have his finger more closely on the pulse of popular feeling, while at the same time he would know the temper of his troops and to what extent they looked forward to demobilization. If he had been eager for an immediate declaration of war, his immense popularity would surely have weighed with the People; thus the fact that at first they refused to declare war may suggest that he did not urge it. In view of his successful personal diplomacy with native princes in Spain and Africa, he may well have thought that a less

brusque approach should be made to Philip, whose confidence he did in fact quickly win when they met later. His previous experience may also have turned his thoughts to development of the West rather than to an immediate and irrevocable interference in Eastern affairs. Or some may prefer to believe that he was actuated by merely personal motives and wished to deny his opponents the chance of winning military glory.¹⁴¹ The supposition, then, that he opposed senatorial policy and perhaps even urged the People to avoid war would help to explain his sinking into the background at the very moment when it would be reasonable to expect that his country would have sought to employ his outstanding military gifts in a fresh theatre of war.¹⁴²

CHAPTER IX

SCIPIO, FLAMININUS AND CATO

SCIPIO'S VICTORY was brought home to the people of Rome by the spectacle of his formal triumph before the end of 201, while in the following year the Games which he had vowed in Africa were celebrated in the capital. The people would also have been thankful when a great quantity of grain had been sent by him from Africa and sold at four *asses* a measure in 201, although in fact the high prices of the earlier war-years had already dropped to this sum two years previously. Scipio also had to think of the interests of his veterans. In theory Roman soldiers were landowners and had farms to return to after their campaigns. But the Hannibalic War had imposed new conditions: many men had been compelled to serve for long years overseas while Hannibal had been ravaging many parts of Italy. Thus there was need for unusual action and by the end of 201 the *praetor urbanus* was instructed to appoint a commission of ten to allocate some *ager publicus* in Samnium and Apulia for the settlement of the African veterans, while soon afterwards it was decreed that the settlers should receive two *jugera* of land for every year served in Spain or Africa. It is noteworthy that the provision of land for long-service soldiers was now undertaken as an obligation by the State and not left to the initiative of their general, as was often to happen later with disastrous consequences to the Republic. To have allowed Scipio to organize the settlement (there was the precedent of his settlement of his men at Italica) would have seemed to the other nobles too dangerous a move. The commission included his friend Q. Caecilius Metellus (who was the senior member, if priority in holding the consulship gave seniority), but the majority of the members do not seem to have been politically friendly to Scipio,

so far as their attitudes are known (they included C. and M. Servilius Geminus). If the measure temporarily increased Scipio's popularity, it involved removing far from Rome and the Comitia many of his loyal veterans.¹⁴³

The censorship, Rome's *sanctissimus magistratus*, was regarded as the crowning glory of a political career. Its holders had more arbitrary and personal influence than other regular magistrates, because they did not have to account for their acts. Thus when the time came to elect censors for 199 Scipio's hopes must have been high. Although Livy says that there were many distinguished candidates, there cannot have been a very large field for the patrician place. Scipio's chief rivals must have been Cn. Servilius Caepio (*cos.* 203), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (*cos.* 201) and, if still living, Ti. Claudius Nero (*cos.* 202), all of whom were his juniors in the consulship; P. Sulpicius Galba (*cos.* 1. 206) was campaigning in Greece, while L. Veturius Philo (*cos.* 206) had been friendly to Scipio and, if still alive, might not have stood against him. At any rate Scipio was elected; his plebeian colleague was P. Aelius Paetus who may have followed the Servilii in abandoning support of the Cornelii, but who seems to have become more friendly again when he came under the spell of Scipio's personality. The two men appear to have worked together harmoniously.¹⁴⁴ Aelius named Scipio as *princeps senatus*, an honour vacant since the death of Fabius Maximus, over the heads of two or three patrician ex-censors senior to him, namely P. Licinius Crassus (*cens.* 210), M. Cornelius Cethegus (*cens.* 209) and, if alive, C. Claudius Nero (*cens.* 204). Thus Scipio became officially the leader of the senatorial oligarchy. The censors acted with great moderation and did not remove a single name from the senatorial roll (Scipio tried to mount no oblique attack on his political opponents), but despite the need for reconstruction in many spheres they achieved little, only contracting for collecting the sales-tax at Capua and Puteoli and harbour-dues at Castra, where they settled three hundred colonists, and selling some land at Capua. Acting on traditional lines, Scipio had formed no general new policy: 'vir memorabilis, bellicis tamen quam pacis artibus memorabilior'.¹⁴⁵

In the meantime Rome had become deeply committed in

Greece. Since the evidence does not clearly reveal Scipio's attitude to Eastern affairs, although suggesting that he may have wished to avoid precipitate action against Philip (p. 177), it is unnecessary here to discuss the perennial question of the motives of Roman policy in declaring war on Macedon. The older view that Rome was actuated by a spirit of aggressive militarism and imperialism and that Scipio as the leading man in Rome must have personified that spirit hardly needs further rejection today.¹⁴⁶ There is no evidence to make him the villain of the piece (if he was, why was he not given the command in the war which he is alleged to have inspired?), nor would many interpret the springs of Roman policy in this way and believe that after her victory over Hannibal Rome saw in the weakness of the Hellenistic world only a source of riches, glory and dominion.

However, if Rome's motives were less aggressive and more defensive, she had nevertheless become involved in war with Philip. The campaign of Sulpicius Galba in 199 was not inspiring, while Villius, who took over in the winter, had little time because early in the next campaigning season he was succeeded by Titus Quinctius Flaminius¹⁴⁷ (Pl. 36). The latter's rise was spectacular. Though he had only been quaestor and was scarcely thirty, he stood for the consulship of 198 despite tribunician opposition; although the number of possible rival candidates of praetorian status may have been small, Flaminius' success was remarkable and, when given Macedon as his province, his future prospects must have seemed bright indeed. How then will this possibility that Flaminius might become the conqueror of the king of Macedon have appeared to the conqueror of Hannibal?

Attempts to define the political relationship of these two men have led to very diverse results: according to some they were *amici*, while others have seen them as *inimici*. Thus Münzer argued that there was a close connection between the Quinctian and Fabian *gentes* and that Flaminius by raising the leaderless Fabian group to fresh power, emerged as a counterweight to Scipio. On the other hand T. Frank believed that the two men were united by a common philhellenic outlook. While the latter aspect cannot be denied, it need not have led to precise identity of policy regarding

current Greek problems. But at the same time, though arguments for a connection between Quinctii and Fabii may not be as strong as Münzer believed, it is difficult to dismiss them entirely.¹⁴⁸ But a weakness lies behind each point of view which presupposes a static relationship: it may well be that the mutual attitude of the two men changed in the course of a few years.

There is some evidence to suggest that Scipio may have approved of Flaminius' appointment. It is possible that some of Scipio's veteran colonists supported Flaminius, as Plutarch records in a rather muddled passage,¹⁴⁹ and we know that Flaminius was able to take 3000 of Scipio's veterans from the Spanish and African campaigns as reinforcements to Greece, at the very time when 2000 more of the African veterans were facing P. Villius with a mutiny in Macedonia because they were tired of campaigning and, though volunteers, were being treated as conscripts. It therefore seems improbable that Flaminius would have recruited these men so easily if it was known that Scipio was his political rival and opposed to his campaign; rather, Scipio might have appealed to his veterans on Flaminius' behalf.

Although it was suggested (p. 177) that Scipio may not have supported a precipitate declaration of war in 200 and have preferred to try the ways of diplomacy first, once the war was launched, as a philhellenist and a soldier he may have acquiesced in a policy based on the principle of autonomy for Greece which was to be guaranteed by Roman power. Further, after the somewhat unspectacular performances of Galba and Villius, Scipio could advocate the adoption of more energetic military and diplomatic action against Philip and of a more generous policy towards the Greeks, who remembered with bitterness Galba's earlier stay in their country. Scipio apparently lacked sufficient support to win the command for himself. The nobility as a whole probably feared to entrust him with a first-class military command which would give him the chance of placing the Roman People once again deeply in his debt. If at the head of a devoted army he were to humble Philip and earn the gratitude of Greece, would he again retire quietly into private life? Thus if there were obstacles to his own appointment, he may well not have disapproved, or

even have encouraged, the advancement of a younger man who shared his views on Greek culture and was well suited to pose as a champion of Hellenism. But that is not to suggest that Scipio's attitude was necessarily a crucial factor in Flamininus' election, which would rest on average senatorial opinion. Most senators were probably not anti-Hellenists, but combined Greek cultural interests with a traditional Roman foreign policy, although factional interest must have played a part behind the scenes.¹⁵⁰

Flamininus, unlike some senators, however, was ready to carry his Roman brand of philhellenism into politics, as indeed was Scipio. A difference of emphasis, however, has been detected in their attitudes. While Flamininus championed the old Hellenic idea of the autonomy of the Greek city-state against the Hellenistic kingdoms, Scipio was more ready to attempt to deal with the Hellenistic world as a whole and maintain its balance of monarchies, leagues and cities. This supposition has met with some criticism, but while it is easy to point to cases where Scipio championed a city-state or Flamininus supported a king, nevertheless the broad distinction may well be true—indeed, it might be expected from the background of the two men. Flamininus had started his career as a military tribune in 208, serving thereafter in southern Italy, while Scipio is likely to have gained a more synoptic view of the wider world, with his experiences in Spain and Africa.¹⁵¹ In this case Scipio's Eastern policy would be less attractive to the main body of senators, since it could best be implemented by Scipio himself with his outstanding personal and diplomatic gifts. On the other hand they might be ready to support Flamininus because his policy would provide splendid propaganda and at the same time permit more traditional methods: Greece could be established as a neutral zone under Roman protection against all possible aggression. Thus Flamininus may have won his command by agreement with a large body of senators rather than specifically as a protégé of Scipio. Yet even so, Scipio, having failed to achieve what he considered to be the best policy, may well not have withheld support from this second-best plan: Flamininus might well seem preferable to his predecessors in the Greek command, since he possessed unusual diplomatic gifts and

was, according to Polybius, 'exceedingly acute, if ever a Roman was. The skill with which he conducted public business and private negotiations could not be surpassed.' Such gifts were needed since Roman policy now envisaged not merely stopping Philip waging war on Greece, but also his complete evacuation of Greece, a policy which required winning and maintaining the support and sympathy of the Greek cities themselves. To this end Flaminius could bring a magnetic personality, enthusiasm, a love of Hellenic culture, tact and adaptability. In many respects he resembled Scipio, but he was more shallow and vain, ambitious and domineering, lacking that soundness and loftiness of character which was apparently felt by so many who came into personal contact with Africanus.

On reaching Greece in 198 Flaminius tried first the way of negotiation and met Philip at the Aous where he demanded that the king should abandon all the Greek states he held, whether captured or inherited. Since Philip's counter-terms would have left Macedon, though humbled, an autonomous Great Power, negotiations broke down. As Scipio had realized that lasting peace could not be secured merely by driving Hannibal from Italy so now Flaminius (and presumably official senatorial policy) saw that future peace and security necessitated breaking the power of Macedon and depriving her of an essentially independent foreign policy. After winning over the Achaean League, Flaminius again turned to negotiation, and the Conference at Nicaea resulted in reference back to the Senate which had to decide whether to negotiate or to continue the war and prolong Flaminius' command. How far on this and future occasions Flaminius intrigued and was ready to sacrifice principle (e.g. to betray the Greeks) in order to secure the continuance of his command is a ticklish question to answer. To many he appears as an unscrupulous seeker of personal power and glory (and it should be remembered that the pursuit of military glory was recognized as entirely proper for a Roman noble, though opinions as to the legitimacy of means of obtaining it might vary), while others have attempted to whitewash him.¹⁵² On this occasion, at any rate, it is not easy to believe that he set honour before ambition, but

through political wire-pulling by his friends in Rome and careful timing he secured the prolongation of his command, together with the continuance of the war, and had tricked and neutralized Philip until nearer the campaigning season. Clearly there had been some attempt in Rome to supersede him, and possibly Scipio had supported this, particularly if the new consuls elected for 197, C. Cornelius Cethegus and Q. Minucius Rufus, were friendly to him, as is likely.¹⁵³ He may have felt disposed to limit the career of Flamininus, the more so if he knew something of his private scheming: his diplomacy might seem designed to advance his own interest rather than Rome's, and Scipio may have felt that the issue was being unnecessarily complicated by Flamininus' personal ambition.

On military grounds the decision to leave Flamininus in Greece proved wise, since he brought the war to an end by defeating Philip at Cynoscephalae, though even here he owed an indirect debt to Scipio. When the issue was hanging in the balance, a military tribune on his own initiative detached two maniples from the rear ranks of the victorious Roman right wing and led them to the left where they outflanked the enemy and fell on his rear. Many of Flamininus' men were Scipio's veterans and there can be little doubt where they and the tribune had learnt their lesson in tactical flexibility. Before Scipio's reforms some ten years previously no Roman legion would have been able to show such adaptability in the crisis of a battle. When Flamininus announced his intention of treating with Philip on the terms laid down at Nicaea, the king agreed to an armistice, and the matter was referred to the Senate.

Since the international scene on many fronts was threatening, the Romans might well accept a quick and relatively lenient settlement. There had been a vast insurrection in Spain and further trouble in Cisalpine Gaul and above all the uncertain intentions of Antiochus of Syria loomed large, not least in the mind of Flamininus (*Pl.* 39). Though officially the king's relations with Rome had hitherto been friendly, he had asserted his power in Coele Syria against Ptolemy of Egypt and was now free to attempt to regain his hereditary possessions in Asia Minor and even in Thrace;

in fact he was now advancing through Asia Minor, heading for the Hellespont. Thus apart from any desire to make peace with Philip before being superseded, Flamininus had solid reasons for counselling moderate terms. It can hardly be doubted that Scipio who arranged humane terms for the defeated Hannibal and who much later tried to negotiate a more generous settlement for Antiochus than the Senate would allow, argued strongly in favour of moderation towards Philip and generosity towards Greece. To have crushed Macedon completely would have exposed Greece to attack from the northern barbarians and have left a tempting vacuum into which Antiochus might have been drawn. Thus Philip was to be deprived of his external conquests, his fleet and all the Greek cities and fortresses which he held, but to retain his own kingdom. Further, Rome declared that 'all the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and governed by their own laws', thus showing that her Greek policy now went far beyond the mere elimination of Philip from Greece; but if all Greeks were to be free, that freedom was to be guaranteed by Rome herself who thereby established a *patriocinium orbis Graeci*. Thus in this resounding proclamation lay the seeds of much trouble. It was clearly a warning, if not a threat, to Antiochus, while great difficulty was to arise over the timing of the evacuation by the Romans of the three fortresses, Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth, which had been known as the Fetters of Greece when in Macedonian hands.¹⁵⁴ Both these problems became acute at the time of Scipio's second consulship in 194, but before they are discussed we must turn to the emergence of another dominant figure, M. Porcius Cato, who was ultimately to break Scipio's political influence once and for all.

Cato, who had been born at Tusculum not more than two years after Scipio's birth, later lived on a farm in Sabine country; he came of good yeoman stock, but since no member of his family had held curule office in Rome he would be a *novus homo* if he tried to enter the political arena in Rome. He served against Hannibal in Italy, becoming a military tribune in 214, and fought later at Metaurus. When not on military service he worked with his own hands on his Sabine estate and practised as an advocate in the

surrounding villages. His incisive oratory, combined with his rugged honesty, simple living, and dogged perseverance, attracted the attention of his noble neighbour L. Valerius Flaccus, consul in 195. Under Valerius' patronage he went to Rome where he soon made his mark as an orator and came under the influence, though probably not by intimate personal contacts, of the aged Fabius Maximus. In 204 he was enabled to start a public career by obtaining the quaestorship, and served under Scipio, perhaps commanding with Laelius the left wing of the expeditionary force to Africa.¹⁵⁵ It was at this time that his hatred of Scipio was engendered, since there is little evidence to support the view that this animosity only developed much later. He may well have envied the spectacular rise to fame of a man about his own age, but apart from jealousy or any personal cause which tradition had failed to record, tension must have arisen from difference of temperament. Plutarch tells how Cato, as Scipio's financial assistant, blamed him for his liberality to his troops in Sicily, and how he complained in the Senate that Scipio was wasting enormous sums and loitering about in palaestras and theatres like the master of a festival rather than an army commander. Although this anecdote falsely asserts that Cato joined Fabius in his attack on Scipio (a situation which would involve accepting the dating of Cato's quaestorship to 205), it probably reflects the cause of his hostility. Cato could not understand Scipio's culture and love of a Greek way of life, nor perhaps did he appreciate so well the art of timing the relaxation or stiffening of military discipline. Lack of understanding led to distrust, and soon to hatred.

Cato's rise henceforth was speedy, thanks no doubt to the political and financial help of his aristocratic patron. While still holding the plebeian aedileship in 199 and helped by the impression created by the Games he gave, he became praetor for 198. His governorship of Sardinia was marked by extreme austerity and he was so inexorable in administering justice that 'Roman power never inspired greater fear or affection'; protection of the rights of provincials remained a mark of his policy. Finally, the *novus homo* became a *nobilis* when he was elected consul for 195, with his patron Valerius Flaccus as colleague. Since the revolt in Spain now

required a consular army, Cato was assigned to that province. However, just before he left Rome news came that Scipio's friend Q. Minucius Thermus had gained a success in southern Spain of such a nature that he was later granted a triumph. This may well have sharpened the rivalry between the political groups, since Minucius had with smaller forces gained a victory which laid the foundations for Cato's more spectacular campaign. Despite the larger forces under his command Cato achieved only limited success: he checked, but did not break, the spirit of revolt and he inflamed the hatred of the Celtiberians towards Rome by attacking, in vain, their capital Numantia, although the tribe was not technically at war with Rome.

Before he had left for Spain a domestic episode had thrown into greater relief the different attitudes of Cato and Scipio to an aspect of cultural life. Two tribunes had proposed the repeal of the Oppian law, a sumptuary measure passed in 215 during the strain of the Hannibalic War, whereby no woman might own more than half an ounce of gold, wear a multicoloured dress, or ride in a two-horsed vehicle within a mile of Rome except for religious purposes. When feelings were running high, Cato delivered a speech in defence of the law. The theme was congenial, since he was eager to revive Rome's earlier simplicities and moderation, and he believed in the power of legislation to effect this; at the same time his puritanical life bore out his principles. His attack was essentially directed against those nobles whose sympathy with Greek culture was in his estimation undermining the old Roman character and the *mos maiorum*. Scipio and Flamininus will have been among the men he had in mind, and while he had shown his disapproval of Scipio's way of life in Sicily, he will doubtless have equally disliked the conduct of Scipio's wife Aemilia, of whom Polybius wrote: 'This lady used to display great magnificence whenever she took part in women's religious ceremonies. For apart from the richness of her own dress and the decorations of her carriage, all the baskets, cups and other utensils of the sacrifice were of gold or silver and were borne in her train on such solemn occasions, while the number of her maids and servants in attendance was correspondingly large.' But such

pictures and Cato's invectives should not suggest that Roman society was very luxurious if judged even by later Roman standards; the Romans of the Empire could regard Scipio's country house at Liternum as a model of ancient simplicity. But, to Cato, Scipio and his circle seemed to encourage all those foreign elements which he feared would undermine Roman morality. He was, however, unable to withstand the tide of popular feeling and the Oppian law was repealed. The incident must have increased the enmity between these two men, whose relations were further strained by an attack on Scipio's African policy.

At Carthage Hannibal had been summoned from retirement and appointed Sufete (196). He promptly introduced some democratic and financial reforms, long overdue, and thus antagonized the ruling oligarchs who replied by appealing to Rome, where they precipitated a political crisis and provided ammunition for Scipio's opponents. It would be argued that Scipio's generous peace-terms after Zama had allowed Hannibal to win control at Carthage, which he might raise to greatness once again. With the East so unsettled this might be serious, especially as Hannibal's enemies alleged that he was intriguing with Antiochus. Scipio himself maintained that it was beneath the dignity of Rome to meddle in the party politics of Carthage or to treat Hannibal, their defeated foe, as a common criminal. The more generous attitude was also the wiser, since apart from the accusations of his political opponents there is no evidence that Hannibal was plotting with Antiochus. But Scipio's rivals won the day: Cn. Servilius Caepio, M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Terentius Culleo were sent to Carthage, nominally about a frontier dispute, but actually to accuse Hannibal, who at once fled secretly and ultimately reached the court of Antiochus. That he sought asylum beyond the reach of Rome does not prove that he had previously intrigued with the king. The attack on Scipio had thus misfired, unless his opponents could believe that a Hannibal at the court of Antiochus was less dangerous than a Hannibal at Carthage, where, though a popular leader, he was checked by the disgruntled oligarchs. But the fact of the attack shows the strength of Scipio's political rivals, and there can be little doubt that the move was directed by Cato.

CHAPTER X

THE SHADOW OF ANTIOCHUS

THE PROBLEM which faced and worried Roman statesmen regarding the East comprised the interlocked questions of the evacuation of Greece and the intentions of Antiochus. Roman policy was based on 'the freedom of the Greeks' and in implementing this Flamininus had won over Greek public opinion and freed Greece from the influence of a now defeated Macedon. The next logical step was for Roman troops to evacuate Greece completely, and this was Flamininus' genuine desire. But the ten commissioners who were sent in 196 to join him in settling Greek affairs did not feel that the time was ripe. Flamininus tried to allay disquiet and prove the sincerity of the Senate's intentions by staging his famous declaration of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games, while the process of settlement proceeded. Before returning home the commission had accomplished two matters of importance. An alliance was concluded with Philip, the former ally of Antiochus, so that Rome might now hope to use him against Antiochus if the need arose; and secondly the disgruntled Aetolians were pacified. But the commissioners could not advise the immediate evacuation of Greece, however ominous this might seem to the Greeks who began to doubt the integrity of Roman promises. Thus friendship with Philip, the pacification of Aetolia, the continued military occupation of Greece, all pointed in one direction—to Antiochus who had in fact crossed over to Europe and was fortifying Lysimachia in Thrace.

In 195, however, a good reason arose for delaying the evacuation. The Senate decided to prolong Flamininus' command and entrust him with the task of freeing Argos from the clutches of Nabis of Sparta (*Pl.* 38). This tyrant's ambitions were dangerous: if allowed free play, he might threaten the whole of the Peloponnese, and Greece find herself overshadowed by Nabis instead of

Philip; he might even look towards Antiochus. To check him would increase stability in Greece as well as afford a legitimate reason for maintaining Roman troops there a little longer until Antiochus' intentions became clearer. Nabis was quickly defeated and Flamininus imposed terms which were less harsh than some of his Greek allies wished: Nabis was left in control at Sparta but deprived of an independent foreign policy. He could balance the Achaeans in the south, as Philip balanced the Aetolians in the north. Perhaps Flamininus was moving to a view more like that which Scipio may have held (see p. 183), namely that the interests of the Greek cities were not paramount but that all the political units in the country should rest in a peaceful balance. Only then would it be safe for Rome to withdraw her 'military presence'.

Antiochus,¹⁵⁶ who was the cause of so much of this activity, was in one sense an innocent cause, since there can be little doubt that at least in the early years of the decade, his attitude to Rome had been either friendly or neutral: he certainly did not want war. But his advance into Europe to occupy some of his ancestral kingdom was bound to alarm the Romans, however innocent his intentions. This move resulted in a conference at Lysimachia at which the Roman representatives were completely outmanoeuvred and outwitted by the king's more skilful diplomacy. Although there was no open rupture, Antiochus made it clear that he neither wanted nor feared war, but the Romans' suspicions and fears would not be allayed when they learned that on his return to Ephesus Antiochus had been joined by Hannibal.

The time had come for Scipio to rouse himself. He could now stand for the consulship of 194 since the necessary ten-year interval after his first consulship had elapsed: it is noteworthy that he had made no attempt to set aside constitutional procedure. During recent years his political position may not have been very strong, but gradually more of his supporters were gaining high office; these included one of the consuls of 196, L. Furius Purpureo and at least four of the praetors, namely his close personal friend C. Laelius, M'. Acilius Glabrio, Q. Minucius Thermus and Ti. Sempronius Longus. At the polls he and his friends won a sweeping success. He himself was elected consul together with the

young Ti. Sempronius Longus, whose father had been consul with his own father in 218. The praetors included his officer Sex. Digitius, whose career, along with that of other 'new men', he was advancing, and three Cornelii (Nasica, Merenda and Blasio) who are likely to have been friendly, as were the new censors C. Cornelius Cethegus and Sex. Aelius Paetus.

One reason for Scipio's electoral victory must have been fear of Hannibal. Criticism of his African policy had resulted in Hannibal's flight to Antiochus. When the elections were held soon after the news had reached Rome, the pendulum of popularity naturally swung back in his favour; Hannibal's conqueror must be elected consul to face the danger of a Hannibal who would now inflame Antiochus' hostility to Rome. Fear of the future and mistrust of the policy which was being pursued in Greece must have contributed to Scipio's decision to seek office. He knew the measure of Hannibal's hatred of Rome, which would again be fanned into a flame by Rome's ungenerous treatment of him.

The allocation of the consular provinces would define policy and have far-reaching results. The Senate in general took the view that, as the wars in Macedon and Spain had ended, Italy should be assigned to both consuls. But Scipio urged that one consul was enough; the other ought to have Macedonia because Antiochus would soon be driven by double pressure from the Aetolians and Hannibal to commence hostilities.¹⁵⁷ This proposal was a direct challenge to Flamininus' policy, but it concerned its application rather than its principles. Scipio urged that to evacuate Greece completely would create a vacuum into which Antiochus would inevitably be drawn; in the interests of the Greeks themselves Rome should retain an army there a little longer and hold the main fortresses. Rumours were no doubt current that Hannibal was urging Antiochus to invade Italy; Carthage might be stimulated to co-operate, and trouble could easily be stirred up in Spain and northern Italy, which were scarcely yet settled. Greece therefore must be held as a barrier against the Syrian king. To this Flamininus could object that Greece was now pacified; continued occupation would strain Greek patience to the breaking-point. Many Greeks had been sceptical about Rome's promise of freedom, while the

Aetolians had openly asserted that the Romans would never withdraw. It would not do for Antiochus to find a discontented Greece which he could turn against Rome. Let Roman deeds match Roman words. Flamininus had consistently advocated this policy, and could argue that Greece was now sufficiently settled in a careful balance of power to justify it. In the end his policy prevailed over that of Scipio: the Senate decided at last to recall the army from Greece and assigned Italy to both consuls.

That Scipio's policy was dictated by more than personal ambition and that he considered a threat from Antiochus and Hannibal worth taking seriously is suggested by the measures which he took to guard the unprotected seaports in southern Italy. Five colonies, which had been authorized in 197, were now completed on the coast of Campania (namely at Puteoli, Volturnum, Liternum, Salernum and Buxentum), but later in 194 five boards of commissioners were established to found colonies to protect the exposed and distant shore of southern Italy. Roman colonies were authorized at Tempa, Croton and Sipontum, and Latin colonies at Copia (Castrum Ferentinum) in the ager Thurinus and at Vibo Valentia in Bruttium. If Hannibal were to provoke an invasion of Italy (and Antiochus' fleet was by no means negligible), he should find it prepared.^{157a}

But was Scipio misled by a will-o'-the-wisp? True, Antiochus did not invade Greece as soon as the Romans withdrew, nor did Hannibal persuade him to invade Italy even if he ever suggested it; and in the event, matters were allowed to drift on both sides. But Scipio preferred to try to force the issue by negotiating from strength and not allow Antiochus to mature his plans with Hannibal's help; and there was always the chance that he might yield if Rome showed a mixture of determination and conciliation. Scipio may even have pressed for a command in Greece in order to try to avert war by his personal diplomacy.¹⁵⁸ If his advice had been followed, it might have caused discontent, if not open fighting, to blaze up again in Greece but have averted the war, or it might have precipitated war and led to Antiochus' defeat a few years earlier. The risk was perhaps worth incurring, but the Senate declined it, refusing to reach a *modus vivendi* with the king and to

believe his denial of hostility to Rome. Many senators, made nervous by their suspicions and touchy by their pride, preferred not to precipitate matters, arguing no doubt that Rome could fight later if need be, but they were not content to deal with Antiochus on terms of complete equality.

However different the aims of Cato and Flamininus, Cato also would disapprove of Scipio's policy and would follow Flamininus' lead, less on principle than on practical grounds. He would welcome the evacuation of Greece, not for the sake of the Greeks whose influence he disliked but from a narrowly nationalistic outlook and a desire to have nothing to do with Greece. Further, like many other Romans, he was eager not to give Scipio a chance of putting Rome more deeply in his debt. Cato and Flamininus were united by a common desire that Greece should be evacuated and that Scipio should not hold a command there.

Scipio's second consulship was peaceful and uneventful. Though he was again named *princeps senatus* by the censors, he achieved little. If he was not to protect Roman interests in Greece, where he thought the point of danger lay, he was not going to busy himself with minor disturbances. His friends could finish Cato's work in Spain, where the number of legions was again reduced to two; although Digitius was defeated in Hither Spain, Scipio's cousin Nasica curbed the Turdetani and defeated the Lusitanians. In northern Italy Scipio might have anticipated the successes of 192/191, but he left the conduct of the campaign to his colleague Sempronius, who fought indecisively against the Boii.¹⁵⁹ His own aloofness and temper are illustrated by an anecdote which probably belongs to this year: when a sum of money was needed in the Senate for some urgent business, and the quaestor, because of some legal difficulty, refused to open the Treasury that day, Scipio said that he would take the keys himself and open it, since he was the cause of the Treasury being locked at all (P. XXIII, 14). In line too with his aristocratic background is the fact that he probably approved of, if he did not instigate, the censors' action in reserving special seats for senators at the Games; this would please the nobility but annoy the people, and he himself is said later to have regretted the change.¹⁶⁰ Later in the year, as already

said, he was concerned with establishing colonies to protect the southern shores of Italy, and the supervising commissioners included several of his supporters. He also gained a petty victory over his political rivals: when his friend Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, declared that the observance of the *Ver Sacrum* had not been properly carried out by Cato and Flaccus the previous year, it had to be observed again—such was the political triumph of the conqueror of Hannibal.

During his consulship Scipio was forced to witness the triumphs of his two rivals, Cato and Flamininus, in the spring and autumn. Cato, the *novus homo*, made the most of his opportunity to show up the generals of the nobility: he had granted a large amount of booty to his men in Spain because 'it was better that many Romans should go home with silver in their pockets rather than a few with gold', and he himself had taken no part of the booty except what he ate and drank, a boast which doubtless occurred in a speech he delivered to the people in which he expounded his exploits. Flamininus' three-day triumph was even more spectacular.

Flamininus, whose personal success must have been very galling to Scipio, had gained his way and returned from Greece, leaving not a Roman soldier behind and having created a body of goodwill there. Scipio had won the support of half-civilized chieftains in Spain and Africa, but Flamininus counted the bourgeoisie of Hellas in his *clientela*. Scipio, as successor to the vanquished Barcid viceroys, had permitted his own portrait to appear anonymously on silver coinage, to replace the head of Hannibal, but Flamininus in Greece had apparently ordered (since the inscription was in Latin and not in Greek, as would have been natural if the issue had been an honour offered by his Greek admirers) an issue of gold coins bearing his portrait and name and on the reverse a Victory (cf. note 18; *Pls.* 4, 37). Incidentally both issues are very significant and must have offended the Roman nobility: coin-portraiture had been a royal prerogative of Hellenistic kings, and in fact another century and a half was to pass before a Roman coin bore the likeness of a living man. True, these coins were meant for circulation in the provinces and not the capital, but some would find their way there. Further, Scipio had been

hailed as a king by impetuous Spanish tribes and had inspired his troops at least once with a strong faith in the divine help granted to their general, but in Greece Flamininus, whose offering had enriched many a temple, was hailed as Saviour and received homage alongside the gods. He shared dedications with Heracles and Apollo and was granted a priesthood which survived until Plutarch's day; after sacrifice and libation a paean was sung which celebrated him along with Zeus and Roma and Roman Faith: 'Hail, Paean Apollo, hail Titus our Saviour.' Scipio's frequent communing with Jupiter in the Capitoline temple may have appeared somewhat unusual and the 'legend' built up stories of his divine origin, while some of his contemporaries must have been annoyed by his conscious superiority, although most recognized his magnanimity and strength of character. Flamininus appears to have been more vain, shallow and pretentious, seeking applause and intriguing for power, while his eager acceptance of semi-divine honours in Greece must have given wide offence. Yet he had won considerable success in war and diplomacy. If he had not defeated Hannibal, he had at any rate overthrown a Hellenistic king, and he had freed Rome from direct responsibilities in Greece—for the moment.

Despite the rival displays, the Scipionic group was well to the fore at the elections for 193 which Africanus conducted. He could probably count on the two new consuls, L. Cornelius Merula and Q. Minucius Thermus, and among the new praetors on his own brother L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Flaminius, while the curule aediles were M. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Aemilius Paullus, members of a friendly *gens* which had been eclipsed for some time. Early in the year Flamininus and the ten commissioners were authorized by the Senate to negotiate with envoys from Antiochus, who may well have regarded the Roman withdrawal from Greece as a sign that Rome did not want war and sent envoys in the hope of negotiating a treaty in which his existing position would be fully recognized. If so, he was quickly disillusioned, and the Rome Conference proved very different from that at Lysimachia. Since it was held in secret Flamininus could negotiate without regard to Greek interests. When he proposed that Antiochus should abandon his claim *either* to Thrace *or* to the autonomous Greek cities

of Asia Minor, his offer involved a drastic sacrifice of principle and a change of policy: Rome was now willing to forego her claim to protect Greek freedom if she could get Antiochus out of Europe.¹⁶¹ Although her previous declaration of the freedom of *all* Greek cities need not be interpreted as a mere diplomatic manoeuvre which suited her interests at the moment, her policy was obviously becoming harsher under the shadow of Antiochus' advance and it may have had the approval of Scipio since he had been urging the adoption of a more realistic policy in Greece itself. Further, Rome's offer shows that she was at length ready to adopt from the Greeks the theory of 'spheres of influence'. But it was too late. Antiochus may have been short-sighted, but he could hardly have been expected to renounce his claims either in Europe or in Asia at the mere dictate of Rome, while no compromise would endure unless Rome could finally overcome her mistrust of the king—and this was made no easier when on their return journey the king's envoys called at Delphi and made contact with the Aetolian League.

When no decision was reached in Rome, Sulpicius led an embassy (on which, according to a false tradition, Scipio himself served) to the East in an effort at least to postpone any final rupture, but little came of it. Negotiations were protracted and on one occasion, during Antiochus' absence, the Romans conferred with Hannibal at Ephesus, perhaps with the intention of arousing Antiochus' suspicions against him; but later Eumenes of Pergamum, who wanted war, succeeded in wrecking the subsequent conference with Antiochus.¹⁶²

Meantime, news came that an agent of Hannibal named Aristo was stirring up trouble at Carthage, although in the event little came of his agitation. At the same time Masinissa availed himself of this commotion to seize some land which he claimed under the treaty of 201. The Senate therefore sent a commission to Africa, comprising Scipio and his two friends, C. Cornelius Cethegus (the censor of 194) and M. Minucius Rufus, who either decided in Masinissa's favour (according to Appian) or left the question open on grounds of expediency: any action which might antagonize Masinissa and complicate the situation in North Africa

must be avoided. The primary purpose of the embassy, however, must have been to obtain first-hand information about the situation in Carthage and the designs of Hannibal and Antiochus. During the previous year Scipio had emphasized the necessity of watching the East, by opposing the complete evacuation of Greece and by founding coastal colonies. After the report of Aristo's activities, his fears must have appeared less ill-founded and uneasiness would increase while the long-delayed return of the commission under Sulpicius was awaited. So Scipio was allowed to go to Carthage, but apparently his enquiries did not end there; when his colleagues returned to Rome he went on to the Eastern Mediterranean. His precise movements are uncertain, but three points are clear. The journey was short, because he was back in Rome for the elections for 192; he visited Delos, where he dedicated a golden crown to Apollo; and it was this visit to the East that gave rise to the fiction that he was a member of Sulpicius' delegation and it formed the background to the story of his meeting with Hannibal at Ephesus.¹⁶³ He may possibly have had unofficial talks with Hannibal, but if, on the other hand, the episode of their interview is dismissed, together with the pleasant anecdote that adorns it, then he will have had to assess Hannibal's intentions by less direct means.

The story ran that Hannibal, when asked by Scipio whom he ranked as the three greatest generals, named Alexander, Pyrrhus and himself in that order. When Scipio smilingly asked him, 'What would you have said if you had defeated me?' he replied, 'Then beyond doubt I should place myself before Alexander and before Pyrrhus and before all other generals.'

What then were Hannibal's intentions? He had already proposed that Antiochus should invade Greece while he himself organized a diversion in Carthage. It is improbable that he envisaged an immediate attempt upon Italy itself, although that may well have been his ultimate objective. If, as tradition records, he did in fact urge Antiochus to provide him with a full force for an attack on Italy, the king refused because he had not yet decided to break with Rome. If, however, war was to be forced on him, Antiochus might well look to a reviving Carthage to help him to

compel Rome to accept a compromise peace, and he would welcome the resurgence of Carthage as a counterbalance to Rome in the Western Mediterranean. Later, when the situation became more menacing in 192, he did agree to allow Hannibal a very limited force and some open ships for a move against Carthage: it might help to divert Roman attention.¹⁶⁴ But in fact, as Antiochus decided to move into Greece in the autumn of 192, the project was dropped.

On the domestic front the elections for 192 saw a keen tug-of-war between Scipio and Flaminius, who, whatever their earlier relations, had certainly drifted into opposite camps by now. The patrician candidates were Africanus' cousin Nasica, lately back from Spain with a brilliant record; Titus' brother, L. Quinctius Flaminius, who had commanded the fleet off Greece, and Cn. Manlius Vulso, praetor in 195. Three plebeian candidates were Scipio's friends: C. Laelius, his close companion who had shared all his campaigns, M'. Acilius Glabrio, praetor in 196, and C. Livius Salinator, praetor in 202, while the fourth, Cn. Domitius (praetor in 194) may also have been well-disposed. On personal, and perhaps on military, grounds Nasica had stronger claims than L. Flaminius; in his youth he had been chosen to welcome the Great Mother Goddess from Asia in 204, while Lucius Flaminius was later expelled from the Senate for immoral conduct. But Lucius was elected with Domitius as his colleague.

Flaminius' victory probably owed much to the desire to maintain a policy of non-intervention in Greece. Although the Roman ambassadors had not returned from Antiochus before the elections, they may have sent preliminary reports that relations, though strained, were still unbroken. Scipio, who was back in Rome, could report his personal impressions and current rumours but could give little hard fact concerning the intentions of Hannibal or Antiochus. Another reassuring sign was that when in the early summer the Aetolians appealed to Antiochus, Philip and Nabis, in an attempt to combine them against Rome, Philip and Antiochus made no move. True, Nabis acted, but too quickly; the Achaeans under Philopoemen, ready to check him, at once lodged a protest at Rome. How much of this news reached Rome in time

to influence the elections is uncertain, but it was probably thought best to try to settle Greece with as little disturbance as possible, while Philip still remained loyal and Antiochus aloof. Titus Flamininus was therefore sent there, with three fellow commissioners. But Rome was nervous and military precautions were not neglected. Both consuls received Gaul and Italy as their provinces, but Domitius was to have a province outside Italy in case of war with Antiochus, and one praetor concentrated troops in southern Italy and a second led a small squadron to the East 'to defend the allies'.

In the spring of 192 Antiochus acted. His envoy told the Aetolians that the king was ready to join them in restoring Greek freedom. In a sense this was no more provocative than had been Rome's declaration in 197 that the Greeks in Europe and Asia were to be free and autonomous, but it played into the hands of the Aetolians who wanted war. In Flamininus' very presence they reached a decision to ask Antiochus to free Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome: thus the king could play the same role of liberator in Greece as Rome had to the cities of Asia, not yet by open war but by armed mediation. The Aetolians then secured Demetrias and thus, while sacrificing any lingering hope of obtaining help from Philip, they could offer Antiochus a good base. The king now decided to invade Greece, but significantly he was not prepared: he had only 10,000 infantry immediately available. This shows clearly that whatever he thought about the future he had not been envisaging immediate action. But the situation developed more quickly than he had anticipated and demanded a final decision: in the autumn of 192 he arrived at Demetrias. He doubtless hoped that if the Romans insisted on war the campaign might be fought in Greece; he sought recognition as an equal power, not the destruction of Rome. But Roman troops were beginning to move into Greece and, although a formal declaration of war by Rome was delayed for a little while, a state of hostilities now existed.

The imminence of war led to early elections for 191 (September–October) at which Nasica and Manlius Vulso stood again; the third patrician candidate was L. Cornelius, brother of Africanus.

Nasica was elected with the plebeian M'. Acilius Glabrio, a *novus homo* and a protégé of the Scipios, while at least four of the new praetors belonged to families probably friendly to Scipio: L. Aemilius Paullus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, C. Livius Salinator II, and A. Cornelius Mammula. The Scipios thus recovered some ground. Flaminius' diplomacy was good in its place, and he must be allowed to carry on in Greece, but Africanus' warnings now seemed to be coming true: hence the election result. Soon after the new consuls entered office the Roman People declared war on Antiochus and the Aetolians; Greece was allotted to Acilius, Italy to Nasica. L. Scipio, who had failed to win the consulship, accompanied Acilius to Greece, doubtless to gain experience in a theatre of war in which he might hope later to have command.

The campaign in Greece was spectacularly brief. At one blow Antiochus was driven out. Acilius, after wresting Thrace from him, then faced him at Thermopylae; the pass was turned by the skill of Cato who, like his friend and patron Valerius Flaccus, was serving on Acilius' staff. Antiochus fled. News of the victory was brought to Rome by Cato who managed to outstrip L. Scipio whom Acilius had officially sent to make the formal announcement to the Senate. In Greece Acilius somewhat unwisely demanded unconditional surrender from the Aetolians until Flaminius induced him to grant them a truce during which they appealed to the Senate; it was politic to neutralize Greece until the final score was settled with Antiochus, whose main forces were still intact in Syria.

The year 191 was a great one for the Scipionic group. Not only had Acilius driven Antiochus from Greece, but Livius had defeated the king's navy; Nasica had won a resounding victory over the Boii, who had been a constant reminder to the Romans of the Gallic sack of Rome some 200 years before; Minucius was successful against the Ligurians; Aemilius and Flaminius were campaigning in Spain. Visible proof of their achievements was displayed in the magnificent triumph of Nasica (which a tribune, acting for his political opponents, had in vain tried to deny him), while earlier in the year he had also celebrated for ten days Games

which he had vowed during battle as praetor in Spain; further, the temple of Mater Magna, whom as a youth he had conducted to Rome, was dedicated and Games took place. Another temple, that to Iuventas which M. Livius had vowed at Metaurus, was also dedicated with the usual Games, and when news came of the victory of Livius' son over Antiochus' fleet, the Senate declared a public *supplicatio* for nine days. Thus throughout the year the Scipionic group kept its standard flying for all men to see.

The Senate next reached the important decision that the ejection of Antiochus from Greece was not an adequate guarantee of future security. He must be defeated in his own country and forced well back from the Greek cities of Asia Minor, while his kingdom must be reduced from the rank of a Great Power. As Africanus was now politically successful and had urged a similar policy in regard to Hannibal and Carthage in 205, he presumably advocated this policy—on this occasion without the opposition of a Fabius: no dissentient voice is heard. The motive behind this decision should not be interpreted as aggressive imperialism, militarism or even primarily the desire for personal glory; once the war had started, drastic action was needed to secure the future peace of Rome and the Eastern Mediterranean. The commander best fitted to face the Great King and Hannibal was obviously Africanus, but constitutionally he could not now be re-elected consul. The difficulty was met when his brother Lucius and his old friend and officer, C. Laelius, were elected consuls for 190 'while all looked towards Africanus' (Livy).

Livy says that as both consuls wanted Greece, Laelius, who 'had great influence in the Senate', proposed that it should allocate the provinces instead of resorting to lot. Lucius agreed, and when Africanus declared that if the Senate assigned Greece to his brother, he would serve as his *legatus*, Lucius was given Greece. But Cicero records a different version: Asia having fallen by lot to Lucius, the Senate was about to transfer the command to Laelius, because Lucius was not considered to have sufficient energy of body or mind, when Africanus protested and said that he would serve on Lucius' staff; no change was therefore made.¹⁶⁵ Laelius was a competent soldier, but as a *novus homo* he can scarcely have had the

influence in the Senate which Livy curiously ascribes to him; he had failed to win the consulship in 193 and perhaps again in 192 when another Scipionic candidate, Acilius, won the plebeian place. The Scipios therefore probably supported his election now on the understanding that he would co-operate loyally and not claim Greece, but would allow Lucius to obtain the command against Antiochus. Thus Africanus gained effective command and the Scipionic group was at the height of its influence. This was emphasized to all and sundry when, before leaving Rome, he constructed an arch on the Capitoline hill, at the top of the Clivus Capitolinus, together with seven gilded statues and two equestrian figures and two marble basins in front. It would be interesting to know whom the statues represented; there were statues of the seven kings of Rome on the Capitol, but these, at any rate in Pliny's view, were much older. We hear too from Cicero that in his day there was a statue of L. Scipio, in a cloak and wearing Greek slippers, but would Cato have allowed its erection in 190?¹⁶⁶ But even if Africanus dared not erect his brother's or his own statue, he may by this means have drawn attention to some of his famous ancestors, if in fact he was honouring men and not gods. It is noteworthy that the arch was over against the temple of Jupiter with which Africanus had such close links, and it may be symptomatic of his confidence if not of his pride that he erected a triumphal arch before the victory had been won.

When the Scipios reached Greece they found that Acilius had recommenced siege-warfare against the Aetolians, who had failed to obtain more lenient terms from the Senate and were fighting on. Unwilling to spend time crushing the country piecemeal or to leave an unbeaten Aetolia in their rear, they welcomed an Athenian offer of mediation. Africanus used his personal diplomacy with such success that he persuaded the Aetolians to agree to a six-months' armistice during which they sent envoys to Rome to seek milder terms, but he was evidently handicapped by the Senate's harsh decision which he had no authority to moderate.¹⁶⁷ In the circumstances the Aetolian acceptance of the truce was a lucky contribution to the security of the armies marching to Asia, and was achieved only through the good atmosphere created by

Africanus. Precautions were also taken against Philip to whom the Scipios sent an energetic young man, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, later the son-in-law of Africanus and the father of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. The Senate had recently sent home Philip's son Demetrius, a hostage in Rome, and had conditionally promised to remit his tribute; Philip thus knew where his interests lay and informed Gracchus of his preparations to facilitate the passage of the Roman army. His desire to co-operate with Rome was strengthened by the personal friendship which he formed with Africanus when they met soon afterwards, although the way to good relations had already been paved by Flamininus. Thus the security of the Roman army on its march through Macedonia and Thrace owed something to the tact of Africanus, who, when safely through Macedonia, announced to Philip the Senate's decision to cancel the rest of his indemnity. Soon afterwards the way to Asia was opened by a naval victory by L. Aemilius Regillus, the successor to Livius, over the fleet of Antiochus who feebly made no attempt to hold Lysimachia or bring up his troops to contest the crossing of the Hellespont.

The Scipios next diplomatically detached Prusias (*Pl.* 40), king of Bithynia, from Antiochus' cause and secured his neutrality by sending him a letter, which was reinforced by a special visit from C. Livius, explaining that it was not Rome's policy to overthrow all kings:

so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their sovereignties, the Romans had even themselves created some new kingdoms and increased the power of other princes . . . as Andobales (Indibilis) and Colichas (Culchas) in Spain, Masinissa in Africa, and Pleuratas in Illyria, all of whom they had raised from petty and insignificant princes to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned Philip and Nabis in Greece. They had conquered Philip in war . . . yet, after receiving a slight proof of his goodwill, they had restored his son and hostages, had remitted the tribute and restored many of the cities taken in the course of the war. As to Nabis, though they might have utterly destroyed him, they had spared him,

although a tyrant, on receiving the usual pledges. In view of this they urged Prusias not to be afraid about his kingdom.¹⁶⁸

With the way thus paved by the diplomacy of the Scipios the Romans crossed the Hellespont: for the first time a Roman army entered Asia.

Despite the need to face Antiochus before his army grew to formidable proportions, Africanus waited a month on the European shore: he was a Salian priest and during the holy days when the *ancilia* (sacred shields) were carried in procession no Salian priest who was absent from Rome might move. Whether it was that Scipio took his religious obligations very seriously or whether he wished to give Antiochus a chance for second thoughts, the king at any rate seized the chance to negotiate: as soon as Scipio had crossed the Hellespont, Antiochus offered to abandon his claims in Thrace and Asia Minor and pay half the cost of the war. As these terms would leave the power of Syria substantially intact and would not remove the possibility of future wars with Rome, the Scipios demanded his withdrawal beyond the Taurus Mountains and the whole cost of the war. This Antiochus would not consider, but he privately informed Africanus that he would return his son, who had fallen into his hands, without ransom, and he further offered Africanus an immense bribe if he would support the terms which Antiochus had suggested. Scipio refused, but rumours of the incident later gave his political enemies a good weapon. Negotiations had failed; war remained.

The Roman army advanced, but Africanus fell ill and had to be left behind. Learning of this, Antiochus at once returned his son without ransom. Scipio is said to have shown his gratitude by advising Antiochus not to fight until he himself had rejoined the Roman army. This cryptic advice naturally gave colour to the accusations of Africanus' opponents. What did it mean? Treachery to his country can be ruled out. Did he still hope by his personal influence even at the eleventh hour to bring about a peaceful settlement? Or if it was to be war, did he wish to win the battle in person either from private ambition or from a belief that thus victory would be more certain and complete? Or did he wish to

repay Antiochus' kindness by ensuring the king's personal safety in defeat? His motives may have been mixed. He probably desired the defeat, but not the annihilation, of the Syrian monarchy, and the re-establishment of a balance of powers, now subordinate to Rome. To crush Antiochus completely would be no less dangerous for the future peace of the East than acceptance of his earlier terms. Philip had been confirmed on his throne; Antiochus should not lose his. Rome's mission, as Scipio probably conceived it, was not to destroy other political units but to dominate them in order to ensure their protection and to secure peace. But whatever Scipio's motives were, it is clear how they would be interpreted by his enemies at home. In fact his advice had little effect on the king, who withdrew eastwards to seek ground where his cavalry, chariots and superior numbers would have full scope.

At Magnesia the fate of the Seleucid Empire was decided, much credit for the Roman victory falling to Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who in the absence of Africanus and in view of the mediocre abilities of L. Scipio was the effective commander. The successful tactics scarcely owed much directly to Africanus since he would not have been able to foresee Antiochus' dispositions and advise his brother accordingly, while apparently his old enemy Hannibal was also absent from the battle. Thereafter Africanus was well enough to meet the king's envoys at Sardes where he imposed preliminary terms roughly similar to those proposed before the battle. He thus wished to leave Syria humbled but alive, and to give Rome no further occasion for interference or dispute. Additional terms, however, were later imposed by the Senate, where a reaction had taken place against the Scipios: Antiochus must surrender most of his fleet and his elephants, and must not make war in Europe or the Aegean; if attacked, he could resist, but must not thereafter have sovereignty over or ally himself with the aggressor. Scipio's terms would have allowed Syria to maintain a prosperous national life under a Roman protectorate, but the Senate's, by weakening the central authority, would hasten the breaking up of the State and inevitably result in Rome being drawn into the East.¹⁶⁹

By defeating Antiochus the Scipios had delivered the Greek

cities of Asia Minor. That this task was congenial is clear on both cultural and political grounds. Their life and habits show them to have been among the foremost supporters of the wave of Hellenism which was sweeping over Rome, while they were conspicuous among those Romans who now began to honour the shrines of Greece. As early as 206 Africanus had sent a gift to Delphi from the spoils of Hasdrubal's camp after Ilipa; he had made a dedication to Apollo at Delphi when in Greece early in 190; his friends Glabrio and Livius played a considerable part in establishing the autonomy of Delphi after the battle of Thermopylae; and Africanus with his brother Lucius dedicated three crowns at Delos, probably in 193 and 189, and received reciprocal honours.¹⁷⁰ Their policy to the Greek cities after the war is shown by two inscriptions addressed to Colophon and Heraclea.¹⁷¹ That to Colophon Nova, which had supported Rome by revolting from Antiochus and in consequence had had to stand siege by him, granted the city *asylia*. That to Heraclea-by-Latmos, which had hastened to submit to Rome directly after Magnesia, recognized and guaranteed the liberty and autonomy of the inhabitants, promised Rome's goodwill and favour and similar treatment to all cities which surrendered; it also emphasized the Scipio's philhellenic policy: 'for our part we are well disposed to all Greeks'. The sincerity of the pledge is seen in the despatch of a Roman officer to protect the interests of Heraclea in the disturbed period of resettlement and in the fact that in the next few years Heraclea was allowed to carry on a war with Miletus without Roman interference. Although in the final settlement when the claims of some cities conflicted with those of Rome's allies, Pergamum and Rhodes, the former were sometimes sacrificed to the latter, these inscriptions show that Scipionic policy was to liberate all Greeks who had supported the Roman cause or who surrendered at once; the Scipios were not responsible for the fact that the Senate proved less eager to continue this liberal treatment.

Another inscription shows that the city of Aptera in western Crete offered honours to L. and P. Scipio and to Cn. Scipio (probably Hispallus, consul in 176).¹⁷² This suggests that the Scipios must have visited Crete on their return from Asia in the

summer of 189. This may have been planned as a break in the homeward journey after Africanus' recent illness, but more probably it was connected with the visit of a Roman praetor who had tried to check some internal disturbances in the island and to rescue some Roman prisoners, the victims of piracy, though without much success. Since many Cretan cities had helped Philip at the end of the Hannibalic War, a small reminder of Roman power by the conquerors of Antiochus might seem good policy, while the Scipios may have wished to follow up a rumour that Hannibal had fled to Crete after Magnesia and was seeking help from the city of Gortyna.

Apart from any interest in Greek political theory arising from his reading of Greek literature, Africanus must have been led by his personal experiences to formulate some conception of what Rome's attitude to conquered nations should be. Having spent the first ten years of his active life fighting in Spain and Africa, he could hardly have retained a narrow continental outlook like some of his contemporaries. Despite the lack of precise evidence, the clues provided by his dealings with the Greeks and other foreign powers, together with the character of the settlements he sought to impose on Rome's conquered foes, suggest that he championed Rome's protectorate mission in the world. Hannibal and Antiochus could both testify that the policy of their conqueror foreshadowed something of Virgil's later thought, '*parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*'. The Greeks were to be free; the barbarians to be won over to alliance or crushed; the monarchs of the Hellenistic world were to be humbled but not dethroned or enslaved; client princes were to check their movements and prevent the danger of their revival; the existing units, whether autonomous cities, federations, kings, native princes, or backward tribes, were thus to be maintained; a balance of power was to be created, all dependent on Rome, and owing not a little to their new patron Africanus. With this established, Rome could largely withdraw and allow free life to flourish under her protecting aegis. Greek culture was doubtless to be fostered and, tempered with Roman steadiness and common sense, might well be encouraged to spread westwards.

To initiate such a policy Scipio was well suited. In the Hellenistic world diplomacy was an old art, which accorded ill with the blunt forcefulness of many an early Roman. But Rome produced a new type to meet her new need. Flamininus possessed the finesse necessary to deal with the intricate political needs of the Greek city-states, while Scipio's sympathetic approach and personal magnetism allowed him to win the confidence of kings and princes as well as the devotion of his troops. But his ideals perhaps had little prospect of realization. The weakness and servility of many of the peoples with whom Rome dealt; the increase of the desire for personal military glory; the decay of the old national character which was accelerated by the assimilation of some of the worse aspects of Greek life and by the influx of wealth; the refusal to re-order a constitution which had been framed for a city-state in order to meet the demands of an empire—these were some of the obstacles. Above all, the liberal policies of the Scipios were challenged by Cato, who, fearing the corrupting influences of the Greek world, preached a doctrine of isolationism and narrow nationalism which in turn had to give way to the needs of the time and was replaced by a far more aggressive attitude than the one he had combated.

CHAPTER XI

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SCIPIOS

VICTORY HAD BEEN GAINED IN THE EAST, but the Scipios were recalled before their task was completed. Their supersession had been preceded by attacks upon their friends. The first to come under fire was Q. Minucius Thermus. He had served under Africanus in Africa (202); then, as plebeian tribune, acting with Glabrio, he had upheld Scipio's interests against Cn. Lentulus (201); curule aedile in 198, with Sempronius Longus, he was appointed one of the colonial commissioners in 194. For successes during his praetorship in Spain (196) he was accorded a triumph and, with Africanus conducting the elections, he obtained the consulship of 193 with Cornelius Merula. Thereafter this 'fortis ac strenuus vir' campaigned against the Ligurians until he returned to Rome as proconsul in 190 when he sought a second triumph. Cato rallied to the attack and denounced him in the Senate.

Cato charged him with a wide range of crimes: exaggerating the casualties he had inflicted on the enemy; scourging ten officials of an allied community; killing ten others and 'cutting them up like bacon'; unnatural vice; and valuing neither 'fides neque iusiurandum neque pudicitiam'. There may have been some truth in some of the accusations, since the Senate denied Minucius a triumph, but the fact that he was apparently not brought to trial and was appointed one of the ten commissioners sent to Asia in the following year suggests that he did not fail to rebut at least some of the charges. But while Cato was probably genuinely concerned about Minucius' alleged breach of the *fides maiorum*, he also welcomed the chance to discredit a member of the Scipionic

group. The latter counter-attacked: Cato was brought into the law-courts, probably by a tribunician prosecution, on some charge relating to his conduct during his consulship in Spain. Neither the precise charge nor the result of the trial are known; presumably he was acquitted or else proceedings were dropped before the end.

During the next few months opposition to the Scipios gradually hardened, and although the consul Laelius would try to protect their interests, he was in Cisalpine Gaul part of the time, and was besides a *novus homo*. The manner in which Africanus had handled the question of the allocation of the provinces in the Senate in March 190 had demonstrated his power but it helped to unite the nobles against him. There appears to have been a middle bloc representative of average senatorial opinion, with the Scipionic group under Africanus' outstanding personal leadership on the one side and the reactionaries like Cato and Valerius Flaccus on the other. This was seen in the consular elections for 189. Since Laelius was presiding and news of the naval victory of Aemilius Regillus and of the safe arrival of the army in Asia had reached Rome (and for each event a *supplicatio* had been voted), the Scipionic group had good reason to hope for success for the presumably friendly M. Aemilius Lepidus, one of the patrician candidates. His record was satisfactory and he was serving as *propraetor* in Sicily, but he left his province without senatorial permission in order to stand for the consulship in 190. By securing the prolongation of his command, his political opponents may well have been trying to keep him out of the way or ensure his failure: if he returned he would incur the Senate's displeasure, while if he remained he could not make his formal application (*professio*) or canvass in person. He was defeated.

The new consuls were Cn. Manlius Vulso and M. Fulvius Nobilior who were naturally eager that one should secure Asia as his province and that the command of the Scipios should not be prolonged. In this they were successful, persuading the Senate to revert to the system of annual commands. L. Scipio was superseded by Manlius, while Fulvius obtained Aetolia and Aemilius Regillus was succeeded in the eastern naval command by one of the new praetors, Q. Fabius Labeo. Laelius was retained as *proconsul* on

colonial work in Cisapline Gaul: his opponents would wish to keep him out of Rome. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, however, forbade Q. Fabius Pictor, who was Flamen Quirinalis and also praetor, to leave Rome for his province of Sardinia; a major dispute blew up, but Fabius had to bow to the Pontiff's authority and received the peregrine jurisdiction. Thus a friend of the Scipios robbed a Fabius of a provincial command. Soon afterwards the victory at Magnesia was announced in a despatch from L. Scipio, who must have hoped that the Senate would extend to him such permission to complete his work in Asia as Africanus had received in Spain and Africa (especially since one of the praetorian provinces had been changed). However, although according to Livy the matter was debated, no change was made and Vulso was sent to the East as arranged, together with ten commissioners who included a number of Scipio's supporters; thus Vulso may have had a difficult team to drive.

A fierce struggle for the censorship followed. The six candidates fell into three pairs. Scipio Nasica and Acilius Glabrio were Scipio's supporters; Valerius Flaccus and Cato represented the reactionaries, and T. Flamininus and M. Claudius Marcellus the middle bloc. It was a distinguished field. Glabrio, who had not only defeated Antiochus and the Aetolians at Thermopylae but had distributed much oil and wine, was said to be the most popular candidate, but he was a *novus homo*. Two tribunes promptly impeached him on a charge of having failed to carry in his triumph or deposit in the Treasury some spoil from Antiochus' camp, and demanded a fine of 100,000 *asses*. The evidence given by his staff officers and military tribunes was conflicting. One of these was Cato. Although a rival candidate for the censorship and despite any loyalty owed by a *legatus* to his *imperator*, Cato so far from showing any reluctance was foremost among the witnesses. He declared that he had not seen in the triumphal procession some gold and silver vases which he had noticed among the booty in Antiochus' camp. Glabrio then withdrew his candidature, whereupon the tribunes dropped further proceedings.

Glabrio's guilt or innocence cannot be established, especially as generals had considerable discretionary powers in the disposal of

booty (cf. p. 218), but it can hardly be doubted that Cato was behind the prosecution and that his object was primarily political, since the enquiry was abandoned when Glabrio had withdrawn from the election. But although he had introduced the weapon of scandal into political life with initial success, Cato soon found that it was a boomerang: Glabrio, when retiring, gave as his reason that his competitor was defaming him with perjured evidence and incidentally that Cato was as much a *novus homo* as he himself. Cato was hoist with his own petard, while the reputation of his noble patron Flaccus would not be improved. Nasica may well have been compromised by the charge against Glabrio, and so all these men failed; Flamininus and Marcellus became the new censors. On entering office they acted with moderation, nor did they dare issue a direct political challenge to Africanus but re-appointed him *princeps senatus* for a third period.

Fulvius Nobilior was successful in crushing the Aetolians and hurried to Rome to conduct the elections for 188. At these he took a strong line with his enemy, Aemilius Lepidus, and blocked his candidature. The constitutional procedure is not clear, but Fulvius apparently either refused to accept his name as a candidate or else blocked him after he had started canvassing. The consuls elected were M. Valerius Messalla (perhaps supported by Fulvius, since he had had an unspectacular career) and C. Livius Salinator, son of the consul of 219; himself a pontiff, he had been praetor back in 202, served in the Macedonian war and against the Boii. After failing to win the consulship for 192, he had held a second praetorship and defeated Antiochus' navy (191); he prepared for the Scipios' crossing into Asia and went on the successful diplomatic mission to Prusias (cf. p. 204). For these services he was now rewarded, and the Scipios could probably count on his support.

In the course of 188 the two Scipios returned to Rome with Aemilius Regillus, whose request for a triumph for his naval victory was granted. However, the claim of Lucius Scipio was challenged on the ground that Thermopylae had been the decisive victory, Magnesia a mere epilogue. This suggestion, for which Cato must have been responsible, was palpably false since Antiochus' main forces had not been engaged in Greece. Lucius thus

gained his triumph which he celebrated on a grand scale, and not to be outdone by his brother, he took the *cognomen* Asiagenus (later Asiaticus). But the Scipios now had to rouse themselves: Nasica and Glabrio had been defeated at the censorial elections, Aemilius Lepidius had failed to win the consulship, Laelius had not proved a great political success, Aemilius Paullus and other supporters of consular and praetorian rank were absent on the Asiatic commission. So Africanus had to build up his position in Rome once again so that he might influence the elections for 187.

In order to strengthen his position Scipio appears to have tried to gain more influence over the voting-groups and at the same time to show a liberal attitude in the question of the further spread of Roman citizenship in Italy. Voting in the Assemblies was essentially based on the thirty-five tribes, directly in the Comitia Tributa, and indirectly in the Comitia Centuriata, where the units of *centuriae* were linked to the tribes (e.g. in the first *classis* there were 70 centuries, two to each tribe). In 189 (or possibly 188) Terentius Culleo, a devoted supporter of Scipio, was tribune and persuaded the People to carry a law against the wishes of the nobility which the censors Flamininus and Marcellus had reluctantly to implement: this granted full citizen rights to (i.e. removed from the class of *libertini*) sons of freedmen and allowed them to vote in all the tribes, rural as well as the four urban tribes to which they had been confined. It would not be surprising if in the future some of these men remembered the source of their new privilege when they came to exercise their votes.

A second measure was carried in 188 by another tribune C. Valerius Tappo, whose brother in 195 had crossed swords with Cato on the Oppian law. Scipio's influence is probably to be seen behind his proposal that the municipalites of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum should receive full Roman citizenship in place of *civitas sine suffragio*. They would then normally have been assigned to the tribes which were geographically nearest to them, but Tappo proposed that the new citizens of Formiae and Fundi should be assigned to the tribe Aemilia and the Arpinates to the Cornelia, both these tribes being nearer Rome. He presented his bill to the People without the authority of the Senate and despite initial op-

position from four other tribunes he secured its passage. By putting the new citizens in old rural tribes with small territory near Rome, he greatly enhanced their voting power, since they could come to vote more easily and in the smaller units their votes would count for more *vis-à-vis* the votes of members of the larger tribes (issues were settled by a majority of group tribal votes).

In so far as Scipio was behind these measures he had displayed a liberal attitude to the rights of freedmen and to the spread of citizenship, he had shown how the tribunate could be used to carry measures of which many senators appear to have disapproved, and at the same time he had greatly increased his *clientela* (in the wider sense of the word). In the phrase of our chief authority on the tribal system, 'no other noble seems to have been as successful as Scipio in creating new divisions of tribes'.¹⁷³

However they might try to pull strings, the Scipios had to face a further indirect snub during this year (188): the commands of both Fulvius and Manlius were prolonged, and thus the Senate allowed them what it had denied to the Scipios. The consuls, Valerius and Livius, were fobbed off with Liguria and Gaul. Manlius, who meanwhile had been reducing the Galatians, now held a peace conference at Apamea and the terms imposed on Antiochus were executed. The king was confined to Syria and amid considerable controversy much of the territory he ceded in Asia Minor was assigned to Pergamum and Rhodes; in particular Eumenes of Pergamum was left as a wedge between Syria and Macedon and as a check on the ambitions of the smaller border kingdoms.

In the autumn Manlius evacuated Asia, but on the return journey he was attacked by some Thracian tribes and lost much booty and many men, including the commissioner Minucius Thermus. Unlike Scipio, he had failed to secure the co-operation of Philip, who was annoyed at the recent hardening of senatorial policy towards him, and he may have felt that co-operation with Rome had not brought adequate recognition; his friend Scipio had been superseded and so he looked on grimly when Manlius was attacked.

There was some delay in holding the elections, possibly due to intrigues designed to block once again, as in 190 and 189, the candidature of Aemilius Lepidus. If so, it was unsuccessful, since he was elected, together with C. Flaminius. Though the latter had been quaestor to Africanus in Spain in 210 and elected praetor for 193 under his electoral presidency, at some time he was attracted to Fulvius Nobilior, so that his political relationship to Africanus at this point is uncertain. When the Senate proposed to assign Liguria to both consuls, Lepidus urged that, if forces were to be retained in Greece, he and his colleague should supersede Fulvius and Manlius, but otherwise these commanders should be recalled. As a supporter of the Scipios, who had been robbed of the fruits of their victory over Antiochus by senatorial insistence upon annual commands, Lepidus emphasized that Manlius and Fulvius had already spent two years abroad 'acting as kings'. As the campaigns in the East were over and Manlius was already half-way home, Lepidus could scarcely have expected to succeed to a command in the East, but he may well have drawn the Senate's attention to the undesirability of prorogation and so countered the supporters of Manlius and Fulvius. Lepidus next attacked the absent Fulvius, who had previously kept him out of the consulship, by introducing some Ambraciotes into the Senate to complain about Fulvius' conduct in their country. Manlius too came under fire. On his return he asked for a triumph, but was opposed by a majority of his ten commissioners, led by the two pro-Scipionic members Furius Purpureo and Aemilius Paullus. They denied his right to have made war on the Galatians and criticized his method of waging it together with his disastrous return through Thrace: the death of Minucius in Thrace gave point to their argument. According to Livy the feeling of the House when it adjourned was against Manlius, but next day, thanks to the exertions of his friends and relatives, the triumph was granted.

Next, if Livy's order of events is to be trusted, the first direct assault was made upon the Scipios. Cato, seeing the revival of Africanus' influence, decided to strike, thus initiating the series of confused events which are generally referred to as 'the Trials of the Scipios'.¹⁷⁴ He instigated two tribunes, both named Petillius,

to demand in the Senate that L. Scipio should give an account of 500 talents which he had received from Antiochus after Magnesia as a condition of the armistice and as pay for his troops. This was no question of a legal trial, since the Senate was not a court of law, but any senator could draw attention to anything of interest to the State, and when public attention had been arrested, the Senate could as a result of a public demand decree an enquiry which might then lead on to a trial before the People. Thus the episode was the first movement of the political enemies of the Scipios to stir up trouble.

Lucius Scipio had proposed to Antiochus an indemnity of 15,000 talents, of which 500 were to be paid at once, 2500 on the ratification of the terms, the rest in twelve annual instalments. In fact the 2500 passed through the hands of his successor Vulso, but since Polybius refers to 3000 during the debate they were probably mentioned in the discussion together with 500 for which Lucius was responsible. It is not likely, however, that Lucius was charged with peculation.¹⁷⁵

At some point Africanus intervened, knowing that the attack was really directed against himself: he tore up the account books before the eyes of the whole Senate, telling Q. Petillius to look in the fragments for what he wanted to know. He indignantly asked the senators how they could quibble about 500 talents and not ask by whose agency 15,000 talents from Antiochus had come into the Treasury or how they had become masters of Asia, Africa and Spain. The matter was then allowed to drop, because the Senate, jealous though some of its members might be of the Scipios, made it clear that it would remain loyal to its *princeps*, while it also disliked bold tribunician interference in financial matters. No other result could have been expected, except damage to Scipio's prestige. Africanus' high-handed conduct had averted the blow, but in acting thus he harmed more than his own popularity: in tearing up the books he had destroyed the evidence that could vindicate the honesty of his brother's administration. Suspicion, engendered by his autocratic bearing, could now flourish unchecked.

Was Lucius in fact under any legal obligation to account for the money? The financial responsibility of generals is not clearly

defined. A consul was naturally responsible for State funds voted to him by the Senate; he could also obtain money from the Treasury without a special senatorial decree because he acted through a quaestor who was responsible and gave an account of sums paid from the Treasury to his officer and also of sums raised by the general from taxes. Generals were less accountable for money won from the enemy. Booty was probably handled by their *praefecti fabrum* rather than by their military quaestors. They could use it freely in the interests of their army or public utility, without having to render an account, which perhaps could strictly be enforced, but was in fact seldom claimed; presumably they would keep accounts of receipts and payments for their personal use. Any surplus would be paid into the Treasury, while a general could be charged with peculation if suspected of undue personal profit. Further, his responsibilities may have varied in respect of two different categories of booty, named *praeda* and *manubiae*.

Thus a distinction must be drawn between State funds administered by responsible quaestors, and *praeda* which was controlled by the general directly or by his agent. But into which division do the 500 talents fall? The fact that Scipio had demanded and received the sum from Antiochus to pay his troops would lend colour to the view that it was *praeda* at the general's disposal. But the fact that the Senate and the Roman People approved it by including the sum in the terms of the armistice would support the view that it was State funds. It was a matter of definition. Scipio maintained that it was *praeda*, for which no account should be given, whereas the opposition under Cato classed it as a contribution of war. It is improbable that, at this stage, there was any suggestion that Lucius had administered the money incorrectly, or that there had been any leakage; he was merely asked to put the matter in order. The Senate was very jealous of its financial rights, and would be quick to question an act by which a general had administered personally, and not through a quaestor, a part of the indemnity which they had approved. Thus it is hardly possible to say whether Lucius was right or wrong, though his brother indignantly asserted the correctness of his position: 'he ought not to render an account to any one'.

Nothing daunted, Cato took steps to enforce his demand elsewhere. Another tribune, C. Minucius Augurinus, was found to bring the question before the People. At a preliminary examination (*anquisitio*) in an informal meeting (*contio*) Minucius urged that L. Scipio should render his accounts. At this stage Cato probably delivered his speech *De pecunia regis Antiochi* in which he presumably argued that the 500 talents fell into a category for which account should be rendered to the Senate and People. Anticipating perhaps that another tribune would be found to veto proceedings at this or a later stage Lucius refused to show more respect for the People than he had for the Senate. To have acceded now would have involved admitting that he had been wrong in the Senate. Also the account books had been destroyed, so that, unless they had been kept in duplicate, an accurate account would now be impossible. Lucius' refusal, however, must have provoked suspicion and rumours of peculation. Minucius therefore imposed a fine on Lucius because he refused to account for this money.

The normal procedure would then have been for Lucius to appeal to the verdict of the People (*iudicium populi*). But Minucius added further insult by demanding surety with a threat of imprisonment if Lucius refused; this demand may have been strictly legal but was exceptionally harsh. Africanus then appealed on behalf of his brother to the tribunes, but eight refused to help. Lucius remained obdurate and Minucius ordered his arrest, but the tenth tribune, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, intervened and protected Lucius from imprisonment. The demand for surety was thus quashed, but what of Minucius' fine? No certain answer can be given: probably Gracchus' intervention caused Minucius to drop his accusation and the whole question was allowed to fall into abeyance. Cato had won his political objective of discrediting the Scipios: he may not have wished to push the matter to a vote of the People which might even have had an embarrassing result. Similarly two years before, the attack on Glabrio had been called off once its political purpose had been achieved (p. 212). It is less likely that the fine was exacted, while the pathetic sequel recorded by Valerius Antias (which Livy recounts) must be set

aside: he described how Lucius' property was sold but was insufficient to meet the fine, how his relatives supplied the balance, and how he went to the East to retrieve his lost fortunes by arbitrating between Antiochus and Eumenes. Once again, the question of Lucius' guilt hardly arises: it was a matter of definition. If the charge had been speculation and there was any possibility that he was guilty of this, Cato is unlikely to have let the matter rest there.¹⁷⁶

The discomfiture of the Scipios was to be emphasized by the triumphs of Fulvius Nobilior and Manlius Vulso, although these celebrations were held only after considerable intrigue and difficulties. When Fulvius asked for a triumph for his Aetolian campaign, the consul Aemilius Lepidus, who was absent in northern Italy, used a tribune to try to block the grant, but the Senate finally allowed the triumph although limiting the scale of the Games. As Aemilius was delayed by illness, Fulvius hastily held his triumph some little time before the date he had planned, in case Aemilius on his return might try further obstructive tactics. Manlius, who with difficulty gained his triumph (cf. p. 216), delayed celebrating it because he feared he might be involved in the attack on the Scipios: apparently his financial responsibility for the 2500 talents had been discussed in the Senate. When the time came, he managed to overshadow Fulvius' effort in his display of spoils, while his popularity was enhanced when his friends persuaded the Senate to use the spoils from the East to repay 25½ imposts of *tributum*. However the Scipios soon made a fresh bid to obliterate memories of their recent discomfiture: in 186 Lucius Scipio celebrated for ten days Games which he said he had vowed during the war with Antiochus, with money contributed for the purpose by kings and cities.¹⁷⁷

After the defeat of Carthage, Macedon and Syria, Rome drifted into somewhat quieter waters although involved with the barbarian fringe of Ligurian and Spanish tribes. She could therefore give further thought to domestic matters, such as the spread of Roman citizenship (cf. p. 214) and her relations with her Latin and Italian allies. One aspect of the latter question was the increasing number of Latins who migrated to Rome where they could be-

come citizens if they settled down. This movement upset the system of allied mobilization: if Latin towns were depleted, they might not be able to fulfil their military obligations. It was a friend of Scipio who first tried to ease the situation: in 193 the consul Minucius Thermus raised the levy of allied troops, not in accordance with the fixed agreement but in proportion to the men of military age (*iuniores*) fit for service available in each city. When, as the difficulty increased, the Latins in 187 asked for the repatriation of those who had migrated to Rome, another supporter of Scipio, the praetor Terentius Culleo, repatriated all Latins whose fathers or themselves had been registered in a Latin city in 204 or after.

This was not a selfish alien act, but it arose from a request of the Latin authorities themselves, although its consequences were not entirely happy in that it robbed Rome of men who were militarily and economically useful and at the same time infringed the constitutional rights of the individuals concerned. On this matter, however, Scipio's attitude appears to have been liberal: there was no question of deliberate interference in allied affairs. The great Bacchanalian conspiracy, which flared up throughout Italy and was suppressed during the next year, brought into sharper focus the problem of Rome's delicate relations with her allies. Cato blamed the Scipionic group for having opened the door to Greek cults and influences which now took on such an ugly shape, but though he was heart and soul in the attempt to suppress the evil, his motive would have been moral and social rather than a desire to interfere in allied affairs: in this matter he need not have been opposed to Scipio.

The next year or two saw some tough political struggles between the Claudii, Sempronii, Porcii, Valerii and Fulvii. These need not be traced in detail here, beyond noting that Q. Terentius Culleo failed to win the consulship for 184, as also did L. Aemilius Paullus: the men who gained the office for the year in which Africanus ended his political career were P. Claudius Pulcher and L. Porcius Licinus. A fierce struggle for the censorship ensued early in 184 (censors entered office immediately after election). Nine candidates presented themselves: the patricians L. Valerius Flaccus,

L. Cornelius Scipio, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, Cn. Manlius Vulso and L. Furius Purpureo; the plebeians M. Porcius Cato, M. Fulvius Nobilior, Ti. Sempronius Longus and M. Sempronius Tuditanus. Valerius and Cato worked together, while according to Livy all the other candidates opposed Cato not so much to keep out a *novus homo* as because they feared that his censorship would be strict and aggressive. The Scipios were represented in strength, if Sempronius Longus and Purpureo are reckoned among their supporters: they may have been trying to impress the public with their strength, but concentration of effort might have paid better.

It is possible that Cato tried to discredit the candidature of Sempronius Longus by prosecuting him, as on an earlier occasion he had witnessed against Glabrio (p. 212); we know that he delivered a speech against Longus on some occasion and this election would be most suitable (although it could have been in 189 since Longus had served as Glabrio's legate). But the most spectacular prosecution was that of Africanus himself, which cannot be accurately dated: if Cato launched the attack just before the elections, it would obviously explain the failure of Lucius Scipio and any other Scipionic supporter. The victors were in fact Cato and Valerius Flaccus, and Cato's success will not have been made more difficult by the fact that the presiding magistrate was his kinsman Porcius Licinus.

Thus in the same year Cato reached the heights and Africanus the depths of their careers. If Cato was emboldened to make the final assault upon Africanus before the censorial elections, his primary purpose was obviously to discredit the candidature of L. Scipio; if after, then his electoral success will have encouraged him to try to end the political influence of his hated rival once and for all. The details of his manoeuvre are very obscure. Our main source is an anecdote in Polybius, who records that 'when someone took upon himself to bring Scipio to trial before the People in the manner usual at Rome, and produced many bitter accusations against him, he came forward and said nothing but that it ill became the Roman People to listen to accusations against Publius Cornelius Scipio, to whom the accusers owed it that they had the

power of speech at all. At this, the populace dispersed and quitting the assembly left the accuser alone.' Unfortunately this account leaves some critical points unanswered: the accuser is anonymous, the accusation vague and the ultimate result uncertain.

Gellius, however, provides some important additions: the accuser was the tribune M. Naevius and the accusation that Scipio had 'received money from Antiochus in order that peace might be made with him in the name of the Roman People on more favourable and easier conditions, and certain other charges unworthy of such a man'. These points are reasonable. The charge will have been Africanus' relations with Antiochus and may even have been bluntly defined as treason, to which colour would be lent by Africanus' private dealings with the king, his alleged advice to him before Magnesia, his relatively easy peace-terms, and the fact that the king had returned his son without a ransom. Cato might have little evidence to substantiate such a charge, but it would be plausible enough as a weapon to discredit Scipio. His personal dealings with Antiochus had been private; exact information about what occurred would not be current knowledge. Any contact with the enemy in time of war could be represented in a bad light, especially when rumours could be based on the undeniable fact of the return of Scipio's son. Further, Scipio had in accordance with his imperial views granted relatively easy terms to Antiochus; this was totally opposed to the foreign policy of Cato who would represent Scipio's generosity as treason, and any suspicion of treason, however groundless, made a good political weapon. In reply to this onslaught Scipio diverted the enemy's fire by an appeal to his past services to his country, as he had done before during the attack on his brother. By sheer force of personality he won a great temporary triumph, but the charge remained unanswered; so, knowing that his enemies would press home their advantage, now old and ill and always averse to the game of politics, he decided to withdraw from Rome. Cato, his object achieved, took no further action.¹⁷⁸

At Liternum within a year the conqueror of Hannibal and the founder of Roman power in three continents, in Africa, Asia and Spain, died, a king uncrowned because his loyalty to his fellow

nobles and the strength of the Senate stayed his hand when unbounded popularity and military power seemed to be placing a crown within his reach. True, the rise of the military dictators was not achieved until almost a century had passed, but we have the nearly contemporary observation of Polybius that the thought of monarchy somewhere in the world did cross Scipio's mind. Wisely he cast away ambition: to have grasped the shadow, at any rate in Rome, would have caused his own downfall amid dishonour and civil war. Instead he died in virtual exile, and it was his ungrateful country that was dishonoured.¹⁷⁹

CHAPTER XII

THE MAN AND HIS WORK

'IF ONCE WE GRANT that the fate of kingdoms—nay of whole continents—may turn on the appearance of a great military figure, and on his application of strategy and tactics and organization to the problems of his day, we cannot refuse to concede that not only his personality but his methods of war must be studied as an important item in world history. To ignore them and to hand them over to the study of the military specialist is unphilosophic and unworthy of the self-respecting historian.'¹⁸⁰

In the Hannibalic War Rome had to face a new situation and her citizen-militia met a professional army. True, she had faced the phalanx of Pyrrhus, but the contacts had been sporadic and he had neither grappled for long years with his enemy as Hannibal was to do nor inflicted such overwhelming defeats. Rome now had to meet a general of genius whose army was the product of his own training. In Spain the Barcids had created what was virtually a professional army, and long years of practice had given it a freedom and elasticity of movement which the Romans lacked. Though Rome had produced competent generals in the past, they were essentially annual magistrates who after a year or two in command sank back into private life. Soldiering was part of a citizen's duty, but it was not to be his life-work. So when Hannibal appeared over the Alps, Rome could oppose him with an army of good material but of insufficient training, led by annual magistrates who lacked little but brilliance. Rome fought well, but without success, until Cannae exposed all her faults and at the same time the greatness of her dogged perseverance and her 'will to conquer'. But she could not win the war until she produced a general who would burst through her Republican formalities, adapt her armies to the need of the day, and prove himself able to meet the genius of Hannibal in a pitched battle. Conservatism and

constitutional niceties alike must yield, since her life was at stake.

The need produced the man and, as Napoleon said, 'in war it is not men, but the man, that counts'. Hannibal, maintaining himself for so many years in enemy country, without reinforcements and with little support from his home government, bearing the war almost on his own shoulders alone, is a familiar figure. Equal emphasis is not always laid on the difficulties which Scipio faced and overcame, since Hannibal's romantic ambience overshadows them. He had to discover the weaknesses of the Roman army, to understand the causes of its defeat and then to build up a new force which could face Hannibal; at the same time his strategic aims received only half-hearted support from the home government, since many distrusted their outcome. Scipio had to face Rome as well as Hannibal.

Rome's first need was to sacrifice her system of yearly commands on a scale very different from the occasional prolongations which had been made in the past. When a competent man was found, he must be continued in his command. Thus the elder Scipios had been sent to Spain and were not superseded until they died. The idea was born that efficient generals ought to serve for the duration of the war — '*donec debellatum foret*'. Still more revolutionary, the best man must be chosen, irrespective of his technical qualifications. Thus at an age which did not qualify him for a major command, without having held a curule magistracy, young Scipio was sent to Spain with proconsular power at the wish of the Roman People to fight until Carthaginian power there had been broken. Thereafter he was consul and fought in Africa as a proconsul, but the spirit of the office was changed: he was not an annual magistrate executing the will of the Senate, but had been carried by popular enthusiasm over some senatorial opposition to a command which again should last '*donec debellatum foret*'. This meant that he was able to build up a professional army which could be trained to his methods and experimented upon, and which would look to him as its general, not to a succession of generals. The ordinary annual officer could never have carried through the necessary tactical reforms, probably not even Scipio himself as a consul commanding an ordinary citizen army for a

year. The Republic was to last many years longer, but the first shadow was cast over it by the man who was invested with pro-consular *imperium*, who continued in a long command at the will of the People, and who won a devoted and semi-professional army. The military dictators, who were ultimately to overthrow the Republican system, were on the distant horizon.

Scipio's personality was doubtless one of the causes of his success. He gained the devotion of his men, some of whom may have regarded him with religious fervour. His staff was equally loyal. No rumour reaches us of any jealousy or neglect of his aides-de-camp; even his political opponents did not attribute any of his success to them, though he himself was the first to acknowledge their help. The loyalty of his friend and right-hand man, Laelius, became proverbial, like the friendship of the legendary heroes. Napoleon may have been jealous of his marshals, Caesar have met with a Labienus, and Alexander have made enemies through his fiery temperament, but Scipio seems only to have inspired his lieutenants, both Roman noble and Numidian sheikh. Like many generals, he had to deal with one mutiny, but his handling of it bound most of his men still closer to him. This loyalty of officers and men was a tribute to his great faith in himself, which in turn kindled the enthusiasm of others. The discipline he exerted was moral as well as military, and Napoleon has said that in war moral force is to physical as four to one.

On his arrival in Spain he had to blend the various elements of his army: the shattered remains of the earlier disasters, his new troops and the Spanish allies, each part having special needs and requiring special treatment. Again, in Africa he had to form the volunteers, the legions from Sicily and the native African troops, into a homogeneous whole. His magnetic personality was doubtless as much of a unifying influence as the common devotion to the same cause. His bravery cannot be questioned (even if the rescue of his father is only an anecdote). If he did not expose himself recklessly, that was the mark of a good general, as is often emphasized by Polybius, who commends Hannibal for his sanity in not risking depriving the ship of its pilot, while he condemns the culpable self-exposure of Marcellus which led to his death in 208,

acting 'more like a simpleton than a general'. The three men who carried shields before Scipio at New Carthage did not shelter a coward but the directing force which would win the day. When necessary Scipio took personal risks, as in his perilous visit to Syphax. But though the legend might exalt his physical prowess, he was nearer to a modern commander than a Homeric hero. He rightly estimated the value of his leadership.

The gradual development of Scipio's reform of traditional Roman tactics has been traced above, but it may now be considered in its historical setting. The early formation had comprised three lines, each of which was divided into maniples between which spaces were left for skirmishers to advance and retire. These maniples were drawn up in quincunx order, so that the openings of the front line were covered by the maniples of the rear. This formation, which relied on push and weight and on the serried lines, had served Rome well enough and had even stood up to Pyrrhus' professional soldiers. But it had a weakness: it could advance or retire, but it could not wheel or turn with any ease and tended to become a compact mass. Further, it could act only as a whole; individual initiative was not required. Although the maniple did give a certain freedom of movement, the security of the whole force was based on its remaining in close order, and 'it broke because it could not bend'. This was precisely what had been happening in the Hannibalic War in Italy. Hannibal had an army which could wheel, could lengthen its wings and make a flank attack. Cannae had shown that the Roman army could not face such an enemy, but was outflanked and surrounded; unable to turn or retire, it became a mass of struggling humanity and was cut to pieces. Against this mobile enemy and his new methods the Romans could do nothing and wisely realized that they must avoid another open battle at all costs. So Fabius advanced his strategy of delay, of a war of sieges and guerilla methods, which succeeded in confining Hannibal in southern Italy and avoiding a second Cannae. But complete victory could not be won until someone had forged a weapon capable of meeting Hannibal on his own ground. Scipio saw this and spent all his free time in Spain, possibly during his first winter there and certainly after the

fall of New Carthage, in trying to train his army in new methods. He had good material, since some of the men had been serving for ten years and had become almost professionals, and he himself had the requisite genius and drive. He must have learnt the lesson of Cannae, that if two opposing armies were drawn up in two parallel lines in the traditional manner, there was the gravest danger of one being outflanked if the other possessed greater mobility and could execute a flanking movement. The remedy must be applied.

Scipio realized the inability of the army to act in separate units and the insufficient training of the individual to make him effective when he broke away from the compact mass; the third weakness, lack of cavalry, was faced and remedied later in Africa. He made his first attempt at Baecula, where he entirely threw over the close maintenance of the triple line, and put his light troops with some of his infantry in the centre, while his really effective legionaries were moved to the wings. It is difficult to appreciate what a complete revolution in method this was. Not only was the form different, but also the spirit; for it meant the independent action of three separate units, acting on their own with no central command once the battle had commenced. No longer did one man direct and control the whole battle, overlooking the ranks from one wing to the other, but each section now became a small army in itself, operating with different objects and orders. By making the maniple an effective unit, Scipio could alter his formation without utter confusion, even perhaps in face of the enemy, as he certainly did two years later at Ilipa. Such a change must have involved much practice and training, but the discipline of the previous year had given his troops greater tactical freedom and more self-reliance as units and individuals. Further, Scipio tried to counteract the weakness of the individual in the use of his weapons. Arms drill was a feature of the training after the capture of New Carthage and Scipio started a reform in the handling of weapons which led on to those of Rutilius Rufus and Marius, who turned to the gladiatorial training schools as an example of the efficiency necessary in the army.

Thus Scipio had forged and proved a New Model Army. It is

true that he was fortunate in holding a command in a country where he could develop his reforms far beyond Hannibal's reach. In Italy his attempt might have fared otherwise, if he had had to meet Hannibal in the initial stages, in 208, for instance. Yet this reformation was achieved despite the conservatives at home like Fabius, who later, in criticizing Scipio's strategy, depreciated his Spanish campaign and may well have included his new-fangled tactical methods. Cromwell too had to face much opposition in building up his New Model, with the Earl of Manchester playing the part of Fabius, but he was fortunate in that his new army was unified by true religious fervour. But if this was lacking in Scipio's army, it was compensated for by a real devotion to their general on the part of his men, while the superstitious or religious enthusiasm of some was kindled by the rumours of divine support which circulated among them after the mysterious ebb at New Carthage. As Cromwell won Marston Moor on the wings against Prince Rupert, so Baecula was won on the wings, and proved the worth of the new weapon. Ilipa and Naseby were the natural sequence. At Baecula Scipio had succeeded in holding only the enemy's inferior forces. At Ilipa he held their main force, but not securely enough. At Campi Magni the weapon was perfected, and he held the enemy's main force along the whole of the front with his first line, while the two rear ranks marched out to the flanks. It now became possible to hold the enemy firmly, while out-flanking and surrounding him, and Hannibal's tactics at Cannae could now be carried out by a Roman army. At the final duel at Zama, where Scipio brought his newly perfected army against the master from whom he had learned the tactics, Hannibal thwarted him by the use of a real reserve, though Scipio's wise foresight in securing adequate cavalry saved the day. If his precise tactics could not be applied in the future, he had broken the stiffness of the Roman legion, made the units more self-reliant and improved the fighting quality of the individual, thus preparing the way for the next development of Roman tactics when the cohort became the unit.

The strategic aims by which Scipio hoped to win the war are clearly twofold. In the first place he held the firmest conviction

that Spain was the key to the whole war and must be held at all costs. It was there that the enemy's power must be undermined, while Hannibal was held at bay in Italy. Further he believed, as had his father and uncle, that it was not enough merely to hold Spain and prevent supplies leaking through from it to Italy, but the offensive must be taken, and Carthaginian power must be shattered, not merely shackled. While this ideal was being realized, gradually there must have developed in Scipio's mind the thought that, when victory was gained, Spain would be left in the hands of Rome, and that Rome would have to face a new situation and fresh responsibilities; and he probably saw a future such as would hardly have occurred to the more provincial mind of a Fabius. The second part of his plan, his determination to carry the war to Africa after the subjugation of Spain, showed the greatest insight. The battle of Metaurus may have ensured the actual safety of Rome, but Fabius' strategy of exhaustion would never secure a peace on terms adequate to compensate Rome for all her sufferings, even if it did at last manage to drive Hannibal from Italy. It was short-sighted in that, although it aimed at quick relief for the Italian farmers, it gave no security against Hannibal's possible return which would destroy any reviving efforts. Scipio saw deeper, that Hannibal must be beaten in the open field as well as driven from Italy. Only thus could Rome dictate terms which would guarantee her future safety. This is sufficient reason to explain why he forced through his African project. At the same time by humbling, though not destroying, Carthage, he would clearly be changing the whole balance of power in the Western Mediterranean: in the future Rome would be dominant there and the foreign policy of Carthage would effectively be controlled by Rome. But whether imperial influence (and Scipio clearly envisaged at most a Roman protectorate policy, not direct rule) was good or bad, planned or accidental, military necessity and Rome's safety enforced the correctness of his immediate strategy, although this would inevitably lead to a permanent extension of Rome's political horizon.

Scipio's strategic methods have already been examined. He had solved the problem of invading Spain, on the lines laid down by his father and uncle. He knew that he must win a base and control

the coast road, that it was dangerous to penetrate into Baetica until a base further south than Saguntum had been secured. His swoop on New Carthage secured his future advance as well as inflicting moral and economic loss on the enemy. The way now open, his march to Baecula, to engage one of the Carthaginian armies separately, was strategically sound. After the battle he was faced with a difficult choice, but he chose the lesser of two evils, knowing well that Spain must be held and the two other Carthaginian armies crushed, which was done by a brilliant blow against their strategic flank at Ilipa. Having reached Africa, he did not fall into the mistake of trying to storm Carthage itself, especially when Hannibal might return. Instead, he tried to secure an adequate base, to cut Carthage off from her source of supplies, and to build up an army against the return of Hannibal. To this end he won over Masinissa so that, with Numidian cavalry and his own flexible army, he could face Hannibal in the open field. Meantime, he moved with extraordinary rapidity against the gathering forces of the enemy, both in his swoop on their camps and at Campi Magni. Then, his retreat into Numidia to meet Masinissa, which at the same time drew Hannibal from his base, was a sound if slightly risky strategic move. He had forced Hannibal to fight on ground favourable to himself.

Scipio's organizing skill must have been considerable, since we hear of no breakdown of his intelligence or commissariat: a great tribute in a country as notoriously difficult for campaigning as Spain. 'One of the cardinal blunders of Napoleon's whole scheme for the conquest of the Peninsula,' wrote Sir Charles Oman, 'was that he persisted in treating it as if it were German or Italian soil, capable of supporting an army on the march. But in Spain there are only a few districts where this can be done; it may be possible to go forward without an enormous train of convoys in Andalusia and the coast plain of Valencia . . . but over four-fifths of the Peninsula an army that tries to feed on the countryside will find itself on the point of starvation in a few days and be forced to disperse in order to live.'¹⁸¹ Scipio was fortunate in not having to penetrate far into the mountainous centre of Spain or very deep into the heart of North Africa, fortunate too in having command

of the sea, but for his two campaigns to have been carried through so smoothly implies a vast amount of efficient organization. If critics are inclined to ask why he was apparently idle for so long on his arrival in Spain and after his first year's campaign, it must be remembered that he had not only to train and re-form an army but also to secure its physical well-being.

His treatment of the natives of the countries in which he fought was good. In Spain he followed his father's example and tried by every means to conciliate the inhabitants. He admitted chieftains to his fellowship and won the people by his clement policy of restoring the hostages who fell into his hands. Many an anecdote was told to illustrate this attitude: his generosity to the hostages in New Carthage, to Aluccius, to his Spanish allies and Masinissa's nephew after Baecula, and to the people of Saguntum (cf. note 57). Shrewd policy might underlie his humanity and he could pose as the deliverer from the hated Carthaginian yoke, but it was not mere pose. His romantic personality, like that of Sertorius later, combined with his mild treatment, won the hearts of the Spaniards; unlike many of the more stolid and brutal Romans who were often sent to Spain in the next century, he was alive and sympathetic to the native point of view. Foreseeing that Spain would have to bow to Rome, he tried to foster in her devotion to her future mistress. There are some blots on his record, although they may have arisen from what he regarded as military necessity. He could be cruel, as Ilurgia and some of the towns of the African hinterland found to their cost, but not without a purpose. When a severe lesson was needed, Scipio did not flinch from inflicting it, but there was no senseless waste of life: he struck to punish and deter.

Such was Scipio the soldier, the strategy he adopted and the tactics by which he fulfilled his strategic aims. Once the importance and significance of his work is recognized, it is perhaps unprofitable to try to decide to what precise place he should be assigned in the list of the world's great soldiers.

The world misunderstands many of its great men and neglects others. Scipio has in part suffered both these fates. During his lifetime he was bound to be misunderstood by some, especially by the more traditionally-minded, while clouds of legend soon

began to cluster around his romantic figure, a tribute from Greek writers who thus honoured the man whom many Romans mistrusted and feared. Then cold shafts of rationalism were hurled by another Greek to dissipate the clouds: but Polybius succeeded only in illuminating a different side of the picture, not in giving a complete portrait of the man he admired. If in later days Scipio has suffered neglect, it may be partly because of his success; the losing cause, nobly fought, tends to overshadow the cause which triumphs. Conquered Hannibal has captivated the world's imagination, but the victorious Scipio stands aloof in his triumph.

The fact that ancient writers presented such varying views of Scipio's personality makes modern assessment difficult if not impossible. But one aspect is clear; his personality was so outstanding that it caused offence to many and admiration in others. Although he had many friends among his fellow nobles, to the nobility as a whole he appeared as a potential danger to their existing control of the state: his career had placed him in a position which no Roman had hitherto enjoyed, while his attitude of conscious superiority would not ease personal relations. Further, he personified a new age, that of the individual, and saw his ideal not in ancient Rome alone but in a judicious blend of the *mos maiorum* with Greek culture: the traditionalists were appalled. But however overbearing he may have seemed to some of his enemies most men recognized his worth and indeed his magnanimity and many came under the sway of his personality. His imagination and wide outlook kindled enthusiasm in others. His troops, the Numidian princes, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, Philip king of Macedonia, Antiochus king of Syria, the Spanish chieftains and the common people of Rome, all acknowledged his greatness. Our main guide to his personal qualities is the impression which he made on those he met, which survives largely only in anecdotes; but since a false anecdote may be good history, it is perhaps legitimate to assume that, even where the incident described is false, the characteristics assigned may be true. From anecdotes an impression is gained of a kingly nature, of moderation, self-control and courtesy, of shrewd calculation, calmness of judgment and generosity. He seems to have been endowed with unusual tact, an ability

to penetrate in a sympathetic way to the real feelings of those with whom he was dealing. Few reproaches were launched against his personal character by his enemies, who attacked only his ambition and his Hellenism.¹⁸² Polybius' portrait is incomplete and Livy may come nearer the truth when he leaves a loophole for humane feeling and genuine piety. On occasion Scipio may have acted dramatically or even theatrically, as when he tore up the account books in the Senate, but this was not mere play-acting but arose from a conscious belief in himself and the rightness of his cause.

From the absence of detailed information many figures of the ancient world may appear to us as the mere abstract embodiment of the qualities assigned to them, but that such varied qualities as are assigned to Scipio could well blend in one personality is seen when we recall men about whom more is known. Thus a modern proconsul, Lord Curzon, was described as follows: 'to the public he appeared as a pompous and even arrogant figure—cold, haughty, aloof; to his intimate companions, as an emotional and sensitive being, warm-hearted and impulsive, within whose frame there lurked eternally the spirit of incorrigible youth'. The man who had to be warned, when explaining the Indian policy of his government, that he must realize 'that he is not a divinity addressing black beetles', is also the same man who 'outwardly so complacently self-confident was curiously dependent on spiritual aid'.¹⁸³

Was Scipio also dependent on spiritual aid or in other words did his self-confidence derive from some religious conviction as the legend suggests? In considering the possibility it is important to try to envisage the religious atmosphere of Rome in Scipio's day and not be influenced by attitudes which developed very soon afterwards and are reflected in the Greek Polybius. Roman life in the religious sphere, as in so many others, was very different before and after the Hannibalic War, which marks a cross-roads in cultural development. In a famous passage Polybius describes how the Roman nobility cynically used the State religion and the superstition of the masses as a means of maintaining control by their rationally-minded minority. Thus, if for the purposes of statecraft Scipio deliberately encouraged a false belief in his divine

inspiration, he would not have been acting more hypocritically than the average Roman senator of Polybius' day! But as A. J. Toynbee has recently pointed out, Polybius may very well have been betrayed into making the same mistake as did Gibbon later, who 'made the unwarrantable assumption that their (*sc.* the historical characters with whom he was concerned) *Weltanschauung* had been the rationalist one that was Gibbon's own, and this assumption betrayed him into the unwarrantable conclusion that a profession of belief in religion convicted anyone who made it, at any time or place, of being either a knavish hypocrite or a guileless fool . . . Polybius is misrepresenting the Roman nobility of the second century BC in depicting them in the image of Polybius himself and of the Greek philosophers who were his contemporaries.'¹⁸⁴ No doubt certain Roman intellectuals had gained some knowledge of earlier Greek Scepticism before the end of the third century, but (as Toynbee pertinently goes on to point out) it is unlikely that for many 'their conversion had been so effective as to strip them completely of their traditional belief in their ancestral religion'. One must beware of projecting the age of Poseidonius or even of Panaetius back into the third century. Further, the Hannibalic War had been a time of extreme religious fervour among the masses. As the traditional deities of Rome seemed insufficient for the needs of the day, many Greek and foreign practices were introduced and given public recognition; while *lectisternia* and Games, not to mention the exceptional reversion to human sacrifice in 216, provided an outlet for the pent-up emotions of the individual. Thus the religious background to Scipio's youth was not necessarily an environment which would be hostile to religious beliefs. We know from Polybius that both his mother and his wife supported conventional religious practices (pp. 28, 188). Further, there is the testimony of the existence of the legend, part of which was circulating in Scipio's lifetime and was denounced by Polybius. If Scipio was known to have been a cynical rationalist, would the stories of his religious contacts have spread so widely? It is of course possible to make the best of both worlds and to suppose that in his earlier career he had such beliefs and later when he knew Ennius and had learned

more about Euhemerism and Greek Sceptical thought, he lost his earlier beliefs—but there is no evidence to support such a hypothesis. It may be going too far to suggest that he was in a real sense a mystic, but that he had a sense of communion with the divine and believed that he received help from heaven on occasion is not unreasonable, and it would help to explain the unusual self-confidence which many men saw in him.

Whether Scipio, who must have been well versed in Greek literature and history, ever consciously followed the example of Alexander the Great cannot be said, but he is likely to have studied his generalship, and the legend found similarities between the two men. Parallels abounded: Alexander's siege of Tyre, Scipio's of New Carthage; the recession of the sea at Mount Climax and the ebb at New Carthage; Alexander's visit to Zeus Ammon and Scipio's relations with Jupiter; Alexander's magnanimity towards the mother and wife of the defeated Darius, and Scipio's towards the wife and children of the Spaniard Indibilis. Other parallels were invented: the birth stories; the leaping into the enemy's town by Alexander among the Malli, by Scipio at New Carthage (App., *Ib.* 22); the single combat between Alexander and Darius at the Issus, and between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama. Thus the historic figure of Scipio was soon enveloped in an epic air.

Scipio lived at a time of great cultural change, when Greek ideas were flooding into Rome and fundamentally affecting her literature, art, architecture, education, religion and thought. It is not possible here to examine this vast field, but we may note a few of the pieces of evidence which indicate that Scipio was in the forefront of the movement. In literature he encouraged the poet Ennius, who, though brought to Rome by Cato, was soon attracted by Scipio's munificence and later repaid his patron by composing a panegyric in his honour. Ennius wrote the first epic account of the Romans in Greek hexameters instead of in the old Saturnian verse, thus setting the example for all later Latin poetry, while he also popularized the free-thinking doctrines of Euhemerus. His bust was placed in the tomb of the Scipios, along with those of Publius and Lucius; his relations with them must have been intimate, as Cicero said, '*carus fuit Africano noster Ennius*'.

We have seen how Scipio threw himself into the Greek life at Syracuse, wearing Greek dress and occupying his leisure with literature and gymnastics. No doubt his children were brought up on Greek educational lines. Not very much is known about either of his sons, Publius and Lucius. The former was debarred by ill-health from a public career, although he did become an augur before 180; he also wrote a history and, following the earliest senatorial writers, he chose to write in Greek, thus reflecting the bilingualism of his early training. His brother Lucius was captured and freed by Antiochus (see p. 205) and later in 174 gained the praetorship. Africanus' second daughter Cornelia was an exceptionally well-educated woman and later employed Greek tutors for the instruction of her famous sons, the Gracchi. What would a Roman of the old school, practical and pragmatic, think of a man who could say that he was busiest when he had nothing to do, namely when free from military and political duties he could devote his leisure to thought and literature.¹⁸⁵ Whatever his own religious practices, it was during his consulship and under the escort of his cousin Scipio Nasica that the Great Mother Goddess was brought from Asia Minor, and he may well have approved. His philhellenic sympathies were also shown when he was in Greece, even apart from his political relations, by his personal gifts and dedications at Delphi and Delos.

Of Scipio the politician at Rome little perhaps need be said, since clearly he made no really distinctive contribution. His military career had opened up the way to all the highest magistracies. Like all Roman nobles he sought to cultivate *amicitia* with other noble families and individuals who were willing to co-operate and to extend the range of his more humble *clientela*. If only those of his supporters who were Roman citizens were of value at election time, in a wider sense his clients included the conquered peoples of Spain and Africa, who would help to increase their patron's *auctoritas*. Further, Scipio was active in introducing new men into public life and promoting their careers: such were his friend Laelius, who started as his *praefectus classis* in Spain, Sex. Digitius whom Livy describes as a *socius navalis* in Spain, and Acilius Glabrio. Laelius and Digitius were probably not originally

Roman citizens and came to Rome under Scipio's patronage; unfortunately their home-towns are uncertain, though Digitius may have come from Paestum. Whether these men were useful in the economic field (they have been called 'commercial clients') as well as in the military is less certain, though clearly Roman nobles through their non-advertised economic activities did in this way gain a wide range of clients and their votes.

If Scipio became unpopular with many of his fellow-nobles whose *invidia* was provoked by his wide-flung patronage as well as by his personal behaviour, he certainly commanded widespread popularity with the Roman people, and this of course was one reason for the hatred, jealousy and fears of the nobility. Again and again he obtained or was continued in a command by the wishes of the People, but in the end, although he might appeal to them to support him against the intrigues of his political foes, he made no appeal for unconstitutional action by them against the Senate: he was a noble and remained essentially loyal to his class.

Scipio's impact on domestic affairs may not have been particularly significant, but his influence on foreign affairs was revolutionary and marked a decisive stage in the growth of the Roman Empire. The primary purpose of his ejection of the Carthaginians from Spain was military but he must have reflected on the parallel with the First Punic War when the Carthaginians had been driven from Sicily: Spain, no less than Sicily, would fall under Roman control. Then Africa. The Western Mediterranean was bordered by Spain, Africa and Italy, and here Rome and Carthage had shared dominion. Scipio's decision to leave Hannibal in Italy in order to knock out Carthage itself must indicate that he had envisaged the possibility of establishing Rome's sole dominance in this western area.¹⁸⁶ Though he will doubtless have followed keenly reports of Rome's somewhat half-hearted tussle with Philip in the First Macedonian War and have talked to many who fought in it (indeed it was during his first consulship that the Peace of Phoenice was made), his primary interest may well at this time have been in the West and he must have given some thought to its future development. Here we may find a very significant pointer in his settlement of veterans at Italica in the Baetis valley. In the

general context of Roman colonization it is easy to overlook its revolutionary importance: it was in fact up to this time unique. This was not a settlement in Italy a hundred or so miles from Rome but at the far end of the Mediterranean near the Pillars of Hercules. Further, when an Alexander, Seleucus, or Antiochus founded cities they generally named them after themselves. But Scipio, who did become Africanus, did not follow the example of these Hellenistic monarchs but rather symbolically called his foundation *Italica*, an outpost of the Italian community.¹⁸⁷ All this suggests that he may well have regarded Rome's first task, after the defeat of Hannibal, to be the organization of the West, and this would need some time: in fact it was not until 197 that the Spanish provinces were properly established. In line with this is the hypothesis (cf. p. 177) that he was not eager to see Rome plunged immediately into a war in the Hellenistic East and would have preferred to try to re-establish the disturbed balance of powers there in the first instance by a diplomatic approach to Philip. But however that may be, his great work was to eliminate Carthage as a major power and to lay the foundations for Rome's Empire in the West, which was the heart of the later Empire as a whole.

Later when Rome had tried to settle Greek affairs and was withdrawing all her forces from Greece, Scipio came to regard Antiochus as a menace to the delicate balance that Rome had established between the monarchies, Leagues and cities. He may have misjudged the king's intentions and he failed to secure the chance of direct dealings with him by either war or diplomacy during his second consulship. After war had come, his policy was in line with that which he had adopted towards Carthage. It was not enough that Antiochus should be defeated in Greece (nor Hannibal in Italy), but he must be humbled in Asia. Then after Magnesia, by comparatively generous terms Scipio allowed Antiochus to continue to reign in Syria, while Rome became the arbiter of the whole Hellenistic world. In the barbarian West it was necessary to undertake direct administration in Spain, but in the more civilized Hellenistic world, including Carthage, only a protectorate was required, while lesser client kings could keep an eye on the older seats of power, Masissina acting as watchdog over Carthage, and

Eumenes over Asia Minor and Syria. Thus it would seem that Scipio's imperial ideal, as already suggested (p. 208), was not very different from Virgil's 'parcere subiectis et debellare superbos'. War was aimed not primarily at destruction or territorial aggression (no Roman troops were left in Africa, Greece or Asia Minor), but at removing all threats, real or feared, to Roman security throughout the world; then, instead of making a desert and calling it peace, Rome could extend her civilizing influence, at least in those areas which could profit by it. The world was thus offered peace, but on Roman terms: a *pax Romana*.

Scipio stands in the centre of the history of Republican Rome, emerging as a strong individual personality after an age which had preferred corporate action, and championing the new forces which were to blend with the older *mos maiorum* to produce the Graeco-Roman culture of the late Republic. A noble of the nobles, born into one of Rome's greatest families, he shone forth like a star of hope in his country's darkest hour. For nearly ten years the dread Hannibal had swept all before him, but in ten more years Scipio was to bring him to his knees. Hannibal, however indomitable his courage, however magnificent his resolve, was one who came to destroy, not to build. His life's work was an attempt to overthrow Rome, but what could he have put in her place? Had Carthage anything to offer the world, which would be worthy to rise from the ashes of Rome? Scipio's was a creative spirit, one of the fertilizing forces in man's progress. A king without a kingdom, he gained for Rome supremacy throughout the length of the Mediterranean: in Spain, Africa and the East. He championed Rome's imperial and protectorate mission in the world. Vested with proconsular power, which was the mainstay of the later emperors, he was great enough to inspire some with a belief in his divine inspiration—a belief accorded to many an emperor only by servile flattery. He developed the Roman army by tactical and strategic ideas and so forged a weapon to assert Roman supremacy. By so doing he turned a citizen-militia into a semi-professional army, he overrode the older system of annual commands, and he won an army devoted as much to an individual, whom it had probably acclaimed as its *imperator*, as to the State, thus foreshadowing the rise of the

military dictators and the days of Marius, Sulla and Caesar. With the world at his feet, with the way open for his ideals of Greek culture and Roman mission, he returned home to the highest honours and was for twelve years *princeps senatus*. But Rome had no room for an uncrowned king, and opposition built up like storm clouds around his head. For many years he withstood the bitterness of party politics and personal antagonism, not again granted the full military command which his abilities deserved, but willing to serve as a subordinate to his brother. But at length he bowed his head to the storm. Unable to achieve a fitting place within the State, but unwilling—and too wise—to turn demagogue or challenge his peers, he withdrew to voluntary exile, soon to die, having drunk deep of the waters of success and power, but willing to forego the outward show in a constitution which had no place for the outstanding individual. He kindled a torch which illumined the path which Rome was to follow, and the shadow of the Empire fell athwart the Republic.

Scipio's influence, however, reached far beyond the Roman Empire. His life evoked great interest during the early Renaissance and helped the first humanists to build a bridge between the classical world and Christendom: the idealized hero, who supposedly embodied the finest elements in Roman morality and natural excellence, was seen to have served the ends of Providence. Dante saw the hand of God in Scipio's victory at Zama which made possible Rome's future, and he allowed St Peter himself to acknowledge the debt in a speech which by contrast denounced the covetousness of many of his successors in the apostolic see. Scipio was even more significant for Petrarch, who found in him 'a means of depicting a more elaborate spiritual drama'. If later generations showed more appreciation of Petrarch's Italian lyrics than of his Latin epic, the *Africa*, in which he glorified his hero Scipio, it is nevertheless this classical work which secured his coronation as poet laureate on the Capitoline in 1341, and it was the fate of his *Africa* which, after his death, so greatly concerned Boccaccio and Coluccio Salutati.

Petrarch of course saw Scipio not only through the eyes of Livy, whose moral and artistic approach to history he so greatly admired, but also through the mystic light of Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* and Macrobius' commentary, which exercised such wide influence on the Middle Ages in general. Indeed by using the dream as a method of opening his epic Petrarch from the beginning presented Scipio as more than a normal human hero. It has been said that 'Petrarch, by drawing a highly poetic portrait of his favourite hero of antiquity, Scipio Africanus the Elder, had attempted a synthesis of all those values that were dearest to him . . . in the poem's lofty glorification of Scipio Petrarch had tried to present a message that could be called the birth of humanism's dream: the world of the spirit.'¹⁸⁸

Thus while the greatest achievement of the historical Scipio was his defeat of Hannibal and Carthage and his contribution to the development of Rome's Mediterranean empire, and perhaps also the part which he played in the Hellenizing of Roman life (although this unfortunately cannot be assessed), a Scipio, which he himself would not have recognized, lived on to inspire the thoughts of Italian humanists who a millennium and a half later were rediscovering the values of the ancient world.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

L.	Livy
P.	Polybius
<i>A. Esp. Arq.</i>	<i>Archivo Español di Arqueologia</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
Badian, <i>For. Cl.</i>	E. Badian, <i>Foreign Clientelae</i> (1958)
Broughton, <i>MRR</i>	T. R. S. Broughton, <i>The Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i> (1951-52)
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
Cassola, <i>Gruppi</i>	F. Cassola, <i>I gruppi politici romani nel III secolo A.C.</i> (1962)
De Sanctis, <i>SR</i>	G. De Sanctis, <i>Storia dei Romani III</i> (1916-17).
Dittenberger, <i>Syll.</i>	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
Haywood, <i>Studies</i>	R. M. Haywood, <i>Studies on Scipio Africanus</i> (1933)
Kahrstedt, <i>GK</i>	U. Kahrstedt, <i>Geschichte der Karthager III</i> (1913)
Kienast, <i>Cato</i>	D. Kienast, <i>Cato der Zensor</i> (1954)
Kromayer-Veith, <i>AS</i>	J. Kromayer and G. Veith, <i>Antike Schlachtfelder</i> (1903-31)
Kromayer-Veith, <i>S. Atlas</i>	J. Kromayer and G. Veith, <i>Schlachten-Atlas zur Antike Kriegsgeschichte</i> (1922)
Liddell Hart, <i>GN</i>	B. H. Liddell Hart, <i>A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus</i> (1926)
<i>Riv. Fil.</i>	<i>Rivista di Filologia</i>
<i>Rom. Pol.</i>	H. H. Scullard, <i>Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C.</i> (1951)
Schlag, <i>Regnum</i>	U. Schlag, <i>Regnum in Senatu</i> (1968)
<i>Scip.</i>	H. H. Scullard, <i>Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War</i> (1930)
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Walbank, <i>Pol.</i>	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> (1957-67)

It has not seemed necessary to separate the longer Notes from the shorter by making them into Appendices, but for greater convenience brief headings have been added to the longer Notes.

CHAPTER I

SOURCES, YOUNG SCIPIO AND SPAIN

- 1 On the sources see H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (1930), ch. 1 (hereafter=*Scip.*) and F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I (1957), II (1967) (hereafter=Walbank, *Pol.*).
- 2 Walbank, *Pol.* I, 16 ff.
- 3 On Fabius Pictor see E. Badian, *Latin Historians* (1966, ed. T. A. Dorey), 2 ff. and (for further literature) 28 f.
- 4 On the legend see *Scip.* 13 ff., R. M. Haywood, *Studies on Scipio Africanus* (1933), ch. 1, and F. W. Walbank, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 1967, 54 ff.
- 5 There is probably an oblique reference to this episode in Plautus, *Amphitruo* 41 ff., where in the prologue Mercury says that he has heard other deities, namely Neptune, Virtus, Victoria, Mars and Bellona, speak in tragedies of the benefits which they have bestowed on their audience, i.e. the Roman people. O. Skutsch (*Harvard Stud.* 1967, 125 f.=*Studia Enniana* (1968), 174 f.) suggests that Mercury's reference is to the *Andromacha* of Ennius, which was based on Euripides' *Troades* where the prologue was spoken by Poseidon (Neptune). He further argues that the benefits which Neptune claimed to have given the Romans were not general (e.g. the blessings of trade) but involved a specific reference, which will have been Neptune's help at New Carthage; if the *Amphitruo* is dated with Skutsch around 190 (it may be later), the *Andromacha* will have been between 195 and 191. Thus in the productions of both Ennius and Plautus Roman audiences, which will have included veterans from the Spanish campaigns and even perhaps Scipio himself, were reminded in the 190s of Scipio's spectacular achievement in 209.
- 6 N. S. de Witt, *TAPA* 1941, 60 ff.
- 7 F. W. Walbank, *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* 1967, 55. Cic. *De Rep.* frg. 3. Horace, *Odes* IV, 8, 15 ff. Lactantius, *Inst.* I, 18: Hercules, qui ob virtutem clarissimus et quasi Africanus inter deos habetur. On the link between Hercules and Scipio see further, G. K. Galinski, *TAPA* 1966, 224 ff.
- 8 R. M. Haywood, *Studies* 25; F. W. Walbank, *op. cit.* (note 7) 64.
- 9 On the speech of Tiberius Gracchus (L. XXXVIII, 56) see R. M. Haywood, *Studies* 15 ff. (who accepts it as genuine) and Scullard, *Rom. Pol.* 282, Walbank, *op. cit.* (note 7) 55 f. and C. van Nerom, *Latomus* 1966, 426 ff.

(who reject it). Nissen thought that it was based on a rhetorical exercise; those who trace it to a political pamphlet, attribute the latter to the age of Sulla (De Sanctis, *Riv. Fil.* 1936, 189 ff.) or of Caesar (Mommsen and Ed. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* 531) or of Augustus after 23 BC (Nerom, *op. cit.*).

- 10 See G. K. Galinsky, 'Scipionic themes in Plautus' *Amphitruo*', *TAPA* 1966, 203 ff., who attempts to show that both *Amphitruo* and Jupiter (the latter assumes the mortal appearance of *Amphitruo* in the play), though not equated with Scipio, nevertheless take on Scipionic aspects in Plautus' treatment which thus reflects contemporary views of Scipio's close links with Jupiter. If such parallels could be accepted (and they are numerous enough to be impressive), we should have contemporary evidence since Plautus is believed to have died about the same time as Scipio.
- 11 *Heroization*. On this see A. Elter, *Donarem pateras* (Bonn, 1907); A. R. Anderson, *TAPA* 1928, 31 ff.; Walbank, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* 1967, 55 ff.; G. K. Galinsky, *TAPA* 1966, 227 ff. It is difficult to assess how far Ennius went in his attested desire to glorify Scipio in his *Scipio*; cf. the lines quoted above p. 22 which are preserved by Lactantius, *Inst.* I, 18; and also Seneca, *Epist.* 108, 32:

hic est situs cui nemo civis atque hostis
quivit pro factis reddere opis pretium.

and Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V, 49:

a sole exoriente supra Maeotis paludes
nemo est qui factis aequiperare queat.

Walbank comments (p. 57): 'these three couplets certainly imply some kind of attempt to heroize Scipio, as Cicero's comparison with Hercules recognizes. True, heroization may not be a Roman concept; but Ennius was not a Roman.' Even so, it might be going too far to suppose that Scipio himself tried to promote the idea, as is suggested by Galinsky (p. 229 f.): 'apotheosis is a Greek concept, which Scipio and Ennius already have implicitly accepted and now try to make palatable to the Romans—*si fas est*.' The reference to 'deum parentem' in a letter of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, though adduced as relevant by Haywood (*Studies* 22) and Galinski (p. 214), is better left out of discussion, since apart from the question of the genuineness of the letter (on which scholars seem about equally divided) the phrase refers to the dead Cornelia herself and not to Africanus, as shown by Walbank, p. 56. Caution is needed, since in the words which Ennius puts into the mouth of Scipio, the latter speaks only of the possibility of becoming immortal (*si fas . . .*), as emphasized by C. J. Classen, 'Romulus in der römischen Republik', *Philologus* 1962, 180. Further, we do not know when Ennius wrote these lines (before or after Africanus' death?), so that however they may have been interpreted by later writers, they do not

provide firm evidence for any ideas which Ennius may have wished to propagate during Africanus' lifetime, still less for Africanus' own wishes.

12 On Livy, see especially P. G. Walsh, *Livy* (1961).

13 On these three writers and on the early historians of Rome in general, see the brief but excellent treatment by E. Badian, *Latin Historians* (1966, ed. T. A. Dorey), ch. 1.

14 *Livy's view of Scipio*. See P. G. Walsh, *Livy* 93 ff., who in relation to Scipio's religious attitude believes Livy's view to be not very different from that of Polybius: 'Livy's different characterizing methods result in less outspokenness, but his brief comments (see especially XXVI, 19) closely reflect the views of Polybius' (p. 95 n. 2). But, as pointed out in the text (p. 27), Livy does allow for genuine *superstitio*, and Walsh sums up, 'Livy is concerned to portray Scipio as a man with firm beliefs in the efficacy of the traditional religion, and to discount his more exotic religious activities as superstition or deceit.' But whatever Livy may think of *superstitio*, at any rate he appears (*pace* Walsh) to allow that Scipio's belief in this *may* have been sincere. Walsh's interpretation of Livy's view of Africanus is questioned by J. E. A. Crake (*Phoenix* 1962, 212 ff., a review), who writes that though 'Livy is mainly interested in portraying the good Roman hero, Walsh does not produce any real evidence of falsification on Livy's part.'

15 There are of course a very great number of other sources which contribute in greater or lesser degree to our knowledge of Scipio. They need scarcely be listed here, but they will be mentioned where they contribute an additional point of value. Appian perhaps may be referred to here because he has emphasized the religious aspect of the legend: Scipio is frequently sacrificing and seeking omens, speaking and acting as inspired by god or guided by his Daimonion.

Plutarch's Life of Scipio is unfortunately lost. We know that one *Scipio* formed a pair of Parallel Lives with Epaminondas and that another was a separate biography. K. Ziegler (Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Plutarchos, 895 f.) argues that the parallel life was that of Africanus Maior, while K. Herbert (*AJP* 1957, 83 ff.) supports Scipio Aemilianus.

16 *Scipio's birth*. Pliny, *NH* VII, 47, records that 'it is a better omen when a mother dies in giving birth to a child, sicut Scipio Africanus prior natus primusque Caesarum a caeso matris utero dictus'. This belief that Pomponia died in child-birth is not found earlier than Pliny (it is also given by Silius Italicus XIII, 626 ff.); it is therefore suspect, and should be rejected on the authority of Polybius' statement that the mother was alive when her two sons stood for the aedileship. There is no suggestion in the sources that the father married twice or that young Publius and Lucius were only half-brothers. Further, if Lucius was the younger (see note 21), the mother cannot have died at Publius' birth. 'The story may have been invented to give Scipio a wonderful "Caesarian" birth' (Walbank, *Pol.* II, 200).

The passage in Pliny has given rise to further complications. E. V. Marmorale ('Primus Caesarum', *Synteleia*, Arangio-Ruiz (1964), 1009 ff.) takes 'primus Caesarum' as applying to Scipio. On this basis he rightly denies the truth of Pliny's remarks, pointing out that Scipio did not bear the *cognomen* Caesar (and if he had, he would not have been the first, since Sextus Julius Caesar, praetor in 208, was older) and that anyway 'Caesar' has nothing to do with 'caedere'. He explains Pliny's mistake by supposing that when the readers who collected material for him met the phrase 'primus Caesarum' it was in fact used in a political sense and misunderstood by them; and indeed Scipio might well have been so called in the sense that Julius Caesar and Augustus can be regarded as spiritual descendants of the great proconsul who refused the odious title of *rex*. But surely all this is beside the point, since the passage can be translated (with H. Rackham, Loeb edition) as 'instances are the birth of the elder Scipio Africanus and the first of the Caesars (*sc.* Julius) who got that name from the surgical operation performed on his mother'.

17 See note 21 below.

18 *Portraits of Scipio*. It is now certain that a series of fine silver coins from Spain were issued by the Barcids after 237 BC: see E. S. G. Robinson, *Essays in Roman Coinage presented to H. Mattingly* (1956), 34 ff. (Pls. 5-10). Those here relevant are (a) *obv.* head of Heracles bearded, *rev.* elephant, (b) *obv.* head of Heracles beardless, *rev.* elephant, (c) *obv.* similar head, beardless but without Hercules' club, *rev.* Punic type of standing horse and palm-tree. It is now widely accepted that (a) reflects the features of Hamilcar and (b) and (c) those of Hannibal. This last series was being minted at New Carthage in 209 when the city, with its mint, fell into Roman hands. At this point, while the Punic reverse type is retained, the *obv.* portrait changes to one which is generally recognized as Roman, and can hardly be any other than that of Scipio himself. The change could have been made by a direct order from Scipio, but is more likely due to an attempt by the mint officials to honour their new master: in any case the portraiture is not very good and the head remains anonymous, unlike the gold coins which Flamininus some ten years later had struck with his own named portrait in Greece (Pls. 4, 17).

A bronze coin of Canusium in southern Italy has a strikingly similar head, apparently a portrait (Pl. 3). If this similarity is accepted, an explanation of this 'eccentric' coin in the series of Canusium can be offered. It was here that young Scipio is said to have rallied the survivors after Cannae and it is likely that the people of Canusium later recalled this famous episode in their local history by the issue of coins bearing Scipio's portrait (possibly they might also have erected a statue to him, so that his features would be familiar to many of them).

The situation is complicated by a portrait on a Roman *denarius* (Pls. 2, 15) of c. 105 BC issued by Cn. Cornelius Blasio, with the figures of the Capito-

line deities, Jupiter, Juno and Minerva on the *rev.* and a portrait on the *obv.* which is usually identified with Scipio Africanus, one reason being the link with Jupiter. However, the portrait does not bear a strikingly obvious resemblance to that on the New Carthage coins. It is therefore possible to suppose that it represents someone else (e.g. a famous ancestor of Blasio, namely Cn. Cornelius Blasio, consul in 270). On the other hand Dr M. L. Vollenweider (*Museum Helveticum* 1958, 27 ff.) does find resemblances between it and the Canusium portrait, and points out that the latter would represent the young Scipio, the *denarius* an older Scipio. One feature, which helps to confirm the identity of the New Carthage portrait, is the long hair which Livy specifically mentions as a feature of Scipio's appearance; *caesaries promissa*' (XXVIII, 35, 6; cf. Silius Italicus VIII, 561). This would not in any case show up well on the *denarius* portrait with its helmet which obscures the head (though on one issue there does appear to be hair at the back of the neck below the helmet: cf. Vollenweider, p. 39 and Pl. iv, 4). Nor need its absence really cause difficulty if the *denarius* portrait is based on a later representation of Scipio: he may not have retained his flowing locks in later years.

Finally, a gold ring, which was found at Capua and is now in the National Museum at Naples, has a portrait signed by Herakleidas (Pl. 1). This has been identified with Africanus: see further M. L. Vollenweider, *op. cit.* The form of the ring, the nature of the portrait and the artist's signature (cf. G. M. Richter, *JRS* 1955, 44) all point to the late third or early second century as the approximate date, while the features of the head resemble those of the Canusium and New Carthage coins. The identification seems highly probable, while it is in fact known that at least one signet ring bearing Africanus' portrait existed: Valerius Maximus (III, 5, 1) says that Africanus' son Lucius wore a ring 'in quo caput Africani sculptum erat'.

Thus whatever may be thought of the Blasio *denarius*, we have three very probable portraits of Africanus. The New Carthage series, which unfortunately is not artistically the best, appears virtually certain, but a note of caution must be sounded. A. Beltran (*Cronica del III congreso arqueologico del Sudeste Español* (1948), 224 ff.) would place this series *before* the elephant series; if this chronology were accepted, the general feeling that the head is 'Roman' would have to be rejected and presumably it would represent Hannibal's predecessor, Hasdrubal, the founder of New Carthage. There may in fact be some slight numismatic grounds for the suggestion (though Beltran does not advance any), but until these are put forward and are shown to have any cogency, it is better to accept the general feeling that the head is 'Roman' and that therefore (since it is almost impossible to suggest any reasonable alternative in this context) it represents Scipio.

It may be added that the group of busts which were once thought to represent Africanus (cf. e.g. Bernoulli, *Röm. Ikonographie* I, 32) has long

- been dissociated from him (cf. W. Dennison, *Amer. Journ. Arch.* 1905, 11 ff. —they may perhaps be priests of Isis).
- 19 P. X, 3; L. XXI, 46. Cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 198 f.
- 20 The episode (L. XXII, 53) is rejected by Ed. Meyer (*Kleine Schriften* II, 429 n. 2), but Broughton (*MRR* I, 253 n. 5) regards the argument from the silence of Polybius as 'questionable'. For the coin see above note 18.
- 21 *P. Scipio's aedileship*. This was in 213 (L. XXV, 2, 6–8). Polybius says that when he was elected 'his father was then on his voyage to Spain' which was in 217. This error, which may have arisen from a loose expression in his source or by Polybius himself, is not very serious. More important is Polybius' statement that Lucius was older than Publius: this seems to be contradicted by his whole career. He was Publius' legate in Spain and Africa 207–202, praetor in 193 and consul in 190, while his aedileship was probably in 195 (on the basis of the restoration of *Inscr. Ital.* XIII, iii, 15: see Broughton, *MRR* I, 340). If the aedileship is placed in 213 the gap before the praetorship in 195 is extremely long. However, Marmorale (*Synteleia*, Arangio-Ruiz (1964), 1009 ff.) revives the defence of Polybius and argues that Lucius *was* the elder, but was overtaken by Publius because he was 'infirmum corpore' (*De Viris Ill.* 53) and an 'imbellis vir' (Val. Max. V, 5) and his career was delayed for health or other reasons. However, in view of Lucius' lengthy military service this seems hardly likely, and more probably after a period of rest after the Hannibalic War he started a public career in the 190s.
- 22 Scipio's election is more likely to have been in the Comitia Tributa (L. XXVI, 2, 5) than in the Comitia Centuriata (L. XXVI, 18).
- 23 Polybius (X, 6, 7) refers to Silanus as *συνάρχων*, and in a speech Livy (XXVIII, 28, 14) says he was 'eodem iure eodem imperio'. Thus W. F. Jashemski, *The Origins . . . of the Proconsular and the Proprætorian Imperium* (1951), 25 f., argues for a proconsular command co-ordinate with Scipio's. But Livy also says (XXVI, 19, 10) 'Silanus proprætor adiutor . . . datus est'. Further, Silanus had been praetor in 212 and proprætor in 211, but there is no evidence that he had praetorian *imperium* in 210 before his appointment to Spain: thus it seems likely that this was the basis of his authority there. On the whole therefore it appears that his *imperium* was *minus* than Scipio's proconsular *imperium*.
- 24 The sources for the wars in Spain from 218 to 206 BC are conveniently collected, with brief notes, by A. Schulten, *Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae* III, *Las Guerras de 237–154 a. de J.C.* (Barcelona, 1935).
- 25 Cissa, of which the Iberian name is shown by the plentiful coinage to have been Cese, either lay near Tarraco or is in fact the Iberian name for Tarraco.
- 26 P. III, 76; L. XXI, 60–1, 4. Scipio's second campaign (L. XXI, 61, 4–11) against Hasdrubal and the northern tribes is a doublet of the previous one.
- 27 A. Schulten discovered the Roman camp at Almenara, 8–9 km. north

of Saguntum near the temple of Venus Marina, precisely where Polybius described its position: see *Philologische Wochenschrift* 1928, No. 8, p. 222 and *Archaeologischer Anzeiger* 1927, 233 and 1933, 525. The camp lies on a hill, facing towards Saguntum, about 1 km. inland from the temple (on the latter see Garcia y Bellido, *Archivo Español de Arqueología* 1947). It measures c. 200 m. on the north, c. 300 m. on the south, and c. 500 m. on the other two sides: the walls are stone with a central filling (see Pl. 24). A large lagoon below the temple marks the site of the harbour which the Roman fleet used.

28 The importance of this incident, although it is recorded by Polybius, may be exaggerated, but is not necessarily basically untrue. Cf. *Scip.* 47 n. 1.

29 Cf. note 30.

30 Livy's accounts (e.g. XXIII, 48 sq., and XXIV, 41 sq.) of the Scipios' victories in south Spain during these years derive from an annalistic source and may safely be rejected. Yet mixed with this bad tradition there are traces of a better one (Coelius and Silenus?). Thus the references to Iliturgi may originally have referred not to the town in Andalusia but to an Iliturgi in Catalonia, at Cabanes west of Oropesa, while the Intibili of L. XXIII, 49 may have been just west of Benicarlo: cf. A. Schulten, *Hermes* 1928, 288 ff. The site of the southern Iliturgi is now shown by an inscription (in honour of its *deductor* Ti. Sempronius Gracchus) to have been near Mengibar in the province of Jaen; cf. *A. Esp. Arq.* 1960, 193 ff.

30a *Portraits of Hasdrubal Barca and Mago* (see Pls. 11-14). We have already seen (note 18) that Hannibal issued in Spain silver coins which beyond all reasonable doubt bear the portraits of himself and his father Hamilcar. Two other portraits appear on coins which are generally agreed to represent Carthaginians and probably members of the Barcid family, the viceroys in Spain. See E. S. G. Robinson, *Essays in Roman Coinage presented to Harold Mattingly* (1956), 34 ff.

One series (Robinson, no. 4) has a beardless diademed male bust and on the reverse an impressive prow of a war galley, 'its deck piled with shields and the admiral's pennant flying from the wreathed post at the bow' (Pls. 13, 14). Robinson would attribute these to the mint at New Carthage and thinks that the portrait may be that of the city's founder Hasdrubal, but the distribution of the finds might rather suggest Mago and a mint in Gades: one from Malaga, two from Seville, one from Granada, and one from Ibiza (Mago was active in the Balearic Islands), and none from the three main hoards of Barcid coinage found near Cartagena at Mazarron, Mogente and Cheste. With so few specimens and provenances known, speculation is hazardous, but Mago seems to have a good claim. (For the mint cf. G. K. Jenkins and R. B. Lewis, *Carthaginian Gold and Electrum Coins* (1963), 45.)

The other series (Robinson, no. 8) also presents puzzles (though no one would now attribute it to Jugurtha, as at one time). It has a laureate head,

with curling hair and long whiskers, with 'pronounced African features and prominent frontal bone' (Robinson—the latter feature is typical of the other Barcid portraits): the reverse has an elephant walking (see *Pls.* 11, 12). One thinks immediately of Hasdrubal Barca (incidentally a shield bearing his portrait was dedicated to Jupiter at Rome: see below note 31). The chief puzzle is that no piece is of certainly recorded Spanish provenance (one is possibly from Spain), but Robinson would incline to Gades as the mint and a date around 209. There is now fresh evidence from a recent hoard from central Sicily, which contains at least five specimens, together with Sicilian coins of the Second Punic War period (including late Syracusan Philistis, Hieronymus, democracy, and some Roman *quadrigati*). This is very satisfactory since it fixes beyond doubt the date of the 'Hasdrubals' coins, but their appearance in Sicily raises fresh problems which cannot be discussed here at length. If they were minted by Carthaginians in Sicily or Africa, whose would then be the portrait? (Could it be that of Himilco, the general who conducted the campaigning against Rome in Sicily after the revolt of Syracuse to Carthage? But it is scarcely credible that an ordinary Punic general would claim the right of portraiture and thus aspire to rival the Barcids, and incidentally borrow the elephant type which Hannibal had made his own.) It would be easier to suppose that the coins reached Sicily 'in the course of nature': Hasdrubal took his war-chest from Baecula with him to Italy, and doubtless some coins were paid out to his troops and others would have been scattered after Metaurus. Or one could speculate that he had sent some from Spain direct to Sicily to pay the Spanish or other mercenaries and supporters who had rallied to the Punic cause after 214. Such hypotheses are mentioned merely to suggest that this new Sicilian find should not lead one lightly to discard the view that the series does in fact represent Hasdrubal Barca.

Although they may well be linked with the Barcid coinage, it may be better to leave out of this discussion the coins which were once attributed to Hiempsal II (male head crowned with corn; galloping horse—see e.g. J. Mazzard, *Corpus Nummorum Numidiae Mauretaniaeque*, nos. 78–80). Their Hannibalic date is now fixed by their appearance in the hoard mentioned above as well as at Morgantina.

CHAPTER II

NEW CARTHAGE

- 31 For Scipio's arrival and preparations, see L. XXVI, 19-20, 6, which no doubt derives mainly from Polybius who is not extant here. On Marcius, see especially L. XXV, 37 ff.; XXVI, 17, 3 and 20, 4. The annalistic tradition, to which Livy (XXV, 39, 12-13) specifically refers, credited Marcius with a fictitious victory; Livy adds that according to Claudius Quadrigarius he dedicated a shield bearing the portrait of Hasdrubal Barca in the Capitoline temple (39, 17): this might be true (cf. Pliny, *NH* XXXV, 14), especially if the two Hasdrubals were confused, since, while it is not known that Marcius fought at Baecula against Hasdrubal Barca (though he may well have done so), he did fight at Ilipa against Hasdrubal, son of Gisco. While Livy says that Marcius in 211 was an *eques*, Cicero (*Balb.* 34) calls him 'primi pili centurio' and Valerius Maximus (II, 17, 5) makes him a military tribune.—The quotation is from Liddell Hart, *GN* 24 f.
- 32 This precise position is given differently by P. X, 7, 5 and L. XXVI, 20, 6. For the problem cf. *Scip.* 59 n. 1. and Walbank, *Pol.* II, 202. The important aspect is their distance from New Carthage.
- 33 Sir John Fortescue, *Six British Soldiers* (1928), 253.
- 34 On the seventh day according to P. X, 9, 7 and L. XXVI, 42, 6. Polybius does not expressly name the starting-point, but the context implies the Ebro, while Livy says 'ab Híbero'. A march of this speed is very improbable: it would mean 45 miles a day. Thus probably either the figure seven is corrupt or the starting-point from which the time was measured was south of the Ebro. Cf. *Scip.* 67 f. and Walbank, *Pol.* II, 208. The suggestion of G. V. Sumner (*Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.* 1968, 227) that the seven days refer to the movement of the fleet alone, and not of the army, must remain hypothetical: it is not what Polybius says.
- 35 *The topography of New Carthage*. For a fuller treatment see *Scip.* 289-99. Cf. also A. Beltran, *A. Esp. Arq.* 1948, 191 ff.; Walbank, *Pol.* II, 205 ff. J. M. Blasquez, *Estudios Clasicos* VII, 1962, 8, lists many bibliographical items which bear on various aspects of the history of New Carthage. Once again I would draw attention the very valuable work by M. Fernández Villamarzo Canovas, *Estudios geograficos-historicos de Cartagena desde los tiempos prehistoricos hasta la expulsion de los Arabes* (Cartagena, 1905),

with its instructive series of maps which trace the development of Cartagena from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries (see Figs. 2-5).

I need not raise again here at any length issues which seem now to be settled, e.g. Kahrstedt's attempt to deny the existence of Monte Molinete in Roman times (he dismissed it as a mere *mons testaceus*) and his consequent need to create a new hill which he found by splitting off the area of the Plaza de Toros from Monte Concepcion (see *Pl.* 27). I showed that there is sufficient solid rock halfway up Monte Molinete to indicate that it is natural and not artificial, and also that the present cutting between Monte Concepcion and the Plaza de Toros is relatively modern. Kahrstedt, in a letter to me, was kind enough to agree, and in *Philologische Wochenschrift* 1931, No. 13, 384 accepted my discussion in general as 'einem schönem Fortschritt'.

There is no need here to repeat other topographical questions, although the equation of the ancient and modern hills may be mentioned. Polybius had orientated the city wrongly, up to 90°. Dominating the south of the city is Monte Concepcion (Aesculapius); in the north-west covering the canal is Monte Molinete (arx Hasdrubalis); in the north Monte Sacro (Saturn); in the north-east San José (Aletes); in the east Castillo de Despeña Perros (Vulcan), which bore the brunt of the first Roman attack: and to the east of it, outside the city walls, Castillo de los Moros (Mercury) on which Scipio camped. See *Pls.* 26, 27.

36 On the difficulties of P. X, 11, 1, which seem to contradict P. X, 9, 7, cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 211 f.

37 J. J. Javregui ('La conquista de Cartago Nova por Scipion y las mareas del Almarj', *Cronica del IV Congreso Arqueologico del Sudeste Espanol* (1948), 404 ff.) points out that at various points on the coast of Spain an irregular ebb and flow occurs, lasting at its height some 10-15 minutes; it is greatest at full moon and happens in March to June and in September and October. It reaches some 2.05 to 1.05 metres and is found at e.g. Tarraco and Malaga. At Cartagena it reaches only 0.34-0.42 metres (cf. *The Mediterranean Pilot*, quoted on p. 55 above). Because it is relatively light at Cartagena, Javregui would reject Polybius' account and thinks that the city was taken by assault without the diversion through the lagoon. Here I would not follow him, but it is noteworthy that Polybius says that Scipio learnt of the ebb from fishermen at Tarraco; as the phenomenon was stronger there, they might well have given him a wrong impression of its strength at New Carthage.

38 Cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 193.

39 How, in the three later versions of the story, the miraculous element has grown round the early account of the wind, is shown by J. E. M'Fayden, *Hibbert Journal*, July 1923, 743 ff. Cf. also H. H. Scullard, 'The Passage of the Red Sea', *Expository Times*, Nov. 1930, 55 ff.

40 Such occurrences are not uncommon. 'The Lake of Geneva is subject to arbitrary fluctuations of level known as *Seiches* . . . these are apparently

caused by sudden changes in the wind and atmospheric pressure. The longitudinal seiches have lasted as long as $1\frac{1}{4}$ hr. and reached a height of 6 ft.' Muirhead's *Switzerland* 58.

- 41 Cf. *CAH* VI, 364 and 6. Such an ebb could have been caused by volcanic action (as the Persian troops found to their cost at Pallene: Herodotus VIII, 129), but there is no need to import this idea into the discussion since Livy's wind is sufficient explanation by itself.
- 42 Cf. U. Kahrstedt, *GK* III, 290.
- 43 Polybius X, 12, 2 says that Mago posted half of these troops on the citadel hill (i.e. Monte Molinete), half on the eastern hill (i.e. southern = Monte Concepcion). R. Lacqueur (*Hermes* 1921, 161 f.) points out that neither hill is vital for the defence of the walls and sees a contradiction with § 8 where the best troops are fighting at the isthmus. This need not be contradictory. The men may have been on the two hills because these were their normal barracks: Mago would naturally live on Monte Molinete in the palace built by Hasdrubal and would keep some of his best troops there as a body-guard; the rest might well be stationed on the most important and largest hill of the town. Mago may at first have stationed them there to protect the sea side of the town against the Roman fleet. Cf. *Scip.* 82 f.; Walbank, *Pol.* II, 213.
- 44 The two stades mentioned by Polybius (X, 12, 6) show that the battle was fought practically on the slopes of the Castillo de los Moros.
- 45 Cf. Kahrstedt, *GK* 511.
- 46 P. Coussin, *Les Armes Romaines* (1926), 222 ff.
- 47 Cf. A. Schulten, *PW s.v. pilum*, col. 1344; Walbank, *Pol.* I, 704. The view of A. Schulten (*Rhein. Mus.* 1921, 573 ff.) that the Roman *pilum* also was of Spanish origin and adopted during the Second Punic War has been rejected by Coussin (*Les Armes Romaines* 184 ff.) who concludes however that the Spanish javelin (*phalerica*), although not the prototype of the *pilum*, yet influenced its development. If so, Scipio may have had a hand in the development of the two main weapons of the later Roman army.
- 48 e.g. Valerius Maximus III, 7, 1.
- 49 Cf. Kahrstedt, *GK* 513.

Additional note on New Carthage. I am most grateful to Mr A. H. Griffiths of University College, London, for telling me about his fascinating interpretation of a poem by Antiphilus in the *Greek Anthology* (IX, 551) where for 'Kalchedon' he would read 'Karchedon' (= Carthage = Carthago Nova). The poem tells that the heron was called a traitor because one was seen standing in the water near the city in the evening: it thus revealed to the attacking enemy the depth and enabled them 'at the last moment to pass through the sea on foot'. Mr Griffiths' discussion of the poem in the context of the capture of New Carthage will be awaited with great interest.

CHAPTER III

BAECULA

- 50 For the year 208, the chief authorities are P. X, 34-40, and L. XXVII, 17-20. Livy's account is shorter than that of Polybius, which he follows in general, but on occasion he supplies more details, especially for the battle of Baecula, e.g. the introductory skirmish (18, 2 sq.), Hasdrubal's position and the arrangements of his troops (18, 6 sqq.), the posting of two Roman cohorts, details of the Roman attack and the number of the Carthaginian dead. Livy had access, through Coelius as usual, to Polybius' source, perhaps Silenus.
- 51 Cf. E. Badian, *For. Cl.* 117.
- 52 *Castulo*. The attempt to locate the site of Castulo precisely has produced varied results, some of them very wild (cf. P. Spranger, *Historia* 1958, 95 ff.). One reason is that it has often been equated with Cazlona, but when one visits the area there is no such village or settlement to be found, nor in fact do the best modern maps record any Cazlona (e.g. the 1:50,000 map published by La Direccion general del Instituto Geografico y Estadistico: Section 907). The name must be preserved in the Molino Casa de Caldon, which lies on the north side of the Guadalimar, about 7 km. south of Linares. There can be no doubt that Castulo lay about $1\frac{1}{2}$ km. N.E. of here, overlooking the river by the ruins of the Torreón de Sta Eufemia (marked on the map). It is placed here by Man. Acedo, *Castulo* (Madrid, 1902), 135, and also more recently by Spranger (*op. cit. supra*, 98 ff.) who does not know Acedo's work nor my earlier note (*Scip.* 300 f.) The sooner the word Cazlona disappears from modern discussions, the better. Excavation of the site, as Spranger emphasizes, would be most welcome (there are also Moorish remains).
- 53 *Hasdrubal's plans*. It is not necessary to accept Livy (XXVII, 18, 2) who describes a preliminary skirmish, though this is not improbable. De Sanctis (*SR* 478) believes that Hasdrubal withdrew to a strong position, resolved to await his colleagues, and not to give battle unless he had the advantage of the ground. He further sees a contradiction in Polybius and Livy; Polybius X, 37, 4-5, says Hasdrubal wished to fight, which contrasts with the account of the battle itself, where Hasdrubal had no intention of fighting and was not prepared; so we must distinguish between the facts given by Polybius and his judgment of motive. But these statements are not in contrast. Hasdrubal wanted a fight but not a fiasco. Fearing the

strength of the enemy, he took up a strong position against which he hoped Scipio would throw himself. He was forced back to the defensive for the moment, but he still wished to fight and hoped Scipio would not decline his challenge. He was unprepared for the attack, it is true, but that was because he underestimated the strength and seriousness of the Roman movement. The account of the battle itself does not imply that Hasdrubal had changed his intention of fighting, but merely that he was forced to relinquish the offensive. It is unlikely that he was waiting for the arrival of his colleagues, as De Sanctis believes. Polybius, 37, 2, definitely states that one of the grounds of Hasdrubal's anxiety was τὴν ἀντιπαράγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἀλλοτριότητα of the other generals. True, Polybius, 38, 10 says that Scipio attacked for fear of the arrival of Mago and the other Hasdrubal—but his fears may have been groundless.

- 54 *The site of the battle of Baecula.* Fig. 6 and Pls. 28, 29. See Kromayer-Veith, (*Schlachten Atlas*, Röm. Abt. 8, 1, and *Antike Schachtfelder* IV, 503 ff.) and *Scip.* 300 ff. Baecula is almost certainly the modern village of Bailen, which lies some 15 km. to the north-west of Castulo in a strong strategic position. For a description of the surrounding district see Sir Charles Oman, *History of the Peninsular War* I, 187 sq. Can there then be found in the neighbourhood of Bailen a site which corresponds to Polybius' description — 'a hill protected in the rear by a river and in front a stretch of level ground defended by a ridge, with sufficient depth for safety and width for deploying his troops' (X, 38, 8)? Livy describes it more clearly than Polybius, 'tumulum . . . plano campo in summo patentem: fluvius ab tergo; ante circaque velut ripa praeceps oram eius omnem cingebat. Suberat et altera inferior submissa fastigio planities. Eam quoque altera crepido haud facilius in adscensum ambibat.' The river mentioned is not the Baetis (for then it would have been named), but a tributary, the Rumblar.

Kromayer-Veith place Hasdrubal's camp on and south of the hill Jarosa (392 metres), which slopes down to the south-east and is some 3 km. from the Guadiel. The flat ridge, which was occupied by the light-armed troops, stretches on either side as far as the gorges of the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza in the east, and the Arroyo del Matadero in the west. The Rumblar flows in the rear, the nearest point being about 6½ km. from Jarosa. This site suits the required conditions fairly well, especially when viewed from the Rio Guadiel, but there are objections to it. (a) The required terrace is not very distinctly marked, is by no means flat and is narrow; further there is some awkward lower ground north of its southern end due to a posterior ridge which runs horseshoe-like from its northern end. (b) The plateau at the top is small, while Livy says 'tumulum . . . plano campo in summo patentem'. (c) The whole site seems too compact. (d) Finally there is the question of water-supply, a vital factor in choosing a camp site. The two Arroyos would probably be dry in the spring; Hasdrubal would have to rely on Bailen, where presumably there is a supply.

Immediately to the north-east of this site lies some ground which appears more suitable, stretching from the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza (now the south-west limit of the field) to the Arroyo de la Muela, with the highest point named Ahorcado (404 metres). Less than a kilometre to the south-west of this height is an unnamed peak (400 metres); it or the ground just to the south was perhaps the site of Hasdrubal's camp. The ground, sloping down from here to the south-east, suits the requirements well. Its contours can be seen clearly from Jarosa itself; it presents a gradually sloping hill with a very decided break of almost level ground in the centre (*Pl.* 28). This site may be more straggling than Veith's, and consequently may seem less strong, but the distance from the highest point to the Guadiel is actually only about $\frac{1}{2}$ km. more than from this stream to Jarosa, while the height is 8 metres more. But the ridge is wider, more flat, more strongly marked. The plateau also is larger (compare, e.g. the space embraced by the 360-metre contour line in both cases). Lastly, the water supply is better: the Arroyo de la Muela is a much more considerable stream than the Matadero; it passes the hill about 1 km. distant, and would afford the Carthaginians a supply. If there was water in any of the three relevant streams, it would be in the Muela. Livy emphasizes the steepness of the hill; neither of those two sites could be called precipitous, but no doubt this aspect has been exaggerated by the patriotic Roman. Superficially Veith's site, which is the lower hill, appears the steeper, but that is because it is accentuated by the sloping terrace, which the description demands should be flatter.

Veith places the Roman camp on the slopes of Jabalquinto, south-east of the Carthaginian camp, on the other side of the Guadiel. If it lay there, Scipio chose a very strong position: Jabalquinto is some 100 metres higher than Jarosa, and from its summit the hills opposite look very low. But this constitutes another argument against Veith's site, since it is clear that the Roman camp was in a weaker position than the Carthaginian, because after the battle Scipio transferred his camp there διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφύιαν (P. 40, 11). If the Carthaginian camp was near Ahorcado, the Roman position must be sought more to the north-east than Jabalquinto. From this height to Linares there stretches a range of hills, almost any part of which would offer a suitable site opposite the Carthaginians. But need for water would suggest that, unless he camped on the site of Linares (419 metres), he would probably turn to the hills just east of Tobaruela, where a small stream runs down to the Guadiel.

Neither of the two suggested sites can be proved to be the actual ground of the battle, unless the spade or air-photography should reveal traces of Hasdrubal's or Scipio's camp. Both agree, more or less, with what topographical details the authorities furnish, but the one which lies to the north-east would seem to agree better.

After examining the sites R. Thouvenot, *Essai sur la province romaine de*

Bétique (1940), 89 n. 3, expresses preference for the site which I suggested. Cf. also Walbank, *Pol.* II, 248 ff.

Unfortunately there is no better map of the whole of Spain than the 1:50,000 (the 1:25,000, which is being produced, as yet covers the site of neither Baecula nor Iliipa) and it suffers from the fact that its contour lines represent no less than 20 metres, thus masking the rise and fall of the ground between them (and there is no hatching or shading to indicate this). For a site of this nature the absence of a more detailed map is unfortunate. I stress this because it means that the excellent model of the site which Mr I. Davies made for me (*Pl.* 29) cannot of course be more accurate in detail than the only material on which it can be based.

55 Dio 57, 48 (Zon. IX, 8) says that before the battle Scipio had predicted that he would encamp in the enemy's camp. This is probably derived from Coelius and is part of the Scipionic Legend.

56 Cf. A. Piganiol, *Revue internationale des Droits d'antiquité* 1950, 339 ff.

57 *Scipio as king and emperor*. See P. X, 40; L. XXVII, 19, 3-6. Cf. A. Ay-mard, *Revue du Nord* 1954, 121 ff. = *Études d'histoire ancienne* (1967), 387 ff.; Walbank, *Pol.* II, 252; R. Combes, *Imperator, Recherches sur l'emploi et la signification du titre d'Imperator dans la Rome républicaine* (1966).

On *rex*, see further pp. 175 ff. and note 139; on *imperator* Combes, *op. cit.* 55 ff. and A. Momigliano, *Quarto contributo alla storia d. studi class.* (1949), 484 ff.

In 205 the Saguntines sent an embassy to Rome to give thanks for the preservation and restoration of their city by the elder Scipios and by Africanus (L. XXVIII, 38): see p. 167. They also erected in their city a monument, probably a statue, to P. Scipio: 'P. Scipioni cos./imp. ob restitutu/tam Saguntum/ex s.c. bello Pu/nico secundo' (*CIL* II, 3836; *ILS* 66). The surviving inscription is a later restoration of perhaps the second century AD. It now appears that there is in the museum at Saguntum an unedited fragment of an earlier inscription which reproduces the last lines (see Combes, *op. cit.* 57), belonging to the time of Cicero or Augustus; thus *ILS* 66 will belong to a later reconstruction of the monument. Whether the new fragment dates from the time when the monument was first set up must be uncertain, but it could well be later and the Saguntines have set up the original earlier in the lifetime of Africanus. The reference to P. Scipio is unfortunately ambiguous: in the absence of filiation it could refer either to Africanus or his father, since both could appear as 'cos.' in the sense of proconsul. But two points suggest Africanus: if the tradition in Livy (and presumably in Polybius also) about the use of 'imperator' is accepted, then surely Africanus must be meant. Further, although Saguntum had been snatched from Carthaginian control and restored twice, by father and son, the use of 'ex s.c.' points to Africanus: the resolution can scarcely be that of the local Senate, authorizing the erection of the monument, but rather must refer to the Roman Senate. It will therefore fit in

with, and support, the Livian tradition (XXVIII, 38) that in 205 the Romans passed a senatorial decree approving the treatment of Saguntum by the elder Scipios and by Africanus; since Africanus was consul and introduced the embassy into the Senate, the Saguntines are likely to have concentrated on him, their living and present benefactor.

Combes suggests that the rather curious use of names and titles points to a possible rewording when the inscription was renewed (unfortunately the first part of the unedited fragment is missing). But is this necessary? True, one might have expected a *nomen* in place of or in addition to the *cognomen*, but if the dedication was arranged in 205, how better could Africanus be described than by consul and *imperator*; he was not yet Africanus, but he was consul and (more significantly perhaps at this moment in the eyes of the Spaniards than of the senators) *imperator*.

If then the acclamation as *imperator* is accepted, two further points arise: its date and significance. The date implied by Livy is immediately after Baecula, but Scipio does tell the Spaniards that his soldiers 'had addressed him by this name'; while one would naturally take this to refer to the immediate past, it could of course have occurred the previous year after the spectacular capture of New Carthage, but this is mere speculation. The significance of *imperator*, as pointed out by Combes, was purely honorary and had no constitutional implications, and still less any hint of Hellenistic monarchy. More important is the early use of *imperator* as an epithet of Jupiter; Livy records (VI, 29) that Cincinnatus in 380 introduced the cult of Jupiter Imperator from Praeneste into Rome, with a dedication in the Capitoline temple. In view of Scipio's close links with the temple and Jupiter Capitolinus, his use of *imperator* as a title may well have conveyed to many of his legionaries not only his supreme military authority but also some divine support in addition.

- 58 On the barrier of the Pyrenees from the military point of view, see Sir Charles Oman, *History of the Peninsular War* I (1902), 72 ff.

CHAPTER IV

ILIPA AND THE LAST STEPS IN SPAIN

- 59 For the events of the year 207 we have unfortunately to depend on Livy (XXVIII, 1-4), as Polybius here fails. It has been supposed, e.g. by De Sanctis, that these chapters are a partial repetition of 12, 10-17, and that Livy or his source, Coelius, draws on Silenus for them and on Polybius for the later chapters, while these two authors are in reality recording the same events. This view, which involves the transference of Ilipa to 207, is closely bound up with the chronological difficulties of 207-206 and should probably be rejected (cf. *Scip.* 304 ff.). The tradition of chs. 1-4 is good.
- 60 The exact position of Orongis is not known. According to Ed. Meyer (*Kl. Schr.* II, 405), it must be south of the neighbourhood of the source of the Baetis and the Segura, somewhere near Basti (= Baza) or farther north by Huescar, south of the Sierra Segura and its silver mines. It probably is equivalent to Aurinx in the bad annalistic account of Livy XXIV, 42, 5, but has nothing to do with the Oningis of Pliny, *NH* III, 12.
- 61 For the events of this year see P. XI, 20-24; L. XXVIII, 12, 10-16. Livy's account corresponds in the main with Polybius', although he has evidently misunderstood some of the military details. He has additions to Polybius, which may be due to his use of Silenus or other Greek writers (through Coelius), e.g. his number of the Carthaginian troops (12, 14) is more reasonable than Polybius' (20, 2). For arguments against De Sanctis' view that Ilipa should be transferred to 207 (cf. above note 59), see *Scip.* 304 ff. and Walbank, *Pol.* II, 17 ff.
- 62 L. XXVIII, 12, 14; he adds that certain writers state that the infantry amounted to 70,000. P. XI, 20, 2 gives 70,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry and 32 elephants—presumably *ad maiorem Scipionis gloriam*. Livy may go back to Silenus through Coelius.
- That the main herd of Carthaginian elephants consisted of African, not Indian, beasts is, or should be, beyond doubt: it is proved conclusively, amongst other evidence, by the animals depicted on the Barcid coinage of Spain (*Pls.* 6, 8, 12). On Hannibal's elephants in general see H. H. Scullard, *Num. Chron.* 1949, 1 ff. (p. 11 n. 28 on whether the elephants at Ilipa carried towers) and, with Sir William Gowers, *Num. Chron.* 1950, 271 ff.
- 63 *Site of the battle of Ilipa*. Ilipa is certainly to be placed at Alcala del Rio (cf. *CIL* II, 141) and is to be equated with Livy's Silpia (there are many parallels for the S: e.g. Edetani and Sedetani). There is no justification for

the old view that this was really a 'second battle of Baecula'. Polybius mentions Baecula only as the place where Scipio was joined by Culchas but in no way implies that the battle was fought in this neighbourhood.

On a second visit to the district around Alcala del Rio in 1935 I located what appear to be the sites of the Roman and Carthaginian camps (see *JRS* 1936, 19 ff.). The Roman camp will have been on a hill named Pelagatos (79 metres), 10½ km. N.E. of Alcala del Rio, 2½ km. W. of the village of Villaverde del Rio, while the Carthaginian camp may be placed on a low unnamed hill 5 km. to the S.W., and thus about 6 km. from Alcala. The plain between the hills is in parts about 6 km. broad. On the south side of Pelagatos there is a lower branch or spur which sweeps round to the west and gradually decreases in height until it merges with the plain west of Pelagatos. This spur admirably fits Polybius' description of the *βουνός* over which Scipio delivered his cavalry attack. Further, the ground immediately to the west of the top of Pelagatos descends gradually in a broad flattish slope which would afford ample space for the *auxilia* to encamp. Around the hill is an earth rampart some 1300 yards in circumference, with two distinct breaks (representing the Porta Praetoria and the Porta Decumana?). It encloses some 21 acres and thus corresponds roughly in size to the camp of the elder Scipios at Almenara (cf. note 27) though the walls are earth not stone as far as can be seen. See *Pl.* 30, and for the Carthaginian camp *Pl.* 31.

There can I think be little doubt that this was the site of Scipio's camp and the plain below was the site of the battle. Whether the earth walls actually represent the walls of the Roman camp must await expert archaeological investigation, as I emphasized in 1936. No such expert could be better qualified than Professor A. Schulten, to whose labours our knowledge of Roman castrametation in Spain owes so much. In 1940 he visited the site and believes that in the case of both the Roman and Carthaginian camp my suggestion is right (*Archaeologische Anzeiger* 1940, 113 ff.). Three years later he again saw the site but this time he expressed some doubt as to whether the earth walls may not be more recent than those of Scipio's camp (*Arch. Anz.* 1943, 51). Unfortunately on neither occasion could he dig, so this point must remain open until some other archaeologist examines the structure. Whatever their decision, however, one can be reasonably certain that the site of the camps (if not any of the physical remains) has been established, together with that of the battle itself.

- 64 Livy XXVIII, 14, 6 assigns the order to the previous evening, but this involves some difficulties: cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 299.
- 65 *Cohorts*. As pointed out by Taeger (*Klio* 1931, 342), the position for marching to the right can be achieved either by each individual himself turning to the right or by separate units of infantry and cavalry (the maniples and *turmae*) wheeling as units. I had assumed individual right turns, but Walbank (*Pol.* II, 300) prefers the wheeling of units. This

however seems an unnecessarily complicated move, but, if it is correct, the *velites* will have taken up position in front of their own *turmae* and wheeled round with them. The wheel to the right was led by three maniples (*σπείραι*), one from each line of *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii* (P. XI, 23, 1). Polybius adds in parenthesis after *σπείρας* 'the Romans call this body of infantry a cohort (*κοόρτις*)'. *σπείρα* here, as elsewhere in Polybius, means a maniple and is equivalent to *σημαῖα*: see Walbank, *Pol.* II, 302. When later in the development of the Roman army the cohort replaced the maniple as the basic unit of the legion, a cohort comprised three maniples. Thus perhaps as early as Ilipa, and certainly by Polybius' own time, *cohors* could be used for a combination of three maniples. This does not mean of course that the cohort was used as early as this as a normal legionary unit in the battles of the Hannibalic War: the formation remained manipular. On the other hand M. J. V. Bell (*Historia* 1965, 404 ff.) has suggested that the cohort, as a combination of three maniples, may have been evolved as early as the campaigns of the elder Scipios as a temporary formation to meet the need of tactical concentration against the more barbarian Spaniards; it would also meet the need for strategic dispersion, i.e. would provide a unit of more suitable size than the maniple for operations against hill-forts or punitive expeditions, garrisons, escorts and the like. It will be in line with this that Polybius (XI, 33, 1) speaks of the use of four cohorts against the rebellious Spaniards in 206 (see p. 103). Livy (XXVII, 18, 10) refers to the posting of two cohorts by Scipio to cover the flanks of his position at Baecula (see p. 71); perhaps here he may more loosely mean small detachments rather than precisely units of three maniples (cf. L. XXV, 39, 1: L. Marcius in 211).

66 Cf. Sir Charles Oman, *Hist. of Peninsular War* I, 192.

67 Probably to New Carthage, not to Tarraco as Livy says; see *Scip.* 308 sq.

68 Cf. *Scip.* 304 ff.

69 See *Scip.* 308.

70 *Ilorci*. The chief of these were, according to L. XXXVIII, 19, *Iliturgi* and *Castulo*. Appian, however, gives *Ἰλúργια*, and *Κάσταξ*. A fragment of Polybius (XI, 24, 10) gives *Ἰλούργεια* (which = Appian's *Ἰλúργια*). This can hardly be equivalent to Livy's *Iliturgi*, and probably we find here an example of a not uncommon practice of Livy or Coelius, of substituting the names of known for unknown towns. Meyer (*Kl. Schr.* II, 445) rightly identifies *Ἰλούργεια* with the town *Ilorci*, which Pliny (III, 9) mentions as the place where Gnaeus Scipio had met his fate, the '*rogum Scipionis*'. It lay on the Tader (now the Segura). Unfortunately, Meyer then goes on to equate *Ilorci* with the modern town of Lorca some 70 km. west of Cartagena. Lorca however lies by the River Guadalentin and is generally supposed to have been named *Eliocroca*. The site of *Ilorci* (or *Ilurgia*) is to be found in the modern name *Lorqui*, a village which does lie on the Segura and is situated 21 km. by rail to the north of Murcia. Here was

the 'rogum Scipionis' and also the town to which Publius Scipio now turned his attention. Livy says that Scipio took action against Ilturgi because at the defeat of the Scipios its inhabitants had gone over to the Carthaginians and had put to death some refugees of the disaster. It is far more probable that those who fled from the field would take refuge in the neighbouring town of Ilorci rather than make their way deeper into the enemy's country by fleeing to Ilturgi, which lay near Mengibar which is only a few miles south of Bailen (see *A. Esp. Arq.* 1960, 193 ff.). A further objection to Ilturgi is that in a straight line it is some 200 miles from New Carthage, and we are told that Scipio reached it in five days; actually the country between is very mountainous and it is inconceivable that Scipio could have got there so quickly. If his objective was Ilorci (Lorqui), which is 87 km. from New Carthage, the march would be at the reasonable rate of just over 10 miles a day: he would march fairly slowly to let the news of his approach reach the town, which might surrender through fear without attempting any resistance. What then of Livy's Castulo and Appian's *Κάστοραξ*; unfortunately there is here no Polybius to support us. These are different towns, because elsewhere Appian (*Ib.* 16) mentions *Καστολών* (Castulo), so presumably here too Livy has given the better-known for the lesser-known.

71 Liddell Hart, GN 68.

72 Cf. E. Badian, *For. Cl.* 118.

73 The place and numbers are not given in the long Polybian fragment on the mutiny (XI, 25-30), which omits the beginning. Livy XXVIII, 24, 5, has probably misplaced Sucro.

74 P. XI, 28-30. Livy gives a version (XXVIII, 27, 2-29, 8) in which Scipio appeals more to the men's loyalty: this, however, according to Walbank, 'throws more light on Livy than on Scipio'!

75 Polybius (XI, 32, 1) and Livy (XXVIII, 33) say the Romans crossed to the north of it; but Livy (XXVIII, 31) says the Spaniards had marched into Sedetania, which is south of the river. So either the Romans crossed back to the south, or the Spaniards crossed to the north on hearing of the Roman approach, or Livy is wrong.

76 On the meaning of cohorts, see note 65.

77 Such is Livy's account (XXVIII, 35) and there is no good reason to question it.

78 P. XI, 33, 8. Contrast Livy XXVIII, 38, 1.

79 Gades received a treaty (L. XXXII, 2, 5. Cf. Badian *CP* 1954, 250 ff.) which provided for the imposition of a Roman prefect, but it was not ratified by the Senate or People. Thus the status of Gades was intermediate between the *civitas libera* and *civitas foederata*: cf. Badian, *For. Cl.* 118 f.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERLUDE

- 80 B. W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (1927), 48, 51.
- 81 The anecdote about the cavalry should probably be rejected (cf. a similar story about Agesilaus: Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 9), but opinions are divided on how far the rest of the tradition about Scipio's preparations is reliable: cf. *Scip.* 168. It is in general acceptable to De Sanctis (*SR* 645 ff.), but not to Kahrstedt (*GK* 328 f., 539). Despite contradictions within Livy's account, it seems reasonable to suppose that Scipio was formally denied the right to levy regular troops (apart from volunteers) and that whatever his precise standing *vis à vis* the *Cannenses legiones* may have been, in fact he took over command or at any rate took from them those men whom he wanted for his African expedition. In fact Appian (*Lib.* 7) may be right when he says that 'they would not allow Scipio to levy an army in Italy while Hannibal was ravaging it; he could take any volunteers that he could raise and might use the forces which were then in Sicily.' Cf. also M. Gelzer, *Kl. Schr.* III (1964), 245 ff.
- 82 L. XXIX, 6-9 and 16, 4-22. Some critics reject much of the Livian account of Locri and Pleminius, but its outline may well derive from Polybius, who had a special interest in Locri, and thus in essentials be reliable. Cf. *Scip.* 173 ff.
- 83 See B. Krysiniel-Josefowiczowa, *Eos* 1951, 137 ff. and F. Grosso, *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 1952, 119 ff., 234 ff. for the plot theory. But see A. J. Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy* II (1965), 613 ff. (quotation from p. 621).
- 84 On Scipio's forces, see *Scip.* 318 ff.

CHAPTER VI

FIRST YEARS IN AFRICA

- 85 True, as said, the examples of Agathocles and Regulus might suggest that Scipio would have chosen Cape Bon, but the evidence weighs against this and he is not likely to have been diverted from his objective by a fog. Livy's account (XXIX, 25 and 27) presents many geographical and strategic difficulties: see *Scip.* 184–88. Scipio is said to have ordered the fleet to make for the neighbourhood of the Little Syrtes, but it is unlikely that he would have wished to land so far from Carthage: possibly he spread a rumour that Emporia was the objective in order to deceive the Carthaginians about his landing. It is here assumed that the Promunturium Pulchri or P. of Apollo is Cape Farina and that the P. Mercurii, which Polybius calls the Cape of Hermes, is Cape Bon (cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 341 f.). Mela (I, 34) mentions a Castra Delia between Cape Apollo and Castra Cornelia (the latter being the site of Scipio's later camp near Utica); the suggestion that Delia is a corruption of Laelia is attractive, since Laelius was in charge of part of the fleet.
- 86 L. XXIX, 29, 1 on the defeat of the cavalry squadron is often rejected as a doublet of a similar incident which he records in chs. 34–35. But since Livy was conscious (35, 2) of the possibility of reduplication and yet gives both incidents, it is perhaps better to accept them both and to assume that they both derive from Polybius and that he in turn was not guilty of reduplication. Cf. *Scip.* 189 ff.
- 87 Tillyard, *Agathocles* (1908), 157; cf. Veith, *AS* 582 n. 2.
- 88 Dio 57, 65 sq. (Zon. IX, 12) and App., *Lib.* 14 give a different account from Livy's (XXIX, 34) and similar to each other, but not identical. They make Masinissa the inventor of the plan and keep him in the foreground, whereas Livy (Polybius) puts Scipio there. For the sources cf. *Scip.* 194 f.
- 89 On the site of Utica see G. Velle, *PW* Suppl. IX, 1869 ff. (with plan).
- 90 On Castra Cornelia see L. XXIX, 35, 13, P. XIV, 6, 7 and Caes. *B.C.* II, 24, 2; Veith, *AS* III, 583 sqq.; *Scip.* 196, n. 2.
- 91 Liddell Hart, *GN* 128.
- 92 Cf. *Scip.* 320 ff.
- 93 For the camps see P. XIV, 4, 1 (= L. XXX, 5, 3) and XIV, 1, 14. Cf. Veith, *AS* III, 586 ff.; *Scip.* 199 n. 1.
- 94 Unnamed by Polybius and Livy, but Appian (*Lib.* 24) mentions Anda but the rest of his account is suspect. The site of Anda and of Abba (Obba)

to which Syphax fled cannot be identified with any certainty, despite much speculation. Cf. *Scip.* 204 ff. and Walbank, *Pol.* II, 430 f.

- 95 On the forces cf. *Scip.* 321 ff. The passage of these (or other?) Spanish mercenaries to the Carthaginians has been detected in objects of the third century found near Oran: cf. *Bulletin du Comit. des Travaux historiques*, Feb. 1944, p. xi ff.

- 96 *The Great Plains.* On the forces, cf. *Scip.* 318 ff. The Great Plains are to be identified with the plain around Souk el Kremis. Here the Medjerda (which forms the natural route for Syphax' retreat to the west, and for the Celtiberian mercenaries' advance from the west to Carthage) is joined by four tributaries—on its right the Ou. Mellegue and Ou. Tessa, on its left the Ou. Bou Heurtma and Ou. Kasseb. The last two are short but full. Since the plain is some 25 by 20 km. in extent, it is difficult to fix the exact site of the battle. Polybius says Scipio camped on a hill and then descended to the plain. This hill, Veith (*AS* III, 590 ff.) thinks, was one of the heights on the left bank of the Ou. Kasseb, which enclose the east of the plain. The enemy's camp lay $5\frac{1}{2}$ km. to the west of this, in the plain near Ou. Bou Heurtma. Scipio then moved his camp to within 1–2 km. of the enemy, which would be just north of Souk el Kremis. Between this and the enemy's camp the battle was fought. This exact identification has been rejected by Kahrstedt (p. 551 n. 1), and De Sanctis (*SR* 531 n.), but defended by Veith (*S. Atlas*, col. 37).

As the ground made no difference to the course of the battle (for it was fought in the plain), the exact fixing of the site is comparatively unimportant. Would the Carthaginians have encamped on the plain, as Veith makes them, and not rather on some hills? Cf. further *Scip.* 210 n. 2.

- 97 *Masinissa as king.* Since this episode follows so closely upon the romantic story of Sophonisba some details may be unreliable. Badian (*For. Cl.* 295) remarks that if Scipio did hail Masinissa as *rex*, a title which would have been of the greatest value to him, this remains 'an isolated example, not (so far as we can see) repeated for generations'. The fact that according to Livy the title was later ratified by the Senate *may* suggest its reliability, that is Livy's source might be an official document. It is tempting, though hazardous, to seek support in the coinage. Most of the coinage of Masinissa and his successors lacks the ruler's name (and is difficult to ascribe to the precise ruler), but there is an excessively rare and unusually large bronze coin bearing his name (MSNSN) and behind his head a staff or sceptre which is lacking in all the other issues (see J. Mazard, *Corpus Nummorum Numidiae* (1955), 30). Could this be an early issue, commemorating his recognition as king and even portraying the gift of the *scipio eburneus*? The object is a short rod, ending in a fleur-de-lys (incidentally would not the issue remind contemporaries of the coinage with Hannibal depicted as Hercules with the club behind the head?). On the reverse is a horse behind which stands a similar but longer staff (or *hasta*?) fixed in the ground.

We have to wait until the reign of Juba I (60–46 BC) to find another Numidian ruler depicted with a sceptre (in this case without the fleur-de-lys ending; cf. Mazard, *op. cit.* 50). Thus the presence of a sceptre on what appears to have been an unusual (commemorative?) issue certainly does not weaken the probability that Livy's story of the gift is well founded.

Did the sceptre on this coinage depict the actual object which Scipio gave Masinissa? This is easier to ask than answer, since the distinction between sceptres and staffs is not always clear, while the issue is complicated by the fact that the Scipios used a *scipio* (staff) as a punning device (the *cognomen* is said to have derived from a Cornelius who led his blind father about, acting *pro baculo*: Macrobius, *Sat.* I, 6, 26). Contemporary evidence can be found on the coinage and on an inscription. Above the inscription, which records one of Scipio's gifts at Delos (see *Bull. Corr. Hellén.* 1904, 274 and Pl. xii, and below note 163), a crown and a staff are depicted. The latter which is clearly a punning *scipio* is a knotty staff; it appears to end in a kind of knob, but unfortunately the stone seems to have been trimmed at the top and the end of the *scipio* is missing, though it hardly looks like ending in a fleur-de-lys. That sceptres ending in a fleur-de-lys were contemporary with the Masinissa coin is shown by Roman *quadrigati* which show Jupiter in a *quadriga*, holding just such a sceptre (see, e.g. E. A. Sydenham, *Coinage of the Roman Republic*, Pl. 13 n. 64b) and on coins of Capua at the time of its revolt from Rome in 216–211 BC (see J. Heurgon, *Capoue préromaine* (1942), Pl. I, n. 11). On the other hand a knotted staff with a plain ending is found on the Mars-eagle gold coinage of Rome and on *denarii* (see Sydenham, *op. cit.*, Pl. 16, nos. 239, 240; the gold coinage is now generally dated earlier than Sydenham placed it, namely to c. 209). The object given by Scipio to Masinissa is more likely to have been a symbol of royalty than a symbol of his own name (though the two ideas would no doubt be present in most minds); hence it may well be depicted on the Masinissa coin, and so it seems legitimate to seek in the latter some support for Livy's statement.

On Scipio's name see also O. Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (1968), 148 ff., who also discusses the passages in Latin literature, deriving from Ennius, where the Scipios are described as '*fulmina belli*', thunderbolts of war, recalling no doubt to the reader that Barca, the name of the family of their great opponents, also meant thunderbolt.

- 98 As does De Sanctis (*SR* 532 n.). It cannot be determined whether Livy's source is Polybius or annalistic.
- 99 Traditionally Scipio is said to have acknowledged this aim: L. XXX, 44, 3: cf. L. XXIX, 1, 3.
- 100 On the peace negotiations see L. XXX, 16. Cf. P. XV, 1, 6–8; 7, 8; 8, 7. Livy says that some authors give the indemnity as 5000 talents (cf. P. XV, 8, 7), others as 5000 pounds of silver. Cf. Plutarch, *Reg. et Imp. Apoth. Sc. Maior* 5. Appian, *Lib.* 32 adds that the Carthaginians should, after this,

hire no mercenaries, that they should restrict themselves within the so-called 'Phoenician trenches' and that Masinissa should have the kingdom of the Massyles and as much of Syphax' dominions as he could take. He also gives thirty ships as the maximum to be retained by Carthage; as Polybius vaguely says that all warships were to be surrendered, we do not know whether this figure is preferable to Livy's twenty. For a papyrus fragment dealing with these negotiations, see below note 103.

101 See P. XV, 4, 8; 8, 9; 1, 3.

102 Cf. Gsell, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord* II, 143. See also Pais, *Storia di Roma durante le guerre puniche* II, 470, Tav. XCVIII, for the dangerous rocks of Aegimurus.

103 A fragment of papyrus, which deals briefly with the negotiations of 203-202, was published in 1937: *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library* III, pp. 114 ff., no. 491 (ed. C. Roberts). The author is unknown, but since the papyrus dates to the second century BC he must be a near contemporary of the events. The treatment, which is almost that of an epitome, excludes the idea that it can be a lost passage of Polybius, dealing with events after Zama (*pace* Roberts *op. cit.*, and A. Klotz, *Würtburger Jahrbücher* 1946, 153 f.); further, no breaking of a truce, such as the fragment mentions, is recorded after Zama: cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 442. It refers to oaths and the handing over of (Carthaginian?) prisoners, the return of Roman and Carthaginian envoys to Σκιπίωνος πόλις (Castra Cornelia) and to Carthage, and to the Carthaginian rejection of peace terms and breaking off of the truce. There is no reference to the Carthaginian attack on the Roman supplies: unless this is due merely to the brevity of the narrative, the author will have been more pro-Carthaginian than other surviving writers. The suggestion (see W. Hoffmann, *Hermes* 1941, 270 ff.; M. Treu, *Aegyptus* 1953, 46 ff.) that the absence of reference to the attack implies that the story of the attack should be dismissed as Roman propaganda and that therefore the fragment is to be preferred to Polybius, is not likely to convince many: cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 442. M. Gelzer (*Vom römischen Staat* I, 69 ff.) emphasizes the vividness of Polybius' account of these negotiations, which seems to go back to an eyewitness (e.g. Laelius).

CHAPTER VII

THE LAST CAMPAIGN

104 *Zama and the site of the battle.* Where was the Zama at which Hannibal camped and which, on the authority of Nepos alone, has been considered to have been the site of, and has given its name to, the final battle of the Hannibalic War? There seems to have been more than one place named Zama, but the identification of these is uncertain and has provoked immense discussion. One site can now be dismissed, namely Sidi Abd el Djedidi or 'eastern Zama' which lies some 50 km. north-west of Kairouan. An inscription found there (*CIL* VIII, 12018) refers to a magistrate of Colonia Zamensis; it now appears (cf. *Rev. Tunisienne* 1941, 242 f.) that the man will not have been a local citizen but have come from Zama. Thus El Djedidi should probably disappear as a potential Zama, but, even if it did not, it should still disappear from discussions of the site of Hannibal's camp since it is now generally agreed that it lies much too far to the east to fit the ancient evidence (cf. *Scip.* 312 f.).

Literary and epigraphic evidence refers to a Zama Regia and a Zama Major (Ptolemy) and therefore implies the existence of a Zama Minor (an inscription tantalizingly gives 'Zama m(.)o(r)': some would argue that this must come from Zama Major, as local patriotism would preclude the inclusion of Minor): and there is also the Colonia Zamensis already mentioned.

Zama Regia is recorded by the Tabula Peutingeriana as lying between Assures and Usappa at a distance of 10 miles from Assures. It was obviously a centre of the Numidian kingdom and Sallust later mentions (*Jug.* 56, 1) a Zama: during the Jugurthine war Metellus moved against this royal citadel which was not far from Sicca (El Kef), was in a plain and was fortified artificially rather than by nature (109 BC). In 41 it was captured and destroyed, though later refounded. It is probably to be located at Seba Biar, whose position suits Sallust's description, while the naturally strong position of Jama, where the above-mentioned inscription was found, does not suit. Another possibility for Zama Regia was Ksar Toual Zouameul, 4½ miles east of Seba Biar (see Ch. Saumagne, *Revue archéologique* 1942-1943, 178), but the area has been explored by L. Déroche (*Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 1948, 55 ff.) who shows that Ksar Toual is to be identified with Vicus Maracitanus, a smaller settlement dependent on Zama but not Zama itself. Thus all points to the Numidian Zama Regia

having been at Seba Biar, but since this site lacks monuments of the imperial age the town may have been refounded after its destruction in 41 on another site, though the old name Zama Regia might continue to have been used of the remains of the old site at Seba Biar. In that case Jama will represent the Zama of the Roman empire, the Colonia Aelia Hadriana Augusta Zama Regia, and the inscription from it, which was mentioned above, will presumably have to be read as *Maior*. That will leave Zama Minor without a home. Most recently M. Leglay (Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Zama, 1967) argues that the restoration must be *Minor*: thus Zama Minor = Jama, and Zama Regia = imperial Zama = an uncertain site in the neighbourhood.

As long as the general neighbourhood of Zama can be established (and the Tabula Peutingeriana is enough evidence for that), the question is almost irrelevant to the problems of the battle-site, since it is clear that Zama was only Hannibal's camp before his final advance westwards to the battle-field and we have no evidence for the length of that march (to assume that it was very short and that the battle was therefore near Zama is to fall into the same kind of error which gave rise to the untenable view that the battle of Ilipa was fought near Baecula: see note 63).

Polybius (XV, 5, 14) says that after Masinissa had joined him Scipio broke camp and advanced to a town called Margaron and camped there. Hannibal moved up to within 30 stades and camped; the battle-field lay between them. Livy (XXX, 29, 9) follows Polybius almost verbatim, except that he calls the place Naraggara not Margaron. Margaron itself is unknown, but Naraggara is the modern village of Sidi Youssef (the field of ruins, Henchir Ksar Jaber, probably is the exact site, rather than Ksiba Mraou which lies 9 km. to the north: cf. Veith, *AS* III, 602). The discrepancy between Livy and Polybius can be explained in various ways: (a) Livy substituted the better-known Naraggara for the lesser-known Margaron, (b) Polybius wrote Naraggara and his text has been corrupted into Margaron, (c) Livy's text is corrupt, or (d) Margaron and Naraggara are two forms of the same place-name. It is scarcely necessary here to rehearse some of the many arguments for or against these possibilities. Suffice it to say that Polybius' latest commentator inclines to the view that Naraggara stood in the original text of Polybius (Walbank, *Pol.* II, 447). But there is a major difficulty in accepting Sidi Youssef as the site of the battle: the terrain is far too hilly. Veith suggested two sites further south, but they are rather far: Djebel Labjel 14 km. away or Djebel Harraba 22 km. away (*op. cit.* 607 ff.). One quite reasonable solution is to suppose that there was more than one Naraggara (the example of Zama shows that homonyms might coexist); in that case we should not be tied so closely to the unsuitable terrain immediately around Sidi Youssef. Another possibility is that, on the assumption that Polybius wrote Margaron, the reference in Livy to Naraggara is due to a misunderstanding: Naraggara

could have been mentioned in a slightly different context (e.g. as the place where Scipio met Masinissa before he turned eastwards to the battle-field): thus Livy in placing the battle there would have made the same sort of mistake as Nepos made in placing it *apud Zamam*. We are therefore thrown back on only a general neighbourhood in which to find a site which would suit the physical evidence which Polybius gives. This is that Scipio camped on a good site within a stone's throw of water, while Hannibal camped on a hill 30 stades away which was convenient apart from lack of water; presumably Scipio's camp was also on a hill.

On his travels Veith passed a site, but failed to appreciate its suitability; later (following Pareti's localization near El Kef), he realized its aptness and accepted it as the site of the battle (AS III, 637; IV, 632). It lies some 13 km. west of El Kef and only 27 km. east of Sidi Youssef. It might be argued against it that if the battle was here, it should have been called the battle of Sicca (El Kef), but against that is the fact that this town was outside the strategic picture, whereas Naraggara (Sidi Youssef) came in as Scipio's point of departure. Here are suitable topographical conditions: a plain, the Draa el Metnan, at each end of which is a hill suitable for a camp, the K^{dt} Bou Grine in the east and the K^{dt} el Behaima in the west (see Pl. 12). Just to the north-east of K^{dt} el Behaima at Hir el Chemman are ancient ruins in which Veith sees the site of Margaron (for those who dismiss Margaron, the ruins could represent a second Naraggara if that hypothesis is felt to be necessary). Further it may well be the spot where the road from Zama (Seba Biar) joined the Souk-Ahras to El Kef road. In general this area is of considerable strategic importance: in early days of Algerian and Tunisian independence, it was under the walls of El Kef that the fate of invading armies was often decided, while in still more recent times the spot is remembered as the site of a tragic bombing incident (Pl. 33; Fig. 12).

It is to be hoped that some day the spade or air-photography may probe the two hill-tops for traces of ancient camps or that new inscriptions may throw further light on the difficulties, but in the meantime this seems by far the most likely site of the battle. (Perhaps I may be allowed to add that my own visit there in 1935 had unfortunately to be too hurried to allow me to walk over the two hills, but autopsy certainly confirmed the general impression of suitability.)

I append a few highly speculative enquiries in a field of which I know nothing, in case any philologists might consider whether place-names could throw any light on the problems. My interest was aroused when by means of an Arab interpreter I questioned a herdsman who was tending his sheep on the Draa el Metnan. After he had established his reliability as a local 'authority' by correctly identifying some hills, I casually mentioned the word Margaron and was astonished to see him point in the direction of K^{dt} Bou Grine. Now while it would be fantastic to suppose a local

name has survived 2000 years and escaped the notice of modern cartographers, I felt justified in seeking further information. Professor R. A. Nicholson kindly suggested that the shepherd thought of the Arabic word *ma'bar*^{un} (the rough breathing is a strong guttural), meaning a 'cross-place' though more often a ferry than a cross-road (for the same root cf. the 'ford' of Jabbok in Gen. xxxii, 23 and the 'pass' of Michmash in I Sam. xiii, 23). However presumably a place-name here would go back beyond the Punic of the Numidian court to the native 'Berber' or Libyan, and I am grateful to Professor F. Beguinot for the information that Margaron *might* be compared with actual Berber words: -mar = to be open, extended; emmer = to pass through a place; -iger = a field or plain. Clearly we are in the realm of extreme speculation, but not I hope of complete fantasy. It does look as if Margaron in its Greek form might not be completely out of context in an ancient Berber setting.

Finally some local place-names are interesting. The present form of Bou Grine is apparently Arabic (a diminutive of 'garn', meaning 'horn'), though names compounded of Arabic and Berber words are found. Then just south-east of this hill is El Gargara, around which are many Roman ruins, and just to the west of the latter is Sidi Djouama. However, ancient Margarons and Zamas must not be suspected everywhere, and possibly my herdsman may have thought we were asking for El Gargara. Anyway an instructed philological opinion would be interesting. (On the aid given by place-names to geography and local history, cf. F. Beguinot, 'Per gli studi di toponomastica libico-berbera', Vol. III of the *Atti* of the XI Congresso geografico Italiano (Naples 1930).

105 The story is often dismissed because of its similarity to acts of Xerxes (Herodotus VII, 146, 7) and of Laevinus (Dion. Hal. XIX, 11), but, as Walbank (*Pol.* II, 458) says, Scipio may even have known and utilized these earlier stories.

106 Cf. *Scip.* 233 f.

107 Hannibal made his offer through interpreters although both generals knew Greek, and Hannibal also probably spoke Latin. This need not however tell against the historicity of the episode: as Walbank says (*Pol.* II, 45) 'a Roman noble would naturally use Latin, and Hannibal could hardly follow suit without losing face . . . and one is always at some disadvantage in a foreign tongue'. Though this historic meeting is not above suspicion, Polybius' reliability should hardly be questioned merely on the ground that it is too dramatic to be true. The drama was worked up by later writers: thus Appian records a single combat between the two generals. For a discussion of Appian's account of the campaign, see *Scip.* 235 ff. On Polybius' version of the speeches of Hannibal and Scipio see Walbank, *Speeches in Greek Historians* (The Third J. L. Myres' Memorial Lecture) 12 f.

108 Balearians and Moors were generally light-armed troops, but Polybius

(XV, 12, 7; 13, 1) implies that the first line was heavy-armed. Probably therefore Hannibal had been training them in the use of heavy weapons; alternatively, but perhaps less probably, the line may have comprised a mixture of Ligurians and Celts as heavier-armed and slingers and javelin-men (cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 457). These are hardly to be identified with the real light-armed troops whom Polybius omits to mention, perhaps because he is more interested in the elephants. Livy's view (XXX, 26, 3) that 4000 Macedonian mercenaries served in the second line is probably an annalistic fiction which should be dismissed.

- 109 P. XV, 9 sqq. Four main difficulties are raised by this account, but none of them is really serious. For a full discussion see *Scip.* 239 ff. and now Walbank *Pol.* II, 454 f. The fourth point is whether Masinissa's 6000 infantry were posted on the right wing with the Numidian cavalry or on the flanks of the legionaries, or fought with the *velites*. I was inclined to this last suggestion, but Walbank has emphasized how successful the collaboration of horse and foot units can be (cf. Mantinea in 362, Gaugamela and Waterloo).
- 110 The older literature on the battle is cited by Kromayer-Veith, *AS* III, 576 f., IV, 626. Detailed discussions are to be found in Kromayer-Veith, *AS* III (1912), 599 ff. and IV (1931), 626 ff. and G. De Sanctis, *SR* III, ii, 588 ff. Some of their views are discussed in *Scip.*, and the views which I expressed there have been examined by P. Fraccaro, *Athenaeum* 1931, 426 ff. (reprinted in *Opuscula* II (1951), 327 ff.). See also Walbank, *Pol.* II.
- 111 Fraccaro (*Opuscula* 331) however thinks that Hannibal would not have given up all hope of gaining success with his cavalry.
- 112 Cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 460.
- 113 Cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 460.
- 114 For the latter view cf. Fraccaro, *Athenaeum* 1931, 436, Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* II (1911), 212 f.
- 115 P. XV, 14, 8-9. Appian (*Lib.* 48) gives 25,000 killed and 8500 prisoners for the Carthaginians; the Roman loss was 2500 and that of Masinissa still more. These, or the Roman losses at least, are perhaps more reasonable than Polybius' figures.
- 116 Polybius fails at this point, but Livy (XXX, 36) no doubt follows him closely.
- 117 Livy's account (XXX, 36, 8), although exaggerating Vermina's casualties, etc., probably contains a nucleus of truth.
- 118 Book III, ch. 6.
- 119 On the peace terms see P. XV, 18; L. XXX, 37; App., *Lib.* 54; Dio 57, 82. Livy differs on some details from Polybius, and Appian supplies clauses not given by either, but which are reasonable and supported by other references.

The view of E. Täubler (*Imperium Romanum* I, 190 ff.) that Polybius and Livy give the preliminary, and Appian the final terms has been

rejected by De Sanctis, who believes that all three writers give the final terms but for literary reasons have put them in the form advanced by Scipio. But as Walbank (*Pol.* II, 466) suggests, 'it seems safer to assume that all the sources give what they claim to give, the preliminary terms'. However the matter is of less importance since Livy (XXX, 43, 10) says that the terms he gives were accepted by the Roman Senate, i.e. there is no evidence for any change between the preliminary and final forms.

F. Gschnitzer, *Wiener Studien* 1966, 276 ff., who agrees that Polybius XV, 18 follows closely the treaty sanctioned by the Senate and People, contrasts the treaty with that proposed in 203. Unlike the earlier proposals it lists the rights which are to remain to Carthage, a formulation which, from comparison with other Greek and Roman documents, Gschnitzer argues was applied to enemies who were reduced to dependence on their conqueror.

120 On the hostages, see A. Aymard, *Pallas* 1953, 44 ff.

121 This autonomy clause should not be questioned: cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 467 f.

122 The reference to these Trenches cannot be dismissed on the supposition that they were first dug by Scipio Aemilianus in 146, since they are mentioned by Eumachus of Naples, a contemporary of Hannibal (Jacoby, *FGrH* 178 F2). They probably marked the official frontier of the Carthaginian empire at this time, which stretched from the north coast near the frontier of Algeria and Tunisia to the east coast of Tunisia, perhaps north of Syrtis Minor, and embraced the Great Plains and the district around Thugga.

123 Livy, in the parallel passage (XXX, 37, 4) inaccurately suggests that it did forbid defensive wars by his use of 'bellum gerere' where Polybius spoke of πόλεμον ἐπιφέρειν. In a later passage (XLII, 23) Livy was probably following a different (non-Polybian) source.

124 Cf. De Sanctis, *SR* III, ii, 616 ff.; *Scip.* 256 f.; E. Badian, *For. Cl.* 125 f. (who is inclined to reject the 'ally' clause); Walbank, *Pol.* II, 469 (who is inclined to accept it).

125 P. XV, 19; L. XXX, 37, 7-10. After this Polybius fails, and Livy (XXX, 38, 6-45) forsakes him, generally to follow a good annalistic tradition, with glosses from other sources including Polybius himself (XXX, 45, 5; which is confirmed by P. XVI, 23).

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICS AND PEACE

- 126 On the nature of political life in the Roman Republic in general see R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (1939), L. R. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (1949), H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C.* (1951) and briefly *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 1955, 15 ff., E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 B.C.* (1958), F. Cassola, *I gruppi politici romani del iii secolo A.C.* (1962), A. Lippold, *Consules, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des römischen Konsulates von 264 bis 261 v. Chr.* (1963). For a recent criticism of the general supposition of 'group-politics', see C. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa* (Wiesbaden, 1966), esp. 174 ff. See also A. E. Astin, *Politics and Policies in the Roman Republic* (Belfast, 1968), a lecture.
- 127 I have attempted to do this in *Rom. Pol.*
- 128 On the question of minimum age-limits for office see A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla* (1958), 31 ff.
- 129 For Fabius see *Rom. Pol.* 56 ff. For a different view (Fabius more genuinely 'religious'), see I. Muller-Seidel, *Rhein. Museum* 1953, 241 ff. Cf. also F. Cassola, *I gruppi*, esp. 336 ff. (but on this see E. S. Staveley, *JRS* 1963, 186).
- 130 Despite Polybius' statement (XI, 33, 7), Scipio did not have a formal triumph: cf. A. Degraffi *Inscriptiones Italiae* XIII. i. p. 551.
- 131 L. XXVIII, 38. See further note 57.
- 132 Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* II, 353 n. 2.
- 132a If Mommsen was right in his belief (*Rom. Staatsrecht* I³, 628 f.) that at this period the sanction of *abrogatio* could legally be applied against promagistrates (though not against magistrates), as suggested by the case of the proconsul Marcellus in 209 (cf. L. XXVII, 20, 11), then Scipio who had proconsular *imperium* in 204 could have been threatened by Fabius as Livy records (XXIX, 19, 6): 'quod de provincia decesserat iniussu senatus revocari [a phrase suspiciously reminiscent of later laws *de maiestate*!] agique cum tribunis plebis ut de imperio eius abrogando ferrent ad populum.' But this in effect would involve condemning Scipio unheard, as Metellus emphasized (XXIX, 30, 3: *indicta causa*). A. Bauman (*Rhein. Museum* 1968, 39 ff.) argues that because a bill of abrogation would thus be unfair, the Senate instead decided upon a commission of enquiry.
- 133 This, despite Livy's view, is established beyond doubt by P. XV, 1, 3.
- 134 *The Servilii*. Attempts have been made to deny any Servilian opposition to Scipio. Thus R. M. Haywood (*Studies* 56 f.) argues that 'Caepio was not

trying to oust Scipio from his command in Africa by an indirect method. It was only natural for him to feel that his province was not Bruttium but wherever Hannibal was, and that his duty was to pursue the enemy whom the Senate had sent him to oppose', while A. Aymard (*Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1944, esp. 239 n. 7, and 240 n. 1) believes that the desire of a consul to command the only existing army of any importance was a legitimate ambition. For a rejection of such views, which seem to fall little short of special pleading, see *Rom. Pol.* 277 f.: any attempt to supersede a commander who was appointed by the People for the duration of the war must surely involve the presumption of political hostility on the part of the intriguer, unless (and this is not suggested by the proponents of the theory) Servilius was trying to uphold consular and senatorial constitutional interests against the vote of the People.

However the view that the Servilii in part or whole remained friendly to Scipio has recently been revived by two writers. A. Lippold, *Consules. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des römischen Konsulates von 264 bis 201 v. Chr.* (1963), 210 ff. and F. Cassola, *I gruppi politici romani del iii secolo A.C.* (1962), 412 ff. When Lippold, like Haywood, says that Caepio may have felt his province was not limited to Bruttium but regarded his command to have been to fight Hannibal, one can only say that Livy records Bruttium as the province; presumably Caepio would have needed senatorial instructions if he were constitutionally to go beyond it, and so far from giving these, the Senate tried to restrain him. Lippold also makes the point (p. 214) that if the Servilii were hostile to Scipio, Scipio enjoyed sufficient popular support to enable his friends to have prevented the election of another Servilius, M. Geminus, as consul for 202. But since the elections were conducted by Galba, who was friendly to the Servilii and had indeed named M. Geminus as his Master of Horse, it might have been difficult to prevent the latter's election (Scipio's friends in Rome did not prevent the election of Claudius Nero as the other consul, and it can scarcely be doubted that he was politically hostile to Scipio; if one cannot use the argument that Claudius' election presupposes no opposition from Scipio's friends, can such an argument legitimately be applied to Caepio?).

Cassola (*op. cit.* 412 ff.) on the other hand argues that the Servilii were in fact not united, Caepio and the Gemini following different lines. Caepio was an enemy of Scipio, as shown by his desire to supersede him, while the Gemini were friendly; it is even possible that C. Geminus may have named Galba dictator in order to keep Caepio in Italy, that is to protect Scipio's interests (a view which involves a certain conflation of Livy's alternative accounts of the purpose of the dictatorship). Of the consuls of 202 Cassola regards M. Geminus as the friend of Scipio, and Claudius as the enemy: M. Geminus merely strengthened the fleet, which was necessary, while his brother Gaius, as dictator, named P. Aelius Paetus, a friend of Scipio, as his Magister Equitum. But it may be that Paetus followed

the Servilii in their desertion of the Scipios, while M. Geminus' action in desiring Africa does not appear less hostile than that of Claudius in Livy's account, 'Africam ambo cupientes'; Metellus had to try to protect Scipio's interests and there is no hint in Livy that these were less threatened by Geminus than by Claudius.

- 135 It is curious that Africanus, whatever the cause may have been, never became either an augur or pontiff, although he apparently took his duties as a Salian priest seriously (cf. p. 205).
- 136 Appian, *Lib.* 57-65; Diodorus XXVII, 13-18. This tradition may derive from Polybius, see *Rom. Pol.* 279 f. It is rejected by some, e.g. W. Hoffmann, *Historia* 1960, 309 ff., esp. 315 f., but there may have been discussion even if some of the arguments alleged to have been used are rejected, e.g. the notorious 'counterweight of fear' argument, namely that the preservation of Carthage was required in order to provide a continuing stimulus to Rome's military efficiency and internal unity. Hoffmann goes too far when he even denies that this argument was used by Scipio Nasica in 150 (cf. F. W. Walbank, *JRS* 1965, 6; A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (1967), 276 ff.). But even if it was not used by Scipio Africanus or his friends in 202 (cf. Hoffmann, 319 ff. and Walbank, *JRS* 1965, 6; but on the other hand see the defence by F. Cassola, *Gruppi* 396), this does not invalidate the probability of discussions about the fate of Carthage in 202. Cassola (*op. cit.* 419) goes so far as to argue that the destruction of the enemy was advocated by a group comprising Caepio, M. Valerius Laevinus, Ti. Claudius Nero, Cn. and P. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Furius Purpureo.
- 137 *CAH* VIII, 368
- 138 L. XXXVIII, 56. See further *Rom. Pol.* 282 and above note 9. Similarly the accusation that Scipio exercised a *regnum in senatu* which is found in the unreliable account by Livy (XXXVIII, 56, 6 = Valerius Antias) is not to be taken seriously. Cf. U. Schlag, *Regnum in Senatu* (1968), 162 ff., who concludes (p. 169) 'der Vorwurf, ein regnum in senatu geführt zu haben, der historischen Person des Scipio Africanus nicht gerecht wird.' Whatever post-Scipionic ideas Livy may have had in mind (a *regnum* of Caesar?), it is well to recall that once in the eyes of an envoy of a Hellenistic king every senator had appeared to be a king: Cineas told Pyrrhus that the Senate was an assembly of kings, while after Pydna Prusias, king of Bithynia, could greet the Senate as an assembly of gods (P. XXX, 19).
- 139 *Revue du Nord* 1954, 121 ff. (= *Études d'histoire ancienne* (1967), 387 ff.). Cf. Walbank, *Pol.* II, 252.
- 140 Cf. A. H. McDonald, *JRS* 1938, 154 ff.
- 141 So T. A. Dorey, (*AJP* 1959, 293), who emphasizes the strong desire for military glory which is shown by the bitter intrigues for the honour of a triumph in this period.
- 142 Cf. further *Rom. Pol.* 87 f., where I put forward two further shreds of

evidence, namely the activities of Q. Baebius and of Licinius Crassus, which seem to point in the same direction; they are of course only straws in the wind. One is rejected by Cassola (*Gruppi* 396 f. and *Labeo* 1960, 122 f.) who argues that the tribune Baebius, who spoke against the war, was not in fact a friend of Scipio. E. Badian (*Foreign Clientelae* 65 n. 6) thinks that from the absence of Scipio's name it does not follow that he opposed the war. S. I. Oost (*Roman Policy in Epirus* (1954), 117) thinks that Scipio was responsible for the policy which led up to the war: this is unlikely in view of his absence from Rome during these years. This war policy, rather, was supported by Eastern experts like Galba and Tuditanus and in an 'Eastern lobby' (cf. Badian, *op. cit.* 66, and on a Greek lobby W. G. Forrest, *JRS* 1956, 170, while T. A. Dorey *AJP* 1959, 291 f. discusses the interests of a 'Claudian faction' in Greek affairs).

CHAPTER IX

SCIPIO, FLAMININUS AND CATO

- 143 L. XXX, 45, 2-3 (triumph), XXXI, 49 (Games), XXXI, 4, 6 (grain), XXXI, 4, 1-3 and 49, 5 (land), cf. Chapter XI note 173. It has been suggested that the increase in the number of praetors from four to six and a regulation of the *cursus honorum* may have been due to Sex. Aelius Paetus (*cos.* 198) and that he may have enjoyed the co-operation of the censors of 199 (whose term of office ran on into 198), namely his brother P. Aelius and Africanus: see E. Schlag, *Regnum in Senatu* (1968), 144 ff.
- 144 T. A. Dorey (*Klio* 1961, 192 ff.) would go further and suggests that Africanus had had an electoral arrangement with Aelius, who with his brother Sextus (*cos.* 198) had considerable political influence as a result of their legal activities, in particular the publication of forms of procedure by Sextus would have made him popular. Dorey also, perhaps more speculatively, suggests that, by backing P. Aelius for the censorship of 199 and Sextus for 194, Africanus could not support the claims of his friend Q. Metellus who will have cooled off as a result—it is true that in 193 Metellus criticized L. Cornelius Merula's claim to a triumph, but whether this and the backing of Aelius were enough to cause a breach between Africanus and Metellus can hardly be determined.
- 145 L. XXXII, 7, 1-3 (censorship), XXXIV, 44, 4 (*princeps senatus*).
- 146 Cf. G. De Sanctis, *SR* IV, i, 21 ff.; J. Carcopino, *Points de vue sur l'impérialisme romain* 10, 67 ff. Contrast, e.g. M. Holleaux, *CAH* VIII, 238.
- 147 On these campaigns see now N. G. L. Hammond, *JRS* 1966, 39 ff.
- 148 On the connection between Flamininus and the Fabian *gens* see F. Münzer, *RA* 114 ff.; W. Schur, *Scipio Africanus* 21, 71 ff. For arguments against: F. Cassola, *Labeo* 1960, 105 ff. (cf. J. P. Balsdon, *Phoenix* 1967, 181 n. 19). On the common philhellenism of the two men see T. Frank, *CAH* VIII, 368 ff., R. M. Haywood, *Studies* 61 ff., 65 ff., 72 ff.
- 149 See Plutarch, *Flam.* 1, 4; 2, 1, who says that Flamininus had been a commissioner for colonial settlement at Narnia and Cosa and that his colonists supported him. In fact Flamininus, beside being one of the decemviri appointed in 201 to assign land to Scipio's veterans, had also been a triumvir (with Terentius Varro and Scipio Nasica) in 200 for supplementing the colony (L. XXXI, 49, 6). The triumviri for Narnia were different men and appointed in 199 (L. XXXIII, 2, 6-7). But since many of Scipio's veterans were settled in Apulia, they may well have been among the new settlers

- at Venusia and so Plutarch may be right in saying that they supported Flaminius.
- 150 For further detail cf. *Rom. Pol.* 99 ff.
- 151 For this distinction between the policies of Flaminius and Scipio see A. H. McDonald, *JRS* 1938, 153 ff., 1944, 24 f. For a criticism of it, see F. Cassola, *Labeo* 1960, 116 ff.
- 152 The tradition about Flaminius in Polybius is not favourable and is followed by a majority of modern historians. For attempts to explain a bias in the Polybian record and to put a more favourable interpretation on his motives see, e.g. F. M. Wood, *TAPA* 1939, 93 ff. and J. P. Balsdon, *Phoenix* 1967, 177 ff. U. Schlag, *Regnum* 85 ff. argues again for ambition as the keynote.
- 153 F. Cassola, *Labeo* 1960, 110 does not accept these two men as pro-Scipionic.
- 154 On the development of Roman policy towards Greece between 200 and 196 see Badian, *For. Cl.* 69 ff. and E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* II (1967), 140 ff.
- 155 Cicero (*Sen.* 10; *Brut.* 60) and Livy (XXIX, 25, 10) agree that Cato was quaestor in 204, though Nepos (*Cato* 1, 3) places the quaestorship in 205 (cf. Plutarch's supposition that Cato joined Fabius in denouncing Scipio's conduct in Sicily). The matter need not be discussed here. Despite the revival of 205 by Kienast (*Cato* 16 ff.), the authority of Cicero and Livy should perhaps prevail (as with Broughton, *MRR* I, 310; cf. *Rom. Pol.* III n. 4).

CHAPTER X

THE SHADOW OF ANTIOCHUS

- 156 On Antiochus, beside the standard works, see especially E. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus the Great; a Study in Cold War', *Class. Phil.* 1959 = *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964), 112 ff., who emphasizes that 'both sides were victims of their own policies' and shows how 'without any aggressive intent on either side' each action provoked a further turn of the screw which led on to a war which in consequence could hardly be avoided.
- 157 This tradition (L. XXXIV, 43, 3-5) is sometimes rejected because Plutarch *Cato Mai.* 11; cf. Nepos, *Cato* 2) says that in order to check and outdo Cato's achievements in Spain, Africanus wanted and gained Spain as his province. A. Aymard (*Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la Confédération achaienne* (1938), 256 n. 2) is inclined to follow Nissen (*Krit. Unt.* 160) and accept both traditions, believing that Macedon and Spain may have been *successive* requests of Africanus. But it is better to reject the Spanish part completely: see below note 159. Aymard also stresses the consistency of Livy's annalistic account, which goes on to record the refusal to send a 'novum exercitum' to Macedon: a new army would only be entrusted to a new consul, and the consul could only be Africanus. M. Gelzer (*Kleine Schriften* II (1963), 27) hesitates because the passage probably derives from Valerius Antias, but however thinks that in this case it may go back to the older (and better) tradition.
- 157a. See further E. T. Salmon, *Roman Colonization* (1969), ch. 6, who points out that, unlike the real *coloni maritimi*, these colonists were liable to legionary service, and thus were not necessarily permanently tied to the coast. The purpose of foundation then will have included, beside coast-guard duties, the future possibility of watching over areas of potential disaffection (e.g. Liternum could watch Capua). The sites (apart from Puteoli and Salernum, which could serve as custom stations) were not attractive and so not sufficient Roman settlers came forward for these small colonies, and the commissioners drew on some non-Romans who may have been more eager thus to gain Roman citizenship than to settle for life in some of these remote spots. Later, when fear of Antiochus no longer existed, Rome allowed some colonists to abscond. Salmon, who accepts fear of Antiochus as a leading motive in the foundations, points out that Hannibal's destruction of such places as Tempesa (Strabo VI, 1, 5, p. 256)

may have emphasized to the Romans how defenceless the coast was at some points. In *Rom. Pol.* 117 f. I did not distinguish sufficiently between colonies completed in 194 and those planned in that year.

Why Scipio later chose to retire to an unhealthy place like Liternum is not known. Though locally he may well have been regarded as the founder of the colony, the three founding commissioners for all the colonies planned in 197 were his enemy M. Servilius Geminus (*cos.* 202), his friend Q. Minucius Thermus (*cos.* 193) and the man who held the consulship with him in 194, Ti. Sempronius Longus.

158 A. H. McDonald, *JRS* 1938, 156. For the view that during the next few years Scipio was not among those senators who wished for war with Antiochus, cf. U. Schlag, *Regnum* 129–32.

159 *Scipio's province.* Plutarch, *Cato* 11, records a false tradition that Scipio went to Spain. Livy records two traditions: one that Scipio joined his colleague in N. Italy and marched through the territory of the Boii and Ligurians, and secondly (more correctly) that he did nothing memorable.

Plutarch's tradition, which is contradicted by L. XXXIV, 43, 4, may have arisen from confusion between Africanus and his cousin Scipio Nasica who was praetor in Spain in 194. But one point in his account may be reliable, namely that Scipio criticized Cato for having put to death 6000 deserters in Spain: this might well derive from the senatorial debate on granting a triumph to Cato (incidentally Cato was later to wax indignant against Minucius Thermus for securing the death of ten men: cf. p. 210).

Nepos (*Cato* 2) records that Africanus wanted to succeed Cato in Spain, but the Senate refused. This tradition, that Africanus wanted a Spanish command, is accepted by some (see note 157 above; cf. D. Kienast, *Cato der Censor* (1954), 14 ff.), but it seems unlikely that Scipio would have wished to play a minor role in a province where he had gained such glory earlier; though he might regard Spain as his *clientela* and welcome the possibility of a second triumph, the idea scarcely accords with what is known of his proud spirit: such a campaign might well seem to offer only an anti-climax. The account probably derives from the same kind of bad tradition as that about his command in Italy.

T. A. Dorey (*Klio* 1961, 195) believes that Scipio's inactivity as consul was deliberate: rather than provoke further jealousy by a victory in Cisalpine Gaul he chose to conciliate the nobility by leaving the task to his colleague.

160 For the rather confused tradition about this, see U. Schlag, *Historia* 1968, 509 ff.

161 *The Rome Conference.* A problem arises which affects Flamininus' honour. Unfortunately Polybius is missing at this point, but Livy (XXXIV, 59, 4–5) reports that on the day after the secret meeting Flamininus brought all the delegates of the Greek cities into the Senate to give a report of the meeting and told them that the Romans intended to liberate the Greeks

from Antiochus with the same good faith as they has shown in liberating them from Philip, 'if Antiochus did not retire from Europe' ('nisi decedat Europa'). It would seem that this addition must be rejected (cf. E. Badian, *Stud. Gk. & Rn. Hist.* 137 n. 70), since it is incredible that Flamininus would have admitted that Roman *fides* to the Greeks would only be honoured if Antiochus acted in a certain way. Appian, *Syr.* 6, 24, went further and states that Rome insisted that Antiochus should withdraw *and* allow freedom to the Asiatic Greeks; if this is what Flamininus announced to the envoys, then indeed his report was blatantly false, but perhaps it is safer to leave the matter uncertain and to suppose that his report may have been couched in more general terms, as Livy says (if the phrase is rejected). J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Phoenix* 1967, 187 ff., tries to save Flamininus' face by supposing that the Greek envoys, who apparently were not shocked by the report (cf. Diod. XXVII, 15, 4), interpreted this as normal, and indeed praiseworthy, diplomacy. I find this difficult to follow.

162 U. Schlag, *Regnum* 103-07, argues that Sulpicius wanted to provoke Antiochus, while his fellow-ambassador Villius was conciliatory.

163 *Scipio's eastern journey and dedications.* That Scipio made a voyage to the eastern Mediterranean in 193 is the brilliant hypothesis of M. Holleaux (*Hermes* 1913, 75 ff.). It is supported by one text: Dio, Zonaras IX, 18, 12-13 says ἐντεῦθεν δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη; a remark which is followed by some unreliable statements which do not necessarily undermine its credibility. This is supported by epigraphical evidence. In the inventory of the treasures of Delos there is the record of a gift of a golden laurel crown by Ποπλῖος Ποπλίου Κορνήλιος στρατηγὸς ὑπάτος Ῥωμαίων. If, as is generally assumed, the gift was made by Africanus in person, it must have been in his first or second consulship: 205 is ruled out, as are the following years when he was proconsul, because of his military activities, and so 194 is probable. There is, however, the difficulty that as far as is known he did not leave Italy that year, but this may be resolved by following Holleaux in his belief that Africanus will have had the crown made and inscribed in 194 when he was actually consul in anticipation of a visit there in 193. Thus this dedication supports Dio's statement.

The story, however, is further complicated by the sequel. Another inscription from Delos (Dittenberger, *Syll.* II³, 617) records honours granted to Africanus, and on the *stele* are engraved a crown and a staff (a *scipio*) which was the punning device of the Scipios. Africanus is recorded as being πρόξενος καὶ εὐεργέτης of the shrine and Delians; this honour is usually considered to have been a *quid pro quo* for his gift of the golden crown. The inscription then goes on to record a decree of the Delians, which a herald was to proclaim in the theatre at the time of the musical contest of the children, to the effect that because of his piety to the temple and his goodwill to the people of Delos, he should be crowned with a laurel crown. Since Africanus is referred to without any office being named (he

is 'the Roman') and since his presence in Delos is implied, the occasion of the honour will have been on his return journey from Asia after Magnesia in 189 with his brother Lucius.

U. Schlag, *Regnum* 132 ff., however, argues that the grant of proxeny will not have been in return for his golden crown, but because he may have protected the interests of Delos, when Antiochus' many gifts might have made the island seem a friend of a *hostis* of Rome. This is of course possible, but is perhaps a hardly necessary assumption. More serious is her revival of the idea that Africanus did not make his consular dedication in person in 193, but had his gift delivered by someone else. Such a possibility cannot of course be denied, and, if true, would weaken Holleaux' view of a journey to Delos by Africanus in 193. So too would the conclusion to which Durrbach reluctantly seemed to turn (*Inscr. Delos* 442, note p. 167), that Publius might have used his consular title as late as 189, surely a rather desperate remedy. Neither of these views however remove the statement of Dio, though some scholars would be prepared to throw this also overboard.

In the same temple-inventory there are also entries relating to Lucius Scipio; these raise further problems, which need only brief mention here. Lucius made gifts as *στρατηγός* and as *στρατηγός ὑπατος* (presumably as praetor and consul). The gift made as *στρατηγός ὑπατος* presents no difficulty: L. Scipio will have gone there on his return from Magnesia, together with Africanus (see above). But, as praetor in 193, he served in Sicily, and there is no record of his having left his province. He might of course have done so or he might have had his gift delivered by Africanus, on the assumption that Africanus did visit Delos in 193. Those who find this difficult to accept (e.g. U. Schlag, *op. cit.* 135) fall back on the fact that the precise use of the terms *στρατηγός* and *στρατηγός ὑπατος* at this time is debatable and that *στρατηγός* is sometimes used in the general sense of commander and could be applied to consuls: thus Lucius might have made both dedications as consul (or of course proconsul) and not during his earlier praetorship. It is difficult, however, to believe that, when the two terms are used in the same inscription and presumably record the terms used in the original dedicatory inscriptions, they are not used in two different senses. M. Guarducci (*Rendiconti Lincei* 1938, 41 f.), however, believes that since the inventories were private rather than official documents, strict accuracy should not be anticipated, and even Holleaux, although preferring his earlier view, went so far (in *Στρατηγός ὑπατος* 1918, 154 n. 1) as to admit the possibility that *στρατηγός* might be used as an abbreviation for *στρατηγός ὑπατος*.

164 L. XXXV, 42.

165 L. XXXVII, 1, 7-10; Cic. *Phil.* XI, 1. See further *Rom. Pol.* 284 ff. T. A. Dorey (*Klio* 1961, 196) suggests that at first the hope may have been that Africanus would have served under Laelius, while his subsequent support of

his brother in general will have annoyed not only his opponents but also Laelius and Nasica.

- 166 Scipio's dedication, L. XXXVII, 3, 7. On the arch see G. Spano, *Memorie . . . dell' Accademia dei Lincei* 1950, 173 ff., who believes the statues to have represented the seven planets. Statues of the kings, Pliny, *NH* XXIV, 22. Statue of L. Scipio, Cic., *Pro Rab. Post.* 27.

Cicero (*De Orat.* 262) records an anecdote about Africanus: 'the great Scipio the elder told the Corinthians, who were promising him a statue in a place where there were statues of other commanders (*imperatores*), that he did not like statues in squadrons (*turmales*), i.e. in crowds; perhaps an equestrian statue was proposed. The story may have been invented to illustrate Scipio's pride, but, if true, the episode presumably took place during his time in Greece in 190-189. For a dedication to Flamininus at Corinth, see *Bull. Corr. Hellén.* 1964, 607 ff.; cf. *JRS* 1966, 117.

- 167 Cf. Badian, *For. Cl.* 84 n. 1, 'Scipio made it as clear as he could that, if they did surrender to his *fides*, they would be well treated. Formal guarantees were, of course, not admitted by the nature of the *deditio*.'

- 168 P. XXI, 11.

- 169 Badian, however, believes (*For. Cl.* 82) that 'the spirit of Scipio's armistice terms is the same as that of the Senate's peace treaty', though by adding that 'it was common for the final terms to be harsher in detail', he apparently concedes a greater harshness in fact (if not in spirit).

- 170 Ilipa, L. XXVIII, 45, 12. For Africanus' gift at Delphi see H. Pomtow, *Klio* 1921, 153, *SEG* I, 144: the dedication runs, 'Publius Cornelius, son of Publius, a gift to Apollo.' In return Scipio probably received proxeny, here as at Delos, although his name is lacking in the proxenus list. The gift will have been made in the spring of 190 when Africanus was with his brother at Amphissa (P. XXI, 4, 9). For Glabrio and Livius, see *BCH* 1932, 3, *ibid.* 1930, 40. For the dedications by the Scipios at Delos see note 163 above.

- 171 See M. Holleaux, *Riv. Fil.* 1924, 29 (Colophon); De Sanctis, *SR* IV, i, 226 n. and 576 n. (Heraclea). Cf. Dittenberger, *Syll.* II³, 633 (Heraclea and Miletus). On the genuineness of a letter of Scipio to Heraclea Pontica, quoted by Memmon (*FGrH.* 434, 26) see *Rom. Pol.* 248 f.

- 172 M. Guarducci, *Riv. Fil.* 1929, 60 ff., *Inscr. Cret.* II, iii, 5.

CHAPTER XI

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SCIPIOS

- 173 For the view that Scipio was behind these two measures see L. R. Taylor, *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (1960), 92 f., 138 f., 306 ff., and J. Bleicken, *Das Volkstribunat der Klassischen Republik* (1955), 68 ff. The quotation is from L. R. Taylor, p. 308. For 188 as the tribunate of Terentius, Taylor, p. 308 n. 30. She also points out (p. 92 f.) that in 200 Scipio's veterans, who were settled in Samnium and Apulia, may have been placed in the region of the Hirpini and therefore are likely to have been in the tribe Galeria, which was one of the old ones near Rome.
- 174 *The Trials of the Scipios*. These are among the most confused and uncertain episodes of Roman history. With an early authoritative account lacking and with abundant later evidence of doubtful value, the main problem is to decide how much of the latter can be accepted. Polybius deals with the matter in only one chapter, which is brief and anecdotal; hence while it must be the final criterion for all later accounts, it may legitimately be supplemented with other material, e.g. from the older annalistic tradition which is represented by Nepos (*apud* Gellium), Cicero and part of Livy (XXXVIII, 55, 9-57, 8). The rest of Livy's account reproduces Valerius Antias, who as usual displays disregard for truth in the interests of rhetoric and dramatic effect, though amid his falsifications there are some details worth preserving. Gellius records the two Polybian anecdotes in more detail, refers to the authority of the *veteres annales*, and above all makes it clear that there were three episodes in all, one in the Senate and two distinct trials. The foundations of modern studies were well laid by Mommsen, *Hermes* 1866 = *Röm. Forschungen* II, 417-510. The best more recent treatment is by P. Fraccaro, whose relevant papers are collected in *Opuscula* I (1956), 263 ff. For fuller bibliography and discussion see *Rom. Pol.* 290-303.
- 175 Kienast (*Cato* 60 ff.) seems to cling too closely to a literal interpretation of Polybius' reference to the 3000 talents: since this was strictly relevant to Manlius, he argues that Manlius, not Scipio, was attacked by the Petillii and then the Scipios intervened in the debate, thereby drawing the fire upon themselves while Manlius withdrew from the limelight. This however seems a rather flimsy reason for arbitrarily transferring the scene to an attack upon Manlius, and, while Kienast is shocked at any suggestion

that Polybius can have introduced a slight inaccuracy here, he is later (p. 67) quite willing to reject part of another Polybian anecdote.

- 176 *Lucius' trial*. Some points may be briefly mentioned. The date. The account of Valerius Antias implies that both the episode in the Senate and Lucius' trial belong to 187; attempts to set the latter incident later raise great difficulties; Antias wrongly places Lucius' trial after the death of Africanus which he has transferred from 184 to 187; he has perforce had also to transfer the trial of Africanus to this earlier date. Antias' account of the procedure and the establishment of a *quaestio* must also be rejected because it is flatly contradicted by the simple statement of Nepos, based on the authority of the early annalists, that Minucius fined Lucius and demanded surety on that account. Gellius records that the eight tribunes issued a decree which he quotes *verbatim*; but its official form does not guarantee its authenticity, which in fact is denied by its content. Livy gives a different ending to the trial, saying that Africanus, who was serving in a subordinate command in Etruria when he heard of his brother's misfortune, hurried back to Rome and even used force to prevent Lucius' arrest. The supposed legation of Africanus in Etruria at this point raises difficulties and the incident was probably invented merely to create a dramatic situation in order that Africanus might suddenly intervene at his brother's arrest. However, it is possible that Africanus may have held such a commission during his last years and the annalists may have used this fact to create a false background.

Kienast (*Cato* 62 f.) believes that Lucius' real offence was that by giving his troops double pay after Magnesia (L. XXXVII, 59, 6) he had usurped the rights of the Roman People.

- 177 L. XXXIX, 22, 8. The fact need not be questioned (cf. P. Fraccaro, *Opuscula* I, 379), although Livy goes on to quote Valerius Antias to the effect that Lucius Scipio went on an embassy to mediate between Antiochus and Eumenes: this is very improbable and was probably invented to help restore his fortunes which, according to Antias' pathetic account, had been shattered by his trial.
- 178 *The trial of Africanus*. See *Rom. Pol.* 298–303. A few points may be mentioned. Gellius ends his account of Scipio's reaction in the court with a famous anecdote: Scipio made a few remarks which his *dignitas* and *gloria* required and then, recalling that it was the anniversary of Zama, he moved (*censere*) that all should leave the trifler (*nebulo*) and go and give thanks to Jupiter Optimus Maximus; the whole meeting then followed him to the Capitol. Unfortunately this can hardly be accepted, since such a dramatic coincidence would scarcely have been overlooked by Polybius. The annalists probably elaborated the reference to the 'crowning mercy' of Zama which is implied in Polybius' general account of Scipio's observation. Again, the implication of Gellius' reference to a surviving speech by Scipio on this occasion cannot be accepted in view of Polybius: the speech extant

in Gellius' day must have been a forgery. We need not here examine the account of Valerius Antias, but amid much falsification one statement may be true, namely that Africanus was accused by a tribune before the Tribes, the proposed sentence probably being a fine.

Some historians, especially those who follow Antias in placing the incident in 187, argue that Africanus never was formally accused, but all the stories are to be linked with the attacks on his brother Lucius. But apart from all other considerations, Polybius, who had such close ties with the Scipionic family and must have known the truth, says that Africanus *was* brought to trial before the People, and it is difficult to believe that Polybius did not mean literally what he said.

M. Naevius was tribune in 184 (L. XXXIX, 52, 4) and many accept this as one of the few rocks amid the shifting sands of unreliable evidence. Others, however, argue that since Antias says that the Petillii were the accusers, Naevius' name was wrongly introduced by annalists who knew that the poet Naevius was an enemy of Africanus. This seems unnecessary. The poet Naevius in 206 had attacked Scipio's friends, the Caecilii Metelli, in the famous ambiguous line 'Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules', to which Metellus in anger replied, 'Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae', and Naevius was incriminated on a charge of slander. He had also ridiculed a youthful amatory escapade of Africanus, Metellus' friend. Tenney Frank (*AJP* 1927; *Life and Literature in the Roman Republic* 34) may well be right in supposing that Naevius supported Fabius' policy and that his continued criticism of the Scipionic group went beyond the limits which could be allowed to free-speech in wartime: hence a clause of the Twelve Tables was invoked to check him.

- 179 *Scipio's exile and death.* Valerius Maximus (II, 10, 2) tells how some pirates approached Scipio's villa to see the great man who first prepared to defend his house but on discovering their intention welcomed them inside where they presented him with gifts 'such as are accustomed to be consecrated to the *numen* of the immortal gods'.

On the precise date of Scipio's death, which occurred in 184/183 and probably early in 183, see *Rom. Pol.* 152 n. 1 and Kienast, *Cato* 148 n. 61. As to his financial position, Seneca (*Epist.* 86, 4-6) describes Scipio's *villa* at Liternum: it was well-built and strongly defended, but essentially modest in the eyes of Seneca who contrasts in particular the small bath with the luxurious establishments of his own day. He adds that Scipio used to cultivate the fields with his own hands, like the early Romans. Further Scipio had promised dowries of 300,000 *denarii* to each of his two daughters, and though his widow Aemilia paid half this sum to their husbands, she was unable to pay the rest (which in fact was later paid by Scipio Aemilianus). Thus Scipio's fortune was not unlimited (and indeed Seneca, *Dialog.* XII, 12, 6, refers to his condition as an example of honourable poverty), but the size of his promised gifts to his daughters shows that he was among

the wealthy Romans of his day: he may have been worth a million *denarii* (£200,000) according to Tenney Frank, *Econ. Survey of Anc. Rome* I, 209.

Statues of Africanus and his brother Lucius are said to have been placed in the family tomb in Rome (L. XXXVIII, 56). This Tomb of the Scipios was near the Via Appia; it was first discovered in 1614, rediscovered in 1760 and crudely excavated, and restored as far as possible in 1926. The Scipios followed the practice of inhumation, not cremation, and the funerary inscriptions of eight members of the family are preserved (the oldest that of L. Scipio Barbatus, *cos.* 298 BC). For the remains of the tomb, with photographs, see E. Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome* II, 352 ff. For the inscriptions see A. Degrassi, *Inscr. Lat. Lib. Rei Pub.* I, 177 ff. The name of Barbatus and that of his son were written in red, with verse inscriptions cut in the stone later. It is generally thought (see e.g. E. Wolfflin, *R. Ph.* 1890, 113 ff.) that the reinscribing was done about 200 BC. Thus Africanus at the height of his fame, or when this was slightly overshadowed, may have taken the opportunity to draw public attention to the great deeds of his ancestors.

CHAPTER XII

THE MAN AND HIS WORK

- 180 Sir Charles Oman, 'A defence of military history', *Studies in the Napoleonic Wars* 28.
- 181 *History of the Peninsular War* I, 87.
- 182 The scurrilous verses of Naevius (Aul. Gell. VII, 8, 5), even if taken at their face value, merely reflect a youthful escapade. Cf. Val. Max. VI, 9, 2 on Scipio's youth and VI, 7, 1 on a domestic episode which reflects more credit perhaps on his wife than on Scipio. Cf. also Plut. *Apophth. Reg. et Imp., Sc. Maior* 2. That Valerius Antias has altered the end of the story of the Spanish girl reflects more on his than on Scipio's morals (Aul. Gell. VII, 8, 3).
- 183 Earl of Ronaldshay, *Life of Curzon* I, 73, 60, 58.
- 184 *Hannibal's Legacy* II (1965), 411.
- 185 See e.g. Cicero, *De Off.* III, 1: nunquam se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus esset (cf. *De Rep.* I, 27; Plut. *Apophth.* 196b). For some reflections on this and on *otium* and *solitudo* see H. Haffter, *Römische Politiker* (1967), 165 ff.
- 186 Cf. H. Bengtson, *Historische Zeitschrift* 1943, 493: 'hat Scipio das römische Volk gelehrt, im Kontinenten zu denken.'
- 187 P. Grimal, *Le Siècle des Scipions* (1953), 85.
- 188 See in general A. S. Bernardo, *Petrarch, Scipio and the 'Africa'* (Baltimore, 1962). The quotations are from pp. x and viii.

SOURCES OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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